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The purpose of this study was to extract from his 
writing, to systematize, and to state Thomas Reid's commun­
ication theory, to investigate its philosophical sources, 
and to determine its influence upon the rhetoricians of his 
time# Reid (1710-1796), father of Scottish common sense 
thought, did not formulate a systematized theory of commun­
ication, but he treated the philosophical fundamentals 
crucial to communication and rhetorical theory# This study 
treats Reid's relation to his principal contemporariesi 
Campbell, Blair, Whately, Priestley, Kames, Adam Smith, 
Thomas Sheridan, and Edward T# Channing*
Reid was the product of the influences of the eight­
eenth century# He held that man knows the existence of the 
external world directlyi this notion underlay his philoso­
phy. Reid saw the origin of language in man's use of natu­
ral signs— bodily motions, facial expressions, and vocal 
modulations# For him, man augments natural language with 
artificial signs, or words, making covenants regarding their 
meanings. Language is an ever-improving tool of the common 
man# It reflects the operations of the mind and simultane­
ously influences thought by limiting its progress#
Reid likened common sense first principles to axioms 
or intuitive judgments# He divided logic into two categor­
ies* the demonstrative, characterized by the necessity of
v
its conclusions, and the probable, characterized by the 
probability of truth in its conclusions* To Reid, demon­
strative logic was often an obstacle to truth* Thus he 
preferred probable logic*
In Reid's system, ethics is directly related to 
language, since artificial signB derive from man's abili­
ty to make and keep covenants regarding the meanings of 
words. There are three kinds of principles motivating 
mem mechanical, animal, and rational) the rational reg­
ulate the others* Man is naturally inclined to good) he 
is also free to will either good or evil and therefore 
responsible for his acts* Man should improve himself and 
his environment, ultimately creating utopia* Politics, a 
facet of Reid's ethics, draws on the available knowledge 
about what motivates men to goodness, obedience, and hap­
piness* That government is moral which motivates its cit­
izens by creating a favorable opinion of itself) its op­
posite, mechanical government, demands complete control of 
the governed and is therefore responsible for all their 
acts*
Natural language makes discourse more expressive 
and ought to be employed. Discussing aesthetics Reid 
treated novelty, grandeur, and beauty, a frequent triad in 
eighteenth-century aesthetics treatises* Reid maintained 
that some grammatical rules are common sense principles,
vi
thus grounding grammar in common sense. By observing the 
way men employ language he discovered what he believed to 
be the nature of their minds. He observed, for example, 
that men have a notion of active power from their use of 
active verbs.
About memory Reid asserted that when we remember, 
we receive an immediate impression of the thing remem­
bered, accompanied by a conviction that the event did oc­
cur and that it is not imagined. This conviction is 
strong enough to warrant its use as a kind of evidence.
Reid explored the oral cavity with interest in the 
sense of taste. He also discussed the phenomena of hear­
ing, stammering, and dialect.
Similarities exist between Reid's thought and that 
of several of the prominent rhetoricians of his ora, but 
causal influence between Reid and others is difficult to 
affirm. Campbell and Whately revealed knowledge of Reid's 
theory of common sense, but only Campbell incorporated it 
as a kind of evidence. Blair, Kames, Smith, and Sheridan 
discussed concepts similar to Reid's notion of natural 
language, but did not acknowledge indebtedness to Reid for 
their ideas. Channing's ideas on the nature and use of 
language are also strongly similar to Reid's.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was the chief spokesman of 
the Scottish common sense sohool of philosophy* Reid taught 
at the University of Aberdeen (1752-1763) and at the Uni­
versity of Qlasgow (1763-1781)« He was one of the founders 
and among the most productive members of the Aberdeen Phil­
osophical Society, along with George Campbell, James Beat­
tie, John Gregory, Alexander Gerard, and others#
Reid was b o m  April 26, 1710, in Strachan, Scot­
land, a rural area about twenty miles from Aberdeen# He
was the son of the Rev# Lewis Reid, a minister of the
Church of Scotland# The love of letters was not alien to 
the Reid family, which had pursued scholarly and clerical 
occupations for generations# Thomas was imbued with the 
worth of learning from his childhood, and after two years 
in a parish school he was sent to Marischal College at the 
age of twelve# There he pursued classical studies with 
George Turnbull, and before ending his stay at Marischal 
he bacame librarian to the college# In 1736 he resigned 
this post to accompany one of his professors, John Stewart, 
to England, where he visited London, Oxford, and Cambridge# 
In 1737* after his return, he became a pastor at New-Maloh&r 
and there he remained until 1752, when he was elected Pro­
fessor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen#
2
During the early part of his life at the University 
of Aberdeen he played a significant role in founding the 
Aberdeen Philosophical Society, which served as a breeding 
ground for many of the ideas which gave direction to the 
Scottish philosophical movement. Apparently the plans for 
several works by Reid and Campbell, as well as others, 
were spawned in dialogues which took place at meetings of 
this society. In 1 7 6 3 Reid was invited to become Professor 
of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, succeed­
ing Adam Smith in that position. At Glasgow he published 
much of the work which was evidently inspired at Aberdeen, 
but which never found its way into print. In l?8l he 
resigned his post at Glasgow to go into retirement, but 
he maintained his zeal for vigorous scholarship, publish­
ing at this time two of his most important works, Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the 
Active Powers of Man (1 7 8 8). Reid died in 1796 at the age 
of eighty-Bix.1
Apparently Reid's interest in rhetoric was real. 
According to William Hamilton, editor of the 1 8 6 3 collec­
tion of his works, Reid delivered several lectures on 
rhetoric while Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow.
In his biographical essay on Reid Hamilton says*
■̂Sir William Hamilton, ed., Uccount of the Life and 
Writings of Thomas Reid," in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P. 
(Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3),1, 3-10.
3
A few lectures on rhetoric, which were read, at a 
separate hour [from the time of his other lectures 
at the University] to a more advanced class of stu­
dents, formed a voluntary addition to the appropriate 
functions of his office, to which it is probable he 
was prompted, rather by a wish to supply what was 
then a deficiency in the established course of educa­
tion, than by any predilection for a branch of study 
so foreign to his ordinary pursuits.2
The manuscripts of these lectures do not appear in Hamil­
ton's edition of Reid's works, however, nor in lists of 
manuscripts in private collections. While Hamilton indi­
cates that these lectures were read, he is not specific 
about whether they existed only as notes or in an expanded 
form. Perhaps because there were only a few lectures, 
incidental to Reid's other duties as Hamilton indicates, 
or because they were never written out in their entirety, 
or because they were lost, these lectures seem to have 
been overlooked by critics and historians of Reid's thought. 
In addition to these other possibilities Hamilton may be 
only reporting evidence which he gathered as a student of 
Reid's at the University of Glasgow. The fact that Reid 
devoted some thought to rhetorical theory, however, pro­
vides additional justification for a perusal of his work 
for the impetus of his communication theory.
Like such other philosophers as Francis Bacon,
John Locke, and Jeremy Bentham, Reid dispersed a theory of 
communication throughout his systematic philosophy under 
such divergent topics as aesthetics, hearing, and the
2 Ibid.. p. 10.
origin and nature of language, although he never wrote a 
rhetoric. Unlike most of the philosophical writing of this 
century of enlightenment, Reid's philosophy stresses common 
sense, a departure from the scepticism of John Locke,
George Berkeley, and David Hume, For that reason it is 
more likely than the solipsistic philosophies to provide a 
tenable theory for the pragmatic practice of public address. 
The term communication theory as used in this study 
will encompass all that is traditionally understood by the 
term rhetoric, plus more general definitions of the origin, 
nature, and use of language which eighteenth-century think­
ers were wont to ascribe to that term. By the time of 
Reid's writing the view of rhetoric as dealing solely with 
spoken discourse had virtually vanished, and the term had 
come to include such disparate subjects as letter writing, 
literary essays, and fiction, as well as the theory of 
utilitarian spoken discourse, all under the term belles 
lettres. Belles lettres was a considerable extension of 
rhetorical theory from the older classical view of the 
discipline. This paper will consider all Reid's statements 
dealing with the principles of communication and rhetorical 
theory, regardless of their form, as elements in his communi­
cation theory. Certainly of interest will be Reid's discus­
sion of the origin, nature, and use of language, logic, 
ethics and politics, style and aesthetics, memory, and sub­




Reid did not set forth a systematized theory of 
communication. He did treat such philosophical fundamen­
tals as aesthetics, ethics and politics, logic, and epis­
temology, which are crucial to communication. The purpose 
of this study is to abstract from his writings, to systema­
tize, and to state Thomas Reid's communication theory, to 
investigate its philosophical sources, and to determine its 
relation to that of his contemporaries who devoted their 
thought to rhetoric and communication theory.
II. Similar Studies
Several studies have been completed which deal with 
the communication theories of men who are known primarily 
as philosophers rather than as rhetoricians. A j;tudy simi­
lar in many ways to the present one was done by Karl R. 
Wallace, who researched the writing of Francis Bacon to
organize and formulate that philosopher's rhetorical the- 
3ory. Bacon, like Reid, was not primarily a rhetorician, 
yet Wallace analyzed the references to various elements of 
rhetoric which Bacon made throughout his writings. Wallace 
considered Bacon's general view of rhetoric and classified 
the philosopher's remarks under the ancient rhetorical 
categories of the three modes of proof, logical, ethical,
^Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Theory of Public Address"(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 
1933)» passim.
and emotional, and the five canons of rhetoric, invention, 
disposition, style, memory, and delivery. Wallace conclu­
ded his study by relating Bacon to other rhetoricians, 
primarily Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and 
then to the rhetoricians of sixteenth- and seventeenth- 
century England. He did not attempt to trace Bacon's 
influence beyond that point.
In its aim and scope Wayne Elmer Brockriede*s
study, "Bentham's Philosophy of Rhetoric, " is also like
the one proposed* Brockriede's dissertation opens with
the followingi
Jeremy Bentham, an industrious, versatile, amiable, 
solitary, and somewhat petuland English philosopher, 
1742-1832, was primarily a political, judicial, and 
legislative reformer. He also contributed his obser­
vations to a great many other fields, however, among 
which may be included language and rhetoric.5
Thus Brockriede undertook a study of the rhetorical theory
of a philosopher not primarily known for his rhetorical
and critical thought. He analyzed Bentham's theory of
language, his criticism of rhetoric and rhetoricians, the
influence of Bentham's utilitarian logic upon his system of
rhetoric, and finally, Bentham's concepts of style and the
use of persuasive language. Brockriede did not attempt to
trace the influence of Bentham's rhetoric upon his contem-
**Ibid.. pp. 232-44.
-*Wayne E. Brockriede, "Bentham*s Philosophy of 
Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Illinois, 1954), p. 1.
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poraries, however, nor upon later rhetoricians.
In a study by Lloyd P. Bitzer, "The Lively Idea*
A Study of Hume's Influence on George Campbell's Philosophy 
of Rhetoric."^ the author undertook a task similar to one 
included in the following study* to investigate the influ­
ence of an eighteenth-century philosopher upon an eight­
eenth-century rhetorician, George Campbell. In this study 
of Reid , Campbell will be only one of several rhetoricians 
discussed in this relation. Bitzer attempted to trace the 
influence of the philosophical notion of "vivacity, or the 
liveliness of ideas," in Hume's thought upon Campbell's 
theory of discourse.' Most interesting to the following 
study is Bitzer's comment that "of course, the whole of 
Campbell's theory of rhetoric was not derived from Hume. 
Campbell drew upon a tradition of rhetoric spreading from 
Aristotle to Lord Karnes, fsicl he was influenced also by
O
the philosophies of Locke and Thomas Reid." Part of the 
task of the following study will be to explore further Reid's 
influence upon Campbell, who was not only Reid's colleague 
at Aberdeen but who attended Reid's lectures at the Aber­
deen Philosophical Society during the time Reid was form­
ulating his common sense philosophy. Particular attention
^Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Lively Idea* A Study of Hume's 
Influence on George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric" (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1962), 
passim.
7Ibid., p. k, 8Ibid.. p. 5.
will also be given to the rhetoric of Hugh Blair, Richard 
Whately, and other lesser lights to determine the extent of 
Reid's influence there.
Donald Lee Torrence's study, "A Philosophy of 
Rhetoric Constructed from the Writing of Bertrand Russell,"^ 
is also interesting in that Torrence studied a living philo­
sopher. Though^Russell has no work that can rightly be 
called a prescriptive rhetoric, Torrence set as his aim 
". . .to report the philosophical inquiry which Bertrand 
~ Russell has conducted and the conclusions resulting from 
that inquiry in regard to the broad areas of presupposition 
which would compose a rationale or theory of rhetoric.
The titles and authors of other related studies are
mentioned below with brief comments. "John Locke's Philo-
11sophy of Discourse" by John B. O'Hara is another doctoral 
study of an eighteenth-century philosopher's rhetorical 
theory much in the form of the studies by Wallace and Brock­
riede. Like Wallace and Brockriede, O'Hara did not examine 
Locke's influence on later rhetoricians.
In a study by Vincent Michael Bevilacqua, "The
a^Donald Lee Torrence, "A Philosophy for Rhetoric 
Constructed from the Writing of Bertrand Russell" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1957)» 
passim.
10Ibid., p. 2.
11John B. O'Hara, "John Locke's Philosophy of Dis­
course" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Okla­
homa, 1964), passim.
12Rhetorical Theory of Henry Home, Lord Karnes,H the author 
studied not only the rhetorical works of Karnes but also his 
non-rhetorical works. Bevilacqua also attempted to locate 
the position of Karnes' work in the developing rhetorical 
theory of the eighteenth century by observing how he related 
to preceding and subsequent rhetoricians. The same method 
of examination will be applied to Reid's work in the final 
chapter of the following study.
HStephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of Logic 
and Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric" by H. V. Spicer1-̂ 
dealt with a philosopher's treatment only of specific sub­
jects (logic and ethics) and their relation to rhetoric.
The study demonstrated another method of delimiting an 
investigation, though there is no indication of the neces­
sity of fixing the boundaries of the study of Rei.d in such 
a manner.
Ross Stafford North's study, "Joseph Priestley on
1 ̂Language, Oratory, and Criticism," is another interesting 
dissertation on an eighteenth-century thinker done in the
1 kVincent Michael Bevilacqua, "The Rhetorical Theo­
ry of Henry Home, Lord Karnes" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Illinois, 1 9 6 1), passim.
13H . V. Spicer, "Stephen Toulmin's Functional Ana­
lysis of Logic and Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma,
19 6*0 , passim.
14Ross Stafford North, "Joseph Priestley on Lang­
uage, Oratory, and Criticism" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Florida, 1957)» passim.
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field of speech which has bearing on the present study of 
Reid* Priestley, of course, is most widely known for his 
scientific and philosophical writing* North confined his 
study to Priestley’s lectures on oratory and his grammati­
cal writings rather than attempting to extract a rhetoric 
from his non-rhetorical writing*
Though rhetorical studies have been made of other 
eighteenth-century philosophers, and of philosophers before 
and after that century as well, no study of the rhetorical 
theory of Thomas Reid has been undertaken* Many of the 
works mentioned above are most helpful in formulating a 
study of Reid, not only because they suggest possible meth­
odology, but also because several of them provide biblio­
graphical information vital to a study of Reid* For in­
stance Bitzer's study of Hume’s influence on Campbell is 
of particular use in determining Reid's effect on Campbell, 
his colleague at the University of Aberdeen*
III. Plan of Investigation
The following chapter divisions are employed in 
this study. Chapter I, an introduction, discusses the 
purpose of the investigation, similar studies which con­
tribute to this study of Reid, and the outline of the 
dissertation*
Chapter II, "Eighteenth-Century Sources of Reid's 
Thought," sketches the background in which Reid work is 
set, including a discussion of the social, economic, and
11
political temper of the era, and the major features in the 
thought of the principle thinkers of the ara, including
i
Francis Bacon, Isaac Kewton, John Locke, George Berkeley, 
David Hume, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftes­
bury, John Gay, and Adam Smith,
Chapter III, "Thomas Reid’s Common Sense Philo­
sophy," is an exploration of various ramifications of 
Reid's theory of common sense as it relates to epistemo­
logy and his view of the material world and causality, as 
well as his view of empiricism and philosophy of science.
It also examines Reid's notion of God, In brief, this 
chapter provides the contextual perspective in which Reidfe 
communication theory must be viewed.
Chapter IV, "Thomas Reid on Communication," com­
prises the heart of the study, delving into Reid's writing 
and recording his thought on various topics of communica­
tion theory. The chapter treats Reid's idea of the origin, 
nature, and use of language, his ideas on logic, ethics 
and politics, style and aesthetics, memory, and speech and 
hearing.
Chapter V, "Reid's Relation to His Contemporaries," 
is actually a logical conclusion to a study of this nature 
in that it places Reid's thought in the stream of ideas 
about rhetorical and communication theory being produced 
during Reid's life and subsequent to his writing. An 
attempt is made in this chapter to trace the threads of 
Reid's thought in the rhetorical fabric of the eighteenth
12
century and early nineteenth century. It undertakes an 
investigation of Reid's relation to the three major rhetor­
icians in the eighteenth century. Campbell, Blair, and 
Whately, and also several other makers of rhetorical theo­
ry* Priestley, Karnes, Adam Smith, Thomas Sheridan, and 
Edward T. Channing.
CHAPTER II
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SOURCES OP REID'S THOUGHT
Perhaps the most fertile source of Thomas Reid's 
thought was the eighteenth century itself. In the century 
of enlightenment significant and influential ideas flour­
ished, and progress in many areas took place as it had in 
few ages before. To single out the thought of the most 
productive minds of the era is an expedient method of 
focusing on the prevailing notions of the century in which 
Reid lived and wrote. Tracing the sources of the thought 
of Thomas Reid is an inferential process relying on the 
assumption that a man of Reid's intellectual stature does 
not live in a voidi he is affected by the cultural and 
social climate in which he lives. Therefore, an analysis 
of the sources of Reid's philosophy would be sketchy with­
out at least a cursory understanding of the sociological 
and cultural matrix of the British Isles in which Reid 
lived and formulated his thought.
Scotland and England in the Eighteenth Century
The century in which Reid spent his life was, 
indeed, as Dickens said, the best and the worst of times. 
It was a century of paradox in many ways. Great intellec­
tual advances were taking place. The industrial revolu­
tion was blossoming. With these, however, came the wide
use of child labor. Children and pregnant women worked in
13
1^
the mines, where women pulled coal care like horses and 
gave birth in the dark caverns* Roving bands of poor 
agricultural workers sought employment at a wage of six­
pence a day. Children helped keep the textile mills open 
around the clock by working in twelve- to fourteen-hour 
shifts and sleeping in grimy barracks provided by the 
owner*1 Those who lived in the larger cities in Scot­
land had problems peculiar to urban life of the time. The 
water in large cities like Edinburgh was of notoriously 
poor quality and even in short supply at times. The water 
was drawn from public wells in most cases and often trans­
ported up many flights of stairs to be used. Overcrowding 
was common to city and town, and sanitation facilities 
were totally lacking. One historian writes, "That the 
filth of Edinburgh was jettisoned out of all the windows 
at the sound of the 10 o'clock bell from the High Kirk to 
the warning cries of 'Gardyloo* is well enough known."
The same practice was common throughout Britain, and laws 
failed to stop the practice until the mid-eighteenth cen­
tury. Construction of housing was also poor in eighteenth- 
century Scotland because bricks were scarce, and walls were 
made of turf instead. All these factors, combined with 
widespread poverty and famine, raised the infant mortality
1Robert L0 Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers 
(New Yorki Simon and Schuster, 19*>l), pp» 29-30.
2R. H. Campbell, Scotland Since 1707 (Oxford*
Basil Blackwell, 1 9 6 5 ). p<> 13*
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rate to as high as 75 per cent in the first year of life, 
and probably caused most of the numerous epidemics.^
This description of the world of most of the people living 
in the eighteenth century resembles the condition described 
by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan (1 6 5 1) as a Matate of 
war,** where there are "continual fear, and danger of vio­
lent death1 and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short." But while the life of the majority 
was less than pleasant, the sciences and the world of arts 
and letters fared somewhat better, and it seems as if 
those involved had no knowledge of, or at least little 
concern for, the dismal plight of the many. Perhaps the 
progress evident in the intellectual community is one of 
the few bright spots in the century of enlightenment.
Certainly not all was gloomy in England and Scot­
land in the eighteenth century. The English and Scottish 
parliaments united in 1 7 0 7 , improving markets and breaking 
down the traditional provincialism. In England, William 
Pitt the Elder was minting a golden age of parliamentary 
oratory, and there were heard the first rumblings of the 
common man, who wanted freedom of the press, the right to 
choose his own representatives, and freedom from unjust 
imprisonment. Roads were being improved, and with them 
the mail services, mitigating the isolation of rural areas.
^Ibid.. pp. 9-1 7.
/ifThomas Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Michael Oakeshott 
(Oxford 1 Basil Blackwell, |_19^6j), p. 8 3 .
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Literacy was increasing* and the grov/ing number of people 
who could read brought about a flourishing industry in 
journalism* Newspapers and periodicals of many descrip­
tions appeared* By the end of the century some women 
enjoyed the privilege of education long reserved for men*
In science, Joseph Priestley isolated oxygen and Henry 
Cavendish isolated argon, and broke down water into hydro­
gen and oxygen. Englishmen showed a great interest in 
electricity and hypnotism, and some ascribed curative 
powers to electrical shock* During this century gentle­
men and scholars, and not the court, became the authori­
ties on usage of the English language, and Dr* Samuel 
Johnson's dictionary was perhaps the most influential work 
on language to appear for many years.^
While England was exerting intellectual influence 
over Scotland, Scotsmen were gaining acclaim in their own 
right. Scotland was succeeding in creating a viable intel­
lectual community where universities and scholars could 
flourish, R, H. Campbell points out*
The country's five universities, especially those of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, were leading European institu­
tions at a time when England's two were moribund.
They attracted students from overseas, and from England 
came the nonconformists who found the doors of their 
own universities barred against them. The universities 
were among the active pioneers of a new society in 
Scotland. They transformed their own teaching methods 
when, following the example of Francis Hutcheson, Pro­
^Martin S. Day, History of English Literature, 
1 6 6 0 - 1 8 3 7 (Garden City, New Vorki Doubleday, 1^6^), pp.143-150.
17
feasor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, the Latin •dic­
tates' were replaced by lectures in English, and were 
supplemented, especially in certain science classes, 
by 'examination hours,' or sessions for discussion and 
tutorial teaching.6
Admirable scientific investigations took place at the 
Scottish universities in the eighteenth century, and many 
of these had remarkable practical applications to the 
agricultural and industrial advancement of the country. 
Universities set up reciprocal communication between the 
scholar and the industrialist. In the universities at 
both Glasgow and Edinburgh, William Cullen made great 
advances in pharmacology and soil science, while Francis 
Home, who also taught at Edinburgh, provided scientific 
information about the bleaching of linen which greatly 
aided the textile industry, James Watt, who made mathema­
tical instruments at the University of Glasgow, worked
with others at the school to produce the steam engine,
7which became invaluable to the industrial revolution.
Philosophy of Science and Eplstemology
In terms of its influence on subsequent years, the 
thought of the scholars and clergy in the sanctuaries of 
academe is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the cen­
tury of enlightenment. It became seminal in eighteenth- 
century Scotland, England, Ireland, and throughout the 
world for centuries to come. Possibly the most salient 
topics of eighteenth-century thought are those of the phil-
6 ?Campbell, pp. 1-2. Ibid., p. 2,
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osophy of science and epistemology, both sharing a domi­
nant theme of rigid empiricism which does away with a 
priori conclusions about the world and advocates reliance 
on the senses for drawing new conclusions. The eighteenth 
century was outstanding because the learned men of this 
century had great affinity for empirical experimentation* 
though empirical research was only in its infancy and 
hardly as rigorous as that of the twentieth century*
Bacon had died experimenting with refrigerationi he ate a 
snow-stuffed water fowl which was in an advanced state of 
putrefaction* George Berkeley* with equal devotion to the 
empirical method* almost killed himself trying to discover 
the course of ideas in a man being hanged} a friend waited
o
almost too long to cut him down* Another eighteenth-cen­
tury man* Benjamin Franklin* surprisingly managed to sur­
vive his experiments with lightning.
Francis Bacon.— Francis Bacon (15 6 1-1 6 2 6) was the 
advance guard for eighteenth-century empiricism and a fore­
runner in the philosophy of science. Though Bacon died in 
the seventeenth century* his thoughts about science and 
the theory of knowledge are crucial in any consideration 
of the makeup of the empirical notions of later philoso­
phers. Bacon was troubled that • Time is like a river,
8Radoslav A. Tsanoff* The _Great Philoapphers (New 
York1 Harper and Brothers, 1953J, pp* 2/1 * 3o4.
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which has brought down to us things light and puffed up,
Qwhile those which are weighty and solid are sunk" 7 that 
"• • • a way must be opened for the human understanding 
entirely different from any hitherto known, " 10 and that 
the knowledge accruing from such an undertaking must be 
"for the benefit and use of life* "11 To reclaim the 
weighty and solid things which have sunk in the river,
Bacon thinks it necessary to destroy Aristotelian logic,
12which he calls the "ordinary logic," and to set up a new 
logic in its place. Only by starting to change the very 
way in which he reasons can man recover what he has lost.
Bacon proceeds by noting that the old logic spent 
most of its time talking about the syllogism and virtually 
ignored induction. The syllogism is faulty because it 
"consists of propositions! propositions of words? and 
words are the tokens and signs of notionsi" if these 
notions are in any way weak, " . . .  the whole edifice tum­
bles."1  ̂ Whereas at one time thinkers hurried to general 
propositions, Bacon proposes a new logic in which we
. . .  proceed regularly and gradually from one axiom to 
anotheri so that the most general are not reached till 
the lastj but when you do come to them you find them to 
be not empty notions, but well defined, and such as 
nature would recognize as her first principles,.and 
such as lie at the heart and marrow of things. 14
^Francis Bacon, The Great Instauration. in The Eng­
lish Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed, Edwin A. Burtt
(New Yorki Random House, 193$')» PP* 8-9.
1 0Ibid., p. 6 . 11 Ibid. t p. 13* *2 Ibid.. p. 1 5 .
1 3lbid.. pp. 1 5-1 6. l4 Ibid.. p. 1 6 .
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Noticeably, Bacon's whole logical scheme aims primarily to 
get to the realities of nature. Rather than relying on 
notions formed prior to experience, however, Bacon would 
have the scientist depend on his senses. Though they are 
deceptive at times, the senses can discover by further and 
more careful scrutiny the errors they themselves make.
The scientist, in making judgments about the thing he is 
observing^ must take care not to anticipate his conclusions. 
Bacon warns against hasty and prejudiced judgments in 
Novum Organum (1 6 2 0 )1 "We are wont, for the sake of dis­
tinction, to call that human reasoning which we apply to 
nature, the anticipation of nature, (as being rash and pre­
mature ») and that which is properly deduced from things,
1 *5the interpretation of nature." J Embedded in Bacon's phil­
osophy are the roots of eighteenth-century empiricism. 
Particularly indicative of the epistemology to come in the 
century that followed Bacon's writings are two of his con­
cepts, (l) the need to eliminate general preconceived no­
tions inherent in deductive logic, and (2) the principle 
of careful observation and experimentation. The first 
principle foreshadows the rejection of a priori concepts by 
eighteenth-century empiricists, and the second is a proto­
type of the emphasis that later thinkers placed on the sen­
ses as the only means of experience.
1^Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon (Philadelphia* A. Hart, Late Carey and Hart, 
1852), III, 3^6.
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Isaac Newton*— -While Bacon's significance is not 
to Be adumbrated, possibly the greatest contributor to 
the eighteenth-century view of nature and science was Sir 
Isaac Newton (1642-172?)• Drawing heavily upon the sci­
entific advancement of the previous two centuries, Newton 
strongly influenced philosophical thought in the century 
of enlightenment. Newton, like Bacon, insisted upon ex­
perimentation. In his Principia he writes*
For since the qualities of bodies are only known 
to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all 
such as universally agree with experimentsi and such 
as are not liable to diminution can never be quite 
taken away. We are certainly not to relinquish the 
evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and 
vain fictions of our own devising; nor are we to re­
cede from the analogy of Nature, which uses to be sim­
ple, and always consonant to itself. We no other way 
know the extensions of bodies than by our senses, nor 
do these reach it in all bodies; but because we per­
ceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore 
we ascribe it universally to all others also,16
This emphasis on direct observation of phenomena, experi­
ment, and induction is not unlike Bacon's admonitions about 
the manner in which the scientist must draw his conclu­
sions. Newton also stresses reliance upon sense data in 
observing natural phenomena. He presages eighteenth-cen­
tury philosophers of science in his discontent with mere 
observation of natural phenomena; Newton and those who 
followed him considered nature lawful and wished to learn 
her laws, and by the use of these laws to manipulate her
16 Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy (New York* Philosophical Library, 1964), p. 324.
for the benefit of man.
When Newton uses the term experiment he under­
stands an inductive process which begins with the observa­
tion of phenomena. He makes measurements of such factors 
as weight, length, and size, for instance, to increase the 
precision of his observations and to allow him to reduce 
them to quantitative statements. He then notes any mathe­
matical relations among his figures. By doing calcula­
tions he seeks to reduce his findings to mathematical 
principles of the operations of nature. In his experi­
ments upon the effects of the resistance of a medium to 
a pendulum suspended in it, Newton compares to arc des­
cribed by suspended globes composed of various materials, 
such as wood, lead, iron, etc., which vary in weight. He 
notes the variations of size of the globes and length of 
the thread or wire, and measures the length of the arc of 
each pendulum periodically during its motion. He repeats 
this procedure suspending the pendula in other media such 
as water and quicksilver, and in this way is able to dis­
cern the principles governing the resistance to the oscil­
lations of the penduli in various media. Comparing math­
ematical data gathered from such experiments he derives 
the following principle« "The quantity of matter in fune-
t
pendulous bodies, whose centres of oscillation are equally 
distant from the centre of suspension, are in ratio com­
pounded of the ratio of the weights and the duplicate
ratio of the times of the oscillations in vacuo."1'’ He 
considers this a philosophical principle, and "these prin­
ciples are the laws and conditions of certain motions, and
powers or forces which chiefly, have respect to philoso-
1 f iphy. • • • " Newton intends to reduce natural occurren­
ces to mathematical principles, making possible an under­
standing. of the laws governing all phenomena and facili­
tating man's use of the laws for his own good. This in­
tent to reduce natural occurrences to mathematical expla­
nations of the cause eliminates the necessity of explain­
ing them in religious terms and provides grist for the 
mills of clerical thinkers like Berkeley, who thought it 
his duty to refute the skeptics and atheists. Far from 
making him skeptical, Newton's mathematical explanations 
of universal principles led him to revere the vastness 
and order of the universe as a clear indication of the 
existence of a "Universal Ruler." Newton says "This most 
beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could
only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelli-
19gent and powerful Being." Nevertheless, the material­
ism that Newton took for granted presented problems for 
religiously oriented philosophers of the eighteenth cen­
tury. The question of the existence of matter gave New­
ton no trouble. He apparently assumed its existence, an
1 7 I b i d . , pp. 2^ 3-62 .  l 8 I b i d . ,  p .  323.
1 9 I b i d . ,  p .  W .
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assumption that latar thinkers were not so prone to make* 
More importantly* Newton carried on the tradition of such 
men as Galileo* Kepler* and Copernicus* who considered 
nothing too sacred to be examined* No phenomena lay out­
side the grasp of the thinking mani this principle became 
almost a fetish with philosophers as they looked into the 
very workings of the universe* With Newton* the mechanics 
of nature became discoverable and reducible to laws*
John Locke.— Another significant figure who must 
be considered for his influence on the philosophy of sci­
ence and epistemology is John Locke* Locke (1632-1704) 
lived almost all his life in the seventeenth century* but 
his work provided the primary inspiration for eighteenth- 
century epistemology* The course which English epistemo­
logy took at the beginning of the century of enlightenment 
was largely directed by Locke's philosophy* Locke'b the­
ory of knowledge begins by contending againBt the exist­
ence of any universally held innate principles and argu­
ing against those most basic principles of Aristotelian 
logic* namely* that A is A and that nothing can be both 
A and not A. He maintains in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding that these are neither universally held prin­
ciples nor innate ideas* for "• • • there are a great part 
of mankind to whom they are not as much as known*"20 Some
20John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing. in The Works of John Locke (Londoni n*p.. I.
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of his arguments are that children and idiots have no
thought of universal principles, and to maintain that
innate truths are imprinted on the soul is self-contradic-
tory, since to be imprinted is to be perceived, and no per-
21ception of innate truths exists in some persons. Having 
cleared the ground, Locke is ready to assert that the mind 
comes to nature as a tabula rasa, a "white paper, void of 
all characters," which is "furnished" or filled by experi­
ence, which is the foundation of all knowledge and the
22source of all ideas. This description is reminiscent 
of Bacon's instruction that we rid our minds of precon­
ceived ideas.
Sounds or words which man is equipped to produce 
become "signs of internal conceptions"! " . . .  one word 
was made to mark a multitude of particular existences. .
23. ." J Locke explains that we form abstract ideas by 
taking some attributes which several particulars have in 
common and ignoring those which they do not share. Words 
are thus made general by being signs of general ideasi
The senses at first let in particular ideas, and 
furnish the yet empty cabinet! and the mind by degrees 
growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in 
the memory, and names got to them* afterwards, the 
mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by de­
grees learns the use of general names. In this man­
ner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and 
language, the materials about which to exercise its 
discursive faculty! and the use of reason becomes more
21 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 2 2 Ibid., p 0 82.
23Ibid., II, 158-59.
26
visible, ag these materials, that give it employment 
increase
In simpler terms the mind receives ideas of particular 
cows, such as "Bessie,” "Irma," and "Elsie.” In time the 
mind can abstract similar features from the multitude of 
different cows by concluding that, in general, cows are 
large four-legged animals who give milk# To this abstract 
notion.of this animal the mind assigns the name cow.
Hence by abstracting similarities from the many particular 
cows, according to Locke's formula, we arrive at a general 
notion of cow.
Locke, like Newton, assumes the existence of the 
external world. When discussing the sensation of touch, 
for example, Locke saysi
The idea of solidity we receive by touchj and it 
arises from the resistance which we find in body, uo 
the entrance of any other body into the place it pos­
sesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which 
we receive more constantly from sensation than solid­
ity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture soever 
we are, we always feel something under us that sup­
ports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; 
and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive, 
that, whilst they remain between them, they do by an 
insurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts 
of our hand that press them. • • . This, [idea of 
solidity 3 of all other, seems the idea most intimately 
connected with the essential of body, so as nowhere 
else to be found or imagined, but only in matter.^5
Unlike some epistemologists in his era, Locke includes
reflection as a source of knowledge, as well as experience.
Reflection derives from the ability of the mind to consider
2^ I b i d . , I ,  2 1 .  2 5 I b i d . ,  pp.  1 0 5 - 1 0 6 .
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26its own operations# Speaking specifically of how the
phenomenon of reflection works, Locke asserts*
The mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the 
foregoing chapters, [ideas from the senses, the idea 
of solidity, etc#] from without, when it turns its 
view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions 
about those ideas it has, takes from thence other 
ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its 
contemplation as any of those it received from foreign 
things#2?
Locke's admission of reflection as a source of knowledge 
indicates reservations about complete reliance on experi­
mentation and induction unaided by reflection, and shows 
his kinship to such earlier epistemologists as Hobbes and 
Descartes#
George Berkeley,— Berkeley (1685-1753) studied
Locke's Essay as a text at Trinity College, Dublin, and
28was influenced by it in working out his own thought. At
the base of Berkeley's epistemology is his contention that,
"# • # the existence of an idea consists in being per- 
29ceived." 7 While Berkeley may have had in mind only to 
set aright Hthose who are tainted with skepticism" and to 
offer "a demonstration of the existence and immateriality 
of God, or the natural immortality of the soul," as he
2 6 Ibid.. p. 8 6 , passim. 2 7Ibid.. p. 1 1 1 .
2 8Tsanoff, p. 364.
29George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Prin­
ciples of Human Knowledge, in The English Philosophers 
from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A# Burtt (New York* Random 
House, p# 5 2 3#
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says in the preface to Principles of Human Knowledge 
(1710) . 30 Berkeley's influence went further than that, to 
say the least. He proceeds by saying, "A certain color, 
taste, smell, figure, and consistence, having been observed 
to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified 
by the name 'apple.' Other collections of ideas constitute 
a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things."
Then there must be something to do the perceiving, and that 
Berkeley calls several things* "mind, spirit, soul, or my­
self." Without this perceiver, there is no idea. Berkeley 
argues in the following fashion*
That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas 
formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is 
what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evi­
dent that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on 
the sense, however blended or combined together (that 
is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist other­
wise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intui­
tive knowledge may be obtained of this by anyone that 
shall attend to what is meaht by the term 'exist' when 
applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say 
exists— that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out 
of my study I should say it existed— meaning thereby 
that if I was in my study I might perceive it. There 
was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, 
that is, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was 
perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can 
understand by these and the like expressions. For as 
to what is said of the absolute existence of unthink­
ing things without any relation to their being per­
ceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their 
esse is percipi. nor is it possible they should have 
any existence out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them.31
For Berkeley, abstraction as Locke understood it is not
possible; he could not conceive of an object abstracted
3°Ibid.. p. 509. 31Ibid.. pp. 523-2^.
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from his sensation of it, since this would be tantamount
to dividing an object from itselfj for example, he could
32not imagine motion apart from something moving.J
His argument here hinges on the difference be­
tween his definition of idea and Locke's» Locke defines 
idea rather broadly as "that which his [man's] mind is 
applied about whilst t h i n k i n g , w h i l e  Berkeley under­
stands idea more particularly as perception. This con­
troversy over abstraction, in which Berkeley revels, even­
tually clarified the terminology of the empiricist philo­
sophers. But Bishop Berkeley was most interested in estab­
lishing the existence of God as a Great Perceiver who keeps 
all things in existence while man is not perceiving them. 
When man is not perceiving the world, Berkeley says, it 
"must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in 
the mind of some Eternal Spirit."^
Berkeley's philosophy of perception, regardless of 
the author's intent, seems unmistakably solipsistic. 
Statements in Principles of Human Knowledge must be con­
strued as virtual denials of the certainty of the external 
world. Striking at materialism, Berkeley saysi
How great a friend material substance hath been to 
atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All 
their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary 
a dependence on it that, when this cornerstone is once 
removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to
^2 Ibld., pp. 515» 5 2 3» 52^, passim.
•^Locke, I, 82. ^Berkeley, p. 525*
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the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while 
to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdi­
ties of every wretched sect of atheists.
At one point he puts it more simplyi " . . .  for anyone to
pretend to a notion of entity or existence, abstracted
from spirit and idea, from perceived and being perceived,
is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with
words."3^ While opposing the materialists, skeptics, and
atheists by rejecting corporeal substance in favor of
spiritual substance, Berkeley’s philosophy clears the path
for the most solipsistic theory of the century— that of
David Hume.
David Hume.— Hume (1711-1776), a Scotsman, con­
cluded, like Berkeley, that the existence of substance 
could not be logically supported. He held that the mind 
could have only two kinds of perceptions, (l) those of 
ideas and (2) those of impressions. Ideas are "less fore^ 
ble and lively" than impressions, while impressions are the 
"more lively perceptions" which we entertain when we "hear, 
or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will."
Hume understands impressions not necessarily as impressions 
of anything, but defines both ideas and impressions as pro­
cesses going on in the mind. Ideas derive from reflections 
about such impressions as hearing, seeing, feeling, etc.,
3 5Ibid.t p. 555. 3 6 Ibid.. p. 5 5 0.
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as he says in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*37
Hume views the mental powers of man as extremely limitedi
But though our thought seems to possess this 
unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer exam­
ination, that it is really confined within very narrow 
limits, and that all this creative power of the mind 
amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, 
transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials 
afforded us by the senses and experience* When we 
think of a golden mountain, we only join two consis­
tent ideas, gold and mountain., with which we were for­
merly acquainted, A virtuous horse we can conceivei 
because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtuej 
and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a 
horse, which is an animal familiar to us* In short, 
all the materials of thinking are derived either from 
our outward or inward sentiment* the mixture and com­
position of these belongs alone to the mind and will. 
Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all 
our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our 
impressions or more lively ones,™
This philosopher turned eighteenth-century epistemology 
sharply away from such earlier thinkers as Locke and 
Hobbes, who thought reflection as valid a source of know­
ledge as sense experience,
Hume recognized only two "objects of human reason, 
relations of ideas, and matters of fact." Relations of 
ideas include the study of geometry, algebra, and arith­
metic, or briefly, any science which makes affirmations 
’which [are] either intuitively or demonstrably certain." 
Matters of fact cannot be demonstrated! they contain state-
3^David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Under­
stand ing. in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, 




merits like "The sun will rise t o m o r r o w . W e  can reason 
about matters of fact, however, and our reasoning is based 
on the relation of cause to effect, although this reason­
ing goes beyond the evidence'of the senses. Hume affirms 
that knowledge of cause and effect could not come from the 
senses or from memory. The mind, says Hume, can "never 
possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the 
most accurate scrutiny and examination"j for example, the 
motion in a billiard ball when struck by a second ball may
as consistently be explained in other terms than by means
hoof the causal relation* Hume concludesi
In a word, then every effect is a distinct event from 
its cause* It could not, therefore, be discovered in 
the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, 
a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after 
it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause 
must appear equally arbitraryi since there are always 
many other effects, which, to reason, must tend to 
determine any single event, or infer any cause or 
effect, without the assistance of observation and ex­
perience. 4,1
Without reliance on causal arguments to prove the existence 
of corporeal substance, we are without any certainty of its 
being* We can never assume any cause from the fact that we 
perceive an effect, i.e.. to perceive is not necessarily to 
perceive something* Hume argues further that "the non-ex­
istence of any being, without exception, is as clear and 
distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which
39Ibid.. p. 598. Ibid.. pp. 599-6010
41 Ibid.. p0 601.
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affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceiv-
koable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be.'*
In other words it is quite as logical to reason that the 
external world does not exist as to reason that it does* 
Thus Hume denieB the materialistic philosophers' causal 
reasoning in substantiating their thought, and brings the 
certainty of the external world into serious question*
The whole of eighteenth-century scientific theory, 
and particularly Newtonian physics, became shrouded in 
uncertainty without reliance on the relation between cause 
and effect. Religion, too, had to re-evaluate much of its 
dogma in order to deal with Hume's novel presupposition* 
"The existence • • • of any being can only be proved by 
arguments from its cause or its effect," and when these 
are based on imagination, refusing to affirm the existence 
of matter is the only logical conclusion* Hume says in a 
footnote to the text of Concerning Human Understanding*
That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex 
nihilo. nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was 
excluded, ceases to be a maxim according to this phil­
osophy* Not only the will of the supreme Being may 
create mattert but, for aught we know a priori, the 
will of any other being might create it, or any other cause* that the most whimsical imagination can as­sign*^
If the proposition that Caesar never existed, or that the 
sun will not rise tomorrow, is false) and if that false 
proposition is as "conceivable and intelligible" as any
^2Ibid*, p. 688* ^ Ibid.. p. 689n*
3^
otherj then whatever "is" may also "not be." That is, 
either proposition is equally conceivable— that matter 
(both mental and corporeal) exists and that it does not. 
Thus Hume contrived the most solipsistic epistemology of 
the eighteenth century, denying that belief in the exis­
tence of substance was any more reasonable than non-belief 
in it.
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.— The major figures of 
the eighteenth century, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, un­
doubtedly overshadowed the thinking of Reid on epistemo­
logy, but the influence had a greater negative effect than 
positive. Two lesser lights, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third 
Karl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis Hutcheson 
(169^-17^6) perhaps provided Reid more direct inspiration 
in the formulation of his epistemological thought based 
on common sense.
In his Characteristics of Men. Manners Opinions. 
Times (1711), Shaftesbury relates a narrative of a gentle­
man in court defining common sense. He writes 1
"If by the word sense we were to understand opin­
ion and judgment, and by the word common the general­
ity or any considerable part of mankind, 'twould be 
hard, he said, to discover where the subject of com­
mon sense could lie. For that which was according to 
the sense of one part of mankind, was against the 
sense of another. And if the majority were to deter­
mine common sense, it would change as often as men 
changed. That which was according to common sense to­
day, would be contrary to-morrow, or soon after."
But notwithstanding the different judgments of 
mankind in most subjects, there were some however in 
which 'twas supposed they all agreed, and had the same
35
thoughts in common,— The question was still, Where?
•'For whatever was of any moment, 'twas supposed, might 
he reduced under the head of religion, policy, or 
morals."^
While he recognizes some of the difficulties with the doc­
trine of common sense, Shaftesbury clearly understands 
common sense as a method of determining truth which soli­
cits the judgments of all men on the matter in question. 
Those propositions on which all men have "the same thoughts 
in common" are said to be common sense truths. While re­
cognizing the difficulties, he pledges his word to "try 
what certain knowledge or assurance of things may be recov­
ered, in that very way, by which all certainty, you thought, 
was lost, and an endless skepticism i n t r o d u c e d , B y  
cutting the undergrowth of skepticism prevailing in the 
eighteenth century, Shaftesbury believes he can construct 
a stronger edifice upon the tenet of common sense, a base 
stronger than that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, relying 
on the presupposition that the universal consent of men 
does not err.
Francis Hutcheson, Shaftesbury's disciple and one
of Reid's predecessors as Professor of Roral Philosophy at
46Glasgow, articulated a doctrine of common sense similar 
to his mentor's thought. It is not, however, so precisely
44Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men. Manners. Opinions. Times, ed, John 
M. Robertson (New Yorki The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
1964), I, 55.
, pp. 56-5 7. ^Tsanoff, p. 392.
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presented as Shaftesbury^ or Reid's statements. He, like 
Shaftesbury, founds his ethical theory in principles which 
all men hold in common, universal maxims perceived immedi­
ately by all human beings. Hutcheson speaks in the follow­
ing example, from An Inquiry Into the Original of our Ideas 
of Beauty and Virtue (1725), of all men's agreement regard­
ing the basis of their approval of certain moral actions» 
he writesi
To shew how far mankind agree in that which we 
have made the universal foundation of this moral sense, 
viz. benevolence, we have observed already, that when 
we are asked the reason for our approbation of any 
action, we universally alledge its usefulness to the 
public, and not to the actor himself. If we are vin­
dicating a censured action, and maintaining it lawful, 
we generally make this one article of our defense,
"That it injured no body, or did more good than harm." 
On the other hand, when we blame any piece of conduct, 
we shew it to be prejudicial to others, besides the 
actori or to evidence at least a neglect of their 
interest, when it was in our power to serve themj or 
when gratitude, natural affection, or some other dis­
interested tie should have raised in us a study of 
their interest• »
According to Hutcheson men everywhere and in all ages con­
cur in the reasons they give for approving or disapproving 
the actions of another. This appeal to common sense, the 
concurrence of men on all manner of proposition whether 
moral, logical, or epistemological, foreshadows the com­
mon sense thought of Reid. Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's 
treatment of the notion of common sense at the beginning
A7'Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Into the Original 
pf Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (Vthed. reprint; Glas­
gow i printed by Robert and Andrew Foul is, 1772), p. 183•
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of the century lights the way, as it were, for the more 
structured epistemologies of men like Thomas Reid,
Summary, — “Empiricism and a driving impulse to 
investigate all natural phenomena and the mind of man 
pervaded the thought of the eighteenth century. Of spe­
cial interest to the eighteenth-century thinker was the 
mind of man and the epistemological boundaries of that 
mind. Giving guidance to the passionate investigation 
being carried out in this century was the new stress given 
to the inductive method by Francis Bacon, and simultaneous­
ly, a virtual disdain for Aristotelean deduction. The dis­
covery of laws governing natural phenomena was prized be­
cause it gave to man the ability to manipulate nature to 
his own ends, and to this noble purpose empirical investi­
gations were dedicated. The predominant episterjlogical 
thought of the century of enlightenment conceived of the 
mind unable to make direct contact with the external mater­
ial world. The mind was capable of receiving only exper­
ience, as Locke put it, which comes to the mind via the 
senses. Finally, this empiricism which relied so heavily 
upon the individual's own perception led Berkeley and Hume 
to denials of the knowability of the material world, com­
mitting the principal philosophical thought to a solip­
sism, and thus severely limiting the scope of the mind to 
a knowledge only of itself and its own operations. The 
same century, however, saw new epistemological horizons
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revealed by men like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, whose 
common sense theories gave roan direct access to the exter­
nal world and made it knowable.
The Existence of God and Ethics
Despite the emphasis on epistemology and scien­
tific theory, of course, eighteenth-century thought also 
included other subjects# The British empiricists found it 
necessary for logical reasons or for expedience to discuss 
the existence of God, and they took up the topic of ethics 
as well, though the justification for the latter does not 
necessarily follow from the existence or nature of the 
former. The empirical method of dealing with these two 
topics had substantial influence on later utilitarians 
such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and others in the 
nineteenth century, as well as upon lesser moralists in 
the eighteenth century.
John Locke.— Locke arrives at God's existence in a 
purely rational manner. His method of establishing the 
idea of God is the upshot of his discussion of the crea­
tion of complex ideas out of simple ones. We have the 
notions, he argues, of such things as existence and dura­
tion, knowledge and power. It is when we group these ideas 
together and augment them to infinity that we come up with 
the notion of God. In the same manner we arrive at ideas 
of God's omniscience by having first the notion of varying 
degrees of knowledge and enlarging this notion to infini-
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ty, and so on with power* goodness, and all the perfections
which God possesses as His attributes* Locke argues that
God's existence is as sure as his own, and as certain as
49the proven truths of geometry* 7
In keeping with his view of God as a perfectly 
rational being, Locke also produced a sketchy concept of 
ethics operable on a rational plane* Ho sought a science 
of ethics which would proceed from self-evident proposi­
tions, as incontestable as any in mathematics, to deter­
mine right and wrong, and to determine the consequences of 
human acts* He says in establishing his ethicsi
The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, 
goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and 
on whom we dependi and the idea of ourselves, as 
understanding rational beings, being such as are clear 
in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pur­
sued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of 
action, as might place morality amongst the sciences 
capable of demonstration* wherein I doubt not but 
from self-evident propositions, by necessary conse­
quences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the 
measures of right and wrong might be made out to any­
one that will apply himself with the same indifference 
and attention to the one, as he does to the other of 
these sciences.
He offers the following example of how this system might
work*
Where there is no property, there is no injustice, is 
a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Eu­
clid* for the idea of property being a right to any 
thing* and the idea to which the name injustice is 
given, being the invasion or violation of that righti 
it is evident, that these ideas being thus established.
4 8Locke, II, 31-33* /f9Ibid.. I, 76-77* 
$0 Ibid*. II, 3 6 8-6 9 .
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and these names annexed to them, I can as certainly 
know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle 
has three angles equal to two right ones.*1
By first setting forth the propositions which are known to 
be true, Locke can then proceed to draw conclusions from 
them and make ethics as logically sound as any mathemati­
cal science. All mathematical deductions on matters of 
ethics would proceed from the first principles of God's 
existence and His attributes, and from man's rational 
nature. Apparently from these principles Locke believes 
he is able to make various deductions about man's duty 
and the quality of his conduct. Such an attempt to place 
ethics on the plane with sciences, in which demonstration 
is employed, at once takes ethical problems out of the 
sole domain of theology, where a strong reliance on scrip­
tural prescription is the only necessary authority on 
which the ethician need depend, and it opens the field to 
philosophical inquiry and speculation. Thus Locke's advo­
cacy of a kind of ethical algebra presented new vistas 
which other eighteenth-century thinkers developed more 
fully.
George Berkeley.— Berkeley, however, produced the 
most novel approach to proving the existence of God. It 
was noted above that Berkeley understood God as the Great 
Perceiver of heaven and earth, without whom neither could 
be. Indeed, the very purpose of his treatise Of the Prin»
51Ibid., p. 396.
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ciples of Human Knowledge is to proffer "a demonstration 
of the existence and immateriality of God.'1̂
Having established the immateriality of being, 
and hence the existence of God, he rejoices at the improve­
ment of man's thought which follows the nullification of 
matteri
Matter being once expelled out of nature drags 
with it so many skeptical and impious notions, such 
an incredible number of disputes and puzzling ques­
tions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines 
as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless 
work for mankind, that if the arguments we have pro­
duced against it are not found equal to demonstration 
(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all 
friends to knowledge, and religion have reason to wish 
they were.53
In his Commonplace Book Berkeley discusses Locke's philo­
sophy with particular interest in Locke's ethics, and 
agrees with Locke that ethical propositions, like algebraic 
ones, are demonstrably true. He states in the brief dis­
cussion!
To demonstrate morality it seems one need only 
make a dictionary of words, and see which included 
which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk 
of the work.
Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, 
according to his own rule, trifling propositions.54
Berkeley does not offer a detailed explanation of how his
lexical approach might work.
^Berkeley, p. 509. 5 3Ibid.. p. 556.
George Berkeley, Commonplace Book, in The Works 
of George Berkeley, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (Oxfordi 
Clarendon Press, 1901), II, 90.
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Though he shows Interest in Locke's mathematical 
ethics* Berkeley talks of other ethical concepts in other 
writings* In the dialogue "Alciphron, or The Minute Phil­
osopher* M Berkeley seems to espouse utilitarian viewss 
Lysicles at one point sayst
Happiness is the end to which created beings naturally 
tendi but we find that all animals, whether men or 
brute, do naturally and principally pursue real plea­
sure of sensei which is therefore to be thought their 
supreme good, their true end and happiness* It is for 
this men livei and whoever understands life must allow 
that man to enjoy the top and flower of it who hath a 
quick sense of pleasure, and withal spirit, skill, and 
fortune sufficient to gratify every eppetite and every 
taste. Niggards and fools will envy or traduce such a 
one because they cannot equal him* Hence all that 
sober trifling in disparagement of what every one 
would be master of if he could— a full freedom and 
unlimited scope of pleasure•
While Berkeley seems at times interested in a system of
ethical algebra and at other times in a philosophy of
pleasure, he never fully develops either* He tends to
return to the mandates of religion when evaluating the
conduct of man* Perhaps for this reason he is more often
studied for the impact of his epistemological thought than
for his ethics*
John Gav*— The most famous philosophers of the 
eighteenth century, however, did not produce the earliest 
important ethical statement* Rather, a minister named 
John Gay (1669—17^5) distilled within a relatively few
^George Berkeley, "Alciphron, or The Minute Phil­
osopher, H in The WorkB of George Berkeley* ed* Alexander 
Campbell Fraser (Oxford 1 Clarendon iPress, 1 9 0 1), 1 , 9 0 .
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pages the essence of eighteenth-century ethics, an ethical 
theory expounded in more detail later by Jeremy Bentham and 
James Mill. Gay's system considers virtue as "the conform­
ity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all ration­
al creatures with respect to each other's happiness* to 
which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged* and 
everyone that does so conform, is or ought to be approved 
of, esteemed and loved for so d o i n g . G a y  explains the 
obligation to conform to this rule of life when he defines
virtue, saying "Obligation is the necessity of doing or
*)7omitting any action in order to be happy. • •
Gay finds four ways in which obligation is induced*
(1 ) "from perceiving the natural consequences of things*"
(2 ) from perceiving their "merit or demerit, as producing 
the esteem and favor of our fellow creatures*" ( 3 )  f r o m  
perceiving "the authority of the civil magistrate*" and 
(*0 from perceiving "the authority of God. " ^ 8 Man may 
find his duty inductively, then by observing how particu­
lar acts produce the same consequences and by deciding 
either to perform or avoid such acts on that basis. He 
may make similar decisions by observing how particular
-^John Gay, Concerning the Fundamental Principle 
of Virtue and Morality, in The English Philosophers from 
Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York* Random 
House, 1939). P« 773.
57Ibid.. p. 77^. 58Ibid.
acts are viewed by other men, and in a manner perhaps simi­
lar to the preceding one, he may observe the decisions of 
judges of courts. Finally he may determine his duty by 
consulting the will of God# Of all these sources of find­
ing one's duty, the will of God is most important, because 
God, in all situations, can "make one happy or miserable• " 
Attempting to discover the obligations growing out of the 
will of God, Gay asserts that by observing the infinite 
happiness and goodness of God exemplified in His works,
”, • , he could have no other design in creating mankind 
than their happinessi and therefore that my behavior, as 
far as it may be a means of happiness of mankind, should
CQbe such,*-'7 Thus man's foremost obligation is happiness, 
his own and that of other men. For Gay, man is a creature, 
aware of pleasure and pain, who seeks the former and 
avoids the latter, Man approves the actions of others 
when those actions bring satisfactioni he also sets up 
principles of conduct which serve to simplify the tedious 
process of logically analyzing all the steps from the act 
to the consequent, though these principles are not innate. 
Men imagine that they have innate ideas of what is good or 
bad when actually they have merely forgotten that they 
arrived at the simplifying principles by observing the 
progression from act to consequent in the past. One other 
important factor in Gay's ethical scheme is his postulation
59Ibld.. p. 77if.
^5
that man associates pain and pleasure with the consequen­
ces of actions.^0 By reliance on this principle of asso­
ciation of ideas and on the notion that men form general 
principles of conduct, Gay was able to avoid dependence on 
intuitive knowledge of good and evil and to give rise to 
deductive utilitarian methods of ethical theory which 
Locke had only hinted at*
Notwithstanding modification and expansion by Ben- 
tham and Mill, Gay°s moral theory provided the impetus for 
eighteenth-century ethics* Like most of the great ideas of 
the century, however, his work owed its inspiration to 
John Locke, whose desire to create a system of ethics de­
pending on deduction was carried out by the great ethicists 
of the century* From Gay's utilitarian thought sprang that 
of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, both of whom had their 
greatest impact upon the nineteenth century rather than 
the eighteenth. Like Gay, Bentham sought to develop an 
ethical scheme which would produce the greatest amount of 
happiness for the individual and the community*^1 Mill, 
more politically oriented, was interested in application 
of the ethical calculus to political philosophyi he did, 
however, outline an ethical system for individuals, in the 
belief "that the whole science of human nature must be ex-
6°Ibld*. pp. 776-78^.
^Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation (Oxfordi Basil Blackwell, 
Ll9^6J), p. 83.
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plored, to lay a foundation for the science of govern
62ment." Bentham and Mill may rightly be considered nine­
teenth-century philosophers and are mentioned only briefly 
here to point up the ultimate influence of Gay'B ethical 
thought,
Economic Theorvt Adam Smith
While John Gay's thought is a significant link in 
the evolution of ethical theory in the eighteenth century, 
the thought of Adam Smith (1723-1790) is also significant 
because it marks an expansion of the scope of philosophi­
cal inquiry.
The eighteenth century was the period which saw 
economics dignified as a legitimate area of philosophical 
speculation. A Scotsman, Adam Smith was probably the most 
significant economic philosopher of the century„ just as 
his Wealth of Nations (17?6) is a most important work in 
the history of economic theory. Influenced by the scien­
tific philosophy of his day, Smith observed the workings 
of the economy and set forth principles of its operation. 
Understanding such principles as these puts these opera­
tions under the control of man rather than leaving him at 
the mercy of economic phenomena. Like the moralists of 
the century. Smith views man as a creature motivated by
62 James Mill, Government, in The English Philoso­
phers from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York*" 
Random House, 1^39). P* 857, passim.
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desire for his own selfish gainj but unlike the moralists,
Smith specifies the goal of man's desire as wealth, rather
than pleasure or happiness in general. The economist
points out that we tend to measure men in terms of their
possessionsi "We say of a rich man that he is worth a
great deal, and a poor man that he is worth very little
money." Wen, then, are driven to action by their desire
for money. Important to Smith's economic system is his
view of the market. He postulates an invisible force or
law which causes the unhampered market to work*
The market price of every particular commodity is regu­
lated by the proportion between the quantity which is 
actually brought to market, and the demand of those who 
are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, 
or the whole value of the rent, labor, and profit, 
which must be paid in order to bring it thither.®”
Man's desire for gain is the dynamic element in the effi- 
cienty of this operation, but competition is the control­
ling agent which keeps these avaricious creatures from 
becoming ruthlessly destructive in seeking their goals.^
Smith believed so strongly in the self-regulating 
operation of the market that he argued against the neces­
sity for outside intervention. He talks about this lais- 
sez faire economy in discussing the theory of balance of 
trade; "Upon every account, therefore," he says, the atten-
/I Q
•̂ Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (New Yorki E . P. Dutton and Co., 
n. d.), p. 323.
6/flbid.. p. ^3. 65Ibid.
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tion of government never was so unnecessarily employed, as 
when directed to watch over the preservation or increase of 
the quantity of money in any c o u n t r y . W h i l e  many of 
Smith's economic theories, like many of the epistemologi- 
cal theories of his time, may seem naive by twentieth-cen­
tury standards, his undertaking to reduce the intricate and 
inscrutable workings of economics into mechanical princi­
ples which can be understood and manipulated is significant 
indeed# His work established economics as a reputable 
philosophical endeavor, and opened the field for such pro­
phets as Thomas Maithus and David Ricardo, who warned the 
world of the dangers of an exploding population
Political Thought
Perhaps not so great an innovation, but certainly 
as influential a work as Smith's Wealth of Nations, was 
John Locke's political thought. If any philosophical work 
of the century had an incontestable impact on the thinking 
of the time, it was Locke's Concerning Civil Government
(1688). Some see a causal relation between this work and
6ftthe inspiration of the American and French revolutions. 
Concerning Civil Government begins with a description of 
man in his natural state, having perfect freedom and equal­
ity, but lacking "established, settled, known law," judi-
^ Ibid.. p. 3 3 0. ^Heilbroner, pp. 6l, 7 7-7 8 .
^Tsanoff, p. 358.
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cial authority "to determine all differences according to 
the established law,** and "power to back or support the 
sentence when right and to give it due execution* Be­
cause of these undesirable conditions, man is driven into 
society*
Important in Locke's theory of politics is that 
government has not only the responsibility to protect 
life and liberty, but also property.70 Property arises 
from man's mixing his labor with the object of his labor*
"• • • It is labor indeed," says Locke, "that puts the 
difference of value on everything, • • ,"71 i*e* it is 
one's labor, mixed with a thing, which creates property. 
This labor theory of value, alone, had notable impact on 
later economists and political philosophers such as Karl 
Marx, Perhaps Locke's greatest innovation, however, is 
his treatment of the legislative power of the king.
The people in a "state of nature" give their power 
to a legislativei hence the legislative derives its power 
from the people and must remain subordinate to them*7^
". • * These laws also ought to be designed for no other 
end ultimately but the good of the people*"73 Locke's pro-
697John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original. 
Extent, and End of Civil Government, in The English Phllog£ 
pherg from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York* 
Random House, 1939)* PP* 404, 454*
70Ibid.. pp. 404, **53, passim* 71Ifeid*, p. *U9* 
72Ibid*. pp. 457-59. 73Ibid.. p. 46l.
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visions for the transfer of power of government to the 
people, in case the legislative power miscarries its au­
thority, is significant in the light of the two revolutions 
which erupted toward the end of the century. Revolution is 
justifiable in Locke's scheme of politics* and possibly for 
that reason his thought was popular in eighteenth-century 
America* When England failed to serve the ultimate good of 
the colonists in America and when she miscarried her au­
thority by becoming oppressive, the resistance and revolt 
of the colonists was eminently warranted under the provi­
sions of Locke's thought* The people justifiably could 
effect a transfer of power from King George III to their 
own colonial representatives* Locke writes that H* • • up­
on the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, 
it [legislative power] reverts to the society and the peo­
ple have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legit
lative in themselvesi or place it in hands as they think 
ohgood*"r These closing lines of Locke's treatise make al­
lowance, in unmistakably logical terms, for revolution*
Psychologyi Association of Ideas
The theory of association of ideas is another topic 
discussed throughout the eighteenth century, and certainly 
it plays a role in the creation of the intellectual melieu 
of that era* David Hartley (1705-1757) articulated this 
theory in its many ramifications in his Observations on Mani
74 Ibid*. p. 503.
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His Frame. His Duty, and His Expectations (17^9),^ but 
Hume giveb the most concise definition to the all-impor­
tant psychological and epistemological aspects of the doc­
trine in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, pub­
lished one year prior to Hartley’s work* •
Explicating the doctrine, Hume writes*
It is evident that there is a principle of connec­
tion between the different thoughts or ideas of the 
mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or 
imagination, they introduce each other with a certain 
degree of method and regularity. In our more serious 
thinking or discourse this is so observable that any 
particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular 
tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and 
rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering 
reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we 
reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at 
adventures, but that there was still a connection up­
held among the different ideas, which succeeded each 
other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be 
transcribed, there would immediately be observed some­
thing which connected it in all its transitions. Or 
where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread 
of discourse might still inform you, that there had 
secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, 
which had gradually led him from the subject of conver­
sation, Among different languages, even where we can­
not suspect the least connection or communication, it 
is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most 
compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each otheri a 
certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in 
the compound ones, were bound together by some univer­
sal principle, which has an equal influence on all mankind,7®
Thu8 Hume proceeds in a proof of the existence of some 
principle of association by appealing to premises he be-
'-'David Hartley, Observations on Man* His Frame. 
His Duty, and His Expectations iLondon* Charles Hitch and 
Stephen Austen, 17^9), I and iX passim.
^Hume, pp, 596-97*
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lieves commonly accepted, that there is a regular succes­
sion of ideas even in the most unstructured and informal 
discourse, that an unrelated thought which interrupts the 
regular stream of ideas is recognized and dismissed* and 
that in all language there is a natural correspondence be­
tween simple ideas when combined to produce compound ones* 
In his last argument Hume presumably attempts to observe 
various words, not necessarily compound words, which ex­
press compound ideas, ideas comprised of several simple 
ideasi from his observations of compound expressions in 
all languages, he draws the conclusion that there exiBts a 
universal principle which binds these ideas together. For 
instance the idea of a centaur, compounding the ideas of 
man and horse, is one in which N, • , we cannot suspect 
the least connection or communication, • • • ** yet certainly 
the ideas Hnearly correspond to each other
Hume observes further that there are “four prin­
ciples of connection among ideas, namely, resemblance, con­
tiguity in time or place, and cause or effect, " 77 He ex­
plains the ways in which these four principles might oper­
ate in the following manner*
That these principles serve to connect ideas will 
not, I believe, be much doubted, A picture naturally 
leads our thoughts to the original* the mention of one 
apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry 
or discourse concerning the others* and if we think of 
a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain 
which follows it,7°
77Ibid,. p. 597* 78Ibid,
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In other words when we view a picture, our idea of the ori­
ginal which the picture resembles somehow comes before the 
mindi this is the operation of the principle of resera- .. . 
blance. When one is confronted with the idea of other 
apartments, the principle of contiguity of place is oper­
ative# Likewise the principle of cause or effect brings 
before the mind the causes of a wound or the pain subse­
quent to a wound when the idea of the wound is entertained 
by the mind.
In this brief discussion of association of ideas 
Hume displays the important aspects of the theory prevalent 
in the eighteenth century. Generally, the theory postu­
lates that ideas affect the mind in such a way as to in­
troduce, or bring about in some manner, other ideas related 
to the first by some principle of association such as those 
Hume mentions, "resemblance, contiguity in time or place8 
and cause or effect."
Summary
The eighteenth century in which Thomas Reid lived 
and took his inspiration was one of evident paradox.
While the conditions in which the vast majority of human 
beings lived were only beginning to improve, there was 
progress and admirable development in many areas. This 
century saw outstanding advancement in science and experi­
mentation, as well as the blossoming of the industrial 
revolution. Certainly, this century of enlightenment wit-
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nessed a flourishing of scholarly speculation and of arts 
and letters* Scholars in this era were determined to sub­
ject to precise scrutiny everything from natural phenomena 
and the functions of the human mind to human conduct it­
self « and ultimately to distill their findings into formu­
lae with which they could work. Much attention was given 
to bringing nature into the ken of man, to controlling and 
ordering her, and making her produce for mankind* Bacon, 
for example, dedicated his work to the improvement of life* 
Eighteenth-century thinkers were men of unlimited scopei 
they insisted that nothing lay beyond the reach of the 
thinker, and they expounded on an enormous range of topics 
in their writings* Whether the total of knowledge was 
still small enough to be grasped by a single man, or 
whether eighteenth-century thinkers were men of nncyclo- 
pedic abilities is a moot point* Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations. for example, is a rambling tome which treats vir­
tually every topic conceivably related to economic thought* 
The interest in meticulous observation manifested during 
this century is also remarkable. Thomas Reid's Inquiry 
Into the Human Mind requires him to give considerable at­
tention to his observations of such seemingly miniscule 
topics as smelling and tasting, and to consider the func­
tions of the membraneB of the nose, saliva, and the pores
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of the tongue and f a u c e s W h i l e  some of the thought in 
the century is naive and inapplicable in the twentieth cen­
tury ( there is equally as much to commend it, Sir Isaiah 
Berlin says of the eighteenth century*
The intellectual power, honesty, lucidity, courage, 
and disinterested love of the truth of the most gifted 
thinkers of the eighteenth century remain to this day 
without parallel. Their age is one of the best and 
most hopeful episodes in the life of mankind* 0
79'^Thomas Reid, An Inquiry Into the Human Mind, in 
The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton 
(Edniburgh*Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), II, 104-15 •
8 0 Isaiah Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment (New 
York* Houghton Mifflin Co',), p. 29*
CHAPTER III
THOMAS REID’S COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY
Probably the best known aspect of Reid’s thought 
and the one which brought him the most acclaim in the 
eighteenth century is his notion of common sense. Reid’s 
communication theory, like other areas of his thought, 
draws heavily upon his presuppositions about common sense, 
so that an understanding of his common sense philosophy is 
fundamental to any discussion of Reid’s communication the­
ory. It is necessary not only to clarify the meaning of 
common sense, but also to show how it relates to various 
aspects of Reid’s non-rhetorical thought— his views about 
the external world, empiricism, philosophy of science, and 
the existence and nature of God. Other topics of Reid’s 
philosophy, such as ethics and logic, will be considered 
under his treatment of communication.
Reid's philosophy of common Bense is a turning 
point for the thought of the eighteenth century. By the 
end of this epoch the mainstream of philosophy had retreat­
ed deep into a solipsistic labyrinth, a maze created by 
oonflict between scientific philosophies postulating the 
existence of an unseen entity called matter whose laws are 
discernible and increasingly extreme epistemological the­
ories which questioned more and more insistently the exis­
tence of the external world. Reid, whose principal wri-
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tings appeared at the end of the century, reviewed many 
philosophical systems in critical retrospect and located 
their more tenuous points, giving particular attention to 
the ideas of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. His common sense 
philosophy restored perspective not only to epistemology 
hut to all aspects of philosophy by seeking to eliminate 
the skepticism which epistemologies had produced during 
the century of enlightenment.
Thomas Reid is the father of Scottish common sense 
philosophy, but as indicated in the previous chapter, two 
earlier thinkers, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, developed 
similar theories prior to Reid. Neither treated the doc­
trine so extensively as Reid did, however. In addition to 
these precursors of Reid*s thought on common sense, Father 
Buffier, a French Jesuit, treated various ramifications of 
the subject as early as 1732. 1 Indeed, Reid drew on sev­
eral sources in formulating his particular theory of com­
mon sense, and he acknowledges his indebtedness to Buffier
for his influence on Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual
2Powers of Man. The direct influence of Buffier on Reid's 
earlier work, however, is dubiousj William Hamilton, editor
1[ciaude] Buffier, First Truths, and the Origin of 
our Opinions, translated from the French (London* printed 
for J. Johnson, 1780), passim.
2Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Wan, in The Works of Thomas Reid, P.P.. ed. Sir William 
Hamilton (Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), I,
423.
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of the 1863 edition of Reid’s Works, doubts that Reid was 
aware of Buffier’s work on first principles at the time he 
wrote An Inquiry Into the Human Mind (1763)^* though he 
makes repeated appeals to common sense in that work* By 
the time he published A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic 
(177*0* however, Reid was aware of Buffier, whom he cites
lLin this treatise*
Whether Reid actually innovated the doctrine of 
common sense is not important, however, because Reid sim- 
self is eager "to explain the meaning of common sense, 
that it may not be treated, as it has been by some, as a 
new principle, or as a word without any meaning."-’ He 
argues, in fact, that many philosophers, including his 
detractor George Berkeley, have consistently employed com­
mon sense to establish their philosophical premises and to 
refute their opponents* Reid argues that Berkeley "has 
laid as much stress upon common sense, in opposition to the 
doctrines of philosophers, as any philosopher that has 
oome after him."** Reid regards common sense as an ancient
^William Hamilton (ed.), A Brief Account of Aris­
totle’s Logic by Thomas Reid, in The Works of Thomas Reid. 
P.P. (Edinburgh! Maclachlan and Stewart, lfl63)» II* 713n*
4
Thomas Reid, A Brief.Account of.Aristotle's kogic. in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton 
(Edinburgh 1 Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3 ), II, 713*
'’Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 422-23*
1 Lj id •, p* 423*
59
principle* He revives it, drawing on the thought of sev­
eral of his contemporaries, and articulates it in all his 
works in such a fashion as to gain for himself the distinc­
tion as the father of common sense philosophy.
1. Definition
Reid is aware that at the foundation of his thought 
lies the principle of common sense, and one of his most 
stringent criticisms of most of eighteenth-century philo­
sophy is that it does not give common sense its proper 
importance. However, one of Reid's problems is determining 
precisely what he means by this important term common 
sense. Early in An Inquiry Into the Human Mind (1 7 6 3) he 
offers a definition which identifies common sense with 
intrinsic principles deriving fronp the nature of the mind.i
He says 1
If there are certain principles, as I think there 
are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to 
believe, and which we are unde? a necessity to take for 
granted in the common concerns of life,without being 
able to give a reason for them— those are what we call 
the principles of common sense| and what is manifestly 
contrary to them, is what we call absurd•?
In this passage Reid seems to intend common sense to mean
principles which are assumed and undeniably true but which
cannot be logically proven. These truths are agreed upon
by all men everywhere.
7'Thomas F' id, ftn Inquiry Into the Human Mind, in 
The Works of Thomas Re^d. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton 
(Edinburgh! Maclachlan and Stewarts 1863)» 1» 1 0 8.
6o
In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 
(1 7 8 5) Reid reiterates this meaning of common sense, adding 
that oommon sense notions are presuppositions on which all 
other knowledge is based*
We ought likewise to take for granted, as first 
principles, things wherein we find an universal agree­
ment, among the learned and unlearned, in the different 
nations and ages of the world, A consent of ages and 
nations, of the learned and vulgar, ought, at least, to 
have groat authority, unless we can show some prejudice 
as universal as that consent is, which might be the 
cause of it. Truth is one, error is infinite. There 
are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that 
it may be expected that men should universally agree in 
them.
Here as before, common sense consists of first principles 
which are taken for granted among all men everywhere, but 
Reid allows the possibility that all men can be misled by 
prejudice into believing propositions which are manifestly 
untrue. Furthermore, he acknowledges that these principles 
are not demonstrated but assumed by the vulgar and the edu 
cated alike. Hence, if common sense first principles are 
to be consistent with truth, they must be propounded by a 
sound reasoning mind Which is not perverted by poor judg­
ment.
Reid's insistence on this requisite of consensus 
for common sense precepts is most interesting in its obser­
vation that common judgments of whole nations of men cannot 
always be trusted. Apparently decisions about the correct­
ness of common sense notions can be rather impressionistic
8Reid, Intellectual Poyers. p. 233»
61
and subjective at times. In his discussion of aesthetics 
Reid points out that MWhole nations by force of prejudice 
are brought to believe the grossest absurdities! and why 
should it be thought that the taste is less capable of 
being perverted than the judgment? " 9 As proof of this 
point, Reid cites incidents of the most outrageous custims 
among savagesi "An esquimaux [eskimo]," he exclaims, "can 
regale himself with a draught of whale-oil, and a Canadian 
can feast upon a dog. A Kamschatkadale lives upon putrid 
fish, and is sometimes reduced to eat the bark of trees. " 10  
If whole nations may be led astray in their reasoning and 
judgment, then Reid cannot rely on the strength of numbers 
to prove his argument for the validity 6f common sense 
principles. He does not acknowledge this weakness of his 
argument howeverj he seems quite content to believe that 
occasionally he alone, of all men everywhere, possesses 
the truth. Reid is then left with the formidable respon­
sibility of determining which of men's judgments are, un­
like his own, departures from common sense and the result 
of prejudice, and which are merely different. He does not 
explain how this difficulty is to be resolvedi indeed he 
seems not to recognize its existence.
Nevertheless, and acquaintance with common sense 
principles is indispensable in determining truth. Reason 
and common sense go hand in hand, but they are not identi-
9Ibid.. p. ^92. 10Ibid., p. 91.
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cal. About their relationship Reid saysi "It is absurd to 
conceive that there can be any opposition between reason 
and common sense* It is indeed the first-born of Reasoni 
and, as they are commonly joined together in speech and 
writing, they are inseparable in their nature*" He adds 
further that "A man who has common sense may be taught to 
reason* But, if he has not that gift, no teaching will 
make him able either to judge of first principles or reason 
from them."11 Common sense consists of self-evident prin­
ciples which are universally taken for granted and which 
undergird true propositions. Perhaps inadvertently expo­
sing his interest in rhetoric, Reid adds that "• • • the 
province of common sense is more extensive in refutation 
than in confirmation," and states further that "a conclu­
sion drawn from true principles cannot possibly contradict
any decision of common sense, because truth will always b<
12consistent with itself." For instance Reid finds the 
conclusions of the skeptical philosophers inconsistent with 
common sense and, primarily for that reason, judges their 
conclusions about the external world untrue.
Common sense, sometimes called common judgment, is
13a God-given innate part of the individual mindi departure
1 4from its principles is lunacy. Reid implies that most
11 Ibid., p. 425. 12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 423.
^Ibid,, p. 233.
63
philosophers of his time belong in a category with the 
mentally ill* The notion of common sense itself Reid 
envisions as belonging among those ideas which are taken 
for granted and God-given, requiring no explanation* At 
one point he even apologizes for defining the term at all* 
he saysi
Indeed, it seems to me, that common sense is as 
unambiguous a word and as well understood as the county 
York* We find it in innumerable places in good wri­
ters* we hear it on innumerable occasions in conversa­
tion* and, as far as I am able to judge, always in the 
same meaning* And this is probably the reason why it 
is so seldom defined or explained.1*
Though the terra may need no definition for use in his dis­
course, Reid does admit that it is somewhat unusual to find 
the term employed in philosophical writing* "It is true 
that common sense is a popular and not a scholastic word*" 
he writes, "and by most of those who have treated systema­
tically of the powers of understanding, it is only occa-
163ionally mentioned, as it is by other writers*"
Regardless of whether the term is frequently em­
ployed by philosophers, all of philosophical thought must 
be faithful to the principles of common sense* Reid in­
sists that "Philosophy * * * has no other root but the 
principles of Common Sense* it grows out of them, and draws 
its nourishment from them* Severed from this root, its 
honours wither, its sap is dried up, and it dies and rots*%̂ 7
15Ibid., p. 423* l6lbid.
17'Reid, Inquiry, p. 101.
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He may have had in mind the ideas of many of his contempo­
raries whose skepticism, separated from the nourishment of 
common sense, must wither and die. Indeed, he finds that 
most of the trouble with the philosophy of his time stems 
from its loss of contact with common sense principles and 
has become for that reason, in his estimation, contempti­
ble and ridiculous.
Perhaps the clearest attempt to defind common sense 
is one in which Reid presents the concept as a logical en­
tity related to a major or minor premise of a syllogism. 
Reid also identifies common sense with terms used in disci­
plines other than philosophy and with some Ciceronian 
terms. He writesi
One of the most important distinctions of our judg­
ments is, that some of them are intuitive, others 
grounded on argument.
It is not in our power to judge as we will. The 
judgment is carried along necessarily by the evidence, 
real or seeming, which appears to us at the time. But, 
in propositions that are submitted to our judgment, 
there is this great difference— some are of such a na­
ture that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend 
them distinctly, and perfectly understand their mean­
ing, without finding himself under any necessity of 
believing them to be true or false, probable or impro­
bable. The judgment remains in suspense, until it is 
inclined to one side or another by reasons or argu­
ments.
But there are other propositions which are no soon­
er understood than they are believed. The judgment 
follows the apprehension of them necessarily, and both 
are equally the work of nature, and the result of our 
original powers. There is no searching for evidence, 
no weighing of arguments! the proposition is not de­
duced or inferred from anotheri it has the light of 
truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from 
another.
Propositions of the last kind, when they are used 
in matters of science, have commonly been called
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axiomsi and on whatever occasion they are used, they 
are called firBt principles, principles of common 
senset common notions* self-evident truths. Cicero 
calls them naturae iudlcia. .ludicia communibus homi- 
nem sensibus infixa. Lord Shaftesbury expresses them 
by the words, natural knowledge, fundamental reason, 
and common sense,
Any tautological proposition such as "A is AM or Ha brother 
is a male siblingM would, undoubtedly, be considered true 
propositions without evidence or argument, Reid takes as 
an axiom the proposition that there is a material world 
which is knowable to man, and it is at this juncture that 
he engages in combat with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, While 
Reid is probably oorrect in arguing that the unschooled man 
would immediately affirm the existence of the material 
world, there must be many propositions which some would 
consider common sense first principles while others would 
not view them as such, A renowned universal proposition 
such as HA11 men are mortal" might receive universal affir­
mation because mortality is understood in the term men. 
Another universal proposition, "All cows give milk," may 
depend on one's knowledge of cows for its affirmation.
Apparently, what Reid means by common sense is not 
unlike what Locke calls innate ideas. One of the grounds 
on which Locke denies the existence of innate ideas is that 
they cannot be shown to be universally held by all mem Reid 
on the contrary maintains that all men whose judgment is not 
impaired by prejudice or lunacy must certainly possess these
18Ibid.. p, 434.
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common sense first principles, which they take for granted 
and employ in conducting their lives. Clearly implied in 
Reid's concept of common sense is a denouncement of Locke's 
argument against innate ideas. In the passage which fol­
lows Reid offers a proof of the existence of the material 
world, and in doing so employs various terms which appear 
to be synonymous with Locke's term innate idea. Reid 
writes*
It is therefore acknowledged by this philosopher to 
be a natural instinct or prepossession, an universal 
and primary opinion of all men, a primary instinct of 
nature, that the objects which we immediately perceive 
by our senses, are not images in our minds, but exter­
nal objects, and that their existence is independent of 
us and our perception.19
This declaration not only defies Bishop Berkeley, but sub­
tly repudiates Locke's denial of what Reid calls natural 
instinct, prepossession, universal and primary opinion, and 
primary instinct of nature— in short, of such things as 
innate ideas. Locke's denial rested on the grounds that 
", •• there are a great part of mankind to whom they [in-
-i 2 0nate ideas] are not so much as known•" Reid's affirma­
tion rests of a belief that there are principles held even 
by the most vulgar of men which are undeniably truej this 
belief is the essence of common sense.
^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 299.
20John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing, in The Works of John Locke (London* n. p.. 1823).
I, 14.
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II. Epistemologyi The Material World and Causality
It is not surprising to find that Reid employs the 
principle of common sense to help establish the existence 
of the material world. He states frankly that we can know 
real things in the external world. Reid's epistemology, 
then, is bound up with his consideration of the existence 
of the material world, and his most strenuous struggles are 
against those who would question its existence. His state­
ments about the nature of the material world and our know­
ledge of it are rooted in common sense. Reid contends that 
he does not "dispute the existence of what the vulgar call
the objects of perception. These, by all who acknowledge
21their existence, are called real things, not ideas,” as 
some eighteenth-century thinkers would assert.
The crux of Reid's thought about the material world 
lies in the first principles which he sets forth in Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man. He announces that he 
will establish as presuppositions several metaphysical 
principles which David Hume had questioned. He writesi
The first is, That the qualities which we perceive 
bv our senses must have a subject, which we call body, 
and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a 
subject, which we call mind.
It is not more evident that two and two make four, 
than it is that figure cannot exist, unless there be 
something that is figured, nor motion without something 
that is moved. I not only perceive figure and motion,
2 *Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 2 9 8.
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but I perceive them to be qualities* They have a neces­
sary relation to something in which they exist as their 
subject. The difficulty which some philosophers have 
found in admitting this, is entirely owing to the the­
ory of ideas. A subject of the sensible qualities 
which we perceive by our senses, is not an idea either 
of sensation or of consciousness! therefore, they say, 
we have no such idea. Or, in the style of Mr. Hume, 
from what impression is the idea of substance derived? 
It is not a copy of any impression; therefore there is 
no such idea.
The distinction between sensible qualities, and the 
substance to which they belong, and between thought and 
the mind that thinks, is not the invention of philoso­
phers; it is found in the structure of all languages, 
and therefore must be common to all men who speak with 
understanding•
Thus while Berkeley argued that to be is to be perceived, 
Reid argues that to perceive is to perceive something, and 
to think presupposes the existence of the thinker. He 
believes he has established, in one fell swoop, the exis­
tence of the external world and of mind, and he finds he 
is confirmed in his judgment by the manner in which mankind 
everywhere use language, a confirmation which Reid cheri­
shes and one which will be treated in more depth in the 
following chapter. Reid considers the existence of a ma­
terial world and of mind important enough to justify their 
being treated as first principles.
Reid acknowledges, however, that not all scholars 
agree with him on the subject of material existence. He 
reviews what he calls the various "theories of ideas" of 
his three major philosophical antagonists in the following 
passage, in which a common man asks each of the three,
2 2 I b i d . . p .  454 .
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M. . . Pray, sir, are there then no substantial and perma­
nent beings called the sun, and moon, which continue to 
exist whether we think of them or not?" Reid then hypo­
thesizes the probable answersi
Mr. Locke, and those that were before him, will answer 
to this question, that it is very true there are sub­
stantial and permanent beings called the sun and mooni 
but they never appear to us in their own person, but 
by their representatives, the ideas in our own minds, 
and we know nothing of them but what we can gather from 
those ideas.
Bishop Berkeley and Mr. Hume would give a diffrent 
answer to the question proposed. They would assure the 
querist that it is a vulgar error, a mere prejudice of 
the ignorant and unlearned, to think that there are any 
permanent and substantial beings called the sun and 
mooni that the heavenly bodies, our own bodies, and all 
bodies whatsoever, are nothing but ideas in our mindsi 
and that there can be nothing like the ideas of one 
mind, but the ideas of another mind. There is nothing 
in nature but minds and ideas, says the Bishopi— nay, 
says Mr. Hume, there is nothing in nature but ideas 
onlyi for what we call a mind is nothing but a train 
of ideas connected by certain relations between them- 
selves.23
Reid believes that he has quite accurately summarized the 
views of these three major spokesmen of the eighteenth 
century, and he seems convinced that their philosophies 
are obviously untenable. He declares each "theory of 
ideas" to be *bxtravagant and visionary," and for that 
reason wholly unacceptable. Needless to say, Reid disa­
grees absolutely with the arguments he relates. To him, 
it is patently absurd to hold such viewsi it is ". • • 
directly contrary to the universal sense of men who have 
not been instructed in philosophy. When we see the sun or
2 3 I b i d . .  p .  29 9 .
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moon, we havo no doubt that the very objects which we 
immediately see are very far distant from us, and from
okone another." Being undeniably distant from us, they 
cannot have their sole existence in our own minds. Reid 
finds it equally absurd to maintain that these heavenly 
bodies cease to exist when we stop perceiving them.
In this kind of reductio ad absurdum argument,
Reid consistently turns to the unschooled common man for 
the proof of his argument that skeptical epistemologies 
are unsound. He applies the irrefutable maxim that he 
who knows, knows. This first principle of all mystical 
thought is incontestable when applied in this context.
To proffer a theory of knowledge which tells the unlearned 
man that he cannot be certain of what he knows is obviously 
ridiculous in Reid's view. The skeptical epistemologies of 
Berkeley and Hume ultimately make the existence of the 
external world questionable, a condition which Reid cannot 
toleratei
Thus, the wisdom of philosophy is set in oppisition 
to the common sense of mankind• The first pretends to 
demonstrate, a priori, that there can be no such thing 
as a material worldi the sun, moon, stars, and earth, 
vegetable and animal bodies, are, and can be nothing 
else, but sensations in the mind, or images of those 
sensations in the memory and imaginationi that, like 
pain and joy, they can have no existence when they are 
not thought of.25
We have already seen that when there is a discrepancy be­
tween any propositxon and common sense, the fault is with
2^ I b i d . . pp.  2 9 8 - 9 9 .  2 ^Reid,  I n q u i r y , p.  127*
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the proposition. Certainly referring to Berkeley, Reid 
declares that for philosophy to oppose common sense and 
call into question the existence of the material world is 
Va kind of metaphysical lunacy," and furthermore, the fact 
that men seriously propound such notions gives weight to 
the maxim that M. • • too much learning is apt to make men 
mad, . . . "  Sounding like a confirmed anti-intellectual, 
Reid goes on to blame philosophy for causing irreparable 
damage to its own reputation as a seeker of truth by advo­
cating such idiocies. He questions the sagacity of such 
philosophers and declares* "If this be wisdom, let me be 
deluded with the vulgar," an association which Reid, with 
all his devotion to the academic pursuits, never fails to 
relish.
Reid seeks to weaken the arguments of the skepti­
cal philosophers and at the same time to make more tenable 
a belief in common sense. His principal argument against 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume follows*
. . .  in all this debate about the existence of the 
material world, it hath been taken for granted on both 
sides, that this same material world, if any such there 
be, must be the express image of our sensations* that 
we can have no conception of any material thing which 
is not like some sensation in our minds* and particu­
larly that the sensations of touch are images of ex­
tension, hardness, figure, and motion. Every argument 
brought against the existence of a material world, 
either by the Bishop of Cloyne, or by the author of the 
"Treatise of Human Nature," supposeth this. If this is 
true, their arguments are conclusive and unanswerable* 
but, on the other hand, if it is not true, there is no 
shadow of argument left. Have those philosophers,
2 6 I b i d .
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then, given any solid proof of this hypothesis, upon 
which the whole weight of so strange a system rests.
No. They have not so much as attempted to do it. But, 
because ancient and modern philosophers have agreed 
in this opinion, they have taken it for granted. But 
let us, as becomes philosophers, lay aside authorityi 
we need not, surely, consult Aristotle or Locke, to 
know whether pain be like the point of a sword. I have 
as clear a conception of extension, hardness, and mo­
tion, as I have of the point of a swordt and, with some 
pains and practice, I can form as clear a notion of the 
other sensations of touch as I have of pain. When I do 
so, and compare them together, it appears to me clear 
as daylight, that the former are not of kin to the lat­
ter, nor resemble them in any one feature,2?
Here Reid charges the skeptics with maintaining certain
mistaken notions about man's ability to know the external
world, and contends that when these fragile cornerstones
of the skeptical philosophies are shown to be weak the
entire edifice will topple. Reid says that Berkeley and
Hume have held that our concepts of the material world are
derived from sensations or perceptions of that world, and
that these concepts are like the material things about
which we hold these conceptions. They maintain also that
we can know of nothing that is unlike sensations in the
mind, and that "images of extension, hardness, figure, and
motion" comprise the sensation of touch.
To bring down the skeptical epistemological sys­
tems, Reid argues that when he touches an object he has a 
sensation of things in the external world which is nothing 
like "extension, hardness, figure, and motion." Rather, he 
has the sensation of pain. Comparing his sensation of pain
2 7 I b i d . . pp.  1 2 7 - 2 8 .
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with sensations of the four qualities which Berkeley and
Hume predicted, Reid declares*
They are as unlike, yea as certainly and manifestly 
unlike, as pain is to the point of a sword* It may 
he true, that those sensations first introduced the 
material world to our acquaintance* it may be true, 
that it seldom or never appears without their company* 
but, for all that, they are as unlike as the passion 
of anger igQto those figures of the countenance which 
attend it. 20
Once Reid has established the validity of his contention 
that he does indeed have a sensation of something in the 
external world which does not resemble extension, hard­
ness, figure, and motion, he believes he can claim that 
the skeptical philosophers have mistakenly denied the exis­
tence of the wrong thing. MTheir proof touches not matter 
or any of its qualities* but strikes directly against an 
idol of their own imagination, a material world made of
ideas and sensations, which never had, nor can have an 
29existence.” Because the arguments and proofs of Berke­
ley and Hume do not deal with matter but with sensation or 
perception in the mind, the arguments are irrelevant to 
the conclusions which they draw, and further, the conclu­
sions are invalid and untenable. In summing up his criti­
cism of the epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 
which he calls the “ideal system,” Reid reiterates his con­
clusions by proposing to test the ultimate worth of such a 
system. He writes*
. • • Extension, figure, motion, may, any one, or all
2 8 I b i d . .  p.  1 2 8 .  2 9 I b i d .
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of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. 
Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not.
If any one of them can be shewn to be an idea of sensa­
tion* or to have the least resemblance to any sensa­
tion, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pre­
tense to common sense in this matter, and must suffer 
the ideal skepticism to triumph. But if, on the other 
hand, they are not ideas of sensation, nor like to any 
sensation, then the ideal system is a rope of sand, and 
all the laboured arguments of the skeptical philosophy 
against a material world, and against the existence of 
every thing but impressions and ideas, proceed upon a
false hypothesis.30
Reid, of course, believes that he has indeed reconciled 
reason to common sense by showing that the material world 
is not in the image of our sensations, as the skeptics have 
heldi the sword in the material world is nothing like the 
pain which he receives as a sensation by touching it, nor 
does it resemble any of the sensations of touch which the 
skeptics allow, Reid judges the reason of the skeptical 
philosophers weak, and without considering their skepticism 
further, he adopts the non-skeptical common sense notions 
of the man unschooled in philosophy.
Nevertheless, the Scottish philosopher offers yet 
another proof for the existence of the external world, one 
reminiscent of Samuel Johnson’s kicking a stone to refute 
Hume. Reid observes that when he presses his hand against 
a table he senses pain and hardness. Pain is a sensation 
of the mindi it does not exist in the table. Conversely, 
hardness abides in the table, in the material world, for 
nothing like it exists in the mind. 31 By touching an ob­
30_Ibid. 31 Re id, Intellectual Powers, pp. 310-11*
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ject the common man and the philosopher alike receive seve­
ral sensations, and also "a conception and an immediate 
natural conviction of external o b j e c t s . I f  we all re­
ceive an immediate conviction of the existence of matter, 
then nothing could weaken this conviction unless it im­
paired our perception or our judgment.
In Reid'8 logical arguments against skepticism, he 
has not demonstrated the existence of the external world, 
nor has he claimed to do so. He has simply demonstrated 
the weakness of the skeptical arguments which call the 
material world into question. Relying heavily upon what 
Reid believes to be the incredibility and absurdity of 
skeptical epistemology to bring about its destruction,
Reid grounds his own constructive arguments in rather 
shaky arguments based on appeals to the popularity of 
belief in the material world, and very little else. As the 
last "test" of the material world shows, men need not be 
convinced by argument of its existencei they are convicted 
of it by their own experiences. If there were a rare in­
stance in which a man were not convinced of the existence 
of the material world by experience, the fault lies with 
him, in his prejudices or in the condition of his mind, and 
not in the common sense proposition that the world exists.
Not only does Reid's epistemology seek to negate 
the effect of the skeptics' view of material existence, it
32Ibid.. p. 313.
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also attempts a refutation of Hume's argument against caus­
ality. Just as he regards the existence of matter as a 
first principle, Reid postulates that causal relations are 
knowable first principles* and that to deny their existence 
is absurd. He holds as a metaphysical principle "That 
whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced 
it,"33 and gives reasons for postulating this. First, Reid 
says, underlying this principle is
The universal consent of mankind, not of philoso­
phers only, but of the rude and unlearned vulgar.
Indeed, with regard to first principles there is 
no reason why the opinion of a philosopher should have 
more authority than that of another man of common 
sense, who has been accustomed to judge in such cases. 
The illiterate vulgar are competent judges; and the 
philosopher has no prerogative in matters of this 
kind; but he is more liable than they to be misled by 
a favourite system, especially if it is his own.34
The uneducated masses may mistakenly give credence to all
manner of beliefs about the origin of the world, but they
always understand some cause. Second, Reid affirms the
self-evident principle of causation because all men act
upon the principle in the marketplace of life even when
they may have reason to doubt it.
In establishing the knowability of the principle 
of causation, as in verifying the existence of the material 
world, Reid relies heavily upon common sense, on the uni­
versal certainty men have of such a principle, and on their 
consistent reliance upon it in conducting their liveE.
3 3 I b i d . , p .  4 5 5 .  3** I b i d . .  p .  4 5 6 .
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Reid's use of his common sense maxims in this case serves 
to point to the manner in which common sense pervades his 
thought and forms its basic logical structure.
III. Empiricism and Philosophy of Science
Another feature of Reid's non-rhetorical thought 
is his consideration of empiricism and the philosophy of 
science. There can be no doubt of Reid's devotion to the 
empiricism which pervaded the thought of most learned men 
of the eighteenth century. He is convinced of the relia­
bility of the empirical method of investigation and attri­
butes man's natural affinity for it to some intrinsic fac­
tor in human composition. Like common sense, the tendency 
to empiricism is a natural inclination of man. In the 
following excerpt Reid reveals his admiration for the empi­
rical method of investigation! Francis Bacon's Novum Orga- 
num is no longer new as Reid views empiricism in his Inqui­
ry Into the Human Mind. He states that
Wise men now agree, or ought to agree, in this, 
that there is but one way to the knowledge of nature's 
works— the way of observation and experiment. By our 
constitution, we have a strong propensity to trace par­
ticular facts and observations to general rules, and to
apply such general rules to account for other effects, 
or to direct us in the production of them. This proce­
dure of the understanding is familiar to every human 
creature in the common affairs of life, and it is the 
only one by which any real discovery in philosophy canbe made.
Here Reid reveals his understanding of the empirical method,
*^Reid,  I n q u i r y , p.  9 7 .
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an inductive process of tracing "particular facts and ob­
servations to general rules," and applying these "general 
rules to account for other effects*" or to use these gener­
al rules to produce desired effects. He reveals his rela­
tion to Isaac Newton when he discusses the manner in which 
Newton derived his philosophical laws of nature, saying 
that "His regulae phllosophandi [principles governing the 
occurrence of phenomena] are maxims of common sense, and 
are practiced every day in common lifej and he who philo­
sophizes by other rules, either concerning the material 
system or concerning the mind, mistakes his aim."3^ Thus 
Reid declares his dependence upon the principles of common 
sense in all the ramifications of philosophy and science. 
Even those principles governing the movements of bodies 
and the workings of the material system of the universe are 
maxims which are reliable in "common life," and for Reid 
apparently they do not have the foreboding aura that some 
philosophers would ascribe to them.
Echoing Bacon, Reid is careful to admonish against 
seeking knowledge of natural phenomena in the wrong ways
If we would know the works of God, we must consult 
themselves with attention and humility, without daring 
to add anything of ours to what they declare. A just 
interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox 
philosophyi whatever we add of our own is apocryphal, 
and of no authority.3'
Certainly it is with devotion to the severest scrutiny that 
36Ibid. 37Ibid.
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he undertakes his Inquiry* Reid regards nothing so sacred 
as to forbid his probing. He expresses this dedication to 
the precepts of empiricism when he states at the beginning 
of the Inquiry that "All we know of the body, is owing to 
anatomical dissection and observation, and it must be by an 
anatomy of the mind that we can discover its powers and 
principles.*^®
In Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid 
again praises the virtues of careful scrutiny, saying*
Of all the discoveries that have been made concern­
ing the inward structure of the human body, never one 
was made by conjecture. Accurate observations of ana­
tomists have brought to light innumerable artifices of 
Nature in the contrivance of this machine of the human 
body, which we cannot but admire as excellently adapted 
to their several purposes. But the most sagacious phy­
siologist never dreamed of them till they were disco­
vered. On the other hand, innumerable conjectures, 
formed in different ages, with regard to the structure 
of the body, have been refuted by observation, and none 
evtr confirmed.
What we have said of the internal structure of the 
human body, may be said, with justice, of every other 
part of the works of God, wherein any real discovery 
has been made. Such discoveries have always been made 
by patient observation, but accurate experiment, or by 
conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from observations 
and experiments! and such discoveries have always tend­
ed to refute, but not to confirm, the theories and hy­
potheses which ingenious men have invented.
As this is a fact confirmed by the history of phil­
osophy in all past ages, it ought to have taught men, 
long ago, to treat with just contempt hypotheses in 
every branch of philosophy, and to despair of ever ad­
vancing real knowledge in that way. The Indian philo­
sopher, being at a lost to know how the earth was sup­
ported, invented the hypothesis of a huge elephant* and 
this elephant he supposed to stand upon the back of a 
huge tortoise. This hypothesis, however ridiculous it 
appears to us, might seem very reasonable to other In-
3®I b i d . .  p .  98.
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dians, who knew no more than the inventor of itj and 
the same will he the fate of all hypotheses invented 
by men to account for the works of God. They may have 
a decent and plausible appearance to those who are not 
more knowing than the inventor» but, when men come to 
be more enlightened, they will always appear ridiculous 
and childish.3°
This scientific method, though it advocates the use of ex­
periment, does not admit the necessity of hypothesis even 
if the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis is con­
tingent upon results of experimentation. When Reid advo­
cates drawing conclusions upon Mstrict reasoning from ob­
servations and experiments" he seems to stress the neces­
sity of induction, but unfortunately he does not spell out 
a system in full. Rather than attempting to provide a 
detailed methodology of science, Reid is more interested 
in admonishing against the pitfalls of conjecture and re­
liance upon a priori assumptions about nature.
The scientist must make some fine distinctions if 
he is to follow Reid's advice about doing scientific inves­
tigation! he must take care not to reject common sense - 
first principles in refusing to be guided by conjecture. 
Reid presents a dliemma for the philosophy of common sense 
when he introduces the example of the Indian philosopher, 
with his elephant and tortoise supporting the earth. If 
the Indian philosopher and millions of Indians like him 
maintain that such a basis of natural philosophy is in 
keeping with their common sense first principles, who is to
39•"Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 235.
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attempt to prove their assertion about nature "ridiculous," 
as Reid says it is? Reid does not make clear exactly what 
he means by "enlightenment," but he implies that the In­
dian philosopher and his followers are not enlightened,
and that when they become so they will recognize the scien-
\
tific error of their supposition. He seems here to regard 
instruction or education as a requisite of good judgment, 
but he discounts the fact that centuries of education in 
Europe did not deter scholars from hypothesizing a universe 
which admitted a belief in the material existence of angels 
and the considerable physical influence of spirits and wit­
ches.
It is apparent also that enlightenment does not 
always make absurd hypotheses about the nature of the world 
appear "ridiculous and childish." Only a relatively short 
time before Reid's writings, for example, protectors of th>; 
church hindered Copernican scholars, notably Galileo, from 
pursuing their investigations, in the name of the supposedly 
enlightened hypotheses of common sense first principles of 
learned theology deeply grounded in Aristotelean principles. 
Quite possibly the Indian philosopher may find as many edu­
cated and enlightened Indians, furthermore, who would uphold 
his extraordinary notions about the universe as Reid could 
find who would not. Educational enlightenment, therefore, 
seems of little consequence in determining which hypotheses 
are and which are not valid.
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Nevertheless, Reid's strong attraction for meti­
culous firsthand observation of phenomena commends itself 
to anyone interested in scientific investigation, and it 
is this attribute of many of the scholars of this era 
which distinguishes the eighteenth century as a period of 
considerable empirical and scientific advancement. An 
outstanding example of Reid's empiricism is his remarkable 
and lengthy essay M0f Seeing," in which he not only reviews 
existing theories on the subject and makes observations 
but relates his own conclusions in great detail, including 
treatises on such physiological subjects as the parallel 
motion of the eyes, squinting, double vision, and the op­
tical phenomenon in which images striking the retina inver-
Uoted appear in an upright position. The essay also serves 
as an example of Reid's own methods of scientific examina­
tion, particularly the portion devoted to the phenomenon 
whereby the mind ignores a sign and immediately notices the 
thing signified by it. Though Reid addresses himself prin­
cipally to sight, he relates his observations briefly to 
signs and the things they signify in speech, indicating 
both his tendency to generalize and his continuing interest 
in language. He writes*
When I see a man at the distance of ten yards, and 
afterwards see him at the distance of a hundred yards, 
his visible appearance, in its length, breadth, and all 
its linear proportions, is ten times less in the last 
case than it is in the firsti yet I do not conceive him 
one inch diminished by this diminution of his visible
R eid ,  I n q u ir y r PP» 1 3 2 -2 0 1 .
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figure. Nay, I do not in the least attend to this 
diminution, even when 1 draw from it the conclusion 
of his being at a greater distance. For such is the 
subtilty of the mind's operation in this case, that we 
draw the conclusion, without perceiving that ever the 
premises entered into the mind, A thousand such in­
stances might be produced, in order to shew that the 
visible appearances of objects are intended by nature 
only as signs or indications! and that the mind passes 
instantly to the things signified, without making the 
least reflection upon the sign, or even perceiving that 
there is any such thing. It is in a way somewhat simi­
lar, that the sounds of a language, after it is become 
familiar, are overlooked,, and we attend only to the 
things signified by them. ^ 1
Noticeably, Reid does not cite statistics gathered by any 
experimentation, and there is lacking any structured pre­
sentation of fact that the twentieth-century theorist often 
employs. In the passage Reid announces that MA thousand 
such instances might be produced, . . . "  but he does not 
produce any of them in his writing to shore up his induc­
tive reasoning. Even if he did produce some of the extant 
thousand examples, if they are like the one cited, they 
would be examples merely of observations which tend to bear 
out the truth of his conclusions, rather than reports of 
any actual experimentation which Reid may have carried out. 
In brief, perhaps the one aspect of Reid's concept 
of the scientific methodology which differs most markedly 
from a modern view is his lack of control. He does not con­
fine his observations in time, for example, an omission 
which allows his reader to speculate that the additional 
examples he speaks of might be noted at any time with the
^ Ibid.. p. 135.
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same results* Furthermore, he leaves the reader to assume 
that all thousand examples are drawn from his own observa­
tions! if they are not all drawn from his own observations 
it is possible that the observations are those of a more 
myopic man, and therefore need to be afforded less credence* 
Though Reid's conclusions rely heavily on induction, his 
presentation is like that of a philosopher arguing for a 
conclusion already reached or for a hypothesis which needs 
defense, and not like that of a philosopher who claims to 
have cast off all prejudiced hypotheses*
Despite some unresolved difficulties in Reid's 
methodology, he remains a thinker unflaggingly devoted to 
the empirical scientific method, an inductive process 
deriving general principles of nature from careful obser­
vation of particular phenomena. Reid finds that with these 
universal laws he can account for the occurrence of other 
phenomena and can bring about the occurrence of phenomena 
by applying these laws* Regardless of the procedure for 
arriving at these laws of nature or the ways of using them, 
Reid cannot comprehend there being any discrepancy between 
natural laws and common sense* He maintains that the best 
procedure for deriving these common sense natural laws is 
an empirical one, and praises the method of accurate and 
careful observation of nature* Heaping contempt upon the 
use of conjecture in scientific undertakings, Reid himself 
relies on conjectural propositions, which he calls first 
principles, to establish his common sense philosophy*
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IV. Of God
Reid's devotion to empiricism and the scientific 
method is as avid aB that of his contemporaries, and his 
treatment of the topic is interesting! his discussion of 
the existence and nature of God, by contrast, is rather 
colorless. Some of the most interesting ideas during the 
century of enlightenment were those about the existence and 
nature of God, Berkeley's being the most novel. Reid, how­
ever, seems only slightly interested in the subject. He 
discusses the existence of God incidentally as it is foun­
ded on a necessary truth, and relates the argument from 
final causes in syllogistic formi "First, That design and 
intelligence in the cause, may, with certainty, be inferred 
from marks or signs of it in the effect." Reid observes 
that atheistic thinkers seem to concede this first premise 
of the teleological argument but deny the second premise,
. That the works of nature are the effects of a wise 
and intelligent Cause." Reid is convinced that recent 
discoveries about the human body provide the "clearest 
marks or signs" of "design and intelligence." More recent 
philosophers, Reid claims, find the first premise the weak­
est onei they maintain that signs of a grand intelligence 
are not perceptible in phenomena, and only signs of physi­
cal causeB may be seen. They claim that the ancient athe­
ists had confused final causes with physical ones and that
R eid ,  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Pow ers, pp. ^6 0 - 6 1 ,
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final causes lie outside the domain of the philosopher*
"Des Carte8 seems to have led the way in this," Reid says,
43"though he was no atheist." J
The existence of a Supreme Being is a necessary 
truth much like a common sense first principle, according 
to Reid. He says that it "is the only necessary truth I 
know of regarding existence." In Reid*s philosophy there 
are two classes of truths, necessary and contingent. Nec­
essary truths have been called "eternal truths," because 
"• • • it is impossible they should not be true at all 
times and in all places." Contingent truths depend for 
their truth upon truths outside themselves and apply to
all notions we have about the existence of everything
44excepting God and the attributes of God. Reid argues 
further that
All other beings that exist depend for their exis­
tence, and all that belongs to it, upon the will and 
power of the first causei therefore, neither their 
existence, nor their nature, nor anything that befalls 
them, is necessary, but contingent.
But, although the existence of the Deity be neces­
sary, I apprehend we can only deduce it from contin­
gent truths. The only arguments for the existence of 
a Deity which I am able to comprehend, are grounded 
upon the knowledge of my own existence, and the exis­
tence of other finite beings. But these are contingent
truths.
To reiterate, the existence of God is a necessary truth 
which may be derived logically from the contingent truths 
of the existence of other beings. However, in treating the
Ibid.. p. 46l. ^ I b i d .. p. 430. ^ipid.
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existence of God, Reid never departs from his belief that 
God's existence is in keeping with the first principles of 
common sense. Although he does devote some attention to 
the Deity, Reid seems virtually to have divorced theology 
from his considerations, possibly because he has no profes­
sional interest in establishing God's existence, as did 
philosophers like Berkeley.
V. Analysis and Conclusions
It appears that Reid's common sense philosophy 
reduces to a kind of philosophical mysticism in which the 
knower knows, and whoever does not see the obvious truth 
is unenlightened because of prejudice or poor judgment.
In religious mysticism the unenlightened might be consi­
dered not of the chosen few, or spiritually unclean, but 
in philosophical musticism the sins of those who do not 
subscribe to the first principles of Scottish philosophy 
are intellectual transgressions. Whether Reid is talking 
about empistemology and the material world, causality, 
empiricism, philosophy of science, aesthetics, or the ex­
istence of God, his thought enters an irrefutable circu­
lar pattern which inevitably returns to the credibility 
of the one who professes to see the common sense truth.
His principles are virtually invulnerable to reason in 
that Reid does not rely on reasoning to establish themj 
they are presuppositions and nothing more.
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Though Reid frequently maintains that men univer­
sally believe the truth of his common sense notions, there 
is no actual inductive attempt to investigate the beliefs 
of all men. The reader is asked to accept on the basis of 
common sense the proposition that all men believe, for 
example, in the existence of the material world. Seeming 
to recognize this strong reliance on a priori assumptions, 
Reid offers many appeals designed to win the reader's appro­
val but not always directed at his appreciation for reason. 
Reid assumes the existence of the external world, for 
instance, and directs his vehement arguments and accusa­
tions against those who would bring the material world 
into question. These arguments do not effectively demon­
strate the existence of matter, but rather the absurdity 
of believing otherwise. His arguments against the skep­
tics and the proponents of theories of ideas are largely 
a series of reductio ad absurdum and ad hominem appeals 
and not logical proofs. In an almost defiant anti-intel­
lectual ism he decides to stand with the vulgar in their 
insistent belief in corporeal existence because their 
judgment is as valid as any other man's. Reid believes 
that the educated are no lesB prone to prejudice and poor 
judgment than the unschooled, and perhaps are even more 
likely to be misled because of infatuation with their own 
erroneous ideas. This is a strange assumption for a scho­
lar and man of letters. The possibility that Reid's phil­
osophy is itself prejudiced becomes apparent when he
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reveals his opinion of the "eaquimaux" who smears himself 
with whale oil and the Canadian who eats dogs* Common 
sense here is provincialism, and condemns a difference of 
custom as the result of misguided judgment.
Of course Reid recognizes that common sense first 
principles are presuppositions, but defends them as having 
a respectable precedent in ancient and modern philosophies* 
He must, however, admit that many of the first principles 
of ancient philosophy are erroneous, and in the following 
passage from his analysis of Aristotelean logic he attempts 
to deal with the problem of specious presuppositions*
Although first principles do not admit of direct 
proof, yet there must be certain marks and characters 
by which those that are truly such may be distinguished 
from counterfeits. These marks ought to be described 
and applied to distinguish the genuine from the spuri­
ous*
In the ancient philosophy, there is a redundance, 
rather than a defect, of first principles* Many 
things are assumed under that character without a just 
title. That nature abhors a vacuum* that bodies do 
not gravitate in their proper placet that the heavenly 
bodies undergo no change* that they move in perfect 
circles, and with an equable motion* such principles 
as these were assumed in the Peripatetic philosophy 
without proof, as if they were self-evident. ^
Reid is aware of the problem of determining objectively 
which propositions are and which are not true first prin­
ciples* he reveals the nature of the "marks or characters" 
which belie a counterfeit in Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man. Reid maintains that the marks or character­
istics which distinguish the true from the false first
46R eid ,  A r i s t o t l e ' s  L o g i c , p .  713*
principles are as well determined by the judgment of the 
vulgar as well as the educated, and that false first prin­
ciples will appear absurd in the mature judgment of all 
men when their minds are unencumbered by prejudice, and 
when they have a clear understanding of the proposition.^ 
Though Reid would doubtless give equal credence to the wis 
dom of Aristotle and that of a Greek sheep herder, he 
would have to admit that the "spurious" nature of the 
first principles he mentions above was certainly not appar 
ent to the keenest minds of the era in which they were 
spawned, nor to the keenest minds for many centuries after 
He would also have to admit that they appeared to be com­
pletely obvious and common sensical to men of many nations 
and many times who knew of them. These principles were, 
indeed, common sense notions for the time in which they 
held sway. One can only observe that Reid's declaration 
of their spuriousness shows his preference for the common 
sense of one age over that of another, and demands an 
account of the improvement of common sense from the fifth 
century B.C. to the eighteenth century A.D. The improve­
ment could not be attributed to more widespread education, 
for common sense is not dependent upon learning to dispel 
prejudice and poor judgment, and may in some cases actual­
ly be hindered by it.
'Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. The disting­
uishing marks of true first principles are discussed more 
thoroughly below, pp. 1 2 8-3 9 .
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Though he relies on the persuasiveness of his rea­
sons for accepting common sense first principles, Reid's 
reasoning is not as persuasive as it needs to he. For 
example, it is difficult to assume that all men take cer­
tain principles for granted, and it is unreasonable to do 
so without polling men on the question, Locke maintains 
that children and idiots have never heard and do not under­
stand some of the principles he called innate ideas, and 
for this reason we cannot declare such ideas universalj 
Reid dismissed the opinions of these persons as being of 
poor judgment, just as he dismisses peculiar beliefs and 
customs of Eskimos and Canadians, and believes he has 
refuted Locke. In Reid's scheme the correctness and incor­
rectness of common sense presuppositions seem based direct­
ly upon Reid' 8  opinion of the one making the common sense 
judgment, and whether such a proposition is correct must 
therefore depend upon how much credibility the speaker can 
muster. When those who hold with Aristotle that the hea­
venly bodies move in perfect circles are in ascendance, 
then that belief will be a common sense principlej and 
when those holding with Heraclitus that all is in flux are 
more popular and credible, then that view will be a first 
principle. The fickle nature of absolute truth in such 
a system of philosophy is an untenable premise from which 
to conclude the existence of universal and knowable truth.
Another weakness in the theory of common sense lies
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in Reid's insistence that when there is a discrepancy
between a proposition and common sense, the proposition is
at fault. Reid says that "A conclusion drawn from true
first principles cannot possibly contradict any decision 
of common sense, because truth will always be consistent
li«with itself." Reid argues at length that the common 
man's knowledge of the existence of the external world and 
of causality is obviously valid and that to believe other­
wise is absurd lunacy, but he does not adequately explain 
the apparent difficulty over the fact that at times not 
only the vulgar and illiterate but the learned men have 
been universally misled into believing false propositions 
about the nature of the world. A lack of right reasoning 
or a universal prejudice is hardly sufficient to explain 
the erroneous ideas about the workings of the universe or 
of the human body prevailing among laborers in the market­
place as well as among scholars in universities only a 
short time before and even during the time of his writing. 
At one time, the proposition that the planets revolve 
around the sun was to most people contrary to common 3ense. 
In this case, at least, it is not the proposition which is 
at fault but common sense, however Reid must argue for the 
contrary.
Were it possible by the most meticulous inductive 
process to determine that all of the illiterate and vulgar
h a
Ibid. . p .  425 .
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masses throughout the world in the eighteenth century 
retained a belief in the geocentric universe, Reid would be 
faced with a dilemma* All men, in such a hypothesis, would 
retain this erroneous notion about the world as a common 
sense first principle, forcing the learned Scottish phil­
osopher either to reject the opinion of those whose judg­
ment is as valid as his own, by his own admission, or to 
accept a conclusion he knows to be spurious. We can only 
conclude that Reid's principle of common sense rests on 
tenuous presuppositions, i.e. that man's constitution cau­
ses him universally to assume certain first principles to 
be true, and that any propositions contrary to these are 
false. The untenability of the idea of universal common 
sense becomes apparent when Reid applies it to aesthetics 
and maintains that the African finds certain facial fea­
tures which are native to his race attractive only because 
"Whole nations by force of prejudice are brought to believ 
the grossest absurdities. . . ." 7 If whole nations can 
be misled, we may justifiably assume that the whole world 
might come to believe things grossly absurd to Reid. When 
such is the case, two questions arise, neither of which 
Reid considers. First, are there times when the entire 
world lies in the darkness of its own prejudice and poor 
judgment? And second, is it possible that Reid is the only 
person who sees without prejudice the transgressions and
kgIbid.. pp. 491-92.
9^
folly of us all? When Reid declares the African's admira­
tion of Negroid facial features is the result of prejudiced 
acceptance of the Hgrossest absurdities," it becomes appar­
ent that the African is not alone in prejudice. The reader 
may justly wonder where exactly the poorer judgment abides.
Reason cannot penetrate the fortress of Reid's com­
mon sense first principles, in which the entirety of Scot­
tish philosophy rests secure, any more than it can destroy 
the assertions of a man who declares ad hoc that he knows 
of the existence of centaurs and unicorns. But neither 
does a wise man buy centaurs from this man. Critically 
analyzing Reid's thought one finds himself indulging in 
the same ad hominem arguments of which Reid is guilty.
The most to be expected from an unfavorable critique of 
Reid's common sense philosophy is revelation of its uroer- 
suasiveness and demonstration of the weakness of Reid's 
reasons for adopting it.
While the presuppositions upon which rests the 
superstructure of Reid's philosophy are untenable, the 
influence of Scottish philosophy is undeniable* it became 
the fulcrum on which the full force of eighteenth-century 
philosophy, particularly epistemology, turned to change its 
emphasis. Francis Bacon and John Locke set the century of 
enlightenment upon its journey into the caverns of solip- 
sistic skepticism, finally bringing about the denial of the 
existence of matter and mind* Thomas Reid pointed the way
out. With Reid, eighteenth-century epistemological theory 
came almost full circle, returning in some senses to its 
point of origin in the innate ideas of men like Ren^ Des­
cartes. Reid reasserted the existence of universally held 
principles, similar in nature to the innate ideas that 
Locke felt it necessary to deny, and made philosophy com­
fortable again with corporeal existence, which Berkeley 
and Hume had questioned.
CHAPTER IV
THOMAS REID ON COMMUNICATION
Communication theory relies on a foundation laid 
deep in philosophical principles. The rhetorician must 
grapple with the philosophical problems of ethics, aesthe­
tics, and logic while seeking a sound ideological substra­
tum for his thought about communication. It is not surpri­
sing, therefore, to find a thinker primarily known for his 
philosophical thought to be interested also in communica­
tion theory. Thomas Reid's writings show an overt interest 
in the origin, nature, and use of language, and his remarks 
in references thoughout his philosophical works point to­
ward a theory of communication. Certainly important to any 
system of thought about communication is the author's con­
sideration of logic and ethics, because these aspects of 
any philosophical system are two of the bases of classical 
and modern rhetorical theory. Reid also demonstrates inter­
est in style and aesthetics, and in his discourses he speci­
fically treats menoryi all of these are topics of interest 
as rhetorical canons, and have been since ancient times. 
Because of his empiricistic inclination to probe the un­
known, Reid explored the various parts of the oral cavity 
and speculated about their functions. He also discussed the 
faculty of hearing, thuB making two important early investi­
gations of fundamental factors in human communication. This
chapter will include discussion of Reid's ideas about the
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origin, nature, and use of language» logici ethicsi style 
and aestheticsi memoryi and speech and hearing*
I. General Considerations of the Origin,
Nature, and Use of Language
The Origin of Language
In common sense.— In his discussion of the origin 
of language, Reid remains consistent with his philosophy 
of common sense, in that the basis of language, to him, 
lies in universally comprehended "natural signs." Reid 
perceives natural signs as those which men understand by 
virtue of their constitution, without being taught and 
without previously agreeing upon a meaning. He says, more 
explicitly, that natural signs consist of bodily motions, 
facial expressions, and vocal modulations. For example, 
one may infer that Reid believed a nodding of the head to 
convey affirmation the world over, and so on with other 
bodily motions. A discussion of the fuller ramifications 
of Reid's theory of natural signs appears in Section IV of 
this chapter, but this brief definition is required for any 
further discussion of the origin of language.
Like other features of Reid's philosophy, his con»- 
cept of the origin of language arises from his notion of
iThomas Reid, An Inquiry Into the Human Mind, in The 
Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edin­
burgh i Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3 ), I, 117-18.
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common sense. Language has its origin in commonly under­
stood principles not unlike unversally accepted common 
sense notions (cf. Chapter III above). In a letter to Dr. 
James Gregory Reid envisions language as having definite 
organic characteristics. He says*
Language is like a tree, which, from a small seed, 
grows imperceptibly, till the fowls of the air lodge 
in its branches, and the beasts of the earth rest 
under its shadow. The seed of language is the natural 
signs of our thoughts, which nature has taught all men 
to use, and all men to understand, But its growth is 
the effect of the united energy of all who do or ever 
did use it. One man pushes out a branch, another a 
leaf, one smooths a rough part, another lops off an 
excrescense. Grammarians have,without doubt, contri­
buted much to its regularity and beautyi and philoso­
phers, by increasing our knowledge, have added many a 
fair branch to iti but it would have been a tree with­
out the aid of either.2
Reid’s declaration that language would have grown quite , 
well without the help of those who make a study of it is in 
keeping with his distrust of scholarly pursuits, though he 
does not malign the efforts of those who would serve as 
husbandmen to the health and growth of language. Also im­
portant in this passage is Reid's acknowledgment that it is 
the combined effect "of all who do or ever did use it," 
rather than the efforts or customs of any particular group, 
which brings about the maturation of language. Seemingly 
language is not corrupted by the vulgar, who disregard its 
"regularity and beauty" but is developed and assisted in its
2Thomas Reid, Letter XI to Dr. James Gregory, Aug­
ust 26, 1787, in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir 
William Hamilton (Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), 
I, 71.
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evolution by the vulgar and the educated alike.
Even more significant here is Reid's declaration 
that the basis of language is natural signs. Language 
develops inevitably and irrepressibly as a projection of 
man's constitutioni it is instilled by nature. MHad lang­
uage in general been a human invention, as much as writing
or printing,” Reid argues, "we should find whole nations as
3mute as the brutes.
In man's ethical nature.— While natural signs give
rise to language, language does not always result from
natural signs. Only man makes language from natural signs,
and he does so by virtue of an ethical characteristic of
his nature. Reid saysi
Indeed, even the brutes have some natural signs by 
which they express their own thoughts, affections.; and 
desires, and understand those of others. A chick, as 
soon as hatched, understands the different sounds where­
by its dam calls it to food, or gives the alarm of da*, 
ger. A dog or a horse understands, by nature, when the 
human voice caresses, and when in threatens him. But 
brutes, as far as we know, have no notion of contracts 
or covenants, or of moral obligation to perform them.
If nature had given them these notions, she would pro­
bably have given them natural signs to express them.
And where nature has denied these notions, it is as im­
possible to acquire them by art, as it is for a blind 
man to acquire the notions of colours. Some brutes are 
sensible of honour or disgrace\ they have resentment and 
gratitudej but none of them, as far as we know, can make 
a promise or plight their faith, having no such notions 
from their constitution. And if mankind had not these 
notions by nature, and natural signs to express them by, 
with all their wit. and ingenuity they would never have 
invented language.
^Reid, I n q u ir y , p .  118 .  ^ I b i d .
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Thus because of his notion of "moral obligation" man is 
driven to fulfil his duty to keep his contracts and cove­
nants regarding the use of the signs of languagei he is 
able to sustain language as a usable and reliable tool*
Only if contracts are kept can man add to his natural lang­
uage an "artificial" language in the form of words. Pre­
cisely how far Reid means for the ramifications of this 
moral basis of language to extend is uncertain, but at 
least Reid believes that the very foundation of language 
lies in a moral substrata, man's ability to make and main­
tain binding contracts. Perhaps the implications of Reid's
theory of the moral basis of language go even deeper than 
a simple repudiation of such transgressions as neologisms, 
barbarisms, and obscurity, extending into more intricate 
forms of discourse.
In the origin of the sentence.— Reid also believe! 
that language began not with single words or parts of speech 
but with the sentence. He says that "In speech, the true 
natural unit is a sentence• No man intends less when he 
speaksi what is less than a compleat sentence is not speech, 
but a part or parts of speech. Reid finds it unbe­
lievable that parts of speech were conceived before speech 
was used. He argues in the following manner*
That the parts of speech should be conceived before
^Reid, L e t t e r  XI to  Gregory, p .  71 .
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speech was in use, and that speech should at first ba 
formed by putting together parts of speech, which 
before had got names, seems to be altogether incredi­
ble i no less incredible than if it should be said, they 
first formed the conception of matter, then the con­
ception of form, and, putting these two together they 
got the conception of body, which is made up of matter 
and form*0
Reid seems to find it probable that men at one time con­
veyed in a single sound or word what we might employ an 
entire sentence to convey. One word may have meant "Give 
me bread," for instance, while another meant "Take bread," 
and still another, "Eat bread." By noting the commonality 
existing in each of the three terms (the sound bread) a 
word for bread can be abstracted from the three original 
expressions to become a unit of speech. Thus language did 
not evolve from simple parts into a complicated whole.
Rather the sentence was the primary building block of all 
language, though a sentence may be expressed by a single 
word or phrase. Reid cites examples which he believes be;, 
out this phenomenon. In Latin and Greek verbs, " . . .  be­
sides the radical signification of the verb, its voice, 
mood, tense, person, and number are all expressed in one 
word." Reid also cites the work of Charlevoix on languages 
in Canada to demonstrate that one word can signify what the 
English language may take several words to express. For 
example, a single " . . .  verb very often expresses the whole
6 I b i d .
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sentence,M^ For Reid, then, the sentence is the primary 
unit of all languages, and it is the smallest unit of 
speech. Only after the sentence was in use did men ab­
stract the parts of speech which comprise sentences.
Summary,— Reid conceives language as having its 
origin in the natural constitution of man, in his propen-, 
sity to understand and use natural signs which amount to 
bodily motions, facial expressions, and vocal modulations. 
Man has improved on language by altering its natural . 
growth, but language would have grown and matured without 
the assistance of those who altered it. One might imagine 
that Reid has in mind a comparison of language to a plant 
in a fine garden, flourishing under the care of the gar­
dener but never depending on him for maturity or health.
The beauty and utility of language are augmented with the 
accretion of ariticial signs on which men must agree and 
make compacts to establish meaning. Other animals are in­
capable of inventing language more complex than natural 
signs because they do not possess a moral sense by which to 
make the durable compacts and agreements necessary to create 
artificial signs and language. Evolving out of the natural 
constitution of man, language comes into use first as primi-
^Ibid. Reid refers to the writing of the French 
Jesuit, Pierre Francois Xavier de Charlevoix (1 6 8 2-1 7 6 1 ). 
See, e.g., Charlevoix, Journal of a Voyage to North America 
(facsimile editionj Ann Arbori University Microfilms,
1966), I, 299-303.
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tive natural signs and then as more complicated artificial 
signs. Men first use the signs of language to mean com­
plete sentencesi later these sentences are differentiated 
into words and phrases which possess individual grammatical 
meanings (parts of speech). Reid declares it reasonable 
that the sentence is Mthe true natural unit” of speech and 
proclaims that the sentence appeared on the scene full­
blown, though he admits that it may not have been composed 
of several words but rather of only one complicated connec­
ted utterance. In brief, language is an inevitable natural 
phenomenon growing out of man's original comprehension of 
natural signsi his sense of moral obligation opens the way 
for his use of artificial signs, a symbol system relying on 
compacts and agreements with other men in order to ascribe 
meanings to signs.
The Nature of Language
Constant change in language.— In discussing the 
origin of language in natural signs Reid employed a meta­
phor comparing language to a tree* in the same letter to 
Dr. James Gregory he constructs another metaphor, this time 
likening language to a machine continually undergoing chan­
ges in design to increase its utility. He writes*
I rather consider it [language] a huge and complicated 
machine, which was very imperfect at first, but gradu­
ally received improvements from the judgment and inven­
tion of all who used it in the course of many ages.
It is a machine which every man must use, and which 
he finds of such utility and importance, that, if he has
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any genius, he has sufficient inducement to employ it 
in making language more subservient to his purpose.
So fond are ingenious men to invent such improve­
ments in language, and so prone the multitude to adopt 
them, when they please the public taste, that all lang­
uages are perpetually changing, according to the beau­
tiful simile of Horace—  Utsilvae foliis pronos mutan- 
tur in annos. &c. In a rude language it is easy to 
make improvementsi and changes that are found useful 
and important, though invented by one man, will soon be 
adopted by the multitude.
Thus the inventions of thousands of ingenious men, 
in the succession of ages, all employed upon this one 
machine, bring it by insensible degrees to its perfec­
tion! as knowledge grows, language grows along with it, 
till it arrive at that stately form which we contem­
plate with admiration.
A primary improvement to come to language was the artifi­
cial sign, the assignment of meanings to symbols, a process 
which continues to change language. Reid's view of lang­
uage as being in constant flux is most interesting in that 
he does not believe that the process of change inevitably 
brings about the corruption of language. On the contrary, 
rather than viewing language as a perfect structure which 
change can only corrupt, he sees it as a relatively crude 
instrument which is refined and improved by use. Natural 
signs comprise language in its earliest form, and the inven­
tion of artificial signs made additions and distinctions 
which gave, and continue to give, precision to language, 
making possible ever more complex communication. By virtue 
of man's continuing efforts, language is improvedj its im­
provement is closely associated with the advancement of
^ Ibid.. p. 70.
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knowledge•
Knowledge about the world, as Reid was undoubtedly 
aware, was rapidly expanding in the eighteenth century.
Such accretions in knowledge bring a new abundance of terms 
which deal more precisely with newly discovered phenomena 
or new inventions. While scholarly pursuits require lang­
uage to increase in quantity and accuracy of terms in order 
to accommodate its more critical needs, advances in know­
ledge contribute to and change language at the same time. 
Obviously when experiments with steam led to discoveries of 
its use as a means of propulsion, there was a need for a 
new term, steam engine. to facilitate communication about 
the invention. In this case the pursuit of knowledge pre­
sented the need for a new term, and language responded in 
this case with the fusion of two older words to form a term 
with new meaning. In another instance, and change in the 
semantic quality of a term might make possible a new direc­
tion in the pursuit of knowledge, e.g. if the terms cosmos 
and universe had retained their medieval Christian connota­
tions, it is difficult to believe that information about 
the advances made in astronomy and physics during the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries would ever have been widely
i
disseminated. Thus changes in the use of language can faci­
litate the advancement of knowledge.
Reid seems to regard language and the scholarly pur­
suits as inextricably associated, each contributing to the 
mutual quality and maturity of the other. Although the
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philosopher has a place of importance in the evolution of 
a more perfect language, it is not the philosopher's ef­
forts alone, but the "inventions of thousands of ingenious 
men" which move language toward a state of perfection.
Interestingly, Reid does not talk of the tendency 
of language to become sullied as the masses use it to their 
own ends. Many men have used the machine of language, and 
in using it, have altered it perhaps only infinitesimally 
to better accommodate their own purposes* but in altering 
the machine none has necessarily transgressed on a sacred 
trust. The majority of the signs in language are artifi­
cial ones, and therefore are not God-given but man-made, 
and hence subject to the improvements which man can make 
upon them.
Language as the rightful property of the masses.—  
Far from suggesting that language is corrupted as it is 
used by the common man, Reid's entire philosophical posi­
tion regarding common sense rests on the validity of the 
way in which the unschooled man uses his terms. The vulgar 
understand perfectly well that the material world exists, 
and to say the contrary is absurd. In other words, they 
understand the term to exist as meaning to have material 
being. and of course it is for this reason principally that 
Reid holds the philosophy of the skeptics in such utter con­
tempt. Reid's confidence in the common man's proper use of 
language leads him to maintain that language is improved,
10?
not corrupted, by the unschooled masses. At one point, in 
his discussion of the relation of sensations to percep­
tions, Reid defines the rightful province of language as 
servant to the majority of mankind, who are unschooled in 
the subtleties of philosophy. He argues that we ought not
• • • expect that the sensation, and its corresponding 
perception, should be distinguished in common language, 
because the purposes of common life do not require it. 
Language is made to serve the purposes of ordinary con­
versation! and we have no reason to expect that it 
should make distinctions that are not of common use.°
Philosophical discourse is not "ordinary conversation,"
and therefore "common language" presents the philosopher
with problems.
Philosophers deal with an imperfect tool, ill-adap­
ted to the task to which they put it when they employ the 
language of the vulgar in making minutely precise distinc­
tions sometimes required by their discipline. If language 
is the tool of the philosopher, then the tool must be im­
proved to facilitate the advancement of knowledge. Like an 
astronomer who attributes long-standing errors about the 
universe to the lack of precision in his crude instruments, 
Reid attributes errors about the functions of human under­
standing to a crude instrument, language, which not only 
conveys the philosopher's observations but also provides 
the intellectual matrix from which new thought comes into
oThomas Reid, Kssa.yB on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, D»D». ed. Sir William 
Hamilton (Edinburgh i Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3 ), I, 310.
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being. Just as the telescope and the sextant improve the. 
sciences of astronomy and navigation, so improvements in 
language as a tool of observation and evaluation facili­
tate the advancement of knowledge• For example, language 
was improved as an instrument of observation when the term 
universe lost its connotation of forbidding holiness; re­
moval of the religious aura surrounding the term made pos­
sible more accurate evaluations of cosmic phenomena.
Regardless of whose purposes language is made to 
serve, philosophers and other un-common men continuously 
employ it for purposes other than those of "ordinary con­
versation." Therefore when language is put to unusual 
tasks a frequent problem is ambiguity of terms, about which 
Reid says that " . . .  distinguishing its [a term's] differ­
ent meanings removes all perplexity, and enables us to give 
clear and distinct answers to questions about which philo­
sophers have held much dispute."1® In order to adapt lang­
uage to uncommon purposes, precision must be the principal 
aim. To extend Reid's metaphor of the machine, the perfec­
tion of language in this manner is comparable to designing 
a complicated machine to progressively more exacting stan­
dards to increase its efficiency of performance.
Language as related to thought.— Another aspect of 
the nature of language which Reid treats is the relation
10Ibid.
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between language and thought. His reliance here on ling­
uistic principles to determine the nature and functions of 
the mind is possibly one of the best demonstrations in all 
his work of the Scottish philosopher's interest in language. 
His common sense philosophy hangs upon the way in which 
common men use language! their use of a term clearly indi­
cates that they believe the thing which the term signifies 
exists as a material entity. If Reid's conclusions about 
the mind are valid, then there must be a viable relation 
between the mind and language. Reid affirms«
Language is the express image and picture of human 
thoughts? and, from the picture, we may often draw 
very certain conclusions with regard to the original.
We find in all languages the same parts of speech—  
nouns substantive and adjective, verbs active and pas­
sive,.varied according to the tenses of past present, 
and futurei we find adverbs, prepositions, and con­
junctions. There are general rules of syntax common 
to all languages. This uniformity in the structure of 
language shows a certain degree of uniformity in hose 
notions upon which the structure of language is groun­
ded.
We find, in the structure of all languages, the 
distinction of acting and being acted upon, the distinc­
tion of action and agent, of quality and subject, and 
many others of the like kindj which shews that these 
distinctions are founded in the universal sense of man­
kind. We shall have frequent occasion to argue from 
the sense of mankind expressed in the structure of lang* 
uage* and therefore it was proper here to take notice 
of the force of arguments drawn from this topic.11
Whether Reid's observations about language are indeed fac­
tual is of little or no importance to an analysis of his 
thought, though some of his proclamations are perplexing 
and questionable. The more important consideration is that
11 Ibid.. p. 233.
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Reid believed them to be accurate. Of course, the reader 
likely has a difficult problem overlooking an observation 
such as the one that all languages have three tenses, 
especially when Reid provides no evidence of such a fact 
and seems to believe that none is necessary. Reid’s critic 
can more profitably make an ad hoc assumption of the valid­
ity of his assertions and work from that assumption.
Reid’s argument is that if all languages have simi­
lar rules governing their syntax, then there must also be 
a commonality in the minds of men which brings about this 
similarity. He believes that language can provide an 
accurate picture of the human understanding, and this is 
why language abides at the crux of Reid's major works.
Man's linguistic structures reveal his understanding, and 
Reid employs these linguistic structures like a microscope 
to peer into the mind of man. For instance in Essays on 
the Active Powers of Man Reid concludes that all men have 
a notion of the active powers, since they employ active as
well as passive verbs and comprehend by them acting and
12being acted upon. The philosopher does not relate how 
he arrived at the conclusion that all languages have simi­
lar rules of syntax, nor does he offer proof. Though he 
did know Latin, Greek, and French, as is evidenced in his 
writings, and despite his information on American Indian
12Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 
in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton 
(Edinburgi Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), II, 5 1 5 , passim.
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languages gathered from Charlevoix's travelogue, there is
no evidence in his writings that his linguistic knowledge
went far enough beyond this to warrant such an assertion.
From Clarlevoix Reid seems to derive the idea that the rules
of usage governing the languages of the savages are the
same as those regulating the use of other languages. He
comments on the similarity between the number of moods and
tenses of the Greek verbs and those of the Indians, and
points out that in the language of some Canadian tribes
l 3the object of the verb and the verb itself are fused. J
Reid never reveals any concern over whether he 
might be superimposing a classical grammatical and syntac­
tic structure on languages like those of American Indians 
which possibly have no necessary relation to such a gram­
mar or syntax. Modern linguists might question Reid's 
first premises regarding the relation of language to 
thought, but the important fact is Reid's belief that there 
abides a clear relationship between man's language and his 
thought and that he could draw conclusions about the latter 
by observing the former.
Reid resolves that language is the image of thought 
and that the nature of thought can be known by understanding 
the nature of language. He also judges the converse to be 
true, that thought is influenced by the nature of language. 
In Hssays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses
1 3Reid, L e t t e r  XI to  Gregory,  p.  71*
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Francis Bacon's idols of the mind, and in discussing the 
idols of the forum he writesi
The idola fori are the fallacies arising from the 
imperfections and the abuse of language, which is an 
instrument of thought as well as of the communication 
of our thoughts.
Whether it be the effect of constitution or of 
habit, I will not take upon me to determine! but, from 
one or both of these causes, it happens that no man 
can pursue a train of thought or reasoning without the 
use of language. Words are the signs of our thoughts! 
and the sign is so associated with the thing signified, 
that the last can hardly present itself to the imagina­
tion, without drawing the other along with it.
A man who would compose in any language must think 
in that language. If he thinks in one language what 
he would express in another, he thereby doubles his 
labouri and, after all, his expressions will have more 
the air of a translation than of an original.
This shews that our thoughts take their colour in 
some degree from the language we use! and that, although 
language ought always to be subservient to thought, yet 
thought must be, at some times and in some degree, sub­
servient to language.
As a servant that is extremely useful and necessary 
to his master, by degrees acquires an authority over 
him, so that the master must often yield to the servant,
such is the case with regard to language. Its intention
is to be a servant to the understanding! but it is so 
useful and so necessary that we cannot avoid being some­
times led by it when it ought to follow. We cannot 
shake off this impediment— we must drag it along with 
us! and, therefore, must direct our course, and regulate 
our pace, as it permits.I**
Unfortunately Reid invites speculation on this matter by 
offering no examples to clarify his meaning. If, because
of his constitution, man cannot think without using lang­
uage, then thought is dependent on language. If, on the 
other hand, it is only by habit that man's thinking is 
dependent on his use of language, then were he suddenly
1 AR eid ,  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Powers, p .
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deprived of language he would not be long in developing 
(or re-developing) the skill of thinking without the use 
of language. Though Reid recognizes that words are the 
signs of thought, he sees that the thought and the sign 
are indistinguishably fused, making thought inextricably 
associated with the use of language and allowing language 
to have its great effect upon thought.
One way in which language affects thought, and 
thereby our view of the world, is seen in the restrictions 
which linguistic practices can place upon thought* In 
entire sections of society the semantic content of a term 
frequently alters and restricts thought, reshaping the 
world in the image of a termj examples of such alteration 
of thought occur with regard to terms associated with racial 
prejudice. When the racially prejudiced person understands 
the term nigger invariably to include such undesirable 
qualities as slovenliness, inferiority, ignorance, and vio­
lence he can never reconcile such a statement as "Black is 
beautiful." Reid regards this alliance of language and 
thought as a weakness of language which must be painfully 
tolerated and which brings about such fallacies as the one 
described above. In the preceding passage from his writing 
Reid calls the relationship an "impediment" and laments 
that we are doomed to "drag it along with us," but the al­
ternative would be a rather vague and impossible kind of 
pure thought, perhaps a most appealing ideal to the philo-
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sopher but nevertheless a doubtful possibility.
As the racially prejudiced person creates his own 
myopia about the state of matters, so do all men create 
and sustain the lenses through which they view existence, 
and in this way determine whether their world view will 
be naively sanguine or painfully gloomy. Supposedly there 
is some point at which a clear and accurate view of exis­
tence is possible.
Reid himself offers only brief examples of how
language and thought mutually affect one another, and
these are less concrete and explicit than one might wish.
Continuing his discussion of Bacon's idols of the forum
he speculates*
In the early periods of society, rude and ignorant 
men use certain forms of speech, to express their 
wants, their desires, and their transactions with one 
another. Their language can reach no farther than 
their speculations and notions} and, if their notions 
be vague and ill-defined, the words by which they ex­
press them must be so likewise.*->
His example is consistent with his view of language as an 
impediment, a servant which has usurped the rightful domi­
nance of thought and become the master. Thought can occa­
sionally but infrequently recapture its place of power.
Though in this example Reid speaks of the way pri­
mitive men employed language, he does not imagine that 
matters have improved a great deal by the eighteenth century. 
There is little probability of making language totally sub-
15Ibid.
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servient to thought or divorcing one from the other, but 
in order to facilitate the use of language in more demand­
ing tasks such as those put to it by philosophy, the attempt 
must be made. Reid suggests that the language of the philo­
sopher be improved by augmenting its store of terms and by 
making their meanings clearer, H. • . and that improvements 
in knowledge and in language may go hand in hand to facili­
tate each other. But I fear the imperfections of language 
can never be perfectly remedied while our knowledge is im­
perfect. Hence while language hinders the accuracy and 
facility of thought, and while immature and imperfect thought 
hinders the use of language, it is not imperative that such 
an undesirable situation perpetually exist. Knowledgeable 
men must put forth appropriate efforts to overcome the 
difficulties of language first by overcoming impediments 
which exist in thought, and then by creating terms to accom­
modate such disciplines as philosophy and by being more dis­
criminate in the use of these terms, continually insisting 
on precise definitions.
Reid affirms his belief that the deficiencies of lang­
uage are not irreparable, and that it is not doomed to become 
ever more corrupt with use. On the contrary, Reid seems to 
envision language with definite organic characteristics! when 
it stops growing and changing, it begins to waste away.
l6Ibid.
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Summary.— In Reid's philosophy, language is in con­
stant flux brought about by man's desires to improve the 
linguistic tools which serve his purposes. At one point 
Reid chooses the metaphor of a tree to illustrate the matu­
ration of language! at another time he illustrates the ef­
fect of the alterations man brings to language with a meta­
phor of a machine to signify the increasing perfection 
which man affords language. This emphasis upon the improve­
ments which man brings to his language is consistent with 
Reid's view of language as rightfully belonging to the vul­
gar and the unlearned. The learned disciplines must refine 
language to perform the unusual tasks of philosophy and 
science. Along with the assertion that language is the 
rightful property of the common man, Reid claims a ratio 
between language and thought, making possible analysis of 
the constitution of common men by examination of their use 
of language. The existence of the material world is estab­
lished linguistically, and language provides the basic prin­
ciples of much of Reid's thought. The relation between lang­
uage and thought is reciprocal! while thought influences and 
reveals itself in language, language influences and defines 
the limits of thought. Reid finds that objects in the ex­
ternal world hardly appear to the imagination before the 
words used to signify the objects also appear. This fusion 
of language with thought makes it impossible for man to con­
sider one without the other. Briefly, language is the ever-
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improving tool of the common man, used only incidentally 
for philosophical and scholarly purposes. Because language 
mirrors the mind, it can reveal the nature and function of 
the understanding and increase knowledge of the constitution 
of man. At the same time that language is made in the
image of thought, thought is affected by language, thus
making language a tool created by an artisan, man, whose 
behaviour and nature are subsequently altered by his crea­
tion.
The Use of Language
The utilitarian and rhetorical properties of lang­
uage .— In his philosophy Reid also made observations rele­
vant to the use of language. He considered its utilitarian 
and rhetorical nature, its adaptation to the ordinary tasks 
for which men use it, and its ability to motivate others 
and thereby to promote the aims of those who employ it.
The constant emphasis in Reid's thought is on usefulness of 
language in accomplishing ordinary tasks. Again and again
where his writing touches on language Reid insists that it
serves the common man in mundane enveavors. "Language is 
made to serve the purposes of ordinary conversation;" he
says, "and we have no reason to expect that it should make
17distinctions not of common use." ' Reid's insistence that 
philosophical inquiries make frequent mistakes by attempting
17Ibid., p. 310.
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to make extraordinary semantic distinctions which are not 
in keeping with the normal demands placed on language by 
the unlearned masses has already been discussed in this 
chanter. Just as the butcher's utensils cannot adequately 
perform the functions of a surgeon's equipment, so lang­
uage as it is employed by most men does not suit the cri­
tical demands of the philosopher. Though he demands that 
better and more careful distinctions be made among words 
to make them useful to philosophy, Reid deplores the dis­
tinction made between perceptions and sensations by his
18eighteenth-century philosophical antagonists. Always, 
stressing the common uses of language, Reid admonishes 
devotees of his own discipline to perfect the tools of 
language borrowed from the unlearned if they are to be 
used for the impractical purposes of philosophy.
The noble use of language.— Though Reid regards 
the use of language as primarily the province of the 
common man, language is nonetheless noble. In Reid's 
philosophy, language in oratory is among the noblest of 
arts but not an art for its own sake. As in many arts, 
the purpose of using language is to motivate, to bring the 
full weight of language to bear upon the minds of the audi­




But in the noblest arts, the mind is also the subject 
upon which we operate. The painter, the orator, the 
moralist, and the statesman, attempt to operate upon 
the mind in different ways, and for different ends; 
and they succeed according as they touch properly the 
strings of the human frame. Nor can their several arts 
ever stand on a solid foundation, or rise to the dig­
nity of science, until they are built on the principles 
of the human constitution.1 '
Reid seems to understand all the arts as rhetorical in 
function, in the sense that they seek to achieve an end 
and to affect the mind which they encounter. But Reid 
does not believe the rhetorical arts can attain the great­
ness of which they are capable until they learn all they 
can about the human being through careful empirical scru­
tiny. Here again Reid is less explicit than his readers 
could desire, but in expanding his idea he advocates obser­
ving, experimenting, and drawing generalizations about the
?0human constitution from the individual facts observed«
Reid likely means that the artist interested in 
dignifying the oratorical use of language might reflect 
on how the minds of men have responded to a particular 
appeal, and he might further observe the effect of this 
appeal upon audiences. The artist might then generalize 
from his observations that all men respond in a certain 
fashion to the appeal which he has observed in use. Seem­
ingly, Reid would commend experimental research in rhetori­
cal theory, but his prescription is less than adequate for 
this kind of research in the twentieth century primarily
^Reid, Inquiry, p. 97. 2Qlbid.
120
because he is not explicit about controls of time and the 
quantity of subjects to be studied* He has no aversion to 
relying on memory as a store of observations from which to 
draw needed information, either in his own writing or in 
his prescriptions.
Interestingly, the use of language to "touch pro­
perly the strings of the human frame" ranks among graphics, 
ethics, and statecraft in its worth as an art. Reid does 
conceive language as a tool to "operate upon the mind," 
seemingly bending it by persuasion to suit the ends of the 
artist. There is apparently no diminution of the dignity 
of the art of oratory due to its function of influencing 
the minds of auditors with persuasive ploys. In fact,
Reid suggests a way to improve the art and raise it to 
the dignity of a science.
The use of language to reveal the human constitu­
tion.—  In order for the art of oratory to become a science, 
thorough investigations must be made into the nature of 
the mind, and Reid reveals one method by which such under­
takings may be accomplished. The relation of language to 
thought was treated in the discussion of the nature of lang­
uage in this chapter, but a reiteration of some of Reid's 
considerations of this matter is appropriate here in dis­
cussing the improvement of oratory and other arts. In A 
Brie.f Account of Aristotle's Logic Reid once again refers 
to the topic of the relation of thought to language, this
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time in connection with the use of language to probe the 
intricacies of the mind and to discover the places where 
the skills of the artist, whether orator, painter, moral­
ist, or statesman, can apply his appeals to achieve the 
desired effect. Reid writes that "language being the ex­
press image of human thought, the analysis of the one must 
correspond to that of the other," and he adds regarding 
matters of concern to the rhetoriciani
Things that are distinguished in all languages, such 
as substance and quality, action and passion, cause 
and effect, must be distinguished by the natural powers 
of the human mind. The philosophy of grammar, and that 
of human understanding, are more nearly allied than is 
commonly imagined.21
Thus discovery of the principles governing mental concep­
tions of "action and passion, cause and effect," are linked 
with grammatical principles which must be scrutinized in 
order to gain knowledge of the intricacies of the mind.
One who would move men's minds must first understand thos- 
minds by studying the manner in which men employ language.
He further observes that though some have examined 
the nature of language, as Aristotle did, much more care­
ful and copious scrutiny is demanded in investigation of 
such utterances as propositions, prayers, wishes, ques­
tions, commands, promises, contracts, and others. About 
these investigations He id says j
?\Thomas He id, A brief Account of Aristotle's Lo­
gie, in The Works of Thomas Reid, P.P., ed. Sir William 
Ham i 1. t;on~Tui inburgh » (Viaelachlan and Stewart, 1863), II»
601-0 2.
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. . .  I apprehend that an analysis of such speeches, 
and of the operations of mind which they express, would 
be of real use, and perhaps would discover how imperfect 
an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers of 
human understanding, when they reduce them to Simple 
Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning.M
Thus Reid broadens the scope of the philosophers* task to 
include the study of all aspects of language with the aim 
of increasing knowledge of the functions of the mind. Even 
with this additional explanation, however, the exact pro­
cedure for drawing conclusions about the understanding re­
mains nebulous. Because he believes that active and pas­
sive verbs appear universally in language, Reid concludes 
that men have a notion of being active and of being pas­
sive, and because they use terms in a fashion which implies 
their firm belief in a material world, he is able to de­
clare it a common sense belief, thereby reinforcing its 
credibility. Following Reid's procedure, an orator might 
observe that in all languages men have terms for good and 
evil, and that they avoid the latter and seek the former.
He might reason further that if his proposals are to be 
heeded, they must appeal to the common sense principle that 
men recognize and seek the good.
The logical process from the observation of parti­
cular phenomena to the final generalization and applica­
tion does not seem solely inductive, however. Certainly
22Ibid., p. 692.
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the artist might generalize from isolated instances in 
which audiences have sought the good and rejected the pro­
posal that there is a principle underlying the behavior 
of all men which demands that they respond in this manner. 
The procedure for employing language to discover the nature 
of the mind, and to make the proper appeals to that mind, 
is only partly inductive. An inductive procedure can carry 
the artist only to a generalization about the world, and 
from that point he must rely on some judgment about what 
he ought to do in his discourse.
If analyzing language to determine the composition 
of the mind means that we should employ inductive and deduc­
tive reasoning, then his proposal is not novel in the leasti 
but this is not the entirety of his proposal. The main 
point Reid presses upon his reader is that a man's notions 
can be inferred from the way he uses language. The proce­
dure presupposes two things: that the orator can know how
all men use language or can generalize about it, supposedly 
from an ample universe of subjects; and that the use of 
language is a clear indication of the notions in the minds 
of all men. The worth of Reid's proposal that the artist 
and the scholar analyze language, however, does not abide 
in its novelty but in its utility to the artist, particu­
larly the orator. Inevitably, the thoughtful person makes 
judgments based on the manner in which language is used by 
others. The most sophisticated modern psychological tests
124
must make judgments about the mind of the subject while 
relying upon responses to language or on verbal or writ­
ten responses to stimuli* This modern method of analyzing 
language to determine the nature of the mind is, doubtless, 
an extreme refinement of Reid's proposed method, but Reid's 
proposal contains the seed of a most interesting and poten­
tially rewarding psychological methodology.
Summary*— Language is a serviceable tool of man, 
who developed and improved and now applies it to his pur­
poses* Though language is used primarily to carry out the 
common tasks of unlearned men, Reid imbues it with no less 
nobility and dignity than any arti it is the tool of the 
orator and the statesman as well as the butcher and the 
mechanic. Reid wishes the arts, including oratory, to have 
a more respectable (i.e.. scientific) basis, and believes 
that arts can be dignified only when the artist discovers 
the mysterious sensitivities of the human constitution 
which he somehow touches when his art affects those who 
perceive his work in the form of speech, painting, or writ­
ten discourse. By having such knowledge of the human 
makeup, responses can be more exactly elicited and more 
predictable, and for these reasons Reid apparently would 
consider the noble arts more scientific and more useful in 
serving the purposes for which they are employed.
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I I .  Logic
There seems to be some agreement, spoken or unspo­
ken, about the manner in which we will talk about our think­
ing in order to communicate with our auditorsi the study 
of the nature and operations of this agreement is the 
sphere of logic. Because of its reputation as a tool to 
demonstrate truth, change opinions, and motivate, logic is 
of interest to the rhetorician and the critic of communi­
cation, and it is appropriately considered in this discus­
sion of Reid's communication theory. A conscientious pro­
fessional philosopher, Reid pays his respects to the topic 
of logic, although he regards it with somewhat less rever­
ence than might other philosophers because of his commit­
ment to common sense. Logic is mentioned in several places 
in his writingi one of these is his critical treatise on 
Aristotelean logic* another is an essay on reasoning in 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. There are other 
references to the topic scattered through sundry of his 
other works as well.
The Nature of Logic
Definition of terms.— In the various places where he 
takes up logic Reid falls victim to a vicissitude in the 
definitions of his terms, despite his frequent acknowledge­
ments of the virtue in consistent and precise definitions. 
Part of the difficulty arises from the relationship which
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Reid draws between common sense and logic, and part from 
the ambiguity of Reid's use of the term reason. In Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man he divides reason into 
two functions, common sense and formal logic, a division 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. In this 
distinction common sense is understood to be closely rela­
ted to its counterpart, logic. Reid discusses the diffi­
culty of defining common sense apart from logic when he 
declares that "the power of reasoning is very nearly allied 
to that of judging [the function of common sense]* and it 
is of little consequence in the common affairs of life to
distinguish them nicely. On this account, the same name is
23often given to both." ^ He does not clearly distinguish
common sense, or judgment, from logic here, and for that
reason it becomes necessary to attempt a clarification in
this chapter.
Judgment, Reid believes, is the work of common
sense (also called common judgment), and is "the assent we
give to a proposition . . .  whether the proposition be self*
evident, or derive its evidence by reasoning from other
propositions." "Reasoning," on the other hand, "is the
process by which we pass from one judgment to another,
24which is the consequence of it." Here Reid employs the 
term reasoning when perhaps formal, logic would have speci­
fied his meaning more clearly. In the opening paragraphs
2 ^Reid, I n t e l l e c t u a l  P o w ers , p .  475,  2 /* I b id .
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of his essay on reasoning he uses the term reasoning to 
apply exclusively to deduction, which is part of the second 
office of reason, formal logic* This is his usage of the 
term in the following passage from the essayi
In all reasoning, therefore, there must he a pro­
position inferred, and one or more from which it is 
inferred. And this power of inferring, or drawing a 
conclusion, is only another name for reasoning» the 
proposition inferred being called the conclusion, 
and the proposition or propositions from which it is 
inferred, the premises.
Reasoning may consist of many stepst the first 
conclusion being a premise of a second, that to a 
third, and so on, till we come to the last conclusion.
A process consisting of many steps of this kind, is 
so easily distinguished from judgment, that it is 
never called by that name.
In this excerpt the philosopher clearly employs the term 
reason to include induction and deduction. While at one 
point Reid insists that there is no "opposition between 
reason and common sense" and that the two offices of rea- 
son are common sense and formal logic, he speaks else­
where of reasoning as having the two offices of induction 
and deduction. Thus despite his admonitions of the neces­
sity for accurate definitions, Reid again neglects to apply 
this dictum to his own worko For the sake of clarity, this 
chapter will distinguish to two parts of reason as (1) com­
mon sense or judgment and (2) logic0
The definition and use of the term common sense 
does not change from the manner in which Reid has previ­
ously used it, and the definition of logic will include
25Ibid. 26Ibid., p„ 425.
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the more formal processes of induction and deduction. A 
distinction between common sense and formal logic is main­
tained in this chapter, although Reid disregards it at 
times. A clear designation of these two categories of rea­
son will better illuminate Reid's thought and eliminate 
difficulties arising from lack of distinctions.
First principles.--Crucial to much of Reid's 
thought, and certainly to his writing on logic, is his 
discussion of first principles, which he likens to "axioms,** 
"principles of common sense,'* "common notions," "self-evi­
dent truths," and "intuitive judgments." First principles 
are not derived through deduction or induction but are 
believed immediately upon being understood, and hence 
require no proof. Indeed, first principles serve as the 
foundation upon which logical arguments are constructed, 
and the strength of such arguments is directly reliant 
upon the strength of the first principles on which they 
rest. Reasoning by deduction is like an art, Reid declares*
But the power of judging in self-evident proposi­
tions, which are clearly understood, may be compared to 
the power of swallowing our food. It is purely natural, 
and therefore common to the learned and the unlearned, 
to the trained and the untrained. It requires ripeness 
of understanding, and freedom from prejudice, but no­
thing else.2'
Some of the terms of Reid's definition of first principles 
are not clear, of course. He never specifies what a ripe
27Ibid.. p. 43^.
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understanding is, or how one frees himself from prejudice#
But if we concede his definitions there yet remains the
problem of how such a theoretically conceived notion of
first principles is adapted to practice#
Reid admits that there is quite a difference of
opinion among philosophers about first principles. Since
ancient times men have taken the existence of the sun,
moon, and stars as a first principle, but now their exis-
20tence is questionable to some, explains Reid, who doubt­
less has in mind here his antagonists, Berkeley and Hume# 
When a question arises over the truth of a first principle 
there appear only two courses of action open to the philo­
sopher# He may discontinue discussion altogether, or he 
may attempt to discover some method whereby the validity 
of first principles may be determined#
Reid takes the latter course# Faced with the prob­
lem of determining what is a legitimate first principle &uu 
what is not, Reid is forced to discuss a fundamental ques­
tion* "Is there no mark or criterion, whereby first prin­
ciples that are truly such, may be distinguished from those
29that assume the character without a just title?" 7 Reid’s 
answer to this question is, briefly, that there is indeed 
a mark of a true first principle which allows us to dis­
tinguish it from a false one* " . . .  Nature hath not left 
us destitute of means whereby the candid and honest part
28Ibid. 29Ibid.# p. ^35.
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of mankind may be brought to unanimity when they happen to 
differ about first principles," When an impasse is reached 
over first principles the parties to the controversy "must 
be convinced that there is a defect or perversion of judg­
ment on the one side or the other."3®
Possibly imagining men, and particularly philosophers, 
to be somewhat more yielding than they often are in reality, 
Reid explains further that
A man of candour and humility will, in such a case, 
very naturally suspect his own judgment, so far as to be 
desirous to enter into a serious examination, even of 
what he has long held as a first principle. He will 
think it not impossible, that, although his heart be 
upright, his judgment may have been perverted, by edu­
cation, by authority, by party zeal, or by some other of 
the common causes of error, from the influence of which 
neither parts nor integrity exempt the human understand- 
ing.
In such a state of mind, so amiable, and so becom­
ing every good man, has Nature left him destitute of any 
rational means by which he may be enabled, either to cor­
rect his judgment if it be wrong, or to confirm it if it 
be right?
I hope it is not so, I hope that, by the means which 
nature has furnished, controversies about first princi­
ples may be brought to an issue, and that the real lovers 
of truth may come to unanimity with regard to them,31
Reid may here have presented a problem as knotty as the one
he proposed to solvei distinguishing the "real lovers of
truthH from those who are not real may prove as frustrating
as distinguishing the true from the false first principles.
Both Reid and Hume would have considered themselves "real
lovers of truth," and each would have charitably regarded
the other as such, but they disagreed, for example, on the
3°Ibid,, pp.> 37-38. 31Ibid.. p..^38.
131
very basic first principle that the external material world 
can be known to have existence. Reid's first suggestion for 
resolving differences of opinion over first principles is to 
have each party put away prejudices and approach the propo­
sition with a sound mind, but when the first tack proves 
futile, and when the opposing views still prevail, then the 
parties must seek the marks or characteristics of an illegi­
timate first principle.
The outstanding mark of false propositions is "that 
they are not only false but absurd i and to discountenance 
absurdity. Nature hath given us a particular emotion— to 
with, that of ridicule— which seems intended for this very 
purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either 
in opinion or in practice."32 Thus Reid advocates the use 
of one of his favorite ploys, ridicule, to discredit a sus­
pect first principle. Rather than regarding it as a poor 
appeal, much less as a fallacious argument, he declares*
This weapon, when properly applied, cuts with as 
keen an edge as argument. Nature hath furnished us with 
the first to expose absurdity) as with the last to refute 
error. Both are well fitted for their several offices* 
and are equally friendly to truth when properly used.-5?
He admits that ridicule can be abused, but insists that a
good judgment can as easily detect this abuse.
Reid finds Zeno's philosophy a good example of how 
absurd thought falls away and is not heard of again. Zeno's
32Ibid. 33Ibid.
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arguments against motion fell by their heavy weight of ab­
surd ityi the very idea "was an insult to the common 
sense of mankind, [and] it died away of itself. . • •" It 
might prove interesting to discover how Reid would deal with 
the Atomists, whose theories were taken as absurd by the vul­
gar and the learned alike until modern tines. He does not 
deal with the difficulty of first principles which vacil­
late from popularity to absurdity in the general opinion.
This characteristic of absurdity inherent in false first 
principles makes it appear that truth is a transient entity 
subject to the whims of men, a situation contrary to Reid's 
high regard for the permanence of truth. True propositions, 
he declares, will not fall to the weight of arguments attemp­
ting to show their absurdity* on the contrary, they “will 
always, from the constitution of human nature, support them­
selves, and gain rather than lose ground among mankind.
While the spurious first principle is in continual danger of 
being shown absurd by Reid's methods, the legitimate one is 
bound to gain in popularity.
Reid mentions five methods by which first principles 
may be shown absurd. Discussing the first of these Reid says 
that N. • • it is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be 
shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon 
the same footing with others which he admits* for, when this 
is the case, he must be guilty of an inconsistency who holds
3**Ibid.. p. 4-39.
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the one and rejects the other Apparently when a man is
shown to be inconsistent in his reasoning, Reid feels justi­
fied in dismissing the man's first principles. Secondly, 
one may never know by this method which of the two princi­
ples held by the inconsistent man is true» each is equally 
inconsistent with the other. Reid's argument in this case 
attacks what he calls the "footing" of a first principle.
The second method by which men may test first prin­
ciples is one which Reid terms ad absurdum. He outlines 
what he means by the term as follows*
In this kind of proof, which is very common in 
mathematics, we suppose the contradictory proposition 
to be true. We trace the consequences of that supposi­
tion in a train of reasoning* and, if we find any of 
its necessary consequences to be manifestly absurd, we 
conclude the supposition from which it followed to be 
false* and, therefore its contradictory to be true.
There is hardly any proposition, especially of those 
that may claim the character of first principles, that 
stands alone and unconnected. It draws many along with 
it in a chain that cannot be broken. He that takes it 
up must bear the burden of all its consequences* and, 
if that is too heavy.for him to bear, he must not pre­
tend to take it up.3°
Reid treats this method in only two brief paragraphs and 
does not offer an example of its use. He claims that pro­
positions of the nature of first principles do not stand 
by themselves but carry their consequences along with them. 
If the consequences of a first principle are absurd, then 
the first principle itself must be rejected. Though Reid 
seems to see some relation between the consequences drawn
35 ibid. 36lbid.
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from first principles and the truth of the first principle 
itself, he does not point out what that relation is. Seem­
ingly a first principle needs no reason to exist. By defi­
nition its truth is self-evident and is not predicated on 
the lack of absurdity in its consequences. Presumably 
however Reid would deny the validity of this reasoning.
Reid might well have in mind the consequences drawn 
by such skeptical philosophers as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 
who, postulating that the world is known only through our 
ideas or perceptions, finally come to a denial of the know- 
ability of the world. Reid does not indicate that he has 
these specific thinkers in mind, but his common sense ap­
proach to epistemology is based on a denial of skeptical 
philosophy on the grounds of the commonly acknowledged 
absurdity of its conclusions.
Serious questions arise regarding the utility of 
Reid's method of reductio ad absurdum to test first prin­
ciples. Referring again to the Atomists' theory of the 
universe, we are forced to admit that the existence of such 
an entity as an atom has appeared at times to be absurd, 
but this fact does not alter the truth of the proposition 
that atoms exist. Therefore, perhaps the fact that a first 
principle appears absurd is no indictment of it, no matter 
by what method that absurdity is shown. Reid insists, how­
ever, that the absurdity of a first principle shows its 
falseness by some innate principle which causes the mind 
to dismiss propositions it sees as absurd.
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A third method of reasoning about first principles
Reid calls authority. He sayst ". • • I conceive that the
consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned,
ought to have great authority with regard to first princi-
37pies, where every man is a competent j u d g e . H e  advocates 
that the parties in a dispute over first principles consult 
authority, though he recognizes the potential fallacy hidden 
in such an appeal. He writes that "Authority, though a very 
tyrannical mistress to private judgment, may yet, on some 
occasions, be a useful handmaid. This is all she is enti­
tled to, and this is all I plead in her behalf."3® When 
the truth of a proposition is found to be popularly believed 
the parties to a dispute must, according to Reid, acquiesce 
to the judgment of men of all nations and of all times. As 
an example of how this popularity serves Reid in his philo­
sophy, he asks the following questionsi
Who can doubt whether men have universally believed 
the existence of a material world? Who can doubt whether 
men have universally believed that every change that hap­
pens in nature must have a cause? Who can doubt whether 
men have universally believed, that there is a right and 
a wrong in human conducti some things that merit blame, 
and others that are entitled to approbation?39
Though Reid offers these examples of how he employs argument
from the authority of popular belief in his thought, Reid
never answers a persistent question* if one is to consult
the authority of "ages and nations, of the learned and the
unlearned," in settling disputes over first principles,
37Ibid. 3® Ibid.. p. 4*K>. 39Ibid.
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which times and nations are to have greater authority when 
men of various ages and nations disagree in their acceptance 
of first principles? In a dispute over the shape of the 
earth, for example, one party might justifiably cite the 
opinions of whole nations of men living in an age which 
generally considered the earth flat* Apparently with equal 
justification one might cite the opinions of millions of 
Indians who accepted as axiomatic that the earth was sup­
ported by an elephant on the back of a turtle. Of course 
Reid regards such opinions as absurd and resulting from 
poor judgment, but this does not solve the problem. He 
omits any mention of such difficulties, and the omission 
underscores the weakness of this method of judging the 
truth or falseness of first principles.
Reid's fourth method of testing first principles is 
brief enough to allow its enclosure in full. He writesi
Fourthly, Opinions that appear so early in the minds 
of men that they cannot be the effect of education or of 
false reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as 
first principles. Thus, the belief we have, that the 
persons about us are living and intelligent beings, is 
a belief for which, perhaps we can give some reason, 
when we are able to reasoni but we had this belief before 
we could reason, and before we could learn it by instruc­
tion. It seems, therefore, to be an immediate effect of 
our constitution. 0
There are also some problems with this method. It may prove
difficult to know which opinions were known before we are
able to reason about them. Furthermore, children, without
**°Ibid.. p. kkl •
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reasoning on such mattery may acquire various notions which 
are false and fantastic. Reid presumably would not admit 
all his early opinions as first principles, but he is not 
at all explicit about how to determine which of these early 
beliefs are to be allowed and which are to be omitted.
The fifth mark of a true first principle is that it 
is indispensable to the conduct of life. Reid explains 
that " . . .  when an opinion is so necessary in the conduct 
of life, that, without a belief of it, a man must be led 
into a thousand absurdities in practice, such an opinion, 
when we can give no other reason for it, may safely be taken
illfor a first principle." This method of distinguishing 
true from false first principles is redundant in that the 
second method, ad absurdum, employs essentially the same 
criterion for rejecting a false first principle* that is, 
if Reid can show that the consequences following from a 
first principle, in this case the conduct of men who hold 
the axiom, are absurd, then he is justified in rejecting it.
In enunciating this method Reid seems to refer to 
what he considers the absurdity of thinking that the exis­
tence of the material world is questionable or the absurd­
ity of doubting causality, but he does not show how Hume 
and others who doubt such phenomena have difficulty conduc­
ting their lives* or how life is more easily conducted by 
believing in the existence of the material world or causal-
Ibid.
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ity. The single paragraph in which Reid mentions this 
method is too brief to include any enumeration of the dif­
ficulties he has in mind, but the assumption that men uni­
versally believe in the existence of the material world 
and causality and that to doubt these first principles leads 
to absurdities is an integral part of Reid's common sense 
thought.
Basic to his discussion of the methods by which 
first principles may be distinguished true or false by 
their marks is Reid's notion that men,by some original 
power of their constitutions, ridicule what they find ab­
surd and in this dismiss it from their minds. This asser­
tion, in itself, seems to be a first principle in Reid's 
thought, and it assumes some relation between reality and 
the emotions of those who observe reality. Reid writes of 
the "natural emotion of ridicule" which exerts itself to 
assist man in putting out of favor a first principle which 
appears absurd. Aside from the fact that this first prin­
ciple seems to beg the question, it is faulty on the grounds 
that it assumes a relation between the common opinions of 
men about a proposition and the reality which the proposi­
tion embodies. This relationship is not only hard to prove 
but it is also contrary to Reid's own notion of truth as an 
unalterable and permanent entity. But truth, in all of 
Reid's thought, is subject to the scrutiny and judgment of 
men both unlearned and learned, and the basic first princi­
ples of all logic are constantly subject to changes demanded
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by the degree of their popularity at various tines and in 
various places* Though Reid attempts to help his reader 
in one of the roost difficult problems of logic, determining 
the truth of first principles, he often does little more 
than clarify the insoluble problems connected with first 
principles.
Perhaps Reid's discussion of first principles stres­
ses the rhetorical nature of logic at its most fundamental 
point, and it could be that Reid makes the only reasonable 
appeal in such matters when he relies on the popular accep­
tability of a proposition to establish its truth. While 
the fickle nature of popular opinion is most inconsistent 
with the idea of permanent truth, it is probably the most 
frequently applied criterion of the truth of first princi­
ples in the practice of arguing. In framing arguments, 
the writer and the orator carefully select as first premi­
ses those propositions about which there can be little ques­
tion in the minds of readers and auditors. Thus in rooting 
the concept of the acceptability of first principles in 
their popularity, Reid likely comes very close to describing 
the criterion used to distinguish true first principles from 
false one8 in the actual practice of argumentation, however 
imperfect that criterion may be.
The branches of reason.--While the topic and main 
interest of this chapter is Reid's concept of logic, it is 
impossible to consider logic outside its relation to its
1*K>
counterpart, common sense* Logic is yet another part of 
Reid's thought which is affected by his devotion to the 
doctrine of common sense* Chapter three above contains a 
brief reference to the influence of common sense on logic, 
but the topic deserves specific treatement here* Reid re­
gards reason and common sense as so closely allied that 
they are inextricable. In his discussion of common sense 
he writes*
It is absurd to conceive that there can be any oppo­
sition between reason and common sense* It is indeed 
the first-born of Reasoni and, as they are commonly 
joined together in speech and in writing, they are in­
separable in their nature*
We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees.
The first is to judge of things self-evidenti the second 
to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those 
that are* The first of these is the province, and the 
sole province, of common senset and, therefore, it coin­
cides with reason in its whole extent, and is only ano­
ther name for one branch or degree of reason*^-
In this definition of the branches of reason Reid's insis­
tence upon the respect he feels should be afforded common 
sense is obvious* Like a prince in a royal family common 
sense is the "first-born of Reason."
Reid finds that the terms reason and common sense are 
often employed synonymously in common discourse, and he is 
not willing to relinquish any dignity of the position of 
common sense to that of reason* The first province of rea­
son is common sense, while the second is what is usually 
called logic* Logic and common sense hold at least equal
Ibid*. p. 425*
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rank in the family of reason, but Reid has more reverence
for common sense, of course, than for logic. Ab for their
differing functions, Reid declares that logic
. . .  is the process by which we pass from one judgment 
to another, which is the consequence of it. Accordingly 
our judgments are distinguished into intuitive, which 
are not grounded upon any preceding judgment, and discur­
sive, which are deduced from some preceding judgment by 
reasoning.^3
Judgment, the function of common sense, is also an integral 
part of the most formal logict therefore, in a deductive 
argument the individual propositions are judgments. It is 
the process of logic that allows the logician to deduce 
from two preceding judgments a third statement which is 
itself a judgment. In this argument as well as in others 
Reid draws common sense or common judgment and logic ever 
closer together. In this case they are linked by the func­
tion of judgment common to both.
Though common sense determines by its function as 
the first office of reason whether propositions are self- 
evident, this is not its only function* Common sense also 
measures the truth of propositions, i.e.. no proposition 
can be true if it is inconsistent with common sense, regard­
less of whether it is drawn through the most valid process 
of syllogistic reasoning. Reid insists*
A conclusion drawn by a train of just reasoning from 
true principles cannot possibly contradict any decision 
of common sense, because truth will always be consistent 
with itself. Neither can such a conclusion receive any
43Ibid.. p. 475.
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confirmation from common sense, because it is not within 
its jurisdiction.
But it is possible that, by setting out from false 
propositions, or by an error in reasoning, a man may be 
led to a conclusion that contradicts the decisions of 
common sense. In this case, the conclusion is within 
the jurisdiction of common sense, though the reasoning 
on which it was grounded be noti and a man of common 
sense may fairly reject the conclusion without being 
able to shew the error of the reasoning that led to it.
Thus, if a mathematician, by a process of intricate 
demonstration, in which some false step was made, should 
be brought to the conclusion, that two quantities, which 
are both equal to the third, are not equal to each other, 
a man of common sense, without pretending to be a judge 
of the demonstration is well entitled to reject the con­
clusion, and to pronounce it absurd.44
Here Reid insists that common sense cannot confirm the con­
clusion drawn "by a train of just reasoning," supposedly 
because the conclusion is drawn by a process comprising 
the second office of reason and lying outside the province 
of common sense. The conclusion is drawn from propositions 
which are not self-evident, and common sense cannot adjudi­
cate on the method by which the conclusion is drawn or the 
validity of the argument.
Nevertheless, a true conclusion cannot contradict 
common sense principles* therefore common sense can declare 
a conclusion false only if it does not delve into the pro­
cess by which it was drawn. This train of thought leads 
Reid to remark "that the province of common sense is more
If. cextensive in refutation than in confirmation," a state­
ment which does not entirely preclude the possibility, at 
least, that common sense can confirm the truth of a conclu-
^ lbid.. pp. 425-26. ^5Ibid.. p. 425.
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sion drawn from logic, but which appears to make a simple 
observation of the infrequency of its use for this purpose* 
Unfortunately Reid does not make clear exactly why 
common sense is Hmore extensive in refutation than in con­
firmation, M and not involved in refutation entirely* There 
appears to be a contradiction between the two statements 
about the use of common sense in confirmation and refuta­
tion. In the first Reid categorically excludes the use of 
common sense in confirming conclusions drawn logically, and 
in the second he lays open the possibility that it can 
indeed be employed in confirmation* It seems consistent 
with Reid's concept of common sense to suppose that by 
relying on common sense, the mathematician might immediately 
confirm the truth of the maxim that two quantities equal to 
a third quantity are also equal to each other, and there 
would appear to be no need for any assessment of arguments 
from which the conclusion is drawn or any analysis of the 
process which would violate the province of the second part 
of reason* In fact, it appears that when a common sense 
proposition makes its self-evident truth known, some natural 
and irrepressible principle confirms the truth of the propo­
sition* We may only assume that Reid means to admonish the 
reader against attempting to employ common sense to analyze 
the argumentative process used to arrive at a conclusion, 
but he leaves the possibility of refuting a conclusion 
drawn by such a procedure, and perhaps even of forming such
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a conclusion, open, provided the critic makes no judgment 
bearing on the logic process. Regrettably this is but ano­
ther point of Reid*s thought in which expansion and clari­
fication would be welcome. While speculation is perhaps 
helpful and inevitable in analysing Reid's notion of the 
relation of common sense to reason, it only partially suc­
ceeds in untangling the enigmatic knot.
The enthvmeme,— Much that Reid says about the rela­
tion of common sense to logic is in defense of common sense 
as a means of discovering truth. As part of this defense 
he introduces the topic of the enthymeme to show that the 
distinction between common sense and logic is one which 
logicians have not successfully dealt with and which has 
presented frequent confusion. He argues in the following 
fashiont
We are taught in logic, that judgment is expressed by 
one proposition, but that reasoning requires two or 
three. But so various are the modes of speech, that 
what in one mode is expressed by two or three proposi­
tions, may in another mode, be expressed by one. Thus 
I may say, G.otf is goodi therefore good men shall be 
happy. This is reasoning of that kind which logicians call 
an enthymeme, consisting of an antecedent proposition, 
and a conclusion drawn from it. But this reasoning may 
be expressed by one proposition, thusi— Because God is 
good, good men shall be happy. This is what they call 
a causal proposition, and therefore expresses judgmenti 
yet the enthymeme, which is reasoning, expresses no 
more. 0
Thus Reid has submitted a logical statement which conforms 
to the logician's definition of a judgment, demonstrating a
46Ibid.. pp. 475-76.
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flaw in the logician*s definition and showing the sharp 
distinction between logic and common sense to be a dubious 
one. He believes he has framed a logical proposition in a 
fashion which makes it a judgment by adding the word because 
before the former statement, “God is good,“ inverting the 
order of the two parts, and separating them with a comma 
rather than a semicolon. The resulting causal proposition 
is a judgment as is the enthymeme, Reid argues. When the 
definition of a logical statement breaks down, even as to 
the number of terms necessary to distinguish a logical 
statement from a judgment, then the distinction between 
judgment and logic begins to disappear, and the relation 
between common sense and logic becomes a closer one. Common 
sense principles, such as the one affirming the existence of 
material substance, are not necessarily enthymematic in 
nature, but they cannot be denied a distinguished place in 
the realm of reason because of the number of terms they pos­
sess or because they express judgment.
Apparently Reid believes that logicians determine an 
enthymeme by the number of propositions which comprise it. 
This is the interpretation which he gives to Aristotle's 
logici for example, he interprets Aristotle's concept of 
the enthymeme as meaning one of the "imperfect syllogisms 
. • • in which one of the premises is not expressed, but 
understood." Other kinds of imperfect syllogisms are "in­
duction, wherein we collect an universal from a full enumer-
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ation of particulars) and Example) which is an imperfect 
induction. Because Reid makes only scanty mention of 
the enthymeme, an extended discussion of the topic in this 
study would be inappropriate. The editor of the 1863 edi­
tion of Reid's workp, William Hamilton, takes issue with 
Reid's interpretation of the nature of the enthymeme in 
both places where Reid mentions the topic however* Hamil­
ton, in a note to Reid's discussion in.the essay on reason­
ing, writes* "The enthymeme is a mere abbreviation of 
expressioni in the mental process there is no ellipsis.
By enthymeme, Aristotle also meant something very different 
from what is vulgarly supposed,N On the other occasion, 
when Reid defines the enthymeme as a syllogism from which a 
premise has been deleted, Hamilton points.out in a note the 
erroneousness of this popular conception,^ Whether Reid 
recognized the rhetorical nature of the enthymeme is not 
clear) he gives no indication that he believes that the 
unstated portion of the syllogism, whether one or more pro­
positions, is provided by the audience. Neither does he 
acknowledge the importance of probability in treating the 
enthymeme, Hamilton stateB in his note that while abbrevi­
**7Reid, Aristotle's logic, p, 704.
48William Hamilton (ed,), Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man bv Thomas Re id, in The Works of Thomas Reid.
D .D . (Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, 1&63), I, 475n- 
7 6n.
^William Hamilton (ed.)» A Brief Account of Aristo­
tle's Logic by Thomas Reid, in The Works of Thomas Reid, P.P. 
(Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 6 6 3), II, 704n.
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ation of the logical expression occurs there is no abbrevi­
ation in the mind, and the implication is strong that Hamil­
ton believes that Reid is overlooking this important aspect 
of the enthymeme’s nature. Nevertheless, because of the 
brevity and incidental nature of Reid’s discussion, further 
speculation would be patently conjectural.
True perspective must not be lost in considering the 
importance of the enthymeme however. Reid discusses it in 
hia essay on reasoning because he believes it provides a 
link between the tv/o provinces of reason, common sense or 
judgment and formal logic. His argument that judgment is 
as much a part of logic as of common sense bridges the gulf 
between the two offices of reason and provides the basis of 
Reid’s thought, common sense, with a dignity it would not 
enjoy were to dichotomy to persist.
The kinds of logic.— The categories of logic comprit 
another important part of Reid’s conception of the nature of 
logic. Reid divides logical statements into two large cate­
gories, the demonstrative and the probable. Demonstration 
is characterized by its employment of inference in drawing 
conclusions and the necessity of the conclusion to follow 
from the premisesi no such necessity exists between probable 
evidence and the conclusions drawn from it. It is impossi­
ble in demonstrative reasoning for the premises to be true 
and the conclusion false, but in probable reasoning the pre­
mises may be true and the conclusion quite false. One dem*
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onstrative logical statement is as strong as any otheri 
there are no degrees of strength in demonstrative arguments 
because demonstration deals with necessary truth, 30 Proba­
bility, on the other hand, deals with contingent truth,
"not what necessarily must be at all times, but what is, or 
was, or shall be , " 31 Reid holds that "demonstrative evi­
dence has no degrees; but probable evidence taken in the 
philosophical sense, has all degrees, from the very least 
to the greatest, which we call certainty, " 32 Further expli­
cating the difference between demonstrative and probable 
reasoning, Reid observesi
These two kinds of reasoning differ in other res­
pects, In demonstrative reasoning, one argument is as 
good as a thousand. One demonstration may be more ele­
gant than anotheri it may be more easily comprehended, 
or it may be more subservient to some purpose beyond the 
present. On any of these accounts it may deserve a pre­
ference* but then it is sufficient by itselfi it needs 
no aid from another; it can receive none. To add more 
demonstrations of the same conclusion, would be a kind 
of tautology in reasoning; because one demonstration, 
clearly comprehended, gives all the evidence we are capa­
ble of receiving.
The strength of probable reasoning, for the most 
part, depends not upon any one argument, but upon many, 
which unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. 
Any one of them by itself would be insufficient to con­
vince; but the whole taken together may have a force that 
is irresistible, so that to desire more evidence would be 
absurd. Would any man seek new arguments to prove that 
there were such persons as King Charles I or Oliver Crom­
well?
Such evidences may be compared to a rope made up of 
many slender filaments twisted together. The rope has 
strength more than sufficient to bear the stress laid 
upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is 
composed would be sufficient for that purpose,”
3°Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp, 476-77*
51 Ibid., p. 481. 52Ibid., p, M32. 53Ibid.
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In his essay on reasoning, as in other places, Reid 
fails to provide the much needed examples of demonstrative 
and probable reasoning. We are justified, for this reason, 
in looking for them elsewhere in his works. In his essay on 
Aristotelean logic Reid provides several syllogisms which 
might be analyzed with respect to his statements about 
demonstrative logic. One such syllogism followst
All Africans are black.
Some men are Africans.
Therefore, some men are black.
Such a syllogism is an example of demonstrative logic. The
conclusion is drawn necessarily from the premises, and given
that the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. 
Further, in keeping with Reid's definition of demonstrative 
reasoning, we must concede that the arguer may present more 
and different syllogisms reaching the same conclusion, but 
he would not strengthen it by doing so. For instance, Reid 
himself in the same section of the treatise on Aristotelean 
logic alters this syllogism, making the minor premise uni­
versal in the following manner*
All Africans are blacki
All Africans are meni
Therefore, some men are black. 55
One might contest the truth of Reid's major premise but once 
it is granted, the conclusion is necessarily true. Such 
syllogistic logic conforms to Reid's assertions about the 
nature of demonstrative reasoning. In another place Reid
54Reid, Aristotle's Logic, p. 699. 55Ibid.
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provides an example of probable reasoning. He discusses ana­
logy in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. sayingt
Thus, we may observe a very great similitude between 
this earth which we inhabit^ and the other planets,
Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury, They all 
revolve around the sun, as the earth does, although at 
different distances and in different periods. They 
borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth does. 
Several of them are known to revolve round their axis 
like the earth, and, by that means, must have a like 
succession of day and night. Some of them have moons, 
that serve to give them light in the absense of the sun* 
as our moon does to us. They are all, in their motions, 
subject to the same law of gravitation, as the earth is. 
From all this similitude, it is not unreasonable to 
think, that those planets may, like our earth, be the 
habitation of various orders of living creatures. There 
is some probability in this conclusion from analogy,5©
As the syllogism conforms to Reid's prescription for demon­
strative reasoning, this argument by analogy conforms to 
his requisites for probable reasoning. There cannot be any 
absolute certainty about the conclusion, but only a degree 
of certainty. Presenting more instances of similarity be­
tween the earth and the other planets would serve to in­
crease the degree of certainty and strengthen.the. probabi­
lity of the conclusion that living beings abide in other 
parts of the solar system. Interestingly, from this same 
list of similitudes, other conclusions might be drawn that 
would not have nearly so much credibility as the one Reid 
selects to draw. We might conclude for example that because 
all the planets, like the earth, share a common sun, simi­
larly revolve on their respective axes, have moons, and are
56Reid, Intellectual Powers> P* 236,
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subject to the laws of gravitation, they probably have 
atmospheres composed largely of oxygen* This observation 
points out the fact that all the propositions of such a 
logical construction may be true and the conclusion false*
While auditors may see great probability of truth
in one conclusion drawn inductively from, a set of premises,
they may see very little in a second conclusion drawn from
the same set* About the necessity of induction to convince
auditors Reid writes*
The process of induction is more arduous being an 
ascent from the particular premises to a general con­
clusion* The evidence of such general conclusions is 
probable only* not demonstrative! but when the induction 
is sufficiently copious* and carried on according to the 
rules of art* it forces conviction no less than demon­
stration itself doea**7
Here Reid recognizes the necessity of probable argument to 
convince *the auditor by the peculiar and unexplained rela­
tionship between the set of premises and the conclusion 
drawn from them* To explain this phenomenon Reid resorts to 
saying that the power of induction to convince the auditor 
is based upon a principle of man's nature, the principle of 
induction, which amounts to a belief in the constancy of 
nature that man cannot repress*^8 Seeing that a certain 
similitude exists in the solar system* the auditor is prone 
to accept an extension of the similitude to things not cer­
tain, the existence of life on other planets for example*
*7Reid, Aristotle'a Logic, p. 712.
58Reid, Inquiry* p. 199.
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He assents to this probability because of a natural belief 
in the constancy of the laws of nature. Reid lays the 
rules of the use of probable reasoning with a brevity ana­
logous to that with which he treats the entire topic of 
demonstrative and probable reasoning.
The economy of Reid's remarks about the facet of 
logic and the lack of examples is due possibly to the fact 
that he is revealing nothing novel and is aware of that 
fact. The following excerpt indicates that Reid knew well 
that he was nerely summarizing what was known. Comparing 
Francis Bacon's work to Aristotle's, he B a y B i
Lord Bacon has displayed no less force of genius in 
reducing to rules this method of [probable or inductive] 
reasoning, than Aristotle did in the method of the syl­
logism. His MNovum Organum" ought therefore to be held 
as a most important addition to the ancient logic,59
In praising Bacon's work Reid acknowledges his iriebtedness
to that philosopher as well as to the Aristotelean traditi ,
The Utility of Logic
The imperfect tool.— In the last chapter of his trea­
tise on Aristotelean logic Reid considers the utility of 
logic* "• • • let us consider,** he says, "whether logic is, 
or may be made, subservient to any good purpose. Its pro­
fessed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to rea-
60son with precision and accuracy." Reid doubts whether
59Reid, Aristotle's Logic, p. 7 1 2 . 6°Ii>Ad.«, p. 7 0 9 .
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syllogistic logic alone is able to teach these skills, and 
proposes the possibility that the same ends might be served 
without resorting to the study of logic* "Good sense, good 
examples, and assiduous exercise," Reid insists, "may bring 
a man to reason justly and acutely in his own profession, 
without rules•" He might learn to reason as woll by the 
study of mathematics, mechanics, jurisprudence, politics,
"or in any other science* " ^ 1 While Reid hesitates to con­
demn the study of Aristotelean logic as totally sterile, he 
points out that it is a mistake to assume that because one 
may learn to reason well by studying the rules of logic, 
there is no other way to learn the same thing* To state 
that there is no way to learn to reason well except to study 
syllogistic logic is tantamount to stating ", • , that be­
cause a man may go from Edinburgh to London by the way of 
Paris, therefore any other road is useless." Other ways 
of learning to reason are equally as productive, and perhaps 
more closely related to the daily pursuits of man, and thus 
are more applicable to his aims than the formal rules of 
syllogistic reasoning*
A large portion of Reid's disdain for strict reliance 
upon formal logic falls upon the syllogistic systems of Ari­
stotle, which Reid considers for the most part impotent* 
Judging the utility of the syllogism he writes1
The slow progress of useful knowledge, during the
61Ibid.. p. 710. 62Ibid*
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many ages in which the syllogistic art was most highly 
cultivated as the only guide to science, and its quick 
progress since that art was disused, suggest a presump­
tion against it) and this presumption is strengthened 
by the puerility of the examples which have always been 
brought to illustrate its rules*
The ancients seem to have had too high notions* 
both of the force of the reasoning power in man, and of 
the art of syllogism as its guide. Mere reasoning can 
carry us but a very little way in most subjects. By 
observation, and experiments properly conducted, the 
stock of human knowledge may be enlarged without end} 
but the power of reasoning alone, applied with vigour 
and through a long life, would only carry man round like 
a horse in a mill, who labours hard but makes no progress. 
There is indeed an exception to this observation in the 
mathematical sciences. The relations of quantity are so 
various, and so susceptible of exact mensuration, that 
long trains of accurate reasoning on that subject may be 
formed, and conclusions drawn very remote from the first 
principles. It is in this science, and those which de­
pend upon it, that the power of reasoning triuraohst in 
other matters, its trophies are inconsiderable
To the exception that logic is useful in mathematics
Reid adds, paradoxically, that
* , • it does not appear that Euclid, or Apolo^ius, or 
Archimedes, or Huygens, or Newton, ever made the least 
use of this arti and I am even of the opinion that no 
use can be made of it in mathematics, I would not wish 
to advance this rashly, since Aristotle has said, that 
mathematicians reason for the most part of the first fig­
ure, What led him to think so was, that the first figure 
only yields conclusions that are universal and affirma­
tive, and the conclusions of mathematicians are commonly 
of that kind. But it iB to be observed, that the propo­
sitions of mathematics are not categorical propositions, 
consisting of one subject and one predicate. They ex­
press some relation which one quantity bears to another, 
and on that account have three terms. The quantities 
compared make two, and the relation between them is a 
third. Now, to such propositions we can neither apply 
the rules concerning the conversions of propositions, 
nor can they enter into a syllogism of any of the figures 
or modes, ^
6^ 6U°^Ibid., p, 701, Ibid,. pp, 701-2 .
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Thus arguing* Reid eliminates the possibility that the syl­
logistic art can be of use in mathematics because* as he 
believes* mathematical reasoning such as "A is equal to B* 
and B to C, therefore A is equal to C" will not convert to 
syllogistic form*^
It would be negligent to fail to mention at this 
point that Reid's editor* William Hamilton* takes frequent 
exception to Reid's pronouncements on Aristotelean logic* 
Referring to the above argument Hamilton points out that 
the mathematical statement can* indeed* be converted into 
syllogistic formi
What are equal to the same, are equal to eaoh otheri 
A and C are equal to the same (B)t 
Therefore, A and C are equal to each other*
He observes further that NA reasoning is not the less syllo­
gistic, because not formally enunciated in two orderly pre­
mises and a conclusion* This* however, is the notion that 
many of those who have written about and against logic, seem 
to have entertained."^ However incorrect and prejudiced 
Reid's belief about the use of syllogistic logic* it leads 
him to conclude that the utility of Aristotle's logic is 
virtually nonexistent, and this conclusion, after all* is 
the important fact of this discussion*
Though Reid casts doubts on the vitality of the syl­
logism in discovering new knowledge* he excludes induction 
from this condemnation and offers it as an alternative to
65Ibid*. pp. 701-2. 66Ibid.. p. 702n.
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the problems of the syllogism* He admires the inductive 
method for its productivity and discusses the topic in this 
excerpt*
The art of syllogism produced numberless disputes, 
and numberless sects who fought against each other with 
much animosity, without gaining or losing ground, but 
did nothing considerable for the benefit of human life.
The art of induction, first delineated by Lord Bacon, 
produced numberless laboratories and observatories, in 
which nature has been put to question by thousands of 
experiments, and forced to confess many of her secrets 
that before were hid from mortalst and, by these, arts 
have been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully 
increased.®'
The pragmatic scale upon which Reid weighs induction against 
deduction shows deduction to be wanting. Not only has deduc­
tion failed to contribute as it ought to human life and to 
knowledge, but it has actively prohibited the progress of 
man by creating warring factions. In this discussion, Reid 
seems to believe that Bacon's inductive method avoids such 
factioning and brings about agreement on the issues of sci­
ence, a rather questionable belief. He also attributes the 
lack of progress to the controversy arising out of deductive 
methodology, a judgment which Reid may find quite controver­
sial in itself. For Reid to condemn deductive methodology 
for creating controversy he must believe conflict and dis­
pute to be intrinsically fruitless, even destrictive. He 
must also think that an inductive method would be less prone 
to encourage conflicting opinions. Of course we must under­
stand Reid to be condemning fruitless conflict arising from
67Ibid.. p. 712.
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the deductive method, and not conflict per se.
Reid condemns slavish devotion to syllogistic deduc­
tion as an imperfect implement of science primarily on the 
historical basis that science made little progress during 
the time vrhen this method was in ascendance. He also finds 
an indication of the sterility of syllogistic logic in the 
examples which logicians have employed as illustrations, 
which Reid sees as trivial. He maintains that the ancients 
held an exaggerated opinion of the rationality of man, and 
offers inductive empirical investigation as an alternative 
to the Byllogism as a tool of science. Observation and 
experiment have taken man off the logical treadmill and have 
made possible the progress of knowledge and science which 
Reid observes around him. When Reid condemns reason at? 
feeble he excludes induction because he sees evidence of its 
value, and thus reaffirms his faith in empiricism as a means 
of discovering new knowledge.
Of evidence .— Though he writes that the ancients have 
overestimated the rational nature of man, Reid's own philo­
sophy relies heavily on man's rationality. In the first 
place Reid must concede that even the vulgar man's rational 
capacity is considerable, since he insists that the un­
learned man will assent to a common sense first principle 
naturally, as soon as it is presented to him. Reid also 
argues that the inductive method of reasoning convinces 
hearers as forcefully as a deductive one, implying a rather
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large degree of rationality on the part of an audience*
Reid again reveals a strong belief in man#s ration­
ality in discussing evidence. He defines evidence as "what­
ever is a ground of belief," and further describes the func­
tion of evidence in the following passage*
To believe without evidence is a weakness which every 
man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes 
to avoid. Nor is it in a man's power to believe any­
thing longer than he thinks he has evidence.
What this evidence is, is more easily felt than des­
cribed. Those who never reflected upon its nature, feel 
its influence in governing their belief. It is the busi­
ness of the logician to explain its nature, and to dis­
tinguish its various kinds and degreest but every man of 
understanding can judge of it, and commonly judges right, 
when the evidence is fairly laid before him, and his mind 
is free from prejudices, A man who knows nothing of the 
theory of vision may have a good eyei and a man who never 
speculated„about evidence in the abstract may have a good 
judgment.
Reid enumerates six kinds of evidence* "evidence of sense, 
the evidence of memory, the evidence of conscious ess, ihe 
evidence of testimony, the evidence of axioms, [and] the 
evidence of reasoning." He adds "that they are all fitted 
by Nature to produce belief in the human mind, some of them 
in the highest degree, which we call certainty, others in 
various degrees according to circumstances."^
The evidence of sense is related to common sense, 
bringing belief of the existence of what one sees, hears, 
feels, etc., without the benefit of reasoning. Of the evi­
dence of memory Reid states that when he remembers a past 
event he is convicted by it as well as he is by axioms.
^®Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 328. ^Ibid
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At one point Reid defines consciousness and sheds 
some light on its classification as a kind of evidence. He 
writes*
Consciousness is a word used by philosophers, to sig­
nify that immediate knowledge which we have of our pre­
sent thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the 
present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe, 
that consciousness is only of things present. To apply 
consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in 
popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with mem­
ory i and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided 
in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be ob­
served, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, 
and not of external things, ' 0
Evidence of consciousness, therefore, is that which con­
victs us of the immediate processes of the mindi we are con­
vinced by consciousness that we think, for example. The 
evidence of consciousness is distinguished from evidence of 
sense in that evidence of sense deals with things present 
but external to the mind, such as the corporeal world, Evi­
dence of consciousness differs from evidence of memory in 
that memory deals with things past while consciousness is 
concerned with the present. In the above passage Reid seems 
to think the evidence of testimony quite clear, since he
says of it only that it relies on "the authority of the per-
71son who testifies.
In Inquiry Into the Human Mind Reid discusses the 
tendency to believe in the authority of another human being. 
Reid explains that in the human constitution there exists 
"an early anticipation, neither derived from experience, nor
7° I b i d . . pp.  222-23. 71I b i d . .  p.  329.
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from reason, nor from any compact or premise, that our fel- 
low-creatures will use the same signs, when they have the 
same sentiments•" When a communicator speaks in an atti­
tude of good will, we understand that he will use the same 
language he has used on previous occasions when his atti­
tude has been similar* Reid addsi
This is, in reality, a kind of prescience of human 
actionsi and it seems to me to be an original principle 
of the human constitution, without which we should be 
incapable of language, and consequently incapable of 
instruction.
The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who inten­
ded that we should be social creatures, and that we 
should receive the greatest and most important part of 
our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for 
these purposes, implanted in our natures two principles 
that tally with each other*
The first of these principles is, a propensity to 
speak truth, and to use the signs of language so as to 
convey our real sentiments. This principle has a power­
ful operation, even in the greatest liars» for where they 
lie once, they speak truth a hundred times* r *uth i.3 
always uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind.
It requires no art of training, no inducement or tempt; 
tion, but only that we yield to a natural impulse. Ly­
ing, on the contrary, is doing violence to our naturei 
and is never practiced, even by the worst men, without 
some temptation*
By this instinct, a real connection is formed between 
our words and our thoughts, and thereby the former become 
fit to be signs of the latter, which they could not 
otherwise be* And although this connection is broken in 
every instance of lying and equivocation, yet these in­
stances being comparatively few, the authority of human 
testimony is only weakened by them, but not destroyed.
Another original principle implanted in us by the 
Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the vera­
city of others, and to believe what they tell us. This 
is the counterpart to the formert and, as that may be 
called the principle of veracity, we shall, for want of„ 
a more proper name call this the principle of credulity.(
^2Reid, Inquiry, p* 196.
l6l
The evidence of testimony* like all the other types of evi­
dence* brings about belief naturally and inevitably.
The next kind of evidence which Reid mentions is the 
evidence of axioms. He defines axioms as truths which are 
immediately apparent. Supposedly the evidence of axioms 
differs from the evidence of sense* which is also known to 
be true immediately, in that the evidence of sense, as the 
name implies, conveys truth to us by way of the senses, and 
might convict us of the existence of external bodies, for 
example. The following statements are examples of axiomsi 
all men are mortalst the whole is greater than the parts. 
Like all other axioms these inform of their own truth and 
need no assistance in the performance of this task.
Reid also lists the evidence of reason as a means of 
producing belief, but he insists that while reason can lead 
to certainty about some matters, it has its limits. With­
out the aid of logic, for example, man is brought to know
what exists, but he His led to it [knowing what exists] in
73the dark, and knows not how he came by it.  ̂ Logic does 
not assist him here. Reid seems again to be censuring the 
use of deduction, perhaps by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and 
to be attempting to prove the existence and universal knowa- 
bility of the material world by man's innate common sense.
The nature of logic has been discussed extensively 
above, and deserves mention here only because Reid includes
^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 330.
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it in his list of types of evidence* The evidence of reason 
apparently means here the evidence of deductive logic, but, 
as in almost every case where he mentions deduction, Reid 
insists upon limiting the power afforded this kind of evi­
dence •
Apparently because Reid believes that common men 
employ evidence adroitly every day, he does not offer so 
detailed a treatment of the subject as we might desire* 
Reference must be made to several places in Reid's writing 
for amplification of his meaning* He treats the topic of 
evidence succinctly despite his admission that the logician 
should analyze it minutely* Importantly, Reid considers 
man's capacity to use and weigh evidence quite appreciable, 
on the condition that his judgment is not prejudiced by 
evidence unfairly presented or in any other way hampered*
Of course the question arises as to how often one is presen­
ted with totally unbiased evidence and how often one's mind 
is unencumbered by prejudicial beliefs and attitudes. Here 
again a limitation of reason appears, and it is one which 
Reid does not treat*
The improvement of logic*— While Reid repeatedly 
insists upon the limitations of logic, he also offers sug­
gestions for improving it and making it more useful* In 
A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic he makes several such 
suggestions about the reparation of logic* He suggests 
that a large part of the criticism of formal logic has been
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perpetuated because logic has commonly been taught to stu­
dents long before they are able to comprehend its purpose* 
"One may as well expect to understand grammar before he can
speak as to understand logic before he can reason*M Reid 
7^says* Teaching logic too early makes it merely an exer­
cise of memory, requiring little understanding of the sub­
ject. Though he objects to the practice of teaching logic 
to immature students* he concedes a
There may be an elementary logic, level to the capacity 
of those who have been but little exercised in reasonings 
but the most important parts of this science require a 
ripe understanding, capable of reflecting upon its own 
operations* Therefore, to make logic the first branch 
of science that is to be taught, is an old error that 
ought to be corrected*75
Although the exact age at which logic might be effectively 
taught is not clear from Reid's writing, it is clear ttat 
logic should not be taught to six- and seven-year-old chil ­
dren* Perhaps by "ripe understanding" Reid has in mind to 
teach logic only to the wise and aged, but certainly in 
terras of today's academic world Reid would reserve the study 
of more advanced formal logic until the college years at the 
earliest*
In addition to teaching logic at a later age than was 
customary at the time, Reid wishes to make the subject more 
easily comprehended when it is finally studied* He wishes 
to illustrate the abstract rules of logic with examples from 
the best writing, much as one might illustrate examples of
^Reid, Aristotle'8 Logic, p* 711* ^ Ibid*
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good composition by studying the best writing of literary 
artists. Not only does Reid wish to have examples of the 
best and most correct logic, but also of the poorest and 
most incorrect. HNor are the faults of such writers less 
instructive or less powerful monitors," Reid advises. "A 
wreck left upon a shoal, or upon a rock, is not more useful 
to the sailor than the faults of good writers, when set up 
to view, are to those who come after them."7** When all the 
best and the worst examples of the use of logic are collec­
ted and compiled, Reid envisions that man would have a cata­
logue of the most outstanding products of human reasoning as 
well as a beacon to warn off those who are unaware of the 
pitfalls which await the uninitiated.
Another means of making logic a better tool is to 
give greater attention to induction, the new engine of sci­
ence and discovery. Great advances have been made through 
the application of the inductive principle in empirical 
investigations, and great discoveries of new knowledge pro­
mise to be forthcoming. For its contribution to the study 
of logic, Francis Bacon's Novum Organum should "be held as
a most important addition to ancient logic," Reid pro-
77c l a i m s . W h e n  Bacon's teachings are incorporated into the 
curriculum of logic many of the old errors can be eliminated. 
Reid claims that
Those who understand it f Novum Organum"!. and enter into
76Ibid. 77Ibid.. p. 712.
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its spirit, will be able to distinguish the chaff from 
the wheat in philosophical disquisitions into the works 
of God. They will learn to hold in due contempt all 
hypotheses and theories, the creatures of human imagina­
tion, and to respect nothing but facts sufficiently 
vouched, or conclusions drawn from them by a fair and 
chaste interpretation of nature#'0
Reid advocates further that the idols of the mind be given 
a more extensive treatment and that they Hbe illustrated by 
real examples,,,79supposedly from the writings of philoso­
phers and literarians, much as good and bad deductive argu­
ments should be illustrated by examples.
In order to facilitate the improvement of logic,
Reid also advocates that a bold line be drawn between first 
principles and those requiring proof. The self-evident 
first principles should then be reduced to general axioms. 
Arguing for the feasibility of such an undertaki. s Reid 
statesi
This has been done in mathematics from the beginning, 
and has tended greatly to the emolument of that science. 
It has lately been done in natural philosophy* and by 
this means that science has advanced more in an hundred 
and fifty years, than it had done before in two thousand. 
Every science is in an unformed state until its first 
principles are ascertained* after which it advances 
regularly, and secures the ground it has gained.
Although first principles do not admit of direct 
proof, yet there must be certain marks and characters by 
which those that are truly such may be distinguished 
from counterfeits* These marks ought to be described 
and applied to distinguish the genuine from the spur­
ious.8®
Perhaps Reid's own work would not appear so tenuously con­
structed on the basis of self-evident truths had Reid satiB-
78Ibid. 79Ibid. 8°Ibid.. pp. 712-13.
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factorily solved this problem of first principles*
Application and Analysis
Reid finds logic wanting primarily because of the 
impotence of Aristotelean deduction* but he cannot censure 
the entirety of logic for the defect of a part. Reid's 
condemnation of demonstrative logic is based on its tendency 
to produce little or no new knowledge. He does not condemn 
deduction as a tool of the orator and the writerj indeed, he 
points out its characteristic of producing conclusions which 
necessarily convict the auditor or reader of their truth. 
Logic as a tool of the philosopher and the scientist is an 
instrument of discovery, and Reid believes that deduction 
does not serve this purpose nearly so well as induction.
But logic as the tool of the orator and the write is often 
a vehicle of information and persuasion) however on this 
topic Reid has little to say. Therefore, logic as applied 
to the undertakings of the communicator remains relatively 
unscathed by Reid's attack on syllogistic reasoning. The 
emphasis placed on common sense as opposed to logic as an 
implement for discovering new truth and for persuading audi­
tors is pervasive throughout Reid's works.
Reid's notion that a major office of reason consists 
of common sense judgments or self-evident conclusions holds 
decided implications for the rhetorician. If common sense 
propositions are immediately and intrinsically persuasive, 
then the rhetor has little else to do in his discourse than
167
enunciate common sense propositions to make his audience 
immediately aware of the truth of his assertions and acqui­
esce to them. He need not present arguments or infer the 
truth of his statements from other truthsi common sense 
truths are contingent upon nothingi they inform audiences 
of their own truth and require no supporting statements.
Any evidence offered in their support is, in fact, superflu­
ous and, in Reid's opinion, in violation of the second of­
fice of reason, which includes the use of arguments to de­
duce the truth of statements.
There are propositions which do not immediately in­
form of their own truth, and when the rhetor employs such 
propositions he must make inferences, Bhow evidence, and 
weigh arguments to demonstrate how he deduces the truth of 
such statements in order to win his audience's acceptance.
In practical application, common sense serves also as an 
ultimate test of truth to which all conclusions must con­
form. Finding that a conclusion is not amenable to common 
sense, the rhetor might do well to re-evaluate his reason­
ing. If his discourse involves refutation, the communica­
tor's task is uncomplicatedi he has only to show that his 
antagonist's conclusion is inconsistent with common sense.
He is not obligated to analyze the process by which it was 
drawni to do so in fact would be to transgress on the terri­
tory of the second province of reason.
There is often a dearth of examples in Reid's works,
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but at one point he doee illustrate the manner in which 
common sense can refute a conclusion deduced by the mathema­
tician from many careful logical steps. The example of the 
mathematical statement, however, is not consistent with the 
manner in which arguments often appear in philosophical dis­
course or in deliberative and forensic oratory. Arguments 
of the latter types are often less meticulously organized 
than mathematical demonstrations, and of course they tend to 
conform more closely to the pragmatic dictates of the art of 
persuasion than to the prescriptions of syllogistic logic.
In many cases of this kind it is difficult to determine pre­
cisely which propositions are conclusions and which are the 
terms in an argument, and if the critic is able to isolate 
the terms of an argument, he must chance a guess about whe­
ther they are themselves inferred by some unstated syllogis­
tic process or whether they are known immediately by common 
sense.
Previous chapters contain discussions of rather dubi­
ous conclusions which Reid believes are self-evident and 
which he assumes his readers will immediately recognize as 
true on the basis of common sense. For example when he 
speaks of the relation of language to thought he saysi
The language of mankind is expressive of their 
thoughts, and of the various operations of their minds. 
The various operations of the understanding, will, and 
passions, which are common to mankind, have various forms 
of speech corresponding to them in all languages, which 
are the signs of them, and by which they are expressedi 
and a due attention to the signs may, in many cases, give 
considerable light to the things signified by them.
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There are in all languages modes of speech, by which 
men signify their judgment, or give their testimonyi by 
which they accept or refuse i by which they ask informa­
tion or advicei by which they command, or threaten, or 
supplicatej by which they plight their faith in promises 
or contracts. If such operations were not common to man­
kind, we should not find in all languages forms of speech, 
by which they are expressed• *
This passage is an example of an argument which does not 
easily fit into a convenient syllogistic mold. It is, how­
ever, typical and appropriate in a philosophical essay of 
this kind. Such a redundance of assertions seems frequently 
demanded in an oratorical setting as well. Nevertheless, 
this sort of argument presents the difficulty of determining 
precisely which are the supporting terras of the argument and 
which is the conclusion.
One might assume from the opening sentence of the 
first paragraph quoted above that this is the conclusion 
Reid seeks to establish, and because it is universal in 
nature one might assume that he goes about establishing it 
inductively. Such is not the case, howeveri Reid never indi­
cates that he has examined all languages or that he believes 
it necessary to do so. The quandary remains, and the pas­
sage invites further attempts to analyze its logic. One 
may assume the opening sentence of the second paragraph to 
be the first premise of a categorical syllogism in the fol­
lowing fashion* All language contains forms of speech 
w hich men employ to signify certain operations unversal 
among men. There can, however, be no second term to accom-
8l Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 238.
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pariy this proposition, for the second term must be a state­
ment about a particular in order to allow the inference of 
a particular conclusion. As stated, the conclusion in this 
case seems clearly to be that all languages signify opera­
tions common to all men. The critic of Reid's thought might 
make another attempt at casting a syllogism from the frag­
ments in this argument, which might appear in the following 
form i
If we find in all languages forms of speech by which 
the operations of men are expressed, then these opera- 
tions are common to all mankind.
We do indeed find in all languages forms of speech 
by which the operations of men are expressed.
Therefore, these operations are common to all man­
kind.
But this hypothetical syllogism does not establish that the 
operations of language do, in fact* signify the operations 
of mankind* it concludes only that such operations are com­
mon to all men. In addition, of course, the knottiest prob ­
lem has not yet been solved— i.e.. the problem of establish­
ing that all languages actually have the forms of speech 
which Reid says they have. The most likely solution to the 
enigma is Reid's belief in the self-evidence of the asser­
tion that all languages contain forms of speech which ex­
press the operations of man, a belief which obviously needs 
to be established more firmly before it can be accepted by 
his readers. The proposition is different from the one 
stating that two entities equal to a third are equal to each 
other in that the former proposition need not be immediately
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believed by the one who perceives it. Using Reid’s pre­
scription, we need do nothing more in refuting this conclu­
sion about the nature of language than to point out that it 
is inconsistent with common sense* Of course the proposi­
tion itself is a common sense assertion and is not drawn by 
careful logical process. Supposedly, then, it lies outside 
the purview of common sense, since Reid gives no indication 
that common sense can refute a common sense judgmenti this 
situation would appear to be the reductio ad absurdum of 
Reid's contention* But because Reid seems to assume it as 
a common sense principle, we find ourselves simply denying 
Reid's assertion by making an opposing judgment when we do 
no more than point out that Reid's proposition is not in 
keeping with common sense. The point is clear that except 
in the most meticulously prepared logical discourse, it is 
often impossible to distinguish the propositions intended *«;< 
common sense judgments, propositions of a larger argument, 
and conclusions.
Arguments in oratorical and literary discourses are 
often loosely constructed, as is evidenced by Reid's own 
writings. This not only makes strict logical analysis 
difficult or impossible and leaves it open to broad interpre­
tation, but it makes it equally impossible to determine which 
statements might be refuted simply as inconsistent with com­
mon sense. Apparently for these reasons Reid's suggestions 
are somewhat impractical when applied to the daily discourse
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of man*
Tho use of common sense in refutation is of possible 
value to the rhetor, but it relies as much upon the preju­
dices of an individual audience as it does upon the univer­
sal assent of mankind which Reid assumes. Martin Luther 
would have been foolish to assume that because he held as a 
first principle his right and obligation to interpret holy 
scripture his inquisitors at the Diet of Worms held a simi­
lar belief. Nor would Martin Luther King, Jr. have been 
wise to assume that his common sense belief in the equality 
of men was held by all, or even most, members of his audien­
ces. One man's common sense is another man's absurdity, but 
Reid insists that common sense notions are known to be true 
as soon as they are apprehended.
Attempting to make some use of Reid's concept of the 
first province of reason is difficult for the rhetorician 
he accepts Reid's assertion that the validity of common sense 
truths is universally recognized. When Reid runs upon a con­
tradiction to a notion which he assumes to be universal, he
Dodismisses it as a prejudice or poor judgment. In like man­
ner Martin Luther might dismiss the contrary doctrinal be­
liefs of his inquisitors as a prejudice, and Martin Luther 
King might do the same. Nevertheless, neither of these men, 
nor any wise orator, would simply utter a proposition regard­
ing the interpretation of holy writ or the universal equality 
of men and expect it to convince hearers of its own truth.
®20 f .  be low , p .  2 6 1 .
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Yet Reid insists that " . . .  there are . • • propositions 
which are no sooner understood than they are believed* The 
judgment follows the apprehension of them necessarily, and 
both are equally the work of nature, and the result of our
Q  >J
original power." J The critic who would make practical use 
of this doctrine can only grant that this is the case, but 
he must recognize that some of the propositions which Reid 
holds to be immediately believed upon apprehension are dubi­
ous. This is the basic objection to this common sense doc­
trine, as discussed in Chapter III above, but it becomes 
apparent again in this discussion the the applications of 
Reid's discourse on reason.
Unfortunately Reid does not treat the enthymeme ex­
tensively, making it difficult and presumptuous to draw in­
ferences from his statements for the benefit of t e communi­
cator. He regards the enthymeme as a structural phenomena, 
in logic, relying on the grammatical structure in which the 
logical process is cast, and neglects the role of the audi­
tor in mentally supplying the parts of the logical process 
which are missing in the formal construction. He thereby 
offers further reason for hesitating to speculate about the 
implications of his ideas on logic for communication and 
rhetorical theory.
Reid's discussion of demonstrative logic and probable 
logic serves to remind the communicator of the necessity of
®^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. kjk.
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skill in the use of logic* Much of the logic employed by 
the rhetor will be of the inductive variety, requiring him 
to enumerate many examples to establish a general principle. 
It is reassuring for that reason to remember that probable 
reasoning is equally as convincing as demonstration, though 
induction requires an abundance of evidence while deduction 
is unaided by such additional argument*
Reid implies that the persuasive speaker or writer 
would do well to select carefully his propositions in con­
structing an inductive argument. Reid employs the figure 
of a rope spun of many filaments to illustrate the nature 
of the probable argument and implies that the quantity of 
fibers and their quality are equally important factors.
That is, the inductive argument must be constructed with 
attention to the appropriateness of the propositions to the 
intended conclusion. Likewise, demonstrative arguments 
vary in their appropriateness to their purpose. One may be 
more elegant than others, for example, or easier to under­
stand. Of course the skillful speaker or writer will note 
these differences and make his choices accordingly. Primar­
ily, however, Reid speaks of the relative strength of demon­
stration and probable reasoning and finds the probable argu­
ment no less effective or persuasive than the demonstrative 
one, though the probable argument is more demanding of the 
talents of the rhetor.
Considering Reid's evaluation of the utility of logic 
one must concede that Aristotelean logic appears weak, a
175
conclusion that the practitioner of the rhetorical art would 
likely affirm* Regarding the propensity of logic to teach 
precision in judgment and reasoning* Reid concludes that 
syllogistic logic is never more capable of the task than 
other pursuits may be* specifically mathematics, mechanics, 
jurisprudence* and politics, but he leaves the way open for 
other studies which would serve the purpose of teaching 
skill and accuracy in reasoning* The critic of public 
speaking and of literature would likely confirm the fact 
that skillful use of persuasive and valid argument* both 
deductive and inductive, is possible where the one employing 
the argument has never studied formal logic* Evidently 
skill and precision in thinking and arguing can be acquired 
with practice, by imitation, and perhaps by trial and error* 
Reid advocates imitation as a method of learning to reason 
well* He suggests the inclusion of examples of valid and 
invalid logic in teaching the skill. The student learning 
to reason should note the necessity of using examples which 
are not trivial* Seeing how logic is employed in literature 
and oratory is of apparent valuej so is the clear labelling 
of examples as good or bad logically, so that the student 
can learn to recognize and so avoid fallacious reasoning*
The lack of labels as logic is used in the daily pursuits 
of life, in oratory and in literature, presents a potential 
difficulty in learning to reason by imitation alone.
Reid condemns deduction because it does not equal 
induction in the amount of new knowledge produced, because
it is of less assistance in science, and because it has led 
to factioning of the scholarly community which has resulted 
in lack of cooperation. Whether this objection is valid is 
itself doubtful, particularly when it is considered in the 
light of the relative value of deduction and induction in 
writing and speaking. In these two most practical arts, 
both deduction and induction seem indispensible and inevit­
able. It is difficult to imagine the practice of rhetoric 
without the use of both these varieties of argument, and if 
we accept Reid's thought on this matter, it appears unneces­
sary to eliminate deduction altogether. Certainly, however, 
the rhetor could hardly condemn conflict and dispute per se. 
as Reid appears to do, because the clash of opinion and 
advocacy are the very essence of forensic and deliberative 
discourse. It is the function of effective communication to 
break the deadlock of inactivity with which Reid finds fault, 
and undoubtedly Reid implies his approval of this function 
in his criticism of the deadening effect of unyielding ani­
mosity.
Reid's theory of evidence contains great interest 
for the critic of communication. According to Reid evidence 
convicts the auditor of its truth because of the auditor's 
own nature. The common man, without having studied the 
rules of logic or given attention to the nature and use of 
evidence, is a qualified judge of evidence when it is pre­
sented to him fairly and truthfully, and when his mind is 
unprejudiced. This concept of the effect of evidence con-
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tains implications for the user of evidence as well as for 
the auditor* The communicator is obliged to employ evidence 
truthfully and fairly, and the auditor is equally obligated 
to unshackle his mind of encumbering biases about the matter 
upon which he would judge# In amplifying his notion of the 
evidence of testimony, Reid reiterates these ethical impli­
cations for the use of all language# Man is naturally in­
clined to use language truthfully, to reveal his true opin­
ions and sentiments and also to believe that others do the 
same# To use language untruthfully, presenting unfair, 
false, or prejudicial evidence, is a violation of the very 
nature of man as well as a threat to human society, which 
is based on and possibly even created in reliance on vera­
city in the use of language#
Reid, as has been discussed, regards language as a 
contract to use signs in a given manner. When this contract 
is violated by unethical use of those signs, all other con­
tracts and agreements among men are challenged, since they 
are grounded in the truthful use of language# While it may 
be possible to test the truth and fairness of the speaker or 
writer's testimony, or his use of evidence at large, it is 
no easy matter to verify that the auditor has cleared his 
mind of prejudice, and in this respect a prescriptive appli­
cation of Reid's theory of evidence is impractical • Reid 
seems, however, to be offering a purely descriptive analysis 
of the working of evidence, and his observation commends 
itself to the practitioner of the art of communication#
1?8
The rhetorician's training would likely do well to 
incorporate all of Reid's advice about improving logic# A 
knowledge of induction as well as deduction is indispensable* 
though this is not the issue today that it was at the time 
of Reid's writing. Reid's suggestion about the age at which 
formal logic should be taught is little disputed today and 
for the same reason Reid offers, that the true value of the 
study of logic would be little understood and unnecessarily 
boring at too early an age, Reid's suggestion that text­
books on logic offer examples of good and bad logic from 
various writers, philosophical and otherwise, has been wide­
ly accepted, apparently with good results. It is doubtful 
that logic textbooks have become the repositories of the 
most commendable achievements of man, as Reid envisioned, 
but they supposedly achieve the purpose for which they are 
intended, to teach logic interestingly and with the greatesx 
possible ease of comprehension.
This chapter contains discussion of Reid's problema­
tic suggestion regarding the determination of first princi­
ples in order to improve logic. For the rhetor, of course, 
this suggestion bears as much importance as for the logi­
cian, but it is not easily carried out by either. Self-evi­
dent first principles are as frequently employed by speakers 
and writers as they are by Reid in his works, and the ade­
quate solution of the problem of the identification of first 
principles is one which plagues the philosopher and the rhe­
torician alike.
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The criterion which Reid often applies to determine 
a first principle is to judge of its universal acceptance, 
though it appears to be a criterion strongly affected by 
the prejudices and mistaken beliefs of the one who uses it. 
Regardless of the difficulty with this criterion, it seems 
to be the one most frequently employed in the most practi­
cal matters of life. In constructing an argument, the 
speaker must make many judgments about what his immediate 
audience, if not all mankind, accepts as self-evident first 
principles. He need provide little or no proof for these. 
Indeed, self-evident truths are the basis of the enthymeme, 
which makes use of propositions which the auditors will pro­
vide without their being stated. Doubtlessly, however,
Reid has in mind more universal truths than those of an 
immediate audience* he conceives of discerning truths which 
are accepted by all mankind, and this task is not only the 
most problematic suggestion Reid makes regarding the repar­
ation of logic, but it remains the chief difficulty with his 
entire philosophical system as well as with the pragmatic 
use of logic,
III. Ethics and Politics
Man's conduct as an individual and in groups has long 
been associated with the study of communication, and ethics 
and politics have bearing on the orator and the writer, the 
content and the end of discourse, and the auditors of the 
discourse. Aristotle commends the study of ethics and poli-
tics to the orator as a means of improving his ability to
discover arguments. He writes*
Knowing where a particular game (or argument) is to be 
found, he will hunt for it there, and not in some other 
place or places. But if he is to know these places, he 
must have a thorough and detailed knowledge of the spe­
cial sciences which mainly concern the art of rhetoric—  
that is, ethics and politics, above all, since they have 
to do with theftconduct of men as individuals, and with 
men in groups.
The orator knowledgeable in the conduct of men in particu­
lar and in groups has at his disposal a special place to 
seek arguments i he is equipped to "analyze the types of 
human character • • • along with the virtues."®'* Knowing 
the character of men would, of course, provide the rhetor 
with invaluabe aid in effecting persuasion. In addition to 
this advantage of studying the conduct of men, Aristotle 
recognized*
The character . . .  of the speaker is a cause of 
persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him 
worthy of belief* for as a rule we trust men of probity 
more, and more quickly, about things in general, while 
on points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where 
opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely. This 
trust, however, should be created by the speech itself, 
and not left to depend upon an antecedent impression 
that the speaker is this or that kind of man.°°
Thus ethics and politics, as Aristotle sees them, have bear­
ing on communication from two directions* in the first 
place as they enhance the speaker's knowledge of men in gen­
eral and of his specific audience, and secondly as they
84Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Lane Cooper, in The 
Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York* Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1932), ii. 22 1395^. 155.
8 5 I b i d . . i .  2 . I356a . 9 .  8 6 I b i d . , pp. 8 - 9 .
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relate to his own ethical nature and make his discourse more 
credible and his persuasion more effective*
A* Craig Baird declares a relation between ethics, 
rhetoric, politics, and logic, all four topics being ele­
ments of philosophy. He writes in his Rhetoric» A Philoso­
phical Inquiryi
These four components of philosophy, politics, ethics, 
logic, and rhetoric, are so closely inverwoven and are so 
mutually dependent as to constitute an entity. Politics 
largely records the experiences and subjects about which 
citizens debate. Logic and dialectic help to organize 
and test these ideas and their specific supports. Ethics 
provides the proper motives and goals in the selection 
and shaping of the oral or written document. Rhetoric 
welds together these logical, political and7ethical ele­
ments into a purposive communicative unit, '
Here Baird stresses the role of ethics in communication as
one of directing the mind of the communicator to the best
purposes to which he can put his discourse) he implies the
necessity for the orator, the writer, and the critic of
oral and written discourse to give attention to ethics.
Politics has the lesser role of recording significant areas
of controversy which relate to men in groups. This seems an
appropriate role for this discipline in that politics may be
considered a division of ethics dealing with the conduct of
men in groups rather than as individuals.
Aside from these other considerations, Reid himself 
perceives an extraordinarily strong bond be ^en ethics and 
communication. Section I of this chapter contains a discus-
(New Yo >• 94,
A- Craiff Baird. A Philosophical Inquiry
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sion of how the use of artificial signs grows out of man's 
ethical nature* Man's ability to make and keep contracts 
about the use of artificial signs requires a reliance on
OQ
his moral nature* A brief mention of the ethical nature
of language is in order here also as it serves to stress
the strong relation between communication and ethics in
Reid's thought. It has already been r/bted that Reid, in An
Inquiry Into the Human Mind, believes man to have as a part
of his constitution the notions of a contract or a covenant,
and "of moral obligation to perform them," and that if it
were not for these notions man could never have made the
agreements necessary to affix meaning to artificial signs*
This ability to assign meanings to words and to keep such
agreements is peculiar to man, and distinguishes him from 
89the brutes* 7 The fact that men effectively employ words, 
or artificial signs, implies that they have agreed a+. somf: 
time to affix a meaning to them which all will understand 
when the sign is used* Conversely, if the pact with mankind 
is broken at this very fundamental level, if words are used 
without regard for the meaning which all men have affixed to 
them, then the failure of all communication involving words 
is imminent* Hence in Reid's philosophy ethics is basically 
related to communication in that man's ability to develop 
and employ artificial signs, all his use of words, derives
®®Above, pp* 99-100. ®^Reid, Inquiry, p* 118.
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immediately from his sense of the moral obligation to keep 
covenants and contracts. Furthermore, whether language pre­
vails depends primarily upon the viability of these cove­
nants and contracts. For these reasons, then, a considera­
tion of ethics is relevant to any study of communication, 
and particularly to Reid's understanding of it.
Ethics and the Faculties of the Mind
Reid takes up the topic of ethics in Essays on the 
Active Powers of Man. where his first concern is the divi­
sion of the faculties of the mind into the understanding 
and the will. From the understanding derive all the specu­
lative powers of mam from the will come all the active 
powers. Reid declaresi
It is evidently the intention of our Maker, that man 
should be an active and not merely a speculative being. 
For this purpose, certain active powers have been given 
him, limited indeed in many respects, but suited to his 
rank and place in the creation.
Our business is to manage these powers, by proposing 
to ourselves the best ends, planning the most proper sys­
tem of conduct that is in our power, and executing it 
with industry and seal. This is true wisdomi this the 
very intention of our being.
Everything virtuous and praiseworthy must lie in the 
right use of our poweri everything vicious and blameable 
in the abuse of it. What is not within the sphere of our 
power cannot be imputed to us either for blame or praise. 
These are self-evident truths, to which every unprejug0 
diced mind yields an immediate and invincible assent
Reid*8 first assertions about the ethical nature of man are
based on self-evident first principles of the right and
onThomas Reid, Introduction to Essays on the Active 
Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, D.l!)., ed. Sir"" 
Wiiiiam Hamilton (Edinburghi Maclachlan and Stewart, I863), 
II, 511.
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wrong use of man's active powers, his power to will and to 
carry out his will. Herein also lies a justification for 
philosophizing about ethical matters» apparently Reid takes 
it as a first principle that we are to devise the "most pro­
per system of conduct" and to guide our actions accordingly.
Notably there is no absolute reliance on theology to 
provide a system of ethics, though Reid thinks it evident 
that God created man to be an active being as well as a 
speculative one. Rather Reid setB out to use his specula­
tive powers to devise the "most proper system of conduct."
It is man's application of his intellectual ability which 
guides the use of his will. Reid writes *
Knowledge derives its value from this, that it enlar­
ges our power, and directs us in the application of it. 
For, in the right employment of our active power consists 
all the honour, dignity, and worth, of a man, and, in the 
abuse and perversion of it, all vice, corruption, and 
depravity.
We are distinguished from the brute animals, not less 
by our active than by our speculative powers.
Man is capable of acting from motives of a higher 
nature. He perceives a dignity and worth in one course 
of conduct, a demerit and turpitude in another, which 
brutes have not the capacity to discern.
He perceives it to be his duty to act the worthy and 
the honourable part, whether his appetites and passions 
incite him to it or to the contrary. When he sacrifices 
the gratification of the strongest appetites or passions 
to duty, this is so far from diminishing the merit of his 
conduct, that it greatly increases it, and affords, upon 
reflection, an inward satisfaction and triumph, of which 
brute-animals are not susceptible. When he acts a con­
trary part, he has a consciousness of demerit, to which 
they are no less strangers.91
Thus the understanding plays an important role in man's
91 Ibid.
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effort to determine the right use of his active powers and* 
therebyi to distinguish him from the brutes, who cannot in 
Reid's view act from the higher motives directed by a ra­
tional consideration of the consequences of their conduct. 
Knowledge allows man to forego action based on his immedi­
ate desires and gives him a feeling of satisfaction for 
having suppressed his passions and acted according to his 
duty as he sees it*
Though the role of the understanding is important to 
man, it is subordinate to that of the will, beoause, as 
Reid says, • Every man must acknowledge, that to act
properly is muoh more valuable than to think justly or rea-
o2son acutely*N7 A consideration of ethics has supreme justi­
fication in Reid's philosophy, then, perhaps greater than 
that of logic* Logic is subordinate to ethics, though man's 
rational powers help to direct him in discerning right con 
duct from wrong*
Principles of Action
Also of great interest to the rhetorician is Reid's 
discussion of the principles of action, which include Every­
thing which incites us to act1* or the motives or reasons 
behind our actions*^ These are, of course, of concern to 
the rhetorician because of his interest in inciting action 
on the part of his auditors and in motivating changes in
^ Ibid. ^Reid, Active Powers, p* 5^3*
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attitude and opinion* Reid's discussion of the principles
of action partially answers a question which he himself
raises in Essays on the Active Powers of Man concerning the
inexplicable nature of communication* He writest
Even upon the minds of others, great effects may be 
produced by means within the compass of human poweri by 
means of good education, example, and by the discipline 
of laws and government*
That these have often had great and good effects on 
the civilization and improvement of individuals and of 
nations, cannot be doubted. But what happy effects they 
might have if applied universally with the Bkill and 
address that it within the reach of human wisdom and 
power, is not easily conceived, or to what pitch the 
happiness of human society, and the improvement of the 
specie8 , might be carried*
The power of man over his own and other minds, when 
we trace it to its origin, is involved in darkness no 
less than his power to move his own and other bodies*
We know that habit produces great changes in the 
mindi but how it does so, we know not. We know that 
example has a powerful, and, in the early period of life, 
almost an irresistible effect* but we know not how it 
produces this effect. The communication of thought, sen­
timent, and passion, from one mind to another, has some­
thing in it as mysterious as the communication of motio 
from one body to another
Reid speaks of the power of one human being to affect another 
in various ways, but unmistakable is his interest in the 
power of persuasive communication to affect changes of opin­
ion, attitudes, and conduct in other beings*
Interestingly, in the foregoing excerpt all the means 
that Reid mentions by which we have power over the minds of 
others are related to communication and rhetoric. The pub­
lic speaker and the writer are interested in affecting the
94Ibid.t p. 530.
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minds of their auditors by education, instruction, and per­
suasion*
When Reid speaks of the power of "good example" he 
seems to understand the example of a good character a father 
might set for a child, but he is not explicit on this point* 
This kind of influence,however, is related to ethical ap­
peal, which Aristotle calls ethos, the influence of one 
held in high esteem by those who know him*
The "discipline of laws and government" evolves from 
the deliberative discourse of lawmakers to influence the 
conduct of their fellow men. Thus all the means by which 
men affect the thoughts and actions of others are actually 
rhetorical in character and directly related to what Reid 
calls "the communication of thought, sentiment, and passion, 
from one mind to another*"
Reid, then raises the question about the nature of 
this process of communication, a question of primary signi­
ficance to communication and rhetorical theoryi he provides 
at least a partial answer in his discussion of the princi­
ples of action*
Reid recognises the practical importance of knowing 
how men may be brought to act in a desired manner* He 
declaresi
A man of sagacity, who has had occasion to deal in 
interesting matters, with a great variety of persons of 
different age, sex, rank, and profession, learns to judge 
what may be expected from men in given circumstancesi and 
how they may be most effectually induced to act the part 
which he desires* To know this is of so great importance 
to men in active life, that it is called knowing men, and
188
Q<knowing human nature.
Reid seems to see all men as in a rhetorical situation in 
the daily pursuits of their interests, and in dealing with 
human beings they tend to devise rules which allow them to 
have some degree of power over other men, regardless of 
whether they devise these rules consciously. Essentially 
Reid sots out to investigate that which causes men to act, 
with the aim of assisting the "man of the world" in affect­
ing his purposes when he plies persuasion, offers instruc­
tion or example, and invokes the law to gain his ends.9**
Reid designates three classifications of principles
of action which he calls mechanical, animal, and rational.
He derives these names from a concept of man as a creature
of evolution whose "body, by which his mind is greatly
affected," is "part of the material system, [andl is subject
to all the laws of inanimate matter. " 97 The principles of
action affecting man on the mechanical level, therefore, are
called mechanical principles. "During some part of his
existence," Reid continues, "his state is very like that of
a vegetable. He rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the
animal, and at last, to the rational life, and has the prin-
98ciples that belong to all. " 7 For some unstated reason Reid 
does not include in his scheme a classification called vege­
table principles, possibly because he does not imagine vege-
9 5Ibid., p. 5^3. 96 Ibid.. pp. 543-44.
97Ibid.. p. 5 ^ .  " ibid.
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tables as being affected to any perceptible degree* Never­
theless he does include a category of principles of action 
called animal» "as they seem common to man with other ani­
mals *" and rational, "being proper to man as a rational 
oocreature* " 77
Mechanical principles of action*— The first category, 
mechanical principles of action, are divided into two spe­
cies which Reid designates as instinct and habit* He de­
fines instinct as "a natural blind impulse to certain ac­
tions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, 
and very often without any conception of what we do . " 100  
Instincts have a "natural" origini that is, they are innate* 
Habits, on the other hand, proceed from a different source* 
they are acquired* Both habits and instincts affect the 
conduct of man without his will, intention, or thought of 
them. 101
Reid describes and offers examples of several in­
stincts, including the breathing and sucking instincts of 
the infant, who carries out these functions without know­
ledge of their purpose* Reid declares that
By a like principle it is that infants cry when they 
are pained or hurt* that they are afraid when left alone, 
especially in the dark* that they start when in danger of 
fallingi that they are terrified by an angry countenance, 
or an angry tone of voice and are soothed and comforted 
by a placid countenance, and by soft and gentle tones ofvoice**0*
"ibid*, p. 545. 100Ibid. 101 Ibid.. p. 550.
102Ibid., p. 5^5*
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Instincts such as the above operate to protect us from dan­
ger when we are too young to reason a course of action or 
when a protective procedure is required on such short notice 
that we would be unable to provide it without such a device 
as instinct. For example, we wink our eyes by instinct when 
an object threatens to strike our face* Also certain kinds 
of imitation are instinctive i often when a man does not will 
to imitate a dialect unlike his own he finds himself never­
theless acquiring the intonation patterns of the "words and 
phrases of those he converses with*" Reason is another 
capability which man acquires by imitation* Reid says that 
"man would never acquire the use of reason if he were not 
brought up in the society of reasonable creatures*"10^
Habit is the second mechanical principle of action* 
Reid believes that habits are acquired, at least in ps-t, by 
the instinct of imitation* When an action is done at f in? t 
by imitation and then repeated several times, we acquire a 
facility in doing it and in addition we acquire a tendency 
to do it on like occasions* Reid is particularly interested 
in the manner in which habit affects speech, and he writest
Every art furnishes examples both of the power of 
habits and of their utility! not one more than the most 
common of all arts, the art of speaking*
Articulate language is spoken, not by nature, but by 
art. It is no easy matter to children to learn the sim­
ple sounds of language! I mean, to learn to pronounce 
the vowels and consonants* It would be much more diffi­
cult, if they were not led by instinct to imitate the
103Ibid.. p. 549.
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sounds they hear* for the difficulty is vastly greater 
of teaching the deaf to pronounce the letters and words, 
though experience shews that can be done.
What is it that makes this pronunciation so easy at 
last which was so difficult at first? It is habit.
But from what cause does it happen, that a good 
speaker no sooner conceives what he would express, than 
the letters, syllables, and words arrange themselves 
according to innumerable rules of speech, while he never 
thinks of these rules? He means to express certain sen­
timents i in order to do this properly, a selection must 
be made of the materials, out of many thousands. He makes 
this selection without any expense of time or thought.
The materials selected must be arranged in a particular 
order, according to innumerable rules of grammar, logic, 
and rhetoric, and accompanied with a particular tone and 
emphasis. He does all this as it were by inspiration, 
without thinking of any of these rules, and without 
breaking one of them.
This art, if it were not more common, would appear
more wonderful than that a man should dance blindfold
amidst a thousand burning ploughshares, without being 
burnti yet all this may be done by habit.104.
Thus the child learns to speak just as he learns to reason, 
by imitation. After imitating what he hears, he repeats his 
imitations until they become habit. Habit makes the compli­
cated process of using language manageable by those who are 
not instructed in the rules of grammatical usage and syntax.
Reid commits a seeming oversight in placing reasoning 
in the category of instinct rather than in the category of
habit* the rules pertaining to reasoning, like those of the
use of language, seem to become habitual with repeated use 
and the rules need never be considered in order for one to 
reason correctly. Reid does not seem to recognize this 
oversight, however, nor does he explain in detail exactly 
why he considers reasoning an instinct rather than a habit.
104Ibid., p. 550
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Possibly he aeons to illustrate that we acquire the ability 
to speak by this instinct* Only after we imitate others 
instinctively do we reason or speak by habit.
In concluding his discussion of the mechanioal prin­
ciples of action* Reid summarises the importance of instinct 
and habit to man* saying
It appears evident, that as, without instinct, the 
infant could not live to become a man* so, without habit 
man would remain an infant through life, and would be as 
helpless, as unhandy, as speechless, and as much a child 
in understanding at threescore as at three.
I see no reason to think that we shall ever be able 
to assign the physical cause, either of instinct, or of 
the power of habit.
Both seem to be parts of our original constitution. 
Their end and u b o is evidenti but we can assign no cause 
of them, but the will of Him who made us. 05
This seems an unscientific assertion for a man who avows
interest in empirical investigation, but it points up the
lack of knowledge about this very fundamental lev^l of the
mind's operation and the difficulty of investigating the
phenomena of this kind. Clearly, however, Reid regards
instinct and habit as principles of action important to
man's survival and to the ease with which he conducts his
life.
Animal principles of action.— The second category of 
animal principles includes appetites, desires, benevolent 
affections, malevolent affections, passions, dispositions, 
and opinions, all of which influence the intentions and the
pp. 550-51.
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will of brutes and men alike, but none of which operate on 
the judgment or reason of man.
Reid observes that "every appetite is accompanied 
with an uneasy sensation proper to it, which is strong or 
weak, in proportion to the desire we have of the object," 
and that appetites are periodical, being satisfied for the 
time that the desire is met but returning later. Reid men­
tions three appetites in mam hunger, thirst, and lust.10^ 
He deals in detail only with hunger, and proceeds from this 
to a discussion of appetite in general. Concerning the mora­
lity of action motivated by appetite, Reid declares that
To act merely from appetite, is neither good nor 
ill in a moral view. It is neither an object of praise 
nor of blame. No man claims any praise because he eats 
when he is hungry, or rests when he is weary. On the 
other hand, he is no object of blame, if he obeys the 
call of appetite when there is no reason to hinder him.
In this he acts agreeably to his nature.10'
At times, however, man is restrained in acting as his appe­
tite dictatesi other motives, such as the rational motives 
of "duty, decency, or even interest," may keep him from act­
ing according to his appetites.
Reid understands a moral priority which makes the 
rational motives, like duty, "higher" and more to be heeded 
than others. But in the hierarchy of motives others besides 
rational motives may take priority in given situations.
Reid says*
When appetite is opposed by some principle drawing a
106Ibid. . p. 551. 107Ibid... p. 552.
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contrary way, there must be a determination of the will, 
which shall prevail, and this determination may be, in 
a moral sense, right or wrong.
Appetite, even in a brute-animal, may be restrained 
by a stronger principle opposed to it, A dog, when he 
is hungry and has meat set before him, may be kept from 
touching it by the fear of immediate punishment. In 
this case his fear operates more strongly than his de­
sire
We attribute no virtue to the dog restraining his appetite 
by the motivation of fear, nor to the man acting from the 
same motive, Reid considers the impulse of fear stronger 
than the impulse of appetite, and there is no virtue in 
merely following the strongest inclination, 1 ®9 Reid does 
advocate, however, that man should will to perform those 
acts dictated by his rational powersi the ability to do 
so, indeed, makes man a moral agent.
The animal principle of desire is much like appetite 
except that the "uneasy sensation" accompanying desire is 
constant instead of temporary like that accompanying appe­
tite, Reid envisions three kinds of desires "the desire 
for power, the desire of esteem, and the desire of know­
ledge," He observes the desire for power in brutes as well 
as men, and it manifests itself in their tendency to assert 
their superiority over their fellows. Of the other desires 
Reid says, "The desires of esteem and knowledge are highly
useful to society, as well as the desire of power, and, at
110the same time, are less dangerous in their excesses,"
108Ibid.. p. 55^. 1Q9Ibid. 110Ibld., p, 556,
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Like the appetites, desires are neither good nor had in
themselves, but are judged so on the basis of their conflict
111with Hmore important principles," A such as duty and decen­
cy.
Other kinds of animal principles of action are bene­
volent and malevolent affections which cause us to wish to
do good or ill "to some person, or, at least, to some anima-
112ted being." Benevolent affections are intended by God to
be useful to us for our preservationi Reid explains*
We are placed in this world by the Author of our 
being, surrounded with many objects that are necessary or 
useful to us, and with many that may hurt us. We are led, 
not by reason and self-love only, but by many instincts, 
and appetites, and natural desires, to seek the former 
and avoid the latter.113
Benevolent and malevolent affections assist man in discern­
ing that which does him good and that which harms him? they 
preserve man and his society by causing him to se^ve those 
who do him and society good and to avoid those who do not. 
Reid enumerates several benevolent and malevolent affections, 
some of which he sees in insects and birds as they care for
their eggs, as well as among men as they care for their chil­
li itdren. Other benevolent affections manifest themselves in 
the form of "gratitude to benefactors," "pity and compassion 
toward the distressed," "esteem of the wise and good," 
"friendship," "love between the sexes," and "an affection to
1 1 1Ibid.. pp. 55^-5 5. 1 1 2Ibid.. p. 5 5 8.
113Ibid., p. 560. ll4Ibid.
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any community to which we belong. "11-*
Malevolent affections are of two kinds, emulation and 
resentment. By emulation, Reid means "a desire of superior­
ity to our rivals in any pursuit, accompanied with an uneas­
iness at being surpassed."11^ Emulation here seems closely 
related to envy, and Reid makes no distinction between the 
two terms. Resentment is the sentiment which we have "when 
we are hurt, to resist and retaliate." Reid continues that 
"besides the bodily pain occasioned by the hurt, the mind is 
ruffled, and a desire raised to retaliate upon the author of
the hurt or injury. This, in general, is what we call anger
117or resentment." ' Neither emulation nor resentment is evil 
in itself, but both of course may be corrupted by improper 
indulgence. In his conclusion Reid admonishes that while 
benevolent affections are "health to the soul" an' "the chief 
ingredient of beauty in the human face divine," malevolent 
affections, even in slight degrees, are "a nauseous medicine,
which is never to be taken without necessityi and even then
118in no greater quantity than the necessity requires." Man 
cannot avoid being motivated by benevolent and malevolent 
affections, and both contribute to the good of the indivi­
dual and of society 1 but malevolent affections may be dest­
ructive to the mental health of the individual who falls
1^^Ibid., pp. 5 6 0-6 6 . **^Ibid.. p. 5 6 6.
117Ibid., p. 568. ll8lbid., p. 570.
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their victim even in slight degrees*
One of the most interesting animal principles of 
action is that of passion, by which Reid means a vehement 
agitation of the mind "which is opposed to that state of 
tranquillity and composure in which a man is most master of 
himself."119 He describes the effects of passion upon man, 
saying that
Passion commonly produces sensible effects even upon 
the body. It changes the voice, the features, and the 
gesture* The external signs of passion have, in some 
cases, a great resemblance to those of madnessi in others, 
to those of melancholy. It gives often a degree of mus­
cular force and agility to the body, far beyond what it 
possesses in calm moments*
The effects of passion upon the mind are not less 
remarkable. It turns the thoughts involuntarily to the 
objects related to it, so that a man can hardly think of 
anything else* It gives often a strange bias to the judg­
ment, making a man quick-sighted in everything that tends 
to inflame his passion, and to justify it, but blind to 
everything that tends to moderate and allay it. Like a 
magic lanthorn, it raises up spectres and apparitiors 
that have no reality, and throws false colours upon every 
object. It can turn deformity into beauty, vice 5nto 
virtue, and virtue into vice.120
Despite these rather violent effects upon the body and the 
mind, however, Reid regards passion, like the other princi­
ples which motivate man to act, as neither good nor bad in 
itself. He considers the biblical story of Adam and Eve as 
historical evidence that the understanding of "our first 
parents" was blinded by a passion which perverted their 
wills,*21 but he also cites examples of the good wrought by
U 9 Ibid., p. 571 • 12QIbid. 121Ibid.. pp. 572-7 3 *
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passion. Among these benefits of passion are the patriotic
fervor of the soldier which "makes him despise every dangezv"
and the willingness of other men to undertake the tasks of 
122government.
In discussing the passions, Reid again brings up the 
subject of natural signs, sayings
The involuntary signs of the passions and disposi­
tions of the mind* in the voice, features, and actions, 
are a part of the human constitution which deserves admir­
ation. The signification of those signs is known to all 
men by nature, and previous to all experience.
They are so many openings into the soul of our fellow- 
men, by which their sentiments become visible to the eye. 
They are a natural language common to mankind, without 
which it would have been impossible to have invented 
artificial language.
It is from the natural signs of the passions and dis­
positions of the mind that the human form derives its 
beautyi that painting, poetry, and music derive their 
expression! that eloquence derives its greatest force, 
and conversation its greatest charm*123
Here he gives no more specific example of what he interds by 
natural signs than he does in other places, but Reid implies 
his admiration for forceful eloquence and charming conversa­
tion which are achieved when the passions and dispositions 
of the mind are applied to the matter of the discourse. Of 
course, the terms force and charm need amplification to make 
them clear, but Reid disregards this necessity.
Further, Reid does not explain how an artist, whether 
painter, poet, musician, or orator, can avoid being accom­
plished at his undertaking if the signs of passions and dis­
positions are indeed involuntary. He seems to believe that,
122Ibid., pp. 57^-75. 123Ibid.. p. 57^.
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in public speaking for instance, the force of the natural 
signs of passions and dispositions of the mind may be sup­
pressed by too great a reliance upon the artificial signs I
\
words, to carry out the task of communication. This is an 
assumption which Reid does not clarify, nor is it clear how 
the painter and the musician could suppress natural signs or 
fail to make full use of them, since they would not neces­
sarily employ words in their art. Of course, the vocalist 
does use words, and would suppress natural signs as the 
orator would in this respect. Apparent again is the fact 
that though Reid's idea of natural and artificial language 
makes possible some interesting insights into communication, 
it is not fully developed.
Another animal principle is disposition,
• • • a state of mind which, while it lasts, gives a ten­
dency, or proneness, to be moved by certain animal prin­
ciples, rather than othersj while, at another time, ano­
ther state of mind, in the same person.. may give the 
ascendant to other animal principles.12 ”̂
For example, the mind may at some time show "everything in 
the most agreeable light. Then a man is prone to benevo­
lence, compassion, and every kind of affections unsuspicious, 
not easily provoked." Revealing his awareness of the rhetor­
ician's interests, Reid points out that " . . .  artful men 
watch these occasions [when others are in such good humor}, 
and know how to improve them to promote their ends.*2** Cer­
tainly this watchfulness is a most important activity to the
12/fIbid.. p. 575. 125Ibid.
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orator who would adapt his speech to the dispositions of 
his audience.
Opinion is the last animal principle Which Reid men­
tions, and it provides a logical transition into hie discus­
sion of the rational principles, because opinion has influ­
ence in the animal as well as the rational principles of 
action. Like disposition, opinion is able to intensify 
other animal principles and is a necessary ingredient in 
certain sentiments•
Gratitude supposes the opinion of a favour done or 
intended; resentment the opinion of an injury! esteem 
the opinion of merit! the passion of love supposes the 
opinion of uncommon merit and perfection in its object.
Although natural affections to parents, children, 
and near relatives is not grounded on the opinion of 
their merit, it is much increased by that consideration.
So is every benevolent affection. On the contrary, real 
malevolence can hardly exist without the opinion of demer­
it in the object.126
Opinion also serves to motivate man in restraining 
certain passions. "Thus, if a man were a-thirst, and had a 
strong desire to drink, the opinion there was poison in the 
cup would make him forbear,M Reid explains.3,27 Regarding 
the ability of opinion to motivate or restrain actions in 
brute animals, Reid relates a rather interesting story* He 
sayst
I have been credibly informed, that a monkey, having 
once been intoxicated with strong drink, in consequence 
of which it burnt its foot in the fire, and had a severe 
fit of sickness, could never after bo induced to drink 
anything but pure water. I believe this is the utmost
126Ibid., p. 577. 127Ibld
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1 9Rpitch which the faculties of brutes can reach*
Reid does not consider the fact that a similar experience 
involving a man might cause no restraint in the use of 
alcohol whatsoever*
Reid believes mankind to be motivated extensively 
by opinion* particularly in their obedience to government*
A man of the opinion that government exists justifiably and 
who gives his allegiance on that basis is truly free, while 
one who obeys out of fear is a slave* A wise government, 
therefore, spends its resources on the education of the 
governed and attempts thereby to create an understanding 
of the value of government and law*129 This topic is also 
discussed later as it relates to Reid's notion of politics* 
With no higher principle to motivate him than the 
animal principles, man would still be "capable of considering 
the distant consequences of his actions, and of restraining 
or indulging his appetites, desires, and affections, from 
the consideration of distant good or evil."1^0 He is able 
to make choices based on the inclinations given to him by 
his passions, dispositions, and opinions which intensify 
and allay the other animal principles* With the aid of 
these three animal principles, passions, dispositions, and 
opinions, man would also be able to choose some goal for 
his life, and plan his conduct toward attaining that goal*
128Ibid. 129Ibid*. pp. 577-78. 13°Ibid*. p. 578.
Reid imagines that man may accomplish these rather noble 
achievements without having any sense of conscience or duty* 
He thinks also that a large portion of humanity are motiva­
ted by no higher principles than the mechanical and ani- 
131mal* J Reid apparently refers to the ignorant and sup­
pressed people of all times and all nationsf those people 
who are most easily led and subjugated by demagogues and 
tyrants•
One Interested in communication should take note here 
of the implication in Reid's writing that those motivated by 
principles other than the rational are at a disadvantage 
compared to those who are motivated additionally by the 
rational principles of action* While they are possibly led 
more easily than other men, they maybe unable to respond to 
appeal8 made specifically to motivate them by rational means* 
They may be unable to employ rational appeals in their at­
tempts to motivate others. If those who are not guided by 
rational principles are to be protected from tyranny, those 
who lead them must themselves be motivated by the highest 
principles of conscience and duty* Of course, this neces­
sity for morality among politicians and leaders of society 
is always a difficult one to guarantee, and for that reason 
tyranny is best suppressed in those nations where govern­
ment takes care to educate its citizens and to improve their 
ability to apply the rational principles of motivation in
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such activities aB selecting their leaders and choosing 
their political allegiances.
The rational principles of action.— The third major 
category of principles which motivate man is composed of 
the rational principles of action which abide in beings 
with reason or intelligence. Judgment is a part of the 
ability of man to reasonj it causes men to believe or dis­
believe certain propositions and to have opinions about 
them. Reason serves another function important to ethics 
in that it has dominion over action and can cause man to 
refrain from some acts and to perform others. J The good 
man obeys his reason and judgment before the dictates of 
other motivating principles. It is reason, in Reid's eth­
ics, which makes man know "what is good for us on the whole, 
and, what appears to be our duty." He adds that "whatever 
makes a man more happy or more perfect^ is good, and is the 
object of desire as soon as we are capable of forming the 
conception of it. The contrary is ill, and is an object of 
aversion." Consequently, Reid declares, "that which, taken 
with all its discoverable connections and consequences, 
brings more good than ill, I call good upon the whole.1,1 33 
By taking notice of what is the good upon the whole, men may 
refuse to indulge their appetites or desires at present for 
greater good in the future. They may do the lesser evil now
132Ibld., pp. 579-80. 133Ibid.. pp. 580-81.
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to avoid a greater evil in the future i this kind of action
134Reid calls "wise and reasonable conduct• "
Most interesting is the fact that Reid in defining 
the term good takes an epicurean stance* accounting what 
makes man happy as a factor to be considered. Clearly it 
is not the sole consideration* because he immediately ad­
joins to man's happiness the stipulation that good must 
also make man more perfect, though he does not define per­
fection. The addition of this requirement dilutes the pure­
ly epicurean consideration of happiness. Not only a sense 
of "good upon the whole" but also a sense of duty allows 
man to direct his conduct. Indeed it is the rational prin­
ciple of duty, in Reid's opinion, which makes man a moral
13*>agent and makes possible his acting virtuously.
Reid defines duty in various wayst first, he offers 
the following series of synonyms* duty is "what we ought to 
do— what is fair and honest— what is approvable— what every • 
man professes to be the rule of his conduct— what all men 
praise— and, what is in itself laudable, though no man should 
praise it." He also calls duty "a moral obligation which 
obliges a man to do certain things because they are right, 
and not to do other things because they are wrong."*3** Des­
pite the synonyms and the description of how duty works,
Reid admits that he cannot define duty because it is unique,
13**Ibid.. p. 581. l35Ibid.. p. 586.
136Ibid., p. 587.
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"a relation of its own kind," "too simple to admit of logi­
cal definition.
In addition to duty, man's moral sense or conscience 
is a rational principle of actionf it is not arrived at by 
logic but somehow comes to man when his mental powers are 
mature. Reid writes that "by an original power of the mind, 
when we come to years of understanding and reflection, we 
not only have the notions of right and wrong in conduct, 
but we perceive certain things to be right, and others to 
be wrong.” The moral sense is strengthened by instruction- 
and education, but it comes into being inevitably.13® Reid 
does not specifically account for the fact that some men 
fail to aoquire any sense of duty or knowledge of right or 
wrong, but he implies that these men simply have not "come 
to years of understanding and reflection."
In Reid's ethics man can reason about matters of 
morals, and, as in all logic, ethical reasoning is based on 
self-evident first principles of morals. As an example of 
how reasoning about morals works, Reid considers the ques­
tion of whether polygamy is moral, and says that
We reason upon this question, by balancing the adva- 
tages and disadvantages to the family, and to society in 
general, that are naturally consequent both upon mono­
gamy and polygamy. And, if it can be shewn that the 
advantages are greatly upon the side of monogamy, we 
think the point is determined.
But, if a man does not perceive that he ought to 
regard the good of society, and the good of his wife 
and children, the reasoning can have no effect upon him, 
because he denies the first principle upon which it is
137Ibid.. p. 589. 138Ibid.. pp. 589. 595*
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grounded.
Suppose, again, that we reason for monogamy from the 
intention of nature, discovered by the proportion of 
males and of females that are born— a proportion which 
corresponds perfectly with monogamy— this argument can 
have no weight with a man who does not perceive that he 
ought to have a regard to the intention of nature.
Thus we shall find that all moral reasonings rest 
upon one or more first principles of morals, whose truth 
is immediately perceived without reasoning* by all men 
come to years of understanding.
And this indeed is common to every branch of human 
knowledge that deserves the name of science. There must 
be first principles proper to that science, by which the 
whole superstructure is supported.
The first principles of morals are propositions con­
taining the term ought and specifying man's obligation, and 
these self-evident propositions are recognized as true imme­
diately upon being understood by a man of mature understand­
ing. How to determine whether a man is of mature understand­
ing remains unanswered, however, and forces Reid to beg the 
question, insisting that one of mature understanding is one 
who recognizes his moral obligation. Distinguishing the msn 
of mature understanding from one of immature understanding 
might be important when a dispute arises over first princi­
ples, and all parties in the dispute consider themselves of 
mature understanding and are so considered by all who ob­
serve the dispute. Of course, this iB a ramification of a 
similar problem in all of Reid's philosophy of common sense* 
throughout, it relies for the truth of self-evident first 
principles upon the rather nebulous concept of the unpre­
judiced judgment of man.
139Ibid.. p. 591.
Equally as knotty as the problem of distinguishing 
the man of mature understanding from one who is not is the 
problem which arises when Reid argues that the morality of 
monogamy is supported by the fact that the ratio of male to 
female children is equal. Would the morality of polygamy 
be supported by the fact that wars considerably diminish the 
male population from time to time, or, in the case of the 
Mormon trek to Utah, that the female population is consider­
ably larger than the male by a quirk of circumstance in an 
isolated situation? Seemingly these considerations are 
equally as important as the proportion of male babies to 
females. The fact that the ratio of male births to female 
is not controlled by man presumably gives Reid justification 
in believing that it is the intent of nature that man be 
monogamous. These are interesting questions which arise 
out of Reid's reasoning about morals, but the most important 
point of his discussion is that in reasoning about morals, 
as in reasoning about any matter, arguments must rest upon 
self-evident propositions known to be true immediately upon 
understanding them. Reid clarifies his point, adding that
The first principles of morals are the immediate 
dictates of the moral faculty. They shew us, not what 
man is, but what he ought to be. Whatever is immediately 
perceived to be just, honest, and honourable, in human 
conduct, carries moral obligation along with it, and 
the contrary carries demerit and blamej and, from these 
moral obligations must be deduced by reason.14-0
Hence, in Reid's scheme, man recognizes that he should
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take note of the intention of naturet he may set about to 
discover through reason what that intention is. Likewise, 
once a man knows of his obligation to the good of society, 
he may seek to discover what best benefits society.
The next topic Reid takes up corresponds to the 
ancient mode of persuasion* ethos. Reid treats it in his 
discussion *Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation• " He 
observes that men often make moral judgments about the con­
duct of their fellow ment we judge the actions of others as 
either good or bad. Furthermore, our approbation or dis­
approbation Mappear8 to include* not only a moral judgment 
of the action, but some affection* favourable or unfavour­
able* towards to agent, and some feeling in ourselves." We 
award one whose action we judge to be good our esteem and 
good will, and " . . .  esteem and benevolent regard, not only 
accompany real worth by the constitution of our nature, but 
are perceived to be really and properly due to it* and that, 
on the contrary unworthy conduct really merits dislike and 
indignation.
By some original principle within him, man is brought 
to give "esteem and benevolent regard" to one of "real 
worth." This principle, which Reid regards as natural and 
inevitable in man, has long been of value to the rhetori­
cian because of his interest in the relation between such 
esteem and the credibility and persuasiveness of the orator
141 Ibid., p. 592.
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and writer* Reid does not discuss esteem and moral appro­
bation with specific regard to rhetoric, but he does attempt 
to describe the manner in which contemplation of "a noble 
character" affects man* He writest
• . • like a beautiful object, it gives a lively and 
pleasant emotion to the spirits* It warms the heart, 
and invigourates the whole frame* Like the beams of the 
sun, it enlivens the face of nature, and diffuses heat 
and light all around*
We feel a sympathy with every noble and worthy charac­
ter that is represented to us* We rejoice in hie prosper­
ity, we are affliced in his distress* We even catch some 
sparks of that celestial fire that animated his conduct, 
and feel the glow of his virtue and magnanimity*
This sympathy is the necessary effect of our judgment 
of his conduct, and of the approbation and esteem due to 
it; for real sympathy is always the effect of some bene­
volent affection, such as esteem, love, pity, or humanity*
But, when there is a high degree of depravity in any 
person connected with us, we are deeply humbled and 
depressed by it* The sympathetic feeling has some resem­
blance to that of guilt, though it be free from all 
guilt* We are ashamed to see our acquaintance) we would, 
if possible, disclaim all connection with the guilty 
person. We wish to tear him. from our hearts, and blot 
him out of our remembrance*1^2
Thus, in language perhaps more akin to poetry than to des­
criptive prose, Reid describes the original inclination of 
man to be affected by the character of other men, and his 
description of this apparently inevitable approval awarded 
to the man of good character commends morality to the ora­
tor*
Reid specifically commends high character to the 
rhetor in closing his discussion of the rational principles
142Ibid., pp* 593-9**.
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of action* He says*
The wise man of the Stoics* like the perfect orator 
of the rhetoricians, was an ideal character, and was, in 
some respects, carried beyond naturei yet it was perhaps 
the most perfect model of virtue that ever was exhibited 
to the heathen worldi and some of those who copied after 
it, were ornaments to human nature*1^3
In Reid's opinion, an orator of impeccable character enjoys 
the empathetic response of his auditors to the sentiments he 
conveys* Such empathy on the part of an audience could do 
nothing but insure the communicator's increased credibility 
and persuasiveness, and, conversely, the speaker regarded 
by his audience as morally depraved is assured of failure 
in moving his audience, who seek to "disclaim all connection 
with the guilty person*" The ethical character of the com­
municator has great significance, indeed, in the success or 
failure of the communication, and Reid considers the esteem 
in which observers hold a man as an extremely important 
factor to his effectiveness in motivating others*
The Ethical Man
The principle that men are affected by the approval 
or disapproval they award the man of good character has 
been given either explicit or implicit acceptance by those 
interested in the theory of rhetoric and communication since 
ancient times* Reid's interest in how men are motivated 
by the esteem and approbation they give to the man of good 
character is justification for considering Reid's concept 
of the good man in more detail*
l43Ibld*. p* 598.
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Hlg natural inclination to be good.— Though Reid 
sees man as corrupt, his depravity is apparently not innate. 
Signifying his departure from Calvinism Reid declares man 
more inclined to good than to ill# He argues in the follow­
ing fashioni
The meanest of mankind has considerable power to do 
good, and more to hurt himself and others.
Prom this I think we may conclude, that, although the 
degeneracy of mankind be great, and justly to be lamented, 
yet men, in general, are more disposed to employ their 
power in doing good, than in doing hurt, to their fellow 
men. The last is much more in their power than the firsti 
and, if they were as much disposed to it, human society 
could not subsist, and the species must soon perish from 
the earth .1^
By the term good in this passage Reid understands that which 
does not harm other human beings, and by using the term in 
this manner he presents the second dimension in his defini­
tion of good. Not only is the good man to do that which is 
good for him or that which serves his interests, but he is 
also to do that which serves the interests of the rest of 
society.
Reid's argument that men are inclined to do good is 
grounded principally in his belief that man's power to des­
troy is greater than his power to create, but that society 
continues to exist. Except for man's inclination to good 
it would have been destroyed long ago. These observations 
are remarkably pre-twentieth-century, and Reid might today 
find many who would doubt the premises on which his conclu­
sion about the nature of man is based.
l44Ibid., p. 529.
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Any judgment about man's inclination toward the good 
seems necessarily prejudiced by the judge's particular world 
view. What undoubtedly appeared to Reid as an objective 
judgment in the relatively well-ordered and sedate society 
of eighteenth-century Scotland might seem blatantly absurd 
to a citizen of Detroit or Los Angeles in the latter i960's.
Important here is the fact that Reid's assertion is 
no more than a judgment based* of course* on his observa­
tions. Despite the periodical destructive lunacy of man* 
society does persist* and this persistence tends to indicate 
that men are more frequently interested in the good of soci­
ety than they are in its destruction. This entire argument 
presupposes that men are directly responsible for the crea­
tion and destruction of society* and that it is within man's 
power to create and destroy at will. This assumption places 
a large responsibility on all men for the welfare of their 
fellows, but particularly upon such men as political and 
spiritual leaders who wield an uncommon amount of power. 
Notably, one principal way in which these leaders wield 
their power is through communication in the form of oratory 
and writing. Thus Reid suggests an extraordinary amount of 
responsibility for those who would lead their fellow men 
because it is within their power* more than in other men's, 
to create, order, or destroy society through their communi­
cation.
His innate moral knowledge.--Not only is man inclined 
to do good rather than evil, but he also has instinctive
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knowledge of right and wrong. In Essays on the Intellectual
Powers of Man Reid asks the following rhetorical questionss
Who can doubt whether mankind have been universally per­
suaded that there is a right and a wrong in human con­
duct?*— some things which, in certain circumstances, they 
ought to do, and other things which they ought not to do? 
The universality of these opinions, and of many such that 
might be named, is sufficiently evident, from the whole 
tenor of men's conduct, as far as our acquaintance reach­
es, and from the records of history, in all ages and 
nations, that are transmitted to us.1^*
Reid indicates that he draws his conclusions about the uni­
versality of man's knowledge of duty and right and wrong 
from his observations and from historical evidence» but he 
does not elaborate on this point in his discussion. Parti­
cularly unclear is how the "tenor of men's conduct" indi­
cates the universality of their moral knowledge.
The philosopher gives some amplification to his con­
cept of the innate moral knowledge of man in Essays on the 
Active Powers of Man. Here he discusses the function of 
conscience in giving man his ability to discern between 
right and wrong conduct. Conscience is an original faculty 
of the mind, and " . . .  like all our other powers, it comes
to maturity by insensible degrees, and may be much aided in
146its strength and vigour by proper culture," All the fac­
ulties mature at various times, first the ones which we have 
in common with beasts and later those which belong solely to 
the human being, such as reason and judgment. Men's " . . .  
judgment of moral conduct, as well as their judgment of
l/f̂ Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 233*
lif̂ Reid, Active r wers. p. 595*
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truth, advances by insensible degrees, like the corn and the
grassH and comes to maturity with the proper carei
• • .they may be greatly assisted or retarded, improved 
or corrupted, by education, instruction, example, exer­
cise, and by the society and conversation of men, which, 
like soil and culture in plants, may produce great chan­
ges to the better or to the worse,1^7
Reid explains.
Like a delicate seed "planted in the mind by him that 
made us,M the conscience is cultivated and nourished until 
it can function on its own. Reid also likens the develop­
ment of the conscience to the innate ability of the athlete 
who, although he performs many physical feats with ease,
also seeks to develop his skill in swimming, dancing, fen-
1*4-8cing, and riding. Moral truths concerning right and
wrong conduct are like truths of other kindsi a man left to
discover them by himself might never do so,
. . .  yet when they are fairly laid before him, he owns 
and adopts them, not barely upon the authority of his 
teacher, but upon their own intrinsic evidence, and 
perhaps wonders that he could be so blind as not to see 
them before.1
Thus Reid removes the moral instruction of which he speaks 
from the realm of pure indoctrination by asserting that 
moral truths are evident when understood properly. If 
moral propositions are not self-evident, they are derived 
from self-evident first principles.1-*0
While conscience provides man with a knowledge of
1't7Ibld. 1‘t8Ibld. p. 596.
150Ibid.. p. 591.
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right and wrong and of his duty to do right and avoid wrong, 
it also has authority ovar tho othar motivating principles 
within unt Raid writes ahout this point, sayingi
The authority of conscience over the other active 
principles of the mind, I do not consider as a point that 
requires proof by argument, but as self evident* For it 
implies no more than this— That in all cases a man ought 
to do his duty* He only who doeskin all cases what ha 
ought to do, is the perfect man*1^1
The assertion that "man ought to do his duty,** of 
course, begs the question, since in Reid's philosophy duty 
is defined as that which one ought to do* Nevertheless, 
conscience calls man's attention to what he ought te do and 
helps him restrain the other motivating principles such as 
desire or appetite which may be in conflict with duty*
The good man is assisted greatly in his pursuit of 
moral conduct by the fact that God has planted in his mind 
the seed of conscience, and, given the proper care, nourish­
ment, and guidance, it will serve him as a sextant and com­
pass serve the sailor, to plot his course in the right to 
which he is already inclined* Though Reid implies that the 
guidance which the immature conscience should receive is to 
be given by instructors who are themselves moral men, he is 
not clear on exactly how the conscience is corrupted or 
about the circumstances under which corruption of the con­
science might occur* Reid presumably believes that the con­
151 Ibid*, p* 595.
216
science does not have the proper nurturing when it is 
instructed by those whose lives and thought do not exemplify 
the goodness of which man is capable.
A problem with Reid's theory of conscience is that it 
implies that at some point in the history of man there were 
humans whose conscience had no instruction* education* exam­
ple* or exercise* because Reid believes in the historical 
creation of man as related in the Book of Genesis. Reid 
does not specifically discuss how the conscience of the two 
original humans came to maturity, but he does say that man 
is able to discover moral truth without the aid of instruc­
tion, He explains that just as "truth has an affinity with 
the human understanding, which error hath not," so "• • • 
right principles of conduct have an affinity with a candid 
mind, which wrong principles have not." He further explains 
that "when they [right principles of conduct] are set before 
it [the mind] in a just light, a well disposed mind recog­
nises this affinity, feels their authority, and perceives 
them to be genuine."1^2 A man who is deprived of moral 
instruction or who receives instruction by immoral teachers 
may yet find the right path. Apparently men have come to 
know the "right principles of conduct" through the ages by 
discovering them a few at a time and always passing their 
discoveries to the new generation.
His liberty.— In Reid's scheme of ethics another
152Ibld.. p. 596.
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important fact about man is that he is free? he has a "power 
over the determination of his own will."1^3 In other words 
man can decide what it is that he wills to will? therefore, 
his acts are undetermined* Reid believes that man has moral 
liberty for three major reasons* "first, because he has a 
natural conviction or belief, that, in many cases, he acts 
freely? secondly, because he is accountable? and, thirdly,
because he is able to prosecute an end by a long series of
lmeans adapted to it." Just as Reid's assertion that the 
external world exists is based on man*s universal and irre­
pressible conviction of it, so his assertion of the exis­
tence of man's liberty is based on man's universal and irre­
pressible conviction that he acts freely and not out of 
necessity* Both the principle of the existence of the mater­
ial world and of man's moral freedom are common sense first 
principles in Reid's thought. Reid also takes for granted 
that man is "capable of acting right and wrong, and [is]
I C Canswerable for his conduct to Him who made him."
Man's judgment determines one action "to be prefer­
able to another, either in itself or for some purpose which 
he intends," and without this ability to make judgments 
right and wrong would have no meaning. In other words, Reid 
holds that if man's freedom to will is encumbered, then he 
could not be responsible or accountable for his actions? and 
he cannot be held in blame or praise, because he did not
153Ibid., p. 599* 1 ̂ I b i d ., p. 6l6.
155Ibid.. p. 620.
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control the choices of oonduct which he made,1^  Men clear­
ly do praise and blame others for their conduct, and all men 
do indeed have a concept of right and wrong) thus, this 
second argument for the existence of man's moral liberty is 
ultimately based in common sense principles which are held 
universally by men, Reid's third argument is a simple one 
consisting of the fact that man is able to lay plans for his 
conduct long in advance of carrying them out, and he can 
execute his plans to accomplish an end.1^7 Another argument 
for the moral freedom of man appears in Reid's writing about 
ethics. He asserts that "nature gives no power in vain 
• • • t" nature has given man the power to reason and judge, 
therefore man must be free to judge and reason of what he 
shall will.1”*8 Thus Reid establishes that man has moral 
liberty and that he is, for that reason, accountable on the 
basis of the conduct he chooses.
The fact that man is worthy of praise or blame is of 
interest to the rhetorician because of its relation to the 
ethical mode of persuasion, Man's moral freedom is the 
origin and justification of our esteem for men of good char­
acter, Reid writes about men's tendency to give their appro­
val and disapproval to others in the following passages
The effect of moral liberty is, That it is in the 
power of the agent to do well or ill. This power, like 
every gift of God, may be abused. The right use of this 
gift of God is to do well and wisely, as far as his best 
judgment can direct him, and thereby merit esteem and
156Ibid,, pp. 599-600. 157Ibid., pp. 622-23.
158Ibid.. pp. 599-600.
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approbation* The abuse of it is to act contrary to what 
he knows or suspects to be his duty and his wisdom* and 
thereby justly merit disapprobation and blame*159
It is man's freedom to will certain actions over others 
which makes him worthy of praise or blame, and if man's 
actions were wholly determined, as some believe, men could 
not, at least not justly, hold their fellow men in high or 
low esteem* Indeed no one could rightly claim responsibi­
lity for his actions, nor, simultaneously, his right to the 
esteem of his fellows for his good character.
His improvement.— Another consideration Reid gives to 
the subject of the ethical man concerns the necessity of 
man's improvement and the manner in which it is carried out* 
In Essavs on the Active Powers of Man Reid reveals his be­
lief that man is intended by his maker to be an active 
rather than a passive creature, to work, and to make the 
earth yield a livelihood for him* About man's need to be 
actively about changing the world to accommodate his own 
desires, Reid writes*
If we compare the city of Venice, the province of 
Holland, the empire of China, with those places of the 
earth which never felt the hand of industry, we may form 
some conception of the extent of human power upon the 
material system, in changing the face of the earth, and 
furnishing the accommodations of human life*
But, in order to produce those happy changes, man 
himself must be improved.
His animal faculties are sufficient for the preserva­
tion of the speciesi they grow up of themselves, like the 
trees of the forest, which require only the force of 
nature and the influences of Heaven,
His rational and moral faculties, like the earth
159Ibid., p. 600.
220
itself, are rude and barren by nature, but capable of a 
high degree of culturei and this culture he must receive 
from parents, from instructors, from those with whom he 
lives in society, joined with his own industry.160
Reid, then, perceives the entire earth as created to serve 
the ends of man, if man will only turn his efforts to the 
noble task of improving it. But this task can be accomp­
lished, in Reid's opinion, only when man himself is improved, 
Reid suggests that man must improve his rational 
powers, "acquiring the treasures of useful knowledge, the 
habits of skill in the arts, the habits of wisdom, prudence, 
self-command, and every other virtue," and he explains that 
"it is the constitution of nature, that such qualities as 
exalt and dignify human nature are to be acquired by proper 
exertions. . . . "  A man may improve his fellow men by edu­
cating and instructing them in right conduct, by persuading 
them, by showing the example of his own conduct, and by 
forming governments to legislate right conduct. In addi­
tion, these means of improving oneself and others must be 
applied on a universal scale in order to insure the success 
of man's efforts in "changing the face of the earth.m1^1 
Far from corrupting the earth, man's efforts are 
capable of creating a paradise. For Reid the improvement 
of man is not only a noble aim in and of itself, but it makes 
possible an ideal world which he regards as an even nobler 
dream. The improvement of all the virtues of man makes 
possible the creation of a utopia which Reid apparently
l6olbid.. pp. 529-30. 161Ibid.. p. 530.
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considers entirely possible. His style changes to that of 
the poet when he considers "to what pitch the happiness of 
human society, and the improvement of the species, might be 
carried." He writes*
What a noble, what a divine employment of human power 
is here assigned us! How ought it to rouse the ambition 
of parents, of instructors, of lawgivers, of magistrates, 
of every man in his station, to contribute his part 
towards the accomplishment of so glorious an end!162
To create utopia is the end to which man is put on earth and
made an active rather than a passive being. He is to learn
the laws of nature in order to control natural phenomena for
his own purposes) this involves his rational powers. But
man must also discover the principles which govern his own
behavior and then use these principles to perfect his own
conduct. Only after the conduct of men is made right can a
utopia created by men come to be.
In Reid's notion of man's task of improving the world 
by first improving himself abides the explicit responsibi­
lity of the communicator, whether he is parent, teacher, 
legislator, or magistrate. All men are responsible for com­
municating "the principles of right conduct" to their fellow 
men in some manner, and in order to do this they must first 
be of good character themselves. Thus whether man is crea­
ting utopia or undertaking the more practical purpose of 
making good government, Reid's concept of man's responsibi­
lity to his fellow men is of interest to those who theorize
162Ibid*
about communication and rhetoric.
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Political Theory
Reid considers political theory as a facet of his 
ethics, and it is directly relevant to the conduct of men 
because our knowledge of the conduct of groups of men in 
society is derived from our knowledge of their conduct sb 
individuals. Reid considers this concept when he writes 
that
The science of politics borrows its principles from 
what we know by experience of the character and conduct 
of man. We consider not what man ought to be, but what 
he is, and thence conclude what part he will act in dif­
ferent situations and circumstances. From such princi­
ples we reason concerning the causes and effects of dif­
ferent forms of government, laws, customs, and manners.
If man were either a more perfect or a more imperfect, a 
better or a worse, creature than he is., politics would be 
a different science from what it is.10^
Because he finds it important to understand the na­
ture of man, Reid takes up the topic of the principles of 
action which were discussed earlier. These motivate man to 
perform some acts and help him to discern those which he 
should not perform. Understanding how man is motivated 
gives Reid the ability to predict how he will act in a given 
circumstance. With this knowledge about what motivates man 
to certain actions we can consider how government and laws 
may appeal to these motivating principles and cause man to 
perform certain actions and to refrain from others.
Reid's discussion of politics is sparse and occurs
l63Ibid.. p. 591.
223
only incidentally as it relates to the major topic in his 
ethics, I.e. the moral liberty of man. Because his treat­
ment of political theory grows out of his ethical thought 
and because of its relevance to rhetoric and communication, 
in ancient rhetorical writings and in Reid's thought, the 
inclusion of it in this study is imperative.
The best means of governing,— As mentioned before, 
when Reid discusses the animal principle of actiai called 
opinion, he brings up the manner in which government employs 
opinion as an instrument in motivating man to value and sup­
port the government. He saysi
Of all instruments of government, opinion is the 
sweetest, and the most agreeable to the nature of man. 
Obedience that flows from opinion is refill freedom, 
which every man desires. That which is extorted by fear 
of punishment is slavery, a yoke which is always galling 
and which every man will shake off when it is in his 
power.
The opinions of the bulk of mankind have always 
been, and will always be, what they are taught by those 
whom they esteem to be wise and goodi and, therefore, in 
a considerable degree, are in the power of those who 
govern them.
Man, uncorrupted by bad habits and bad opinions, is 
of all animals the most tractablej corrupted, by these, 
he is of all animals the most untractable.16^
The government which plies the opinions of citizens 
governs best, according to Reid, but government must also 
be certain that the opinions which it attempts to imbue are 
good opinions which leave the citizens "uncorrupted." Reid 
does not specify which opinions are bad and which are good, 
but we might assume that those are good which are motivated
l64Ibid., pp. 577-78.
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by the rational principles of action, 3uch as duty and the 
knowledge of right conduct. When citizens of a country 
think their government right and good they are more prone to 
give their approval to the opinions proferred by that govern­
ment, and presumably a government acquires the approval or 
disapproval of the governed when it performs consistently in 
the behalf and to the benefit of its citizens.
Because the governed must admire the wisdom and good­
ness of their government in order to accept readily the 
opinions offered to them, Reid thinks it important that the 
purposes of government be to the people's benefit. He 
statesi
The most useful part of medicine is that which 
strengthens the constitution, and prevents diseases by 
good regimeni the rest is somewhat like propping a ruin­
ous fabric at great expense, and to little purpose. The 
art of government is the medicine of the mind, and the 
most useful part of it is that which prevents crimes and 
bad habits, and trains men to virtue and good habits by 
proper education and discipline.
The end of government is to make the society happy, 
which can only be done by making it good and virtuous. 
That men in general will be good or bad members of 
society, according to the education and discipline by 
which they have been trained, experience may convince us.
The present age has made great advances in the art of 
training men to military duty. It will not be said that 
those who enter into that service are more tractable than 
their fellow-subjects of other professions. And I know 
not why it should be thought impossible to train men to 
equal perfection in the other duties of good citizens. 
What an immense difference is there, for the purpose 
of war, between an army properly trained, and a militia 
hastily drawn out of the multitude? What should hinder 
us from thinking that, for every purpose of civil govern­
ment, there may be a like difference between a civil 
society properly trained to virtue, good habits, and right 
sentiments, and those civil societies which we now hold? 
But I fear I shall be thought to digresB from my subject
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into Utopian speculation*1^
What might appear to some as Reid's advocacy of a 
kind of Platonic military state in which citizens are reared 
from childhood to the rhythm of martial drums, when fairly 
considered does not have such repugnant intimations after 
all* Reid seems to refer to military training only as an 
analogy to amplify his advocacy of education, but it should 
be conceded that his notion may have been expanded further 
to provide his reader with a clearer idea of what he has in 
mind* He seems to be saying that if such great success can 
be had by intensive training of soldiers for war, similar 
success may be enjoyed by educating the governed to make 
them good and virtuous citizens# If the government were 
truly good, then, in Reid's system of philosophy, it follows 
that education could do nothing but reveal that goodness to 
the governed, because of the affinity which truth has with 
the mind* For example, when citizens are educated to the 
need and purposes of the income tax, they could only come 
to the opinion that the tax is justified and good, provided 
of course that it is truly so# Without telling his reader 
how, Reid arrives at the conclusion that the educated are 
better citizens than the uneducated* supposedly he simply 
means to reiterate his points that education brings a man 
to see the virtue and wisdom of his government and that it 
should be provided for citizens by the government*
l65Ibid.* p. 578.
At the outset of the above excerpt Reid draws an 
interesting analogy between medicine and politics, declar­
ing the latter the "medicine of the mind*” From the analogy 
Reid reveals his opinion that government should spend its 
greatest efforts in strengthening the constitution of soci­
ety by preventing "crimes and bad habits•" When government, 
by design or by necessity for survival, foregoes this pri­
mary function for some other, it is merely "propping up a 
ruinous fabric at great expense, and to little purpose."
When governments fail in their practice of preventive mede- 
cine, when the proper regimen of education no longer suffi­
ces to keep the government in the high esteem of the 
governed, the fabric of society is in need of extensive 
repairs. Reid is pessimistic about the possibilities of 
success in such a case. When crimes against society and 
subversion against the government become widespread Reid 
would probably declare the government's educational endea­
vors a failure, perhaps because of a moral fault of the 
instructor or because the government does not function in 
behalf of the people.
According to Reid's philosophy, if the character of 
the instructor is poor, the people may still discover the 
truth by their own efforts. If the government itself be­
comes corrupt, no longer carrying out its obligation of 
making the society happy, the knowledge of that corruption 
will destroy the prople's good opinion of their government. 
One might logically expect revolution in a society where
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esteem of the government is so low, but Reid does not dis­
cuss the possibilities of revolution nor the situations, if 
any, under which it is justified. This omission is strange 
in light of the fact that Reid’s own age saw two violent 
revolutions.
The kinds of government.— Reid does, however, discuss 
two kinds of government, and makes comparisons as to how 
well they perform the functions of governing. The two are 
mechanical government and moral government. Reid declares 
that "the first is the government of beings which have no 
active power, but are merely passive and acted uponi the 
second of intelligent and active beings."1^  Clearly the 
first kind of government is not meant for human beings, 
whom Reid considers intelligent and active.
Indeed it seems that Reid cannot imagine human beings 
under a mechanical kind of government. He first offers an 
instance of a ship under the command of a commander to illus­
trate mechanical government, and then of puppets which "in 
all their diverting gesticulations, do not move, but are 
moved by an impulse secretly conveyed, which they cannot 
resist." He writes of the moral responsibility of the pup­
pet as if it were human, saying*
If they do not play their parts properly, the fault is 
only in the maker or manager of the machinery. Too much 
or too little force was applied, or it was wrong direc­
ted. No reasonable man imputes either praise or blame 
to the puppets, but solely to their maker or the governor.
1 6 6 I b i d . .  p. 613.
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If we suppose for a moment, the puppets to be endowed 
with understanding and will, but without any degree of 
active power, this will make no change in the nature of 
their governmenti for understanding and will, without 
some degree of active power, can produce no effect. They 
might, upon this supposition, be called intellegent 
machinesi but they would be machines still as much sub­
ject to the laws of motion as inanimate matter, and,
therefore, incapable of any other than mechanical govern 
ment, 7 
Whether Reid has in mind some particular military dic­
tatorship he does not explain, but it is quite clear that he 
does not find mechanical government admirable in the least. 
Under such a government the people are not to be held res­
ponsible for their conducti they can be neither praised nor 
blamed, because they act totally at the whim of the governor 
and never of their own volition. Undoubtedly under such a 
tyranny the tyrant would hold the people responsible for 
their misconduct, but Reid argues that like the puppet their 
misconduct is caused by the governor who did not motivate 
them properly. Perhaps he applied force in the wrong quan­
tity, or perhaps his strategy in its application was ill 
planned or timed. Presumably, according to Reid, revolution 
under a mechanical government, like all conduct of the 
governed, is brought about by the governor, and the revolu­
tionary is not to praise or to blame for the disruption of 
society resulting from his activities.
Moral government, of course, is the kind to which 
Reid gives his approval, not only because it accommodates 
man's nature as an active and rational creature, but also
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because under moral government "• • • obedience is obedience 
in the proper sense. • • ." That is, under moral government, 
obedience to the government emanates from the volition of 
the governed, who understand and approve of the reasons for
laws "prescribed to them for their conduct by the legis-
168lator." The governed readily assent to obedience because 
of the "just authority" of the legislator and because he 
prescribes laws with impartiality and fairness.
Whether the legislator comes to his power by elec­
tion, by a claim of divine right, or by other means does not 
seem important to Reid. The important matter seems to be 
that the legislator's authority is actually just and that 
the people consider his authority just in order to give 
obedience to his laws of their own volition. The second 
requisite of the good legislator is that he legislate with 
equity, a task which in itself must often prove complicated. 
Reid explains that
When the laws are equitable, and prescribed by just 
authority, they produce moral obligation in those that 
are subject to them, and disobedience is a crime deserv­
ing punishment. But, if the obedience be impossible— if 
the transgression be necessary— it is self-evident that 
there can be no crime in yielding to necessity, and that 
there can be no justice in punishing a person for what 
it was not in his power to avoid.1 ”
Given that the legislator's authority is accepted by
the people and that his laws are fair, the people then
assent to their moral obligation to obey the laws, and to
the punishment of those who do not obey. The wise and fair
l68Ibid. l69Ibid.. pp. 6l3-l4.
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legislator would not give legislation which requires conduct 
impossible for his people. For instance he would not tax the 
citizens beyond their means to pay or require actions such 
as those contrary to the teachings of the religions of the 
people*
Moral government depends fundamentally upon the peo­
ple's opinion of the prudence, equity, benevolence, and good 
judgment of the legislator, and this fact places a heavy 
burden upon government to communicate its good intent to the 
governed. The legislator must be a good man in every 
respect in order to succeed) the people must be persuaded of 
his benevolence, morality, and wisdom in order to obey the 
law of their own volition, and, of oourse, the primary way 
in which people know the goodness of the legislator is by 
the effect upon them of the laws he gives. The survival of 
a moral government hinges on its ability to persuade the 
governed of its value, and when persuasion fails to moti­
vate man by appealing to his rational principles of action, 
such as duty and decency, it has no reason to expect willful 
obedience to the laws it sets down. Thus in a moral govern­
ment clear and persuasive communication is indispensible to 
the existence of government, and without it the whole edi­
fice topples.
Summary
The foundation of Reid's ethical and political 
thought lies in his notion of man as an active rather than
a passive beingi man's good conduct is the right use of his 
power. The will of man is the seat of his active power* and 
is the faculty which makes possible man's reason and judg­
ment about various avenues of conduct. Without the will man 
would act out of necessity alone. He could never be held 
responsible for his acts, for he would do nothing except 
that which he must do. For Reid man is responsible, and 
is therefore moral. He is at liberty to do that which he 
wills, and his acts are not determined but are motivated by 
certain principles of action. It behooves those interested 
in man's nature and particularly those interested in moti­
vating their fellow men to know the principles of action 
and how they work on man's will.
The mechanical and animal principles of action are 
common to beasts as well as to man, but the rational princi­
ples of action belong to man alone and make possible his 
morality. Man in motivated by all the principles of actions, 
but some of the rational principles and three of the animal 
principles influence the other principles of action. The 
animal principles of passion, disposition, and opinion may 
cause man to willfully suppress or assent to other motiva­
ting principlest for instance, opinion of the necessity for 
a law may cause a man to restrain the animal principle of 
appetite when it motivates him to steal bread. He suppres­
ses  this appetite by a "higher" principle, opinion that 
stealing is contrary to the law which he regards as good for 
himself and society. Of course he may be equally and simul-
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taneously moved by the rational principles of duty or con­
science, which are also "higher" motives# In Reid's discus­
sion of the principles by which man is motivated to action# 
the philosopher repeatedly asserts the importance of a tho­
rough knowledge of the principles of action to those inter­
ested in effective communication# For instance Reid's 
treatment of the manner in which men are motivated by the 
approbation or disapprobation with which they regard other 
men serves to remind his reader of the necessity of the 
communicator's good character to the effectiveness of his 
communication#
In treating the rational principles of action, Reid 
discusses the topic of moral first principles, demonstrating 
again his devotion to the universal common sense of man#
Moral first principles are similar to logical first princi­
ples? they require only that the one considering their truth 
be of mature understanding and unprejudiced judgment in or­
der to ascertain their legitimacy# This is perhaps one of 
the knottiest problems in all of Reid's thought, and it is 
no less so in his ethics# Despite his apparent conviction 
that he has solved the problem of how men discern first 
principles, whether moral or logical, the point is weak and 
invites careful scrutiny# Because first principles lie at 
the basis of Reid's ethical thought, the critical reader 
must often willfully suspend his disbelief in order to con­
sider equally important aspects of his ethics without undue 
prejudice#
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In various places in his works Reid takes up the 
topic of the moral man# Interestingly, Reid believes man to 
be corrupt, but he also regards man as more inclined to good 
than to evili were this not so, society, which is the crea­
tion of man, would have crumbled long ago. More often than 
not, man acts in a manner which benefits his society and 
himself. Reiterating his assertion of the existence of 
moral first principles, Reid insists upon his belief that 
men universally have a knowledge of right and wrong conduct 
and of what they ought and ought not to do. Reid's evidence 
for the existence of universal moral knowledge comes from 
his observation and judgment of man's conduct present and 
past, an extremely vague source. Man's knowledge of right 
and wrong conduct comes to maturity gradually, but it is 
also guided in its growth by others in the society, suppos­
edly by those who have already achieved maturity in their 
moral knowledge. Regardless of man's innate knowledge of 
right and wrong conduct and of his duty to do right and 
avoid wrong, he is a free moral agent capable of choosing 
to will any action. Because he does not act out of neces­
sity, man is responsible for his conduct* herein lies his 
morality, which would not exist were man's actions deter­
mined. Man may be praised or blamed for his actions because 
since he wills to do what he does, he is responsible for 
them.
Reid is also concerned that man be improved. But 
man is only a part of society and the world, and improve­
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ment of society and the world follows logically, according 
to Reid, from the improvement of man* Paradise on the earth 
seems altogether possible to Reid, and it is man's duty to 
create it* The undertaking must, however, begin with the 
improvement of man. He must become knowledgeable, wise, 
skilled in the arts, disciplined, and virtuous in all ways, 
in Reid's opinion* The good man is innately inclined toward 
the good that he does, though he is at liberty to do either 
good or ill as he wills*
In addition to considering the conduct of men as 
individuals, Reid takes up their conduct in groups, the 
philosophical topic of politics. He declares that of all 
the means of governing, that government which appeals to 
the opinions of the people governs best. Those who obey 
the laws of government from opinion of their fairness are 
truly free, while those who obey out of fear and coercion 
are slaves. This presupposes that government must be moral 
because of Reid's principle that truth and morality have 
greater attraction to the mind than their opposites. The 
successful government^ therefore, must operate in the inter­
est of the governed. The kind of government which does 
this best is, of course, moral government. Mechanical 
government, the converse of moral government, makes the 
governed puppets and Blaves, acting in accord with the whims 
of the government and never responsible for their actions, 
since they have no choice of action. Moral government 
brings about the people's obedience to law by their own
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volition. The legislator gives laws fairly and impartially, 
and authority is derived justly, apparently by election or 
divine right. Reid’s political theory, like virtually 
every aspect of his ethics, reflects a fundamental necessity 
of effective communication without which the citizens could 
be convinced of the integrity neither of the legislator nor 
of the government, nor persuaded to act of their own voli­
tion in obedience with the laws.
One problem arising from Reid’s reasoning about 
ethics and from his presuppositions about man’s nature con­
cerns his assertion that men are innately inclined toward 
the good. He draws this conclusion from the argument that 
men have power to do more harm than good, and that if they 
selected to do harm more often than good they would long ago 
have destroyed society. Society existsi therefore men are 
more inclined to good than to evil. The first premise of 
this argument is either a supposition or a self-evident 
first principle, and it is the weakest link in the argument. 
Apparently, according to Reid, although man is corrupt and 
capable of more evil than good, some higher principle of 
action restrains him from acting destructively and causes 
him to act in accordance with good more often than with 
evil. If men act more often in accordance with good, how­
ever, how can Reid, by observation, conclude that they are 
more capable of evil than good? On the contrary, they 
would appear to be more capable of good than of evil, since 
they do it more consistently. This difficulty is possibly
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one of definition and lack of clarity, but Reid seems under 
the strong influence of the prevailing theological thought 
which postulates raan'B inherent corruption* he does not 
state this, however.
Another similar problem lies in the difficulty of 
ultimately determining the truth of a moral proposition.
Reid does not mention a final authority to which man can 
appeal for an answer. Philosophers with a strong theologi­
cal bent might, for instance, refer to the authority of 
scripture or of God. Reid's reference to the morality of 
monogamy reveals the problem of where to go for authority 
in matters of morals. In demonstrating that we can reason 
about matters of morals he looks at the effects of monogamy 
and polygamy upon the family and society and declares that 
monogamy is of greater benefit to both, but in doing so 
Reid does not examine cultures where monogamy is the excep­
tion and the family and society thrive. Because he does not 
explain the specific inductive process required to draw such 
a conclusion about the virtue of monogamy, the critic must 
assume that the ultimate standard in this case was the con­
tinuance and good health of the Scottish family, quite a 
limited sample of the world's population. Implied also is 
Reid's reliance on the authority of his own opinion which 
might cause him to regard the polygamous customs of other 
lands, like their aesthetic views, as the result of perver­
ted judgment or immature understanding. He does not seem to 
recognize that the opinions of the philosopher may prove an
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unstable basis on which to construct an ethical system.
Reid also states that man ought to conduct himself in accord 
with the intentions of nature, but discovering those inten­
tions must necessarily be a difficult procedure, forcing 
the ethician to resort to his own opinion and interpretation 
of ethical matters.
Reid*s ethical theory, however, is significant in 
that it embodies an endorsement of Locke's proposal of an 
ethical algebra as reliable as any mathematical science.
He reasons about ethics, approaching the topic inductively 
and without a slavish adherence to the presuppositions of 
Judeo-Christian theology, though the premises he supposes 
to be true are at times inadvertently colored by the prevail­
ing theological thought. In addition to these outstanding 
attributes of Reid's ethical theory is his discussion of the 
principles of action, with its remarkable rhetorical empha­
sis on knowing the principles by which man is motivated in 
order to move him to action more effectively. For these 
reasons Reid's ethical theory is important to an understand­
ing of the current of thought in the eighteenth century and 
particularly to communication and rhetorical theory.
IV. Style and Aesthetics
Though not all of hi8 remarks are aimed at providing 
rules of thumb for the orator and the writer, Thomas Reid 
wrote on several divergent subjects which have implications 
for the rhetorical canon of style and the related topic of
aesthetics. Style has always been a rather nebulouB and 
inclusive canon. Definitions of style frequently vary with 
the orientation of the man who examines it. Aristotle's 
definition in his Rhetoric, for instance, is rather loose 
and broadi style is the second of three "provinces of the 
study which concern the making of the speech." These pro­
vinces are "(1) the means of effecting persuasion) (2) the 
style) [and] (3) the right ordering of the several divisions 
of the whole."l7° Aristotle points out that "since it is 
not enough to know what to say— one must also know how to 
say it," and that " . . .  success in delivery is of the ut­
most importance to the effect of the speech."171 Actually, 
many considerations comprise Aristotle's treatment of style, 
including discussions of the voice as it affects delivery 
and the language of prose and poetry.
Modern critics have recognized the amorphous nature 
of style) Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird point out the 
controversy over the term stylei
With the possible exception of invention, no part of 
rhetoric is more complex than style. Its ramifications 
are elaborate, extending, as has been suggested, deeply 
into the fundamentals of invention and disposition and 
losing themselves in them, so that what we arbitrarily 
call style becomes indistinguishable from the other ele­ments. 172
Recognizing the difficulty of drawing sharp definitive lines
17°Aristotle, iii, 1. l403b. 182.
171Ibid.. pp. 182-83.
172Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criti­
cism (New York* Ronald Press, 19*̂ 8), P* ^07.
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around the topic of style, and wishing to allow Thomas Reid 
to "speak for himself," this section deals with several 
disparate topics having bearing on the canon of style* This 
discussion begins with Reid's concepts of natural and arti­
ficial language, then takes up his treatment of aesthetics 
and his notion of grammar as it affects style* Finally, it 
looks into Reid's suggestions for improving the use of lang­
uage* The division on natural language includes a discus­
sion of the subject of gesture, which some critics may argue 
belongs more appropriately under a separate heading* Ges­
ture, however, is an indispensible part of Reid's idea of 
natural language, and to treat it in a separate category 
would sacrifice clarity in understanding natural language 
and gesture*
Natural and Artificial Language
An understanding of the two kinds of language is 
central to any discussion of the implications of Reid's 
thought for the canon of style. By language he means "all 
those signs which mankind use in order to communicate to 
others their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and 
d e s i r e s . H e  divides these signs into two categoriest
(1) those "such as have no meaning but what is affixed to 
them by compact or agreement among those who use them," and
(2) those "such as, previous to all compact or agreement, 
have a meaning which every man understands by the principles
^■^Reid, Inquiry, p* 117*
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of his nature *"17lf The former category Reid calls "artifi­
cial" and the latter, "natural*"
Natural language includes voice modulations, gestures, 
features of the face, and attitudes of the body whose mean­
ings are known immediately upon their perception and without 
previous agreement*17  ̂ Artificial language, on the other 
hand, includes words and supposedly any voice modulations, 
gestures, features of the face, and attitudes of the body 
whose moaning is placed upon them by compact with other men* 
Reid is not at all specific about what bodily activities 
comprise natural language, but his writing implies that he 
believes changes of pitch and stress in grunts and groans, 
and perhaps even whistling, to contain meaning* He provides 
no evidence to this effect however* In natural language, 
the voice modulations cannot logically apply to words and 
to sentences because words and sentences fall clearly into 
the category of artificial languagei hence, voice modula­
tions in conjunction with the use of words must be artifir , 
cial signs.
To speculate further about what makes up natural 
language, we might understand gestures to include such 
things as a shrug of the shoulders to mean "X don't know," 
a vigorous extension of the arm with forefinger pointed to 
mean "go" or "Get out," and a clenched fist to convey a 
threat* A frown and a general slumping might indicate sad­
ness or mourning on the part of the one employing such signs
174Ibid* 175lbld*. p. 118.
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while a smile may mean assent, satisfaction* or general 
happinessi all these examples* however* are of necessity 
conjectural* since Reid is not at all explicit as to what 
he means to include in natural language*
Reid believes that animals as well as men employ a 
natural language, but men, • having a superior degree
of invention and reason, have been able to contrive artifi­
cial signs of their thoughts and purposes* and to establish 
them by common consent."17** Reid apparently doubts that 
animals are capable of the latter achievementi hence the use 
of artificial signs is one of the distinctions between men 
and beasts. Reid's recognition of the distinction between 
men and beasts is reminiscent of Cicero's similar recogni­
tion in his De Oratore. Cicero writes*
For the one point in which we have our very greatest ad­
vantage over the brute creation is that we hold converse 
one with another, and can reproduce oui* thought in word# 
Who therefore would not rightly admire this faculty, and 
deem it his duty to exert himself to the utmost in this 
field, that by so doing he may surpass men themselves in 
that particular respect wherein chiefly men are superior 
to animals? To come, however, at length to the highest 
achievements of eloquence, what other power could have 
been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity 
into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish exis­
tence in the wilderness up to our present condition of 
civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the estab­
lishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, 
tribunals, and civic rights?1?/
Apparently Reid's observations about man's exclusive ability
176Ibid.. pp. 117-18.
177Cicero, De Oratore. trans. E. W, Sutton and H. 
Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard University Press, 19^2),
I, i, 8, 25.
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to communicate by using words is not novel, but his delega­
tion of the use of natural language to both men and beasts 
and the use of artificial language exclusively to man is 
seemingly Reid's*
Somewhere in man's development to a more civilized 
state he evolved artificial language, but Reid believes that 
he employed natural language to achieve the agreements and 
compacts about the meanings he would assign to wordsi thus 
the basis of the use of words and sentences, whether verbal 
or written, lies in natural language, the prerequisite for 
artificial language, since logically some form of communi­
cation must have been required to establish and perpetuate 
the use and meanings of artificial signs, Man could not 
have compacted to affix meanings to signs unless he could 
already communicate by some means, i*e.. a natural language, 
consisting of intonations of the voice in grunts, groans, 
growls, laughter, and like noisesf changes in facial fea­
tures (frowns, smiles, etc.)» and postures of the body*
Reid's assertions about the historical evolution of 
man's use of artificial language must, of course, be spec­
ulative* He offers no evidence which he might have gathered 
from observing primitive tribes, although this could streng­
then his arguments and lend clarity and weight to his asser­
tions* The dearth of examples, common throughout Reid's 
works, presents no less a problem with his concepts of natu­
ral and artificial language, and justifies some doubt about 
the existence of natural signs which are understood without
2^3
learning or prior agreement# Reid does not offer an argu­
ment in favor of his assertion but seems to recognise that 
children* without learning the meaning of voice modulations* 
respond to such natural signs as growls of animals* and to 
soothing parental voices.1^® He does not, however, explain 
the inescapable tendency of humans to comprehend such natu­
ral signs# In brief, Reid simply states these premises on 
which his argument rests with the apparent assumption that 
they are self-evident#
Another interesting aspect of Reid's theory of natu­
ral and artificial signs is his understanding of the rela­
tion between the signs and the things for which they stand# 
Although both natural and artificial signs signify things, 
Reid sees no necessary connection between either sort of 
sign and the thing it signifies# Though he does not use 
the word symbol« he more clearly understands the particular 
signs as symbols of the things they represent. For example 
the word gold is an artificial sign used to signify the 
yellow metallic substance, but it has no "similitude to the 
substance#" Through learning and custom the word has become 
associated with the substance, so that in some way we re­
ceive a suggestion of the substance, gold, from the word#
By way of explaining the relation between the symbol 
and the thing signified by it, Reid offers the example of 
the sense of touchi he writes that there is no necessary 
connection between symbols and the things they symbolize,
17®Reid, Inquiry, pp. 117-22.
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and that "in like Banner, a sensation of touch suggests 
hardness, although it hath neither similitude to hardness, 
nor, as far as we can perceive, any necessary connection 
with it." The sensation of hardness which we receive from 
touching the substance gold, for example, "is not the effect 
of habit, but of the original constitution of our minds,m1?9 
an inexplicable and inescapable phenomenon which causes us 
not only to receive the sensation of hardiness upon touching 
a hard object, but also to receive the appropriate sugges­
tion of meaning from a natural or artificial sign* When 
Reid insists that no necessary connection can be perceived 
between either natural or artificial signs and the things 
they signify, he seems to mean that no logical necessity 
exists between them* That is, there is no perceivable logi­
cal connection between the term gold and the substance which 
makes that particular term suggest the substance more appro­
priately than any other word* Nor is there any perceivable 
logical connection between a natural sign, such as a shrug 
of the shoulders, and its meaning of uncertainty or lack of 
knowledge* The natural sign, however, suggests its meaning 
to us in some unexplained manner, a phenomenon which Reid 
attributes to the "original constitution of our minds*N
Classes of natural signs*— Further. Reid distinguish­
es three classes of natural signst in all three, the connec­
tion of the sign to the thing signified by the sign is not a
l79Ibid*. p. 121.
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necessary one but one which inexplicably derives from the 
makeup of the mind of man* In the first class are those 
natural signs whose connection to the thing signified is 
discovered only by experience* Philosophy’s business is to 
discover the connections by observation of facts and to 
reduce the resulting information to general laws* Reid 
declares that
What we commonly call natural causes might* with more 
propriety* be called natural signs, and what we call 
effects, the things signified* The causes have no proper 
efficiency or causality* as far as we knowt and all we 
can certainly affirm is* that nature hath given to man­
kind a disposition to observe those oonneotions* to con­
fide in their continuance, and to make use of them for 
iraprovyggnt of our knowledge, and increase of our
The fact that causes of phenomena are signs belonging to the 
first classification make them of interest to the scientist 
whether he is involved in the discipline of mechanics, astro­
nomy* optics, agriculture* gardening, chemistry, or medi­
cine*1^1 The physician* for example, attempts to find the 
causes of illness and understand the relation of the cause 
to the symptoms he observes* By observing many cases of a 
similar cause* a virus in the blood, f6r instance* he can 
formulate a general principle on which the relation between 
oause and effect operates) he would determine how the virus 
brings about certain symptoms in his patients*
In a similar manner* presumably* the rhetorician may
/
seek the causes of particular effects in the facial expres­
sions* voice modulations, and bodily motions and attitudes
l80Ibid#* p* 122. 181Ibid.. p. 121.
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of the orator and reduce these to laws, with the ultimate 
interest being that these laws might be applied in producing 
effective speeches* Discovering the lawB governing the 
effectiveness of discourse is the essence of rhetorical 
theory since ancient tiroesi with regard to style, the rheto­
rician is in search of the gesture, whether a facial expres­
sion or a movement of some part of the body, and particular 
vocal modulation which expresses his meaning in the most 
effective manner* Of course, he often does this in hope of 
discovering ways to stimulate a desired effect in his audi­
tors* More concretely, the rhetor may seek a particular 
emotion which is the cause of a pitch or stress pattern 
conveying enthusiasm for an idea in the hope of infecting 
his audience with a similar enthusiasm* This first variety 
of natural signs might be most significant in the work of 
the rhetorician*
The second class of natural signs, however, is the
most pertinent to a discussion of Heid*s intimations about
style* In this class Reid places Hthe natural signs of
human thoughts, purposes and desires, which have already
been mentioned as the natural language of mankind," and
which man discovers via some "natural principle, without
1 fiPreason or experience." Trying to provide examples of 
cases in which the things signified by natural signs are 
known without any possibility of being learned by prior 
experience or by reason, Reid speaks of children who, with-
l82Ibid*. p. 122.
out learning the meaning of particular natural signs, res­
pond to themi he writes*
An infant may be put into a fright by an angry counten­
ance, and soothed again by smiles and blandishments. A 
child that has a good musical ear, may be put to sleep or 
to dance, may be made merry or sorrowful, but the modu­
lation of musical sounds. The principles of all the fine 
arts, and of what we call a fine taste. may be improved 
by reasoning and experiencei but if the first principles 
of it were not planted in our minds by nature, it could 
never be acquired. Nay, we have already made it appear, 
that a great part of this knowledge which we have by 
nature, is lost by the disuse of natural signs, and the 
substitution of artificial in their place.1“3
This natural principle of which Reid speaks is an innate 
part of the constitution of all men, and Reid believes that 
this unexplained propensity which we originally possess for 
using and understanding natural signs tends to dwindle as 
we mature. Rather than our presenting an "angry counten­
ance," for example, we are more prone to employ words, arti­
ficial signs, to express anger and emotions of all kinds. 
Reid also asserts that a fine taste can be improved by rea­
son and experience, provided that this innate knowledge of 
natural signs is present at the outset. This assertion 
implies that not only may fine taste be improved in this 
manner, but also that skills requiring good taste, such as 
communication and public address, may also be improved by 
the reason and experience of the communicator and the ora­
tor. It follows, then, that reasoning about rhetoric and 
communication, combined with the experience of the initiated 
orator, might assist another in acquiring a fine taste.
2^8
Hence Reid reveals the possibility that rhetorical skill can 
be taught.
The third class of natural signs includes those 
which somehow suggest the things of which they are signs 
even when the observer has never before had any concept of 
the thing signified. Reid writes of this category of natu­
ral signs in the following excerpt*
A third class of natural signs comprehends those 
which, though we never before had any notion or concep­
tion of the thing signified, do suggest it, or conjure 
it up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic, and at 
once give us a conception and create a belief of it.
I shewed formerly, that our sensations suggest to us a 
sentient being or mind to which they belong— a being 
which hath a permanent existence, although the sensations 
are transienct and of short duration— a being which is 
still the same, while its sensations and other operations 
are varied ten thousand ways— a being which hath the same 
relation to all that infinite variety of thoughts, pur­
poses, actions, affections, enjoyments, and sufferings, 
which we are conscious of, or can remember
Further, Reid refers to the sensation of hardness for an
example of this particular kind of natural sign. He writes*
The notion of hardness in bodies, as well as the 
belief of it, are got in a similar manner [as the notion 
of a sentient being to which sensations belong]* being, 
by an original principle of our nature, annexed to that 
sensation which we have when we feel a hard body. And 
so naturally and necessarily does the sensation convey 
the notion and belief of hardness, that hitherto they 
have been confounded by the most acute inquirers into 
the principles of human nature, although they appear, 
upon accurate reflection, not only to be different 
things.pbut as unlike as pain is to the point of a 
sword. ^
This third category of natural signs differs from the first 
two categories epistemologically» the relation of each kind
l81*Ibid. l85ibld.
of sign to the thing signified is discovered in a different 
manner. Secondly, the things signified hy each are differ­
ent. The third variety of natural sign conjures up the 
thing signified in some mysterious way, and the thing sig­
nified by it need not have been known before. One need 
never before have had a conception of mind or sentient being 
to be convicted of the existence of mind upon knowing the 
existence of sensations. Similarly, man inescapably 
acquires a "belief of hardness" upon touching a body posses­
sing that quality, even though he may not have had such a 
concept before.
In summary, Reid writes that
It may be observed, that, as the first class of 
natural signs I have mentioned is the foundation of 
true philosophy, and the second the foundation of the 
fine arts, or of taste— so the last is the foundation 
of common sense-ga part of human nature which hath never 
been explained.
The first category of natural signs serves the sci­
ences as they seek to discover the connections between phe­
nomena and their causes and then to reduce these to general 
principles which apply to the workings of the universe. 
Undoubtedly, Newton's work, as much as that of many scien­
tists, makes thorough use of this first kind of natural 
sign. Inasmuch as the rhetorician seeks to find the general 
principles of human nature, his work is akin to that of the 
psychologist and the philosopher, and he too would make use 
of the first category of natural signs. The rhetorician, of
course, would likely find the second classification of 
natural signs as helpful as the first, because into this 
group Reid places the signs of vocal modulations, facial 
features, gestures, and bodily attitudes accruing to the 
natural language of man. Unlike the first category, however, 
these signs are not discovered by experience or reason, but 
known and understood immediately, perhaps by some magic 
similar to that which reveals the thing signified by the 
third kind of natural sign. The third kind of natural sign, 
like the second, requires no reason or experience in order 
to know the relation of the sign to the thing signified* it 
is known by some magical original capacity of our constitu­
tion. But the thing signified by the third kind of sign is 
not like that signified by the second category. The second 
category of signs signify "human thoughts, purposes, and 
desires,"1®^ while the third category of natural signs sig­
nify and make us believe the existence of such things as a 
sentient being to whom sensations belong and hard objects to 
which the sensation of hardness belongs. That is, the third 
variety of natural signs serves as the basis of common sense* 
Reid employs the argument that such signs as sensation of 
hardness immediately and Irrevocably convict us of the exis­
tence of the material world.
One difficulty appears in Reid's discussion of the 
first class of natural signs when an apparent contradiction 
arises concerning his insistence that no necessary connec­
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tion exists between the sign and the thing signified. On 
the one hand Reid writes that there is no perceptible "nec­
essary connection" between a sign and the thing it signi­
fies, but declares only a few sentences later that " . . .  
without a natural knowledge of the connection between these 
signs and the things signified by them, language could never 
have been invented and established among meni and that the
fine arts are all founded upon this connection, which we
1 Rflmay call the natural language of mankind." Seemingly, 
Reid has said at first that no necessary connection exists 
between signs and the things they signify, and later that 
there is indeed a connection. Wary of attempting to make 
ad hoc reason out of blatant chaos, we may yet salvage some 
sense from this confusion.
Hume’s influence must be alluded to here to clarify 
what Reid must have had in mind, since Reid appears to use 
the word connection to mean causal relationship when he 
denies a "necessary connection" between the sign and the 
thing signified. Reid, then, following Hume’s denial of 
causality, must mean in the first instance that when the 
thing signified suggests itself to our minds, the suggestion 
appears coincidentally but not necessarily as an effect of 
the thing signified. In the second instance, when Reid 
implies that a connection does after all exist, he seems to 
be using the term connection to mean correlation or coinci­
dence rather than causal relationship, as in his first state­
l88Ibid„ p. 121.
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ment. Another possibility is that when Reid denies any 
necessary connection between signs and the things they sig­
nify he means to deny any discoverable causal connection, 
although he cannot deny that some sort of connection exists* 
In the case of artificial signs the connection is not neces­
sary but purely arbitraryi and in the case of natural signs 
the connection is not logically necessary, but the natural 
sign is inextricably related to the suggestion it calls up 
in the mind. Regardless of how this difficulty is solved, 
Reid cannot be excused for his lack of attention to the use 
of the term connection without a clarifying definition*
Uses of natural and artificial language.--In further 
explaining the notion of natural language, Reid says*
The elements of this natural language of mankind, or 
the signs that are naturally expressive of our thoughts, 
may, I think, be reduced to these three kinds« modula­
tions of the voice, gestures, and features* By means of 
these, two savages who have no common artificial lang­
uage, can converse togetheri can communicate their 
thoughts in some tolerable manner* can traffic, enter 
into covenants, and plight their faith.18?
In this passage Reid incorporates some elements of natural 
language, arriving at only three, supposedly by considering 
gesture to be inclusive of the previously mentioned bodily 
attitudes. The "features** which Reid mentions apparently 
refer to features of the face, which, along with the other 
elements of natural language, make rather extensive communi­
cation possible with the use of natural language alone.
Reid does not specify the exact manner in which all these
l89Ibid., p. 118.
complicated transactions become possible through the use of 
voice changes, motions of the body and limbs, and expres­
sions of the face, but quite possibly he had studied the 
sign languages used by the "savage" American Indians. The 
only concrete indication of his knowledge of the language 
of savages is a brief mention of his interest in the work 
of Pierre Francois Xavier de Charlevoix, who wrote of Amer­
ican Indian tribes in the eighteenth century.1 At any 
rate, this example of communication between savages is sup­
posedly intended to clarify the concept of natural language. 
But once again Reid leaves himself open to the charge of 
ambiguity, possibly because he does not develop his example 
fully.
If a savage employs a sign language, certainly the 
sign language amounts to a bodily motion, or gesture, and 
as such deserves to be called natural language. But, as 
mentioned before, it is conceivable that some of the ges­
tures in such a language may have meanings which are agreed 
upon in advance, and/or may be arrived at by custom and 
usage in the same way as in the case of an artificial sign, 
such as gold. The manner and time of the agreement may be 
long forgotten. In such a case the gestures, facial fea­
tures, attitudes of the body, or vocal modulations must be 
artificial rather than natural signs, because they lack one 
requirement of the natural signi their meanings are agreed 
upon in advance. Reid, however, does not apparently con­
1^°Above, pp. 101-2.
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ceive of euch a possibility and does not mention it in his 
discourse on natural language.
Reid affirms, however, that the language of nature 
has an important place in the sophisticated discourse of 
civilized man as well as in that of the savage. This com­
mon language of all mankind is "scanty," Reid concedes, but 
it is nevertheless powerful. Even though man can communi­
cate by using only his natural language, he ingeniously 
"improves” it by augmenting it with artificial signs, Reid 
thinks that man should avoid the use of neither artificial 
nor natural language, but that he should instead repair the
defects in natural language by using artificial signs, since
191natural language may be "scanty," ' Unfortunately Reid 
does not explain fully what he means by "scanty"t a possi­
ble explanation is that he is referring to the lack of well- 
used modulation and gesture in the public speaking he ob­
served. Men have become increasingly proficient in the use 
of artificial language to the point of creating a deficiency 
in their skill of using natural language, Reid believes,
"A man who rides always in a chariot, by degrees loses the 
use of his legsi" Reid explains, "and one who uses artifi­
cial signs only, loses both the knowledge and the use of 
192the natural," 7 The orator who increases his power in the 
skillful use of words and who otherwise develops an appro­
priate and effective style might lose his skill in the use 
of gesture through negligence.
1^1Reid, Inquiry, p. 118. 1 lb id.
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Reid himself offers some advice about how the orator
might maintain the potency of his ability to communicate in
the following passagei
It is by natural signs chiefly that we give force and 
energy to languagei and the less language has of them, 
it is the less expressive. Thus, writing is less expres­
sive than reading, and reading less expressive than 
speaking without booki speaking without the proper and 
natural modulation, force, and variations of the voice, 
is a frigid and dead language, compared with that which 
is attended with them; it is still more expressive when 
we add the language of the eyes and featuresi and is 
then only in its perfect and natural state, and attended 
with its proper energy* when to all these we superadd 
the force of action
In Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Reid further discus­
ses the orator's use of natural language. "All that we call 
action and pronunciation, in the most perfect orator, and 
the most admired actor," he says, "is nothing else but
superadding the language of nature to the language of arti-
194culate sounds. In these passages Reid makes it clear 
that he perceives the best discourse as one which employs 
artificial language in tandem with the natural, the natural 
lending force and vigor to the artificial. While natural 
language requires practice for proficiency, it is understood 
readily by the one who perceives it, as if the power to com­
prehend it is intrinsic in the mind of man. Reid here gives 
examples of how natural language affects meanings M. • .an 
open countenance and a placid eye is [sic] a sign of amityi 
• • . a contracted brow and a fierce look is a sign of
* ^ I b i d . ^ S t e i d ,  A c t iv e  Pow ers , p .  664 .
256
anger* It is not from reason that we learn to know the 
natural signs of consenting and refusing, or affirming and
1QCdenying, of threatening and supplicating."
Thus, for Reid, not only does the use of natural 
language, with its elements— "modulations of the voice, 
gestures, and features"— provide discourse with a dynamic 
quality«but lacking this natural aspect, our use of lang­
uage, our style, becomes "frigid and dead." He seems also 
to advocate speaking without manuscript to assure an expres­
sive style, since he finds "reading less expressive than 
speaking without book." Further, "where speech is natural, 
it will be an exercise, not of the voice and lungs only, 
but of all the muscles of the body." Natural speech would 
seem to be necessarily animated and lively, the antithesis 
of what Reid finds in the language of "civilized life," 
which he regards as "dull and lifeless articulation of 
unmeaning sounds, or the scrawling of insignificant charac­
ters."1^
Reid strongly suggests that if we would use speech to 
persuade, we must incline ourselves to natural language in 
conjunction with the artificial, since artificial signs 
". . . signify, but they do not expressj they speak to the 
understanding, as algebraical characters may do, but the 
passions, the affections, and the will, hear them noti these 
continue dormant and inactive, till we speak to them in the
1 ̂ Ibid., p. 665# 1^Reid, Inquiry, p. 118.
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language of nature, to which they are all attention and
1 97obedience#** Natural language is not only more forceful 
and energetic but also more adept at eliciting the desired 
behavior from auditors, If the orator would do more than 
inform his hearers, which he could do by using only artifi­
cial signs, he must employ natural language.
We do not learn natural language however* we re-learn 
it. In Reid*8 view, men come into the world with a propen­
sity for the language of nature, and in the process of 
becoming civilized, they forget it "by disuse, and so find 
the greatest difficulty in recovering it."19® Perhaps Reid 
tends to oversimplify when he declares **that the fine arts 
of the musician, the painter, the actor, and the orator, so
far as they are expressive • • • are nothing else but the
199language of nature •** 77 He argues further that if we could 
"abolish the use of articulate sounds and writing among man­
kind for a century, • • • then every man would be a painter, 
an actor, and an orator,"200 No matter how impossible to 
prove these assertions may be, they point up the fact that 
without the conventions of language, the artificial signs, 
man would be forced to make full use of the elements of 
natural language— modulations of the voice, gestures, fea­
tures of the face, and the motions and attitudes of the 





Earlier in this seotion it was noted that Reid 
believes man's use of artificial signs to be one of his 
distinctions over the brutesi here, on the other hand, he 
warns against the effect of too much use of artificial lang­
uage at the expense of natural language--the extraction of 
life and animation from discourse. When this happens, man 
must revitalize language by animating his own body and 
facial features to express the purpose of his discourse.
To Reid, discourse so enlivened can speak not merely to the 
understanding but also to the emotions. The painter, the 
actor, and the orator are artists who address themselves 
to the passions, in Reid's view, and only as they learn to 
employ natural language can they perform their art well. 
While Reid's interest in language and in many other topics 
is generally descriptive rather than normative, his interest 
in prescribing the use of natural language suggests more 
than a detached interest in the subjecti his entire approach 
is, in fact, normative rather than descriptive. He has no 
interest in accurately reporting the linguistic practices of 
primitives carrying on a complicated discourse without the 
benefit of artificial language. The philosopher's specula­
tive approach does not uphold the weight of severe critical 
analysis for that reason, but neither are his speculations 
about natural language to be dismissed without careful con­
sideration of the value they contain.
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Aesthetics
Reid augments the foregoing treatment of style and 
gesture in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man with his 
discussion "Of Taste." Here he determines to undertake an 
investigation of aesthetics, though he laments, "a philoso­
phical analysis of the objects of taste is like applying the
201anatomical knife to a fine face," His treatment of aes­
thetics contains implication for the rhetorical canon of 
style. In the essay Reid defines taste as "That power of 
the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing
the beauties of Nature, and whatever is excellent in the
202arts. • • when we view a beautiful object there are
two elements which form our response to iti the emotion it 
creates in us and the quality in the object which brings 
about the emotion. The excellence in a piece of music is 
not in the music, but in the hearer? it is contrary to the 
very constitution of the language and to the common belief 
of mankind to think otherwise,2°3 The manner in which we 
employ language is Reid's indication that beauty in any­
thing is in the object rather than in the beholder? in addi­
tion he is convinced that men everywhere regard beauty as 
external to themselves. This external excellence which 
appeals to the "internal taste" is discernible by means of 
some inexplicable original ability of the mind.
201Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 493.
202Ibid., p. 490. 2°3Ibid.. pp. 490, 492.
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In the same manner, persuasiveness, force, or elo­
quence must be qualities abiding in an oration. As the 
sense of taste relishes those things which are nourishing 
and finds disgusting those things which are not, so the 
"internal taste" is most nearly perfect when it finds plea­
sure in those things which are most excellent and displea­
sure with those which are not. Reid recognizes that people 
in other lands have various notions about what is beautiful, 
but he admonishes the reader not to be surprised "that the 
African should esteem thick lips and a flat nosei that other 
nations should draw out their ears, till they hang over 
their shouldersj and in one nation ladies should paint their 
faces, and in another should make them shine with grease."20^ 
These facts indicate to Reid not that there could be more 
than one standard by which to make aesthetic judgments, but 
rather that "whole nations by the force of prejudice are 
brought to believe the grossest absurditiesi and why should 
it be thought that the taste is any less capable of being 
perverted than the judgment?"2®-* The difficulty with Reid's 
insistence upon a single standard of taste arises here. If 
the mind possesses an ability to discern that which is excel­
lent in works of art, for instance, and if there is but one 
standard of taste, there should necessarily be universal 
agreement on matters of aesthetics. On few matters, however, 
is their more diversity of opinion. The critic of Reid's
20^Ibid.. p. 491. 205Ibid.. p. 492.
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thought ic left to assume that the ultimate authority on 
whose aesthetic judgment is and whose is not perverted "by 
force of prejudice" is Thomas Reid himself. He could not 
maintain that those skilled in making aesthetic judgments or 
those educated in the fine arts would have better judgment, 
for this would be contrary to his premise that the vulgar 
and uneducated are equally qualified to judge on such mat­
ters as are the educated and cultured. Insisting that aes­
thetic taste is not a subjective matter and that there is a 
single standard of beauty, Reid's aesthetic theory declares 
that all questions on matters of this kind must ultimately 
come before Reid for adjudication.
Novelty,— Reid can insist that entire nations can be 
corrupted in their appreciation of beauty because of his 
belief that beautiful things are suited by nature inevitably 
to "please a good t a s t e H e  apparently is not bothered by 
the circular nature of such a proposition, and further 
points out that objects of taste are comprised of three 
qualitiesi novelty, grandeur, and beauty. If a new object 
is not Tiisagreeable," it generally giveB pleasure on the 
basis that it is new. Man is not a creature who can be sat­
isfied with the sameness of sensationsi Mhe is made for 
action and progress, and cannot be happy without it," In




In seme things novelty is due, and the want of it 
is a real imperfection. Thus, if an author adds to the 
number of books with which the public is already over­
loaded, we expect from him something new* and if he says 
nothing but what has already been said before in as 
agreeable a manner, we are justly disgusted. But things 
that have nothing to recommend them but novelty, are fit 
only to entertain children, or those who are distressed 
from the vacuity of thought.™?
The reason that novelty is appealing and indispensible in
effective discourse, then, lies in the very nature of mem.
But while novelty is worthwhile and desirable, it is not
an admirable quality of style when unaccompanied by grandeur
or beauty* it may be, on the contrary, actually insulting.
Grandeur.— The contemplation of things that are 
grand inspires man to serious thought, elevates his mind to 
enthusiasm, inspires his nobility, and causes him to disdain 
what is mean. That grandeur which evokes all these emotions 
in man "seems to be nothing else but such a degree of excel- 
lence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration." 
Reid comments on grandeur as it appears in speech, saying*
What we call sublime in description, or in speech of 
any kind, is a proper expression of the admiration and 
enthusiasm which the subject produces in the mind of the 
speaker. If this admiration and enthusiasm appears to be 
just, it carries the hearer along with it involuntarily, 
and by a kind of violence rather than by cool conviction* 
for no passions are so infectious as those which hold 
enthusiasm.
But, on the other hand, if the passion of the speaker 
appears to be in no degree justified by the subject or 
the occasion, it produces in the judicious hearer no 
other emotion but ridicule and contempt.
The true sublime cannot be produced solely by art in 
the composition* it must take its rise from grandeur in 
the subject, and a corresponding emotion raised in the
20?Ibid., p. 494. 208Ibid.. pp. 494-95.
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mind of the speaker. A proper exhibition of these, 
though it should be artless, is irresistible, like fire 
thrown into the midst of combustible matter.2°9
Reid here fully recognises the contagious nature of the
speaker's enthusiasm and the empathy with which the audience
meets such involvement. At the same time, however, he sees
the necessity of sincerity in the speaker. Clearly, for
Reid, there is potential for inspiration in grandeur of
style•
Grandeur for the rhetor lies in a grand subject com­
bined with the sincere vigor of the orator who can properly 
express his enthusiasms it cannot be manufactured by the 
artful manipulation of words. Demosthenes provides an appro­
priate example in the phillipics of an orator who, taking 
as his cause the defense of Athens, experiences a flowering 
of his oratory as was seldom seen in Greece. Winston 
Churchill provides yet another example of one whose speaking 
drew heavily on the grandeur of the moment of history in 
which he rose to speak. Churchill's oratory thrived in the 
fertile soil of the war years, a time when England needed 
his leadership. Reid would likely approve of these examples 
of men whose eloquence was like Hfire thrown into the midst 
of combustible matter."
Reid is concerned not only with the grandeur of the 
orator's topic but with his character and its bearing upon 
his art as well. He notes that we commonly ascribe1 such
2 0 9 I b i d . ,  p.  4 9 6 .
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terras as power. wisdom, and goodness to works of art when
they are rightfully attributes of the artist. Thus the word
grandeur denotes an attribute of the mind that made the
210speech or created the work. The man does not merely 
influence the grandeur and beauty of the stylej his charac­
ter is the ground from which these qualities spring. Reid 
says that
When we consider the "Iliad" as the work of the poet* 
its sublimity was in the mind of Homer. He conceived 
great characters, great actions, and great events in a 
manner suitable to their nature, and with those emotions 
which they are naturally fitted to produce) and he con­
veys his conceptions and his emotions by the most proper 
signs. The grandeur of his thoughts is reflected to our 
eye by his work, and, therefore, it is justly called a 
grand work.
When we oonsider the things presented to our mind in 
the "Iliad" without regard to the poet, the grandeur is 
properly in Hector and Achilles, and the other great 
personages, human and divine, brought upon the stage.
Next to the Deity and his works, we admire great 
talents and heroic virtue in men, whether represented in 
history or in fiction. The virtues of Cato, Aristedes, 
Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, are truly grand. Extraordin­
ary talents and genius, whether in poets, orators, philo­
sophers, or lawgivers, are objects of admiration, and 
therefore grand. What a grand idea does Virgil give of 
the power of eloquence, when he compares the tempest of 
the sea, suddenly calmed by the command of Neptune, to a 
furious sedition in a great city, quelled by a man of 
authority and eloquence.211
In these passages Reid makes evident his belief that great
men undertake great causes) their utterances are enhanced by
the grandeur of their causes, as well as the grandeur of
their characters. Reid would direct the attention of the
critic of public speaking and literature to the excellence
of the man who creates the work, as well as the excellence
21QIbld. 211Ibid., pp. ^96-97.
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in the work itself. He points to the power of the artist's 
mind and personality, to his wisdom, and to his moral char­
acter generally, considerations which the thoughtful critic 
would readily assent to if he would explore every influence 
converging on his topic.
Of course, figurative language is an element of gran­
deur which Reid cannot avoid discussing. Metaphor derives 
from the connection we make in our imagination between 
things which are different in fact, and from our ability to 
attribute to one thing "what properly belongs to the 
other."212 He adds that
. . .  a very great part of language, which we now account 
proper, was originally metaphoricali for the metaphorical 
meaning becomes the proper, as soon as it becomes the 
most usuali much more when that which was at first the 
proper meaning falls into disuse.
The poverty of language, no doubt, contributes in 
part to the use of metaphori and, therefore, we find 
the most barren and uncultivated languages the most meta­
phorical. But the most copious language may be called 
barren, compared with the fertility of human conceptions, 
and can never, without the use of figures, keep pace with 
the variety of their delicate modifications.213
Reid does not explain which languages are poverty-stricken, 
nor does he disclose which ones he has in mind when he de­
clares that the most barren contain more metaphors than 
others. The point, however, is clear* figurative language 
assists man in conveying the fecundity of his conceptions.
In addition to the necessity of metaphor to express what 
otherwise would be impossible, we employ this tool of expres-
2 1 2 I b i d . t p.  ^9 7 . 2 1 3 I b i d .
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sion, Reid believes, because ■# • • we find pleasure in 
discovering relations, similitudes, analogies, and even
pi Zicontrasts, that are not obvious to every eye." The ora­
tor and the writer might be well advised to understand this 
aspect of man's makeup when seeking ways to make discourse 
more appealing! the metaphor is not only pleasing to devise, 
but it must be equally pleasing to observe when used well.
By way of further explanation, Reid says of the nature 
of the figure that it • • gives a body . . .  to things 
intellectual, and clothes them with visible qualities# or
• • • gives intellectual qualities to the objects of 
21 5sense." J The words grand. mean, and low are examples of 
how language ascribes physical dimensions to things which 
have no such dimensions in the real world. Such terms as 
sweetness, simplicity, and crookedness ascribe " names 
common to certain qualities of mind, and to qualities of 
body to which they have some analogy."
As figurative expressions become more commonly 
employed in a language, they are often no longer thought to 
be figurative! thus "the sea rages, the sky lowers, the 
meadows smile, the rivulets murmur, the breezes whisper, 
the soil is grateful or ungrateful, . • •’̂ 1^and no thought 
is given to these expressions being figurative. Thus Reid 
in his theory of figurative language speculates that the 
creation of the figure is attributable to the facility of
2l4Ibid. 215Ibid. 2l6Ibid.
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the mind to imagine associations. Strangely, the author 
seems to view the use of metaphor as a symptom of a lang­
uage deficiency, apparently meaning a deficiency of artifi­
cial language. Because a language is insufficient, meta­
phors develop to increase its utility. The speaker wishing 
to augment the effectiveness of his communication might 
remember Reid’s assurance that figurative language illumi­
nates rather than obscures the mental conception being com­
municated.
Beauty.— Reid examines beauty from two standpoints, 
the "sense of beauty" and "beauty itself." The "sense of 
beauty" quickens within the individual when he perceives a 
beautiful things. It consists of • .an agreeable feel­
ing or emotion, accompanied with an opinion or judgment of
some excellence in the object, which is fitted by Nature to
217produce that feeling." ' "Beauty itself," on the other 
hand, exists in an object intrinsically, apart from any per­
son’s perception of it. Beauty is the terra we assign to 
excellence in an objecti ". • .we find beauty in colour, in 
sound, in form, in motion. There are beauties of speech, 
and beauties of thoughtj beauties in the arts, and in the 
sciencesi beauties in actions, in affections, and in charac­
ters."218
Reid further divides the "sense of beauty" into two 
types, the "instinctive and the rational." The "instinctive
2 1 7 l b i d . ,  p.  499. 218 I b i d . ,  p .  498.
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sense of beauty is activated in the individual without 
reflection and on first sight; children, for instance, find 
beauty in colorful shells, feathers, and other objects, but 
cannot show any reason for their finding those objects beau­
tiful, When the individual can point out the agreeable 
quality in an object which causes him to think it "beautiful"
Reid would say that the individual's "rational" sense of
219beauty is aroused,
"Beauty itself," like the "sense of beauty," is also 
of two types, "original" and "derived," While some things 
possess beauty in and of themselves, others derive it from 
some other object, perhaps as the moon reflects the light of 
the sun. All languages, Reid assures his reader, are com­
prised of words "borrowed from one thing, and applied to 
something supposed to have some relation or analogy to their 
first signification?" we ascribe an attitude of life to 
inanimate objects, as in the figure "raging sea," for exam­
ple. Here again Reid is commenting on the metaphor? figur­
ative language is beautiful because it leads us to the dis­
covery of relationships and analogies in which our minds 
delight.
It might be well at this point to state that the div­
ision of the objects of taste into the three categories of 
novelty, grandeur, and beauty is obviously not Reid's inno­
vation. This trinity is observed as early as Joseph Addi­
2 1 9 I b i d . , pp.  500 - 5 0 1 .
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220son’s writing in 1712, many years prior to the appear­
ance of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 
(1785). In keeping with the apparent tradition of the era, 
Reid apparently does not think it necessary to cite Addisonfe 
contribution to his theory,
Reid's aesthetic theory provides some lessons for 
the student of communication. As Reid points out, beauty 
affects its perceiver. It stirs his emotions in some mys­
terious way, and for that reason it interests the man who 
would move others via language. For this philosopher, beau­
ty is not a subjective matter to be dismissed as a prefer­
ence of the perceiver. In accordance with his common sense 
philosophy, beauty becomes for Reid excellence abiding in 
the thing itself, clearly perceptible to the observer. His 
insistence on the "instinctive" sense of beauty is remini­
scent of his reliance on the common man's "instinctive" 
knowledge of what exists in the world. An individual does 
not have to cultivate the ability to recognize and appreci­
ate beauty 1 it is his instinctively. To exercise his 
rational sense of beauty, one need only reflect on the rea­
sons which cause him to find a thing beautiful. Of course, 
Reid would qualify his assertion that the common man can 
recognize and judge of beauty by insisting that his judg-
220 Joseph Addison, The Spectator. Monday, June 23» 
1712 and Tuesday, June 24, 1712, numbers 412-^13 in The 
Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford 1 Oxford University 
Press, 1965), III, 5^0-47.
ment be free of prejudice.
Of particular interest to our consideration of Reid's
views on style are his comments on the beauty in sound and
motion. "In a single note, sounded by a very fine voice,"
he says, "there is a beauty which we do not perceive in the
same note, sounded by a bad voice or an imperfect instru- 
221ment." In keeping with his entire discussion of aesthe­
tics, Reid declares that this perception of beauty in sound 
derives from the perfection in the human voice or the instru­
ment which produces the sound. Hence he commends develop­
ment of the beautiful aspects of the voice to the rhetor.
Reid declares grace to be the "noblest part of beau­
ty," but admits that he cannot define it. He observes, how­
ever, that grace involves motion— "some genteel or pleasing
motion, either of the whole body or of some limb, or at
222least some feature." Dealing with what the rhetorician
may call gesture, Reid takes up the movement of the face,
saying, ". . • in the face, grace appears only on those
features that are moveable, and change with the various
emotions and sentiments of the mind, such as the eyes and
22 3eyebrows, the mouth and parts adjacent." J Reid would find 
particularly admirable the eyes and the mouth, since these 
two are the most mobile of the facial features. Certainly 
the movement of these two features serves to give expression 
to the emotions, possibly more frequently than any other
221 Reid ,  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Powers, pp. 503-^«
2 2 2 I b i d . , p .  5 0 7 . 2 2 3 l b i d .
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part of the body. Importantly, Reid observes, " . . .  there
can be no grace with impropriety, • . . [and] nothing can be
graceful that is not adapted to the character and situation
224of the person." By definition, then, grace is at once 
adapted to the "character and situation of the person."
Reid's comments on the graceful movement of the entire body, 
"of some limb," and of the features of the face are remini­
scent of his earlier treatment of natural language, and 
serve to underscore the significance of beauty and appropri­
ateness in effective communication.
Grammar
Grammar, of course, is indispensable to the use of 
language and therefore to style as a rhetorical canon, and 
Reid gives it due attention. He understands grammar simply 
as the rules governing the structure of language and rela­
tions among the parts of speech. In his scattered referen­
ces to matters of grammar Reid treats the nature of verbs as 
they relate to his philosophical concept of active power, 
general words, and the use of sentences. Unfortunately, 
Reid's consideration of aspects of grammar are not exten­
sive! he tends to refer to the topic only when it suits the 
purposes of some other interest he has, and not as a subject 
of interest per se.
Though his treatment of grammar is more sparse than 
could be desired, grammar is nevertheless significant in
2 2 4 I b i d .
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Reid's philosophy. There are, for example, certain first 
principles, necessarily true, of which some are grammatical. 
Reid believes he can deduce from such grammatical first 
principles certain truths about the nature of man and the 
world. Some of these grammatical first principles are "that 
every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substan­
tive expressed or understoodi" and "that every complete sen-
22 5tence must have a verb." J In Reid's view, "Those who have
attended to the structure of language, and formed distinct
notions of the nature and use of the various parts of
speech, perceive without reasoning, that these, and many
other such principles, are necessarily true." Hence Reid
grounds grammar deeply in common sense, where the rules of
grammar are undeniably and universally valid to anyone who
considers the matter.
This notion of the "correctness" of grammatical rules
presupposes the appropriateness of the manner in which we
use language, but it does not explain to what standard our
usage is appropriate. Reid does not propose a scholarly
academy to pass judgment on matters of grammar any more than
he advocates one to do the same on matters of aesthetics,
because the unschooled common man must have judgment equally
as sound as that of the scholar. In an earlier section of
this chapter it is noted that Reid views language as a mir-
227ror of the mind. ' Grammatical rules are then but another 
2 2 5Ibid., p. 452. 2 2 6 Ibid. 2 27Above, p. 109.
27 3
reflection of the universal common sense of manj rules 
governing the use of parts of speech and the organization of 
words in sentences appropriately conform to the nature of 
the mind and appear valid to th: ^  of anyone who makes a
study of such things.
The active power of language . —  In keeping with his 
understanding of grammatical rules as first principles,
Reid deduces certain of his philosophical propositions which 
are fundamental to his writing by attending to the grammati­
cal structure of language. For example, Reid establishes 
that men have a concept of active power from the fact that 
they employ active verbs, and active verbs are contrived to 
express active power. "It is evidently the intention of 
our Maker, that man should be an active and not merely a 
speculative being# For this purpose, certain active powers
have been given him, limited indeed in many respects, but
220suited to his rank and place in the creation• " 7 Reid
explains his notion of active power in Essays on the Intel­
lectual Powers of Man. sayingi
Those who have lively conceptions, commonly express 
them in a lively manner— that is, in a manner as to raise 
lively conceptions and emotions in others# Such persons 
are the most agreeable companions in conversation, and 
the most acceptable in their writing.
Abstract and general conceptions are never lively, 
though they may be distincti and, therefore, however 
necessary in philosophy, seldom enter into poetical des­
cription, without being particularised or clothed in some 
visible dress.
22 Reid, Active Powers, p. 515. 2 2^Ibid., p. 511. 
2 ^°Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 3 6 5#
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This passage demonstrates the influence of Hume upon Reid* 
Hume bemoans the lack of liveliness in “abstract and general 
conceptions" in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.^* 
But notably, it is Reid, the advocate of common sense, who 
finds a practical application for Hume's speculative philo­
sophy.
Reid extols the wisdom of expressing lively concepts 
in a lively way because they carry out most efficiently the 
aim of the communicator who wishes to arouse the emotions. 
Showing a clear interest in rhetorical and poetical implica­
tion of the use of liveliness, Reid writes*
Some objects, from their nature, or from accidental asso­
ciations, are apt to raise strong emotions in the mind.
Joy and hope, ambition, zeal and resentment, tend to 
enliven our conceptions* disappointment, disgrace, grief, 
and envy tend to flatten them. Men of keen passions are 
commonly lively and agreeable in conversation* and dis­
passionate men often make dull companions. There is in 
some men a natural strength and vigour of mind which 
gives strength to their conceptions on all subjects, and 
in all the occasional variations of temper.
It seems easier to form a lively conception of ob­
jects that are familiar, than of those that are not* our 
conceptions of visible objects are commonly the most live­
ly, when other circumstances are equal. Hence, poets not 
only delight in the description of visible objects, but 
find means, by metaphor, analogy, and allusion, to clothe 
every object they describe with visible qualities. The 
lively conception of these makes the object appear, as it 
were, before our eyes. Lord Kames, in his Elements of 
Criticism, has shewn of what importance it is in works of 
taste, to give to objects described, what he calls ideal 
presence# To produce this in the mind, is, indeed, the 
capital aim of poetical and rhetorical description. It 
carries the man, as it were, out of himself, and makes 
him a spectator of the scene described. This ideal pre-
231David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understand­
ing, in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed.
Edwin A. Burtt (New York* Random House, 1939), p. 593.
275
sence seems to me, to be nothing else but a lively con­
ception of the appearance which the object would make if 
really present to the e y e *232
The ability to express oneself in a lively manner in order 
to infect others with lively concepts and emotions is pos­
sessed by those who have "keen passions,H supposedly meaning 
those who can strongly feel emotions such as joy and hope, 
and who are at times amtibious, zealous, and resentful*
Reid finds this principle of liveliness particularly appli­
cable to descriptive discourse and believes the lively des­
cription capable of making the conceptions appear vividly to 
the auditor* It is not clear from Reid's discussions of the 
lively conception how the communicator would acquire the 
ability to “raise lively conceptions and emotions in otherB" 
if he happened to be dispassionate, but this detached and 
rather descriptive approach is one Reid employs often, as if 
he thinks it more appropriate to the philosopher. Also, of 
course, the purpose of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers 
of Man is perhaps more strongly descriptive than prescrip­
tive •
The economy of forms.— Taking up various parts of 
speech in somewhat more detail, Reid considers what he calls 
the problem of frugality in the use of language* He expres­
ses the rule that variations in form which indicate modifi­
cations in case, mood, and tense must be frugal enough to 
accommodate the memory of raani if they are too extensive the
2^2Reid, Intellectual Powers. P. 365*
2 76
speaker will not be able to manipulate them with facility.2-^ 
Reid's belief that language is primarily for use by the 
common man and only secondarily for use by philosophers is 
basic to his concept of style, and the belief reappears here 
in his principle of economy of forms. The reason for parsi­
mony, however, is purely to accommodate the speakeri Reid 
does not consider the difficulty of an audience in compre­
hending a particularly complicated style with many varia- .. 
tions in case, mood, and voice. He does not indicate that 
there is a problem of multiplicity of forms in English, nor 
in his discussion of Greek and Latin cases is there any 
indication that any Greek or Roman ever had difficulty in 
remembering or using the various forms in any way whatsoever^ 
Seemingly, Reid's interest in prescribing frugality of forms 
is purely theoretical. His interest in prescribing parsi­
mony, however, warrants its mention here. In this connec­
tion we may say that while Reid warns that "the forms of
language, once established by custom, are not so easily
234changed, • • •" v he does encourage the speaker to experi­
ment with and research the various elements of language. In 
a letter to Dr. James Gregory he writesi
I believe the principles of the art of language 
are to be found in a just analysis of the various species 
of sentences. Aristotle and the logicians have analysed 
one species— to wit, the proposition. To enumerate and 
analyse the other species, must, I.think, be the founda­
tion of a just theory of language.***
2 -^Reid, Active Powers, p. 516. 2 Ibid.. p. 606.
2-^Reid, Letter XI to Gregory, p. 72.
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certain attributes are thrown in to one parcel, and have 
a general name given them, which belongs equally to every 
individual in that parcel. This common name must there­
fore signify those attributes which have been observed to
be common to every individual in that parcel, and nothing
else.237
Hence man employs general words because of the law of parsi­
mony, or economy, mentioned beforet he cannot communicate 
with facility all the proper names necessary without general 
words. For example, the word tree is a general word signi­
fying all the attributes common to every individual tree, 
and the verb to run signifies all the attritubes common to 
all running.
The obligation of the communicator to see that all 
his words "signify those attributes which have been observed 
to be common to every individual in that parcel, and nothing
else" points up the importance of precise definition, which
Reid discusses in the following excerpti
If all the general words of a language had a precise 
meaning, and were perfectly understood, as mathematical 
terras are, all verbal disputes would be at an end, and 
men would never seem to differ in opinion, but when they 
differ in realityj but this is far from being the case. 
The meaning of most general words is not learned, like 
that of mathematical terms, by an accurate definition, 
but by the experience we happen to have, by hearing them 
used in conversation. From such experience, we collect 
their meaning by a kind of inductionj and, as this induc­
tion is, for the most part, lame and imperfect, it hap­
pens that different persons join different conceptions 
to the same general word* and, though we intend to give 
them the meaning which use, the arbiter of language,has 
put upon them, this is difficult to find, and apt to be 
mistaken, even by the candid and attentive. Hence, in 
innumerable disputes, men do not really differ in their 
judgments, but in their way of expressing them. 238
237Ibid. 238Ibid.. p. 365.
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Reid believes that use dictates the meaning of words, 
and that it is the obligation of the one who would communi­
cate clearly to discover the task which use gives to a word 
and to employ it for no other purpose. Though he does not 
say so, Reid would no doubt consult the uneducated and the 
vulgar on the uses to which they put various words as fre­
quently as he would consult the scholar, since this approach 
would be consistent with his belief in the validity of the 
judgment of the vulgar# Though conscious of the necessity 
of thorough definition, as mentioned often before, Reid 
causes confusion in his own writing by neglecting to make 
such precise definitions. The ambiguity caused by his fail­
ure to specify a meaning for the word connection, discussed 
above, is a notable example of Reid's own laxity.
Reid is not always so careless, however; he often
does define his terms, even when they are commonly used
words, probably well understood by the common men who employ
them readily and frequently# On occasion he seems to regret
the necessity for defining common words, such as active
power, about which he saysi
• • • an attempt to explain a word so well understood and 
to shew that it has meaning, requires an apology.
The apology is, that this term, so well understood by 
the vulgar, has been darkened by philosophers, who, in 
this as in many other instances, have found great diffi­
culties about a thing Vhjch, to the rest of mankind, 
seems perfectly clear#239
2-^Reid, Active Powers, p# 512.
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Here Reid brings to attention that if the speaker is to 
avoid misunderstandings and disputes he must take care to 
define controversial terms, while at the same time taking 
pains not to bog down the discourse with definitions of 
terms which require little or no definition* It also be­
hooves the speaker to avoid the errors of philosophers who 
unnecessarily darken the otherwise clear meanings of terms.
The Improvement of the Utility of Language
Reid, of course, insistB that language best serves 
the purposes of common usage and that philosophers have 
8trained the proper use of language in their discourses by 
requiring it to perform tasks for which it was not intended. 
He is especially concerned in this regard with the solipsis- 
tic condition of some epistemology in the-eighteenth cen­
tury, arguing vehemently against the use of language to pro­
pound theories directly contrary to common sense truths.
For example, Hume, the empiricist, argues that the external 
world is not knowable, and Reid counters by saying that the 
world does indeed exist, and furthermore, that it is knowa­
ble. Much of Reid's argument about the existence of the 
material world and many of the principles of common sense, 
as we have already seen, are drawn from the nature and use 
of languagei the manner in which men use language indicates 
that they assume the existence of a material world. In this 
manner Reid's admonitions about the use of language permeate 
his entire philosophy, and, to a large degree, provide the
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very foundations for his arguments regarding common sense*
Reid says, "Language is made to serve the purposes of 
ordinary conversation* and we have no reason to expect that 
it should make distinctions that are not of common use*"^^ 
That is, it is not the office of language to undertake tasks 
not ordinarily put upon it in everyday life. This emphasis 
on the use of language as it is employed by the ordinary man 
seems to be in keeping with the concept of natural language 
which consists of voice modulations, gestures, features of 
the face, and attitudes of the body, which even the savage 
adroitly manipulates to attain his own goals* Reid laments 
the inability of language to carry out adequately the tasks 
which philosophy gives it, and stresses the point that lang­
uage must be improved* Philosophy is more exacting than the 
endeavors of the vulgar and uneducated* it includes discus­
sions of topics in more precise and intricate ways than do 
other disciplines* For instance, we would not expect the 
carpenter and the butcher to demand as much accuracy from 
their language as would the logician or the metaphysician* 
the philosopher requires more precision in his language than 
do other people, and for that reason Reid proposes that lang* 
uage "be gradually improved in copiousness and distinctness," 
implying that more and different words would assist in mak­
ing possible the distinctions in meaning required by philo­
sophers, and that better definitions of existing words would
Reid, Intellectual Powers, p* 310*
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serve a similar purpose* To these suggestions he adds*
that improvements in knowledge and in language may go 
hand in hand and facilitate each other. But I fear the 
imperfections of language can never be perfectly remedied 
while our knowledge is imperfect.
However this may be, it is evident that the imperfec­
tions of language, and much more the abuse of it, are the 
occasion of many errors * and that in many disputes which 
have engaged learned men, the difference has been partly, 
and in some wholly, about the meaning of words
Certainly, such suggestions regarding the clarifica­
tion of meanings of words would make semanticists happy, but 
basically Reid's suggestions amount to using existing words 
more distinctly, supplementing our vocabulary, and thus 
making each word more precise. This would also augment and 
perfect current knowledge about all subjects. By expanding 
his knowledge man is able to talk about all subjects more 
precisely, since misconceptions are eliminated* this would 
make possible more accurate use of language in these matters. 
When a man understands the causes of, for example, fertility 
and reproduction, he no longer employs the term spirit to 
explain the phenomenon. Significantly, Reid acknowledges 
the importance of the improvement of language in any field 
of endeavor outside those of the common man, who, in Reid's 
opinion, does quite well with the language which is made for 
him.
Summary
Reid's concept of style involves the division of lang­
uage into two kinds, that comprised of natural signs whose
241 Ibid., p. W .
meanings are known to man without his learning them, and 
artificial signs (primarily words) whose meanings are de­
rived by agreements among men. Natural signs include vocal 
modulations and movements of parts of the body, and the 
meanings of these are understood by men and animals alike 
by means of some mysterious innate ability. Artificial 
signs of language include words, of course, and presumably 
any movements of the body and vocal modulations whose mean­
ings are not understood immediately but must be learned.
The meanings of natural signs should be studied by the rhe­
torician because such knowledge enhances oral communication, 
making it more virile, more powerful and expressive. Like 
the scientist who studies phenomena in nature, the rhetori­
cian studies the natural signs of language in order to dis­
cover the laws governing their use and to facilitate his 
employing them in communication. Reid sees discourse which 
employs the natural signs of language as more animated, be­
cause using natural signs implies the use of many muscles 
not employed when the orator communicates with artificial 
signs alone. Artificial signs speak to the understanding, 
but natural signs are more effective in persuasive and in­
spirational discourse because they address the passions, the 
will, and the affections of the auditors. Artificial lang­
uage, in Reid*s view, is one factor which distinguishes man 
from the brutes, and although it is admirable on that score, 
it is not to be used to the exclusion of natural language.
When Reid discusses matters pertaining to aesthetics
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he mentions several qualities of a good stylei he urges 
that excellence in anything invariably inspires the imagina­
tion! he explains that certain things are tasteful because 
they are either novel, grand, or beautiful, or have some 
combination of these qualities. He views the orator as 
inseparable from his oration, and emphasizes that the grand 
character of the orator, his wisdom, power, and goodness, aB 
well as the grand subject on which he speaks, contributes to 
the "irresistible" style. Reid's comments on the beauty of 
sound and "the noblest part of beauty," grace, or movement 
of some part of the body, strongly suggest the importance of 
developing all the features of the voice and gestures to the 
most pleasing degree. Novelty, grandeur, and beauty in dis­
course have the ability to captivate and motivate the audi­
tor, and for this reason merit the consideration of one 
interested in rhetorical and communication theory.
Reid's cursory analysis of the grammatical elements 
of active and passive verbs may best be understood in con­
junction with his remarks on delivery, in which he advocates 
a vigorous style of delivery characterized by energy and 
forcei for Reid, active verbs establish the existence of 
man's notion of active power. The use of these active verbs 
can imbue the orator's language with this necessary energy 
and force, and makes it better able to motivate auditors by 
appealing to their emotions and by raising vivid images in 
their minds. Reid also admires frugality in language, sug­
gesting that the communicator should not overextend the num-
ber of tenses and moods of verbs in his discourse. Though 
the problem of too many tenses or moods is seemingly an 
imaginary one, Reid's warning to observe the law of parsi­
mony is one which deserves mention. Of more importance is 
Reid's concern with precise definition. He suggests that 
terms Bhould be employed in discourse according to the man­
ner dictated by their universal use. Though he does not 
solve the difficulties in such a rule, Reid does make his 
intention clear that precise definitions of terms would 
immediately solve many disputes. By making the meanings of 
terms more distinct and by increasing the number of terms 
available for use, man can improve his language and make it 
a more useful tool to serve his ends. Reid's treatment of 
style includes the concept that language, by its very nature, 
is to serve the purposes of common usage; this concept per­
meates and influences all his writing about language. He 
believes that the quality of thought is improved only as 
the quality of language is improved, and thus it behooves 
the rhetor to augment his vocabulary and to be clear and 
distinct in his utterances.
V . Memory
Rhetoricians have been interested in the phenomenon 
of memory from the time of the earliest writings about rhe­
toric, though the subject has not enjoyed so prestigious a 
place in rhetorical writing as topics such as logic and 
ethics. Cicero considers an efficient memory a qualifies-
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tion of the good orator, since a good orator must be able to
242retain what he has been taught. In De Partitione Ora- 
toria Cicero mentions memory "which is in a manner the twin 
sister of written script, and is very similar to it in a 
dissimilar field." He says that " . . .  just as script con­
sists of marks indicating letters and of the material on 
which those marks are imprinted, so the structure of memory, 
like a wax tablet, employs •topics,' and in these stores 
images which correspond to the letter in written script
According to Cicero, topics are "Pigeonholes in which argu-
244ments are stored." The memory stores arguments under 
certain categories where they can be retrieved or revived 
when needed in a speech, and Cicero likens these categories 
or topics to the printed letters of written speech, the 
structure of the memory itself to a wax tablet on which 
impressions are made. Perhaps the memory might be made more 
acute by the use of mnemonic devices, like a pigeonhole, in 
which arguments may be categorized and stored until time for 
recall. At any rate, to the ancients memory was a practical 
tool of the orator.
Reid however does not consider the subject of memory 
specifically as a tool of the orator, but rather as an 
intellectual power of the mind along with conception,
^Cicero, De Oratore. I, i, 28, 89.
243-'Cicero, De Partitione Oratoria. trans. H. Rackham 
(Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard University Press, 1942), 7» 331.
244* Jbid., 2, 313.
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abstraction, judgment, reasoning, and taste* It is an 
innate faculty which appears early in man's development, 
shortly after the appearance of the senses* Memory presup­
poses the memory of something* just as perception presuppo­
ses the perception of something, and Reid adds that "it is 
by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things 
past." He considers the nature of the process of memory in 
the following excerpti
When we perceive an object by our senses, there is, firsts 
some impression made by the object upon the organ of 
sense, either immediately, or by means of some medium.
By this, an impression is made upon the nerves and brain, 
in consequence of which we feel some sensationi and that 
sensation is attended by that conception and belief of 
the external object which we call perception. These opem 
ations are so connected in our constitution, that it is 
difficult to disjoin them in our conceptions, and to 
attend to each without confounding it with the others*
But, in the operations of memory, we are free from all 
ambiguity.
Memory is always accompanied with the belief of that 
which we remember, as perception is accompanied with the 
belief of that which we perceive, and consciousness with 
the belief of that whereof we are conscious* Perhaps in 
infancy, or in a disorder of mind, things remembered may 
be confounded with those which are merely imaginedi but 
in mature years, and in a sound state of mind, every man 
feels that he must believe what he distinctly remembers, 
though he can give no other reason of his belief, but 
that he remembers the thing distinctlyi whereas, when he 
merely imagines a thing ever so distinctly, he has no 
belief of it upon that account.
According to Reid, then, memory comes about first by an
impression being made upon our sense organs, which in turn
bring about an impression upon the nerves and brain. At
this point we are aware of some sensation, which is percep-
^^^Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 339-^0*
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tion. When we remember, we receive an immediate impression 
of the thing remembered just as we receive an immediate 
impression of a thing perceived. Reid's description, how­
ever, does not completely explain memory because it stops 
with the awareness of sensation. Though Reid does not say 
so, this sensation must in some way become rather permanent­
ly impressed to allow for recall at a later timej Reid does 
not explain how recall is possible.
Accompanying memory of an event is the simultaneous
conviction that such an event did occur and that it is not
imagined. This necessary conviction makes memory important
as a kind of evidence, as was discussed earlier in this 
246chapter. Reid concedes that he cannot explain the neces­
sity of this conviction, but he is certain that unless the
mind is immature or deranged it does indeed accompany memory 
of an event. He explains in the following manner*
When I believe that I washed my hands and face this 
morning, there appears no necessity in the truth of this 
proposition. It might be, or it might not be. A man may 
distinctly conceive it without believing it at all. How 
then do 1 come to believe it? I remember it distinctly. 
This is all I can say. This remembrance is an act of my 
mind. Is it impossible that this act should be, if the
event had not happened? I confess I do not see any neces­
sary connection, then I think that belief which we have 
of what we remember will be fairly accounted fori but, 
if this cannot be done, that belief is unaccountable, 
and we can say.no more but that it is the result of ourconstitution.2^7
Reid reasons that because no necessity can be found between
246Above, pp. 158-59*
247'Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 3^1•
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the memory of an event and the simultaneous conviction of 
its occurrence, it must be the result of our constitution. 
Man believes the testimony of his memory, and he cannot do 
otherwise•
Reid's theory of memory, while incomplete, is not 
foreign to eighteenth-century epistemology. His description 
of the manner in which an impression is made upon the nerves 
and the brain is reminiscent of Locke's notion of how the 
mind comes to be furnished with ideas.
Clearly, however, Reid's interest in memory is rele­
gated to its empirical implications as a source of know­
ledge , and it does not extend to the rhetorical significance 
of the subject. How the intellectual phenomenon of memory 
operates is of greater importance to Reid than its practical 
application as a canon of the orator's art. The rhetorician 
must concern himself not only with the application of memory 
in discourse, but also in the function of this mental pheno­
menon. In this regard Reid's thought is of historical 
interest.
VI. Speech and Hearing
In scattered references Reid mentions several miscel­
laneous topics which are relevant to the study of communica­
tion and particularly to the physiological study of speech 
and hearing. In character with his empiricistic bent, Reid 
investigates the sense of taste, inspecting the oral cavity 
and seeking to identify the functions of some of its parts.
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He also shows an interest in hearing and the nature of 
sound, and makes in one place a brief mention of stammering. 
There is also some evidence that Reid was interested in the 
nature of dialect.
The Mouth
When Reid takes up the topic of tasting, he only 
incidentally discusses several parts of the oral structure 
which are of interest to the study of the physiology of 
speech production. As is evident from his assertions about 
the sense of taste, research into the nature and function of 
the oral cavity was in its infancy. Reid writesi
It is probable that everything that affects the 
taste is, in some degree, soluble in the saliva. It is 
not conceivable how anything should enter readily, and of 
its own accord, as it were, into the pores of the tongue, 
palate, and fauces, unless it had some chemical aff3.nity 
to that liquor with which these pores are always replete. 
It is, therefore, an admirable contrivance of nature, 
that the organs of taste should always be moist with the 
liquor which is so universal a menstruum, and which de­
serves to be examined more than it hath been hitherto, 
both in that capacity, and as a medical unguent. Nature 
teaches dogs, and other animals to use it in this last 
wayi and its subserviency both to taste and digestion 
shews its efficacy in the f o r m e r . 2 ^ 8
Reid believes that the sense of taste takes place in the 
pores of the palate, tongue, and fauces. There is no evi­
dence of his investigation of the tissues of the mouth micro­
scopically. Perhaps for this reason Reid does not mention 
the taste buds and their locations, though he clearly asserts 
that taste takes place in parts of the mouth other than the
2 UR Reid, Inquiry, p. 115*
f
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tongue. He also excludes discussion of the number of tastes 
of which man is capable. Commendable is Reid's encourage­
ment of research into the solvent and medicinal properties 
of saliva.
Reid does not mention the tongue, palate, and fauces 
in relation to their articulatory functions, but only as he 
believes them to relate to taste. His cursory examination 
of the oral cavity is mentioned here, however, because it 
exemplifies the interest of an eighteenth-century empiricist 
in the nature of a part of the speech-making mechanism.
This implied interest in first-hand investigation of the 
oral cavity, for instance, is an isolated case of the kind 
of investigations which would eventually lead to a more wide­
spread interest in the workings of the vocal apparatus.
Hearing
Reid's interest in hearing is motivated by the same 
devotion to empirical investigation which stimulated his 
interest in taste, but his discussion of hearing is slightly 
more complete than that of the mouth. Reid seeks to under­
stand the functions of the body which have relation to the 
mental faculties. The senses are, of course, the means by 
which the mind comes to know the external world, and, there­
fore, they hold great interest for Reid.
His concept of the nature and variety of sounds is of 
concern to those who study communication at its fundamental 
levels. About these topics Reid writes*
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Sounds have probably no less variety of modulations, 
than either tastes or odours. For, first, sounds differ 
in tone. The ear is capable of perceiving four or five 
hundred variations of tone in sound, and probably as aany 
different degrees of strength! by combining these, we 
have about twenty thousand simple sounds that differ 
either in tone, or strength, supposing every tone to be 
perfect. But it is to be observed, that to make a per­
fect tone, a great many undulations of elastic air are 
required, which must all be of equal duration and extent, 
and follow one another with perfect regularity* and each 
undulation must be made up of the advance and recoil of 
innumerable particles of elastic air, whose motions are 
all uniform in direction, force, and time. Hence we may 
easily conceive a prodigious variety in the same tone, 
arising from irregularities of it, occasioned by the con­
stitution of the ear itself, upon which the impression is 
made. 9
Because Reid does not indicate whether he did experiments 
which led him to his conclusions about the nature and vari­
ety of sound, we might assume that he cites the result of 
research done by someone else. He does not reveal his 
source, however, possibly because the acoustic theory of 
particle vibration in an elastic medium was well understood 
in the scholarly community at the time of his writing.
His interest in the variety of sounds perceptible to 
the human being seems almost wholly directed at the awesome 
ability of man to detect such a large number of sounds, and 
not at a thorough description of how that variety occurs.
He relates the complexity of the physical phenomenon of 
sound not to point up the difficulty of producing such sound 
but presumably to give example of the extent of man's abil­
ity to perceive the variety.
2/f9Ibid., pp. 116 - 1 7 .
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Generally Reid's concepts of pitch, quality, and 
loudness seem rather well developed, though he does not 
employ terms such as frequency, resonance. or amplitude to 
describe the phenomena. Rather he speaks of the variety of 
sounds produced by MirregulatiriesH of a tone brought about 
the composition of the vibrating body, its shape, "situa­
tion," and the "manner of striking the sonorous body."
While some of his nomenclature is obscure, Reid implies his 
understanding of resonance which produces the difference in 
the sounds of several human voices emitting a sound at the 
same pitch. Reid writes*
Nay if twenty human voices sound the same note, and with 
equal strength, there will still be some difference.
The same voice while it retains its proper distinctions, 
may yet be varied many ways, by sickness or health, 
youth or age, leanness or fatness, good or bad humour. 5
Here he appears to have in mind the ways in which voca1 
resonance, and perhaps pitch and loudness, are altered by 
the factors he mentions. Most vague, however, is the mean­
ing of his phrase "good and bad humour9" which somehow makes 
a difference in the voice. Supposedly Reid simply means 
that the quality of vocal sound in somehow altered by the 
mental state of the speaker, but of course he is not speci­
fic about how he understands this to occur.
Reid believes that the ability to detect the many 
varieties of sounds is given to man for the purpose of 
determining the place and nature of things in the external 
world. He bases this belief on the notion that no power is
2 5 0 I b i d . .  p .  1 1 7 .
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2 *>1given to man in vain. J Both the nature and the location 
of things making sounds are learned by experience, according 
to the Scottish philosopher. He does not believe men to 
have an innate ability to distinguish the direction of a 
soundi he states, "That such a noise is in the street, such 
another in the room above mei that this a knock at the door,
that a person walking up stairs--is probably learnt by
2*52experience.** J
It seems reasonable that the precise source of a 
sound may be learned by experience, but that the direction 
from which a sound comes must also be learned has certain 
faults. If a man hears a strange whistling noise he may 
not know whether it is made by man or bird, for example, but 
he may be able to detect the direction from which it comes 
without prior knowledge of the location of the man or bird. 
Why Reid fails to consider this fact, or at least to recom­
mend research in this direction, is not dear in the light 
of his professed interest in empirical evidence.
Dialect and Stammering
Reid also indicates an interest in dialect and speech 
disorders, though neither of these topics receives more than 
the most cursory mention. In discussing instinct as a mech­
anical principle of action, Reid considers the tendency of 
man to imitate what he approves. An example of this incli­
nation is the manner in which man learns the dialect of a
2^*Reid, Active Powers, p. 600.
2-*2Reid, Inquiry, p. 117•
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region foreign to him. Reid writes*
Let an Englishman, of middle age, take up residence 
in Edinburgh or Glasgow* although he has not the least 
intention to use the Scots dialect, but a firm resolution 
to preserve his own pure and unmixed, he will find it 
very difficult to make good his intention* He will, in 
a course of years, fall insensibly, and without inten­
tion, into the tone and accent, and even into the words 
and phrases of those he converses with* and nothing can 
preserve him from this, but a strong disgust to every 
Scotticism, which perhaps may overcome the natural 
instinct*
It is commonly thought that children often learn to 
stammer by imitation? yet I believe no person ever 
desired or willed to learn that quality*
I apprehend that instinctive imitation has no small 
influence in forming the peculiarities of provincial 
dialects, the peculiarities of voice, gesture, and manner 
peculiar to different ranks and different professions* 
and perhaps even in forming national characters and the 
human character in general,253
According to Reid, then, men learn dialects because of their 
imitative instinct* They can do little to prevent their 
unconscious imitation of the "tone and accent," if not the 
"words and phrases," peculiar to those with whom they asso­
ciate, unless they have the most intense emotional aversion 
to them. How one may go about intentionally changing his 
own dialect is not perfectly clear in Reid's account of 
dialect* Supposedly, in addition to a desire to acquire a 
new dialect, one might be assisted by a strong aversion to 
his old dialect*
Equally brief is Reid's treatment of certain charac­
teristic peculiarities of voice, gesture, and manner among 
members of particular families* Reid supposedly believes 
his reader to understand his meaning, and therefore fails to
^-^Reid, Active Powers, p. 5^8*
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amplify the notion. He might have in mind that some chil­
dren learn from their parents certain peculiar movements of 
the hands and arms, or certain facial or bodily positions 
which convey meaning to all who view them but which are com­
mon to that family alone. The intended meaning, however, 
remains obscure as do the means by which the instinctive 
imitation and learning of dialect and gesture influence the 
formation of "national character and human character in gen­
eral •"
Reid's remark on stammering is indeed terse. He does 
not endorse the theory that children learn to stammer by 
imitation, but merely reports that there are those who hold 
such a theory. He does not state what he includes under the 
defect of stammering. Whether one might avoid or cure such 
a disorder by a strong emotional aversion to it, as in the 
case of dialect, is equally unclear. While his remark is 
brief, however, it indicates his interest in and knowledge 
of such matters, though it does not provide much information 
about the extent of either.
Summary
The brevity of Reid's comments on the nature of the 
oral cavity, hearing, dialect, and stammering indicates only 
an incidental interest in these matters. HiB remarks are 
considered here primarily because of their historical value 
as preliminary investigations in matters of speech science 
and linguistics, and also because they round out this des­
cription of Reid*8 communication theory. They show his
29?
interest in communication, however slight at times, extended 
widely*
CHAPTER V
REID'S RELATION TO HIS CONTEMPORARIES
A report of Thomas Reid's theory of communication, 
unaugmented by any attempt to analyze the possible or pro­
bable influence of it, is an exercise in irrelevance. Reid, 
of course, never thought of himself as a rhetorician, and he 
never demonstrated an intent to include a comprehensive 
communication theory into the corpus of his work. This 
theory of communication is incidental to his systematic phil 
osophy and not an end in itself. Reid's philosophy, however 
was an important factor in eighteenth-century thought, and 
the historian and critic can hardly imagine that it was of 
no consequence in directing the evolution of rhetoric and 
communication theory in the century of enlightenment. The 
impact of Reid's thought and its relation to other thought 
on communication is an indispensable part of a study of 
this kind, because a philosopher of his calibre did not 
produce his work in a vacuum. As the prevailing thought of 
the century of enlightenment influenced Reid's philosophy, 
Reid's thought, in turn, molded to some extent the thought 
of his contemporaries.
This chapter is an examination of the relation be­
tween Thomas Reid's thought on communication and that of the 
principal rhetoricians of the eighteenth century, Campbell, 
Blair, Whately, Priestley, Karnes, Adam Smith, Thomas Sheri­




The influence of one man upon another is an elusive 
phenomenon. The critic finds it always difficult and thus 
dangerous to assert a causal relation between two systems of 
thought. Recognizing his obligation to assert only what is 
certain, he must nevertheless report the correlation between 
the ideas of two men.
At times, two or more men develop the same idea at 
the same time, making the assignation of the idea to one man 
or one school most difficult. For example, the apparent 
pessimism about mankind which emerged after the two great 
world wars and appeared in the writings of philosophers and 
literarians can hardly be attributed to a single influence, 
much less to a single man. Likewise the origin of the pre­
vailing affinity of many eighteenth-century scholars for 
empiricism is difficult to pinpoint.
For these reasons this chapter will often deal with 
points of correspondence between Reid's thought and that of 
his peers who wrote on communication, and with the possibi­
lity or probability of Reid's influence upon them. Where a 
writer cites Reid as a source, of course, this citation will 
be noted, but the reader must become the ultimate judge of 
causal influence between Reid and writers on communication 
and rhetorical theory of his time.
II. Reid and Campbell 
Of all the men who wrote in Reid's era, probably the
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closest relationship exists between Reid and George Campbell 
(1719-1796)* Both men helped to found the Aberdeen Philo­
sophical Society, where they nurtured and shared their ideas 
for many years,1 and both lived and produced a considerable 
amount of their writing at Aberdeen while associated with
pthe university* Reid indicates a rather close relationship 
with Campbell in a letter to David Hume, saying* HYour 
[Hume*si judgment of my style, indeed, gives me great conso­
lation, as I was very diffident of myself in regard to Eng­
lish, and have been indebted to Drs [George] Campbell and 
[Alexander] Gerard for many corrections of that kind*"^ 
Presumably Reid means that Campbell assisted him in editing 
his manuscripts* This suggests that Campbell was well 
acquainted with Reid's work on a firsthand basis, not only 
from the discourses and discussions at meetings of the Aber­
deen Philosophical Society but also from close scrutiny of 
his writings* Given that these two men were devoted to the 
examination of ideas, and postulating that scholars tend to 
influence other scholars, we might expect to find some agree*
1Aberdeen Philosophical Society Minutes, 1758-1771* 
Aberdeen University Library, MS 539 (on microfilm in the 
library of the State University of Iowa), passim,
oA.D. Woozley (ed.), "Introduction," in Essays on the 
Intellectual Powers of Man by Thomas Reid (London* Macmil­
lan Co., Ltd*, 19^1), pp* v-x» Lloyd F* Bitzer (ed.), "Edi­
tor's Introduction," in The Philosophy of Rhetoric by George 
Campbell (facsimile edition, Carbondalet Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1963)# pp* x-xiv.
3̂Thomas Reid, Letter to David Hume, in The Works of 
Thomas Reid, D.D«t ed* Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh* 
Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), I, 91.
ment between the thought of Campbell and Reid*
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Intuitive Evidence
Agreement does exist between Campbell and Reid in one 
of the most important areas of Campbell's thought, his dis­
cussion of evidence in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1 7 7 6). 
Evidence is important as a source of knowledge, and Campbell 
treats it in a fashion commensurate with its epistemological 
importance, avoiding prescriptions to the orator about how 
to use evidence in discourse• According to Campbell there 
are two kinds of evidence, intuitive and deductive. He 
defines each in the following passages
Logical truth consisteth in the conformity of our concep­
tions to their archetypes in the nature of things. This 
conformity is perceived by the mind, either immediately 
on a bare attention to the ideas under review, or medi* 
ately by a comparison of these with other related ideas. 
Evidence of the former kind is called intuitive 1 of the 
latter, deductive
The kinds of intuitive evidence are mathematical axioms, 
consciousness, and common sense, while the kinds of deduc­
tive evidence are demonstrative and moral
These sources of evidence are similar to those men­
tioned by Reid. Reid endorses all of Campbell's sources of 
evidence and adds some of his own. In Essays on the Intel­
lectual Powers of Man he includes a discussion of the evi­
dence of sense, memory, consciousness, testimony, axioms,
4George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. 
Lloyd F. Bitzer (facsimile edition 1 Carbondalei Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1 9 6 3 ), P* 35*
5Ibid., pp. 35-^3.
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and reasoning.^ Campbell's notion of the evidence of axioms 
is like Reid's except that Campbell, of course, discusses it 
in somewhat more detail* Reid's treatment of evidence is 
more concerned with a comparison of the evidence of sense, 
or common sense, than with the other sources of evidence, 
Campbell treats each separately and in detail.
Evidence of Axioms.— Both Campbell and Reid under­
stand that an axiom, like a common sense truth, is known to 
be true immediately upon understanding it. Campbell writes 
that axioms "have in like manner that original and intrinsic 
evidence, which makes them, as soon as the terms are under­
stood, to be perceived intuitively,and Reid compares 
axioms to common sense truths in the following manner*
. . .  if the word axiom be put to signify every truth 
which is known immediately, without being deduced from 
any antecedent truth, then the existence of the objects 
of sense may be called an axiomi for my senses give me 
an immediate conviction of what is commonly called an 
axiom.”
Clearly Campbell and Reid define axiomatic evidence similar­
ly. An axiom stating that the whole is greater than a part, 
for example, would, according to Reid and Campbell, immedi­
ately convict the auditor of its truth upon being understood.
Evidence of consciousness.— The correlation in the
^Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P..ed. Sir William Ham­
ilton (Edinburgh* Maclachlan and Stewart, I8 6 3), I, 3 2 6-3 0 .
^Campbell, p. 3 6 .
U
Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 329.
thought of Campbell and Reid extends into their treatment 
of the kind of evidence called consciousness* Campbell's 
definition of consciousness is operational* He says that 
from the evidence of consciousness "• . • every man derives 
the perfect assurance that he hath of his own existence.
Nor is he only in this way assured that he exists, but that 
he thinks that he feels, that he sees, that he hears, and 
the like."^ For Reid, consciousness is "that immediate 
knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purpo­
ses, and, in general, of all the present operations of our 
minds."10 The evidence of consciousness is understood 
similarly by both Campbell and Reidi for both, in convicts 
one of the truth of its propositions immediately, and for 
both it deals with the processes of the mind, processes 
which relate to one's knowledge of his own existence, his 
thoughts, and his feelings*
Common sense.— The most outstanding feature of Reid's 
thought* however, is his notion of common sense, and it is 
this kind of intuitive evidence to which Campbell gives most 
of his attention. As the main advocate of common sense 
philosophy, Reid must be acknowledged as the fountainhead 
from which springs any interpretation Campbell gives to 
common sense as a kind of evidence. Indeed, Campbell 
acknowledges his indebtedness to Reid as the author of the 
most articulate expression of this doctrine. In his foot-
ôCampbell, p. 37.
^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 222.
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note Campbell says that he uses the term common sense in a 
more limited manner than it has previously been used,11 and 
he seems to mean by this that he considers common sense only 
as a source of evidence and that he intends to minimize its 
epistemological significance.
Campbell holds Reid's doctrine of common sense in 
such high regard that he devotes a lengthy footnote to its 
defense against the attack of Reid's detractor, Joseph 
Priestley. According to Campbell, common sense is an innate 
source of knowledge in all men, except perhaps the mentally 
ill and the half-witted. While Reid often tends to estab­
lish the existence of common sense first principles by 
asserting the universality of their acceptance and use 
among men, Campbell goes about it in a more logical fashion, 
arguing that
All reasoning necessarily supposes that there are cer­
tain principles in which we must acquiesce, and beyoqd 
which we cannot go— principles clearly discernible by 
their own light, which can derive no additional evidence 
from anything besides. On the contrary supposition, the 
investigation of truth would be an endless and a fruit­
less taski we should be eternally proving, whilst 
nothing could ever be provedi because by hypothesis, we 
could never ascend to premises which require no proof.12
All argument is based on some propositions believed self-evi­
dent. Without these, no argument could exist, and no truth 
could be known. Campbell, like Reid, believes that these
11Campbell, p. 38n. Like Reid, Campbell acknow­
ledges that the French Jesuit philosopher, Father Buffier, 
treated common sense and its importance to logic in his 
First Principles, and the Origin of Our Opinions (1732).
12Ibid.. p. 42.
305
self-evident first principles on which all other knowledge
is based are common sense notions.
Campbell does not appear to alter Reid's concept of
common sense, but only to limit it to its use as evidence.
Because common sense first principles appear true to the
mind immediately upon being understood, they are appealing
to Campbell as a source of evidence in rhetorical argument.
For both Reid and Campbell, common sense propositions are,
upon being understood, able to cause the auditor to give his
assent to them. Reid says of all forms of evidence that
. they are fitted by Nature to produce belief in the
human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we
call certainty, others in various degrees according to cir- 
13cumstances^ and though he never says so explicitly, 
Campbell seems to concur in this. When a proposition is 
really one of common sense, it is by definition true, and 
the mind has an innate affinity for it.
Memory.— Campbell includes memory as another kind 
of intuitive evidence, though he does not separate it from 
common sense. Reid mentions memory as a kind of evidence, 
and Campbell takes it up in his discussion of common sense. 
For the most part he maintains Reid's concept of this par­
ticular kind of evidence. Campbell distinguishes the evi­
dence of memory from that of consciousness and common sense 
as Reid does, insisting that the evidence of consciousness
1 "XReid, Intellectual Powers, p. 328.
testifies to the fact that we think, feel, see, and receive 
sensations from the other sensesi consciousness gives evi­
dence only of one's “own present feelings, whose essence
consists in being felt, and of which I am at present con- 
14scious." The emphasis here is upon the term present feel­
ings, as it is when Reid declares that the term consciousness 
is used to "signify that immediate knowledge which we have
of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of
15all the present operations of our minds.*1 J By the evidence 
of consciousness, according to Campbell, we have knowledge 
that our memory reports certain things, but in addition the 
evidence of memory convicts man of the fact that such things 
that he remembers did in fact happen in the past. Explica­
ting this Campbell writesi M. • • I am certain that things
happened heretofore at such a time, in the precise manner in
1 6which I now remember that they then happened."
Campbell, however, places a qualification on the 
credibility of the evidence of memory which Reid does not 
recognize. He asserts that while evidence of sense and con­
sciousness may provide certainty in all instances, memory is 
not always accompanied with this full conviction. He 
writesi
At the same time it is evident, that remembrance is not 
always accompanied with this full conviction. To des­
l 4Campbell, p. 4l.
^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 222.
^Campbell, p. 4l.
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cribe, in words, the difference between those lively 
signatures of memory, which command an unlimited as­
sent, and those fainter traces which raise opinion 
only, or even doubt, is perhaps impracticable) but no 
man stands in need of such assistance to enable him in 
fact to distinguish them, for the direction of his own 
judgment and conduct. Some, may imagine that it is from 
experience we come to know what faith in every case is 
due to memory# But it will appear more fully afterwards, 
that unless we had implicitly relied on the distinct 
and vivid informations of that faculty, we could not 
have moved a step towards the acquisition of experience# 
It must, however, be admitted, that experience is of 
use in assisting us to judge concerning the more languid 
and confused suggestions of memoryi or, to speak more 
properly, concerning the reality of those things, of 
which we ourselves are doubtful whether we remember them 
or not.1'
There are, then, certain less vivid memories which call for 
man to suspend his conviction about their truth, but in the
\u..largest number of instances, man is compelled by necessity 
to rely implicitly upon his vivid memories in order for the 
term experience to have any meaning# Indeed experience 
would be impossible for man were it not that he can rely on 
his memory to report past happenings truthfully#
Reid's failure to qualify his assertion of the reli­
ability of memory is probably due to the brevity with which 
he treats the subject# Campbell's discussion of memory is 
more extensive than Reid's even though Campbell treats the 
topic Bomewhat incidentally under the heading of common 
sense. Reid might possibly have consented to Campbell's 
qualification concerning the relative vividness and distinct­
ness of memories, since Campbell's limitation on the credi­
bility of memory as evidence seems faithful in its descrip­
17Ibid.
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tion of the way in which men regard their memories in the 
common affairs of life* Campbell's ubc of the terms vivid 
an(* distinct are reminiscent of Hume, but he does not 
acknowledge Hume for them.
Deductive Evidence
In addition to intuitive evidence, Campbell disting­
uishes another kind of evidence which he calls deductive* 
Deductive evidence derives from two sourcest
. • • from the invariable properties or relations of 
general ideasi or from the actual, though perhaps vari­
able connexions subsisting among things* The former we 
call demonstrative, the latter moral* Demonstration is 
built on pure intellection [perception], and consisteth 
in an uninterrupted series of axioms*10
Defining moral evidence, Campbell writesi
Moral evidence is founded on the principles we have 
found from consciousness and common sense, improved by 
experience! and as it proceeds on this general presump­
tion or moral axiom, that the course of nature in time 
to come will be similar to what it hath been hitherto, 
it decides, in regard to particulars, concerning the 
future from the past, and concerning the things unknown 
from things familiar to us*1'
Differences betweendemonEtratiyeandmoral evi­
dence*— The difference between demonstrative and moral evi­
dence, Campbell explains, lies in several factors* The 
first is their subject matter* Demonstrative evidence deals 
with "abstract independent truth, or the unchangeable and 
necessary relations of ideas," while moral evidence treats
"the real but often changeable and contingent connexions
20that subsist among things actually existing*" The second
l 8 l b i d *, p.  4 3 .  1 9 l b i d * 2 0 I b i d .
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difference has to do with the degree of certainty accruing
to conclusions drawn from each kind of evidence, ". . ,
Moral evidence admits degrees, demonstration doth not,"
21explains Campbell, There are degrees of probability in 
conclusions drawn from moral evidence, while the certainty 
of a conclusion drawn from demonstrative evidence is abso­
lute, A third difference which Campbell sees is that in 
demonstrative evidence , there never can be any con­
trariety of proofs* in the other [moral evidenceJ, there not
22only may be, but almost always is." For instance a con­
trary proof to such a statement as "The cube of two is the 
half of sixteen,"2  ̂drawn from demonstrative evidence, is
absurd, but a contrary proof to a conclusion such as "Cae-
2ksar overcame Pompey," drawn from moral evidence, might be 
perfectly plausible. Because demonstrative proof deals with 
certainty, when a contrary proof is offered in such a case, 
one argument must be fallacious.
Discussing another difference, Campbell writes*
The fourth and last difference I shall observe is, 
that scientific evidence is simple, consisting of only 
one coherent series, every part of which depends on the 
preceding, and, as it were, suspends the following* 
moral evidence is generally complicated, being in rela­
tively a bundle of independent proofs. The longest 
demonstration is but one uniform chain, the links 
whereof, taken severally, are not to be regarded as so 
many arguments, and consequently when thus taken, they 
conclude nothing* but taken together, and in their pro­
per order, they form one argument, which is perfectly 
conclusive. It is true, the same theorem may be demon­
strable in different ways, and by different mediums*
21 Ibid., p. kk. 22Ibid. 23Ibid. 24Ibid.
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but as a single demonstration, clearly understood, 
commands the fullest conviction, every other is super­
fluous* 2 5
He goes on to say that "In moral reasoning, on the contrary,
there is often a combination of many distinct topics of
26argument, no way dependent on one another*" One demonstra­
tive proof offers certainty of its conclusion, but any addi­
tional moral proofs which may augment the previous ones 
serve to increase the probability of the conclusion.
Campbell's understanding of demonstrative and moral 
evidence is quite similar to what Reid calls demonstrative 
and probable reasoning* Perhaps somewhat more concisely 
than Campbell, Reid discusses the differences between these 
two kinds of reasoning in the following manner*
The most remarkable distinction of reasonings is, 
that some are probable, others demonstrative*
In every step of demonstrative reasoning, the infer­
ence is necessary, and we perceive it to be impossible 
that the conclusion should not follow from the premises# 
In probable reasoning, the connection between the pre­
mises and the conclusion is not necessary, nor do we 
perceive it to be impossible that the first should be 
true while the last is false*
Hence, demonstrative reasoning has no degrees, nor 
can one demonstration be stronger than smother, though, 
in relation to our faculties, one may be more easily 
comprehended than another* Every demonstration gives 
equal strength to the conclusion, and leaves no possi­
bility of its being false.
It was, I think, the opinion of all the ancients, 
that demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to 
truths that are necessary, and not to those that are 
contingent* In this, I believe, they judged right* Of 
all created things, the existence, the attributes, and, 
consequently, the relations resulting from those attri­
butes, are contingent* They depend upon the will and 
power of Him who made them* These are matters of fact, 
and admit not of demonstration*
The field of demonstrative reasoning, therefore, is
25Ibid*. p. 45* 26Ibid.
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the various relations of things abstract, that is, of 
things which we conceive, without regard to thair exis­
tence. Of these, as they are conceived by the mind, and 
are nothing but what they are conceived to be, we may 
have a clear and adequate comprehension. Their rela-. 
tions and attributes are necessary and immutable.
They are the things to which the Pythagoreans and Pla- 
tonists gave the name of ideas. I would beg leave to 
borrow this meaning of the word idea from the ancient 
philosophers, and then I must agree with them, that 
ideas are the only objects about which we can reason 
demons trat ively• 7
In words remarkably like Campbell's, Reid offers his defi­
nition of demonstrative and probable reasoning. He states 
that in probable reasoning there is only a degree of proba­
bility that the conclusion is true, while in demonstrative 
reasoning the inference of the conclusion is certain and 
necessary. In probable reasoning the premises may be quite 
true and the conclusion false, while in demonstrative rea­
soning a true conclusion follows necessarily from true pre­
mises. Also like Campbell, Reid believes demonstrative rea­
soning to deal with immutable relationships among ideasi he 
explains*
The strength of probable reasoning, for the most part, 
depends not upon any one argument, but upon many, which 
unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any 
one of them by itself would be insufficient to convince i 
but the whole taken together may have a force that is 
irresistible, so that to desire more evidence would be 
absurd.20
In other words, probable evidence, or moral evidence as 
Campbell calls it, yields conclusions that have only a 
degree of certainty. Probable evidence is unlike demonstra­
2^Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. *476-77.
28Ibid., p. **82.
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tive evidence, which yields conclusions having the highest 
degree of certainty.
In brief, Campbell's notion of deductive evidence 
shares a similarity with Reid's concept of the divisions of 
reasoning. Reid does not include a category of moral evi­
dence, of course, but his term probable reasoning denotes 
the same thing and conforms to the same limitations which 
Campbell places upon this kind of evidence.
Campbell's esteem for moral evidence .— Though his
remarks about the utility of demonstrative evidence are not
entirely pejorative, Campbell does not find it nearly so
applicable to rhetorical communication as moral evidence.
He says of demonstrative evidences
Here rhetoric, it must be acknowledged, hath little to 
do. Simplicity of diction, and precision in arrangement, 
whence results perspicuity, are, as was observed already, 
all the requisites. The proper province of rhetoric is 
the second, or moral evidencei for to the second belong 
all decisions concerning fact, and things without us.2?
In another section of his rhetoric, Campbell explains what
he means when he insists that "simplicity of diction, and
precision in arrangement" suffice in demonstrative discourse.
He says regarding the address to the understandings
There is indeed one kind of address to the under­
standing, and only one, which, it may not be improper to 
observe, disdains all assistance whatever from the 
fancy. The address 1 mean is mathematical demonstration. 
As this does not, like moral reasoning, admit degrees of 
evidence, its perfection, in point of eloquence, if so 
uncommon an application of the term may be allowed, con­
sists of perspicuity. Perspicuity here results entirely
^^Campbell, p. 43,
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from propriety and simplicity of diction, and from 
accuracy of method, where the mind is regularly, step 
by step, conducted forwards in the same track, the 
attention in no way diverted, nothing left to be sup­
plied, no one.unnecessary word or idea introduced. On 
the contrary, an harangue framed for affecting the 
hearts or influencing the resolves of an assembly, needs 
great^jj the assistance both of intellect and imagina-
Demonstrative evidence, as Campbell understands its function, 
speaks to the faculty of understanding alone, and such an 
address to the understanding serves no effect except to 
instruct the auditors. The orator might use such evidence 
"to dispel ignorance or to vanquish error,"31 but according 
to Campbell these ends are not those most common to rhetori­
cal communication. Rhetoric deals more often in moral evi­
dence, since this kind of evidence yields probable conclu­
sions of fact about affairs in the external world.
One imagines that Campbell envisions the rhetor in 
a court of law or in a legislative hall continually dealing 
with probable truth, the deliberative situation constantly 
forcing him to argue the wisdom of this or that course of 
action in the future, or the forensic situation calling on 
him to deal with the probability of the truth of an occur­
rence in the past. Each of these rhetorical situations 
necessarily has the communicator employing moral evidence 
and drawing probable conclusions.
Important, however, is the fact that Campbell finds 
moral reasoning more attractive for his purposes than demon­
3°Ibid.t p. 2. 31Ibid.
strative reasoning. Though not for precisely the same rea­
sons, Reid also finds the utility of demonstrative reason­
ing somewhat wanting. First, Reid thinks that there are 
other means of teaching men to reason besides the study of 
logici there is no necessary connection between logic and
reasoning. One might learn to reason as well by the study
32of mathematics, jurisprudence, or politics as by logic.-'
Second, the progress of knowledge has actually been retarded
by strict devotion to the syllogistic method of reasoning,
and indeed slavish devotion to the syllogism has caused a
factioning of the intellectual community which has severely
hampered the advance of knowledge, in Reid's opinion. For
whatever reasons, Reid finds induction, the province of
probable reasoning, far better adapted to the discovery of
truth and the expansion of knowledge than demonstrative 
33reasoning.
Campbell regards the utility of the syllogism as
far less than that of moral argument. He states that he is
convinced by Locke that the syllogism is of more use "to
display the ingenuity of the inventor, and to exercise the
fluency of the learner, than to assist the diligent inquirer
3̂4-in his researches after truth.
Briefly, then, Reid and Campbell agree as to the
-^Thomas Reid, A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic, 
in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton 
(Edinburghi Maclachlan and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), II. 710.
•^Ibid.. pp. 701, 711-12. -^Campbell, p. 62.
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general divisions of what Campbell calls deductive evidence 
into demonstrative and moral (probable) types. They also 
agree in their disdain for demonstrative reasoning! Campbell 
because he does not find it well adapted to rhetorical dis­
course and Reid because it is inherently averse to the pro­
gress of knowledge and the discovery of truth.
Kinds of moral reasoning.— In addition to the simi­
larities between Campbell and Reid already cited, the two 
men also agree on another point regarding evidence. Camp­
bell discusses the kinds of moral evidence at length, list­
ing the "three tribes, experience, analogy, and testimony," 
and a fourth category, "calculations concerning chances
Experience, of course, is of great interest to empir­
ic istic philosophy, and Campbell does not fail to pay it 
due regard as the first division of moral reasoning. Exper­
ience is the kind of evidence that testifies to men of the 
truth of some things, and this testimony in the mind of man
is related to the "tendency of the mind to associate ideas
*̂6under the notion of causes, effects, or adjuncts. For 
instance, Campbell says that it is by experience that we 
acquiesce to the truth of a proposition such as the one 
stating "that iron thrown into the river will sink, [and] 
that deal [a plank of wood] will f l o a t . S o m e  evidence 
from experience yields certainty about the truth of the con-
•^Ibid., p. 49. ^Ibid., p. 50. ^Ibid.
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elusion* while other evidence from experience yields only 
probable knowledge.38
Explaining the function of experience as a kind of 
moral evidence* Campbell writesi "Further, let it be remem­
bered, that by experience we not only decide concerning the 
future from the past, but concerning things common from 
things familiar which resemble them*"39 In other words* we 
make decisions regarding the nature of future events on the 
basis of our past experience with like circumstances* Ora­
tors in legislative halls must often propose a course of 
action for the future based on the past. Legislators are 
perhaps prone to argue that a treaty with the Soviet Union 
should not be ratified because of the experience of having 
similar treaties broken by that country on past occasions*
In like manner* it is from our experience with the familiar 
things that we make judgments about matters which are not 
familiar* For example* from our observations of water boil­
ing over a flame* we might come to understand the unfamiliar 
phenomenon of liquid oxygen boiling at room temperature*
Though Reid mentions the topic of experience on sev­
eral occasions, he never treats it extensively* He does not 
list experience as a source of knowledge as we might expect 
an empiricist to do* At one point Reid warns against reli­
ance upon experience alone to find truth* The observer of 
nature would do better to be well acquainted with the induc­
tive method, particularly that discussed in Bacon's Novum
38Ibid. 39Ibld*. p. 51.
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Organum. Using the inductive method for instance would help
prevent the investigator from drawing conclusions from too
Il qfew instances of a phenomenon* In this admonition, Reid 
differs from Campbell, who would give more unguarded cre­
dence to the testimony of experience.
In another place in his Inquiry Into the Human Mind 
Reid again differs from Campbell in his understanding of 
the nature of experience. Reid asserts that H. • • all 
experience is of the past, and can, of itself, give no
iiinotion or belief of what is future." Reid would categori­
cally deny Campbell's assertion that experience is capable 
of assisting man in making judgments regarding the future 
on the basis of his experience in the past or about the 
unfamiliar because of his experience with the familiar.
Briefly, then, though Reid mentions experience as a 
source of knowledge, his cursory statements indicate either 
a general lack of interest in the subject or that he has 
nothing new to add to the existing knowledge about experi­
ence. Experience is mentioned in this section not because 
any similarities exist between Campbell and Reid, but only 
because of Campbell's interest in the topic and because he 
considers it along with other kinds of moral reasoning where 
there is more similarity between the two philosophers.
There is greater agreement of the second of Camp­
bell's "tribes" of moral evidence, analogy. Campbell asserts
**°Reid, Inquiry, p. 200. ^ Ibid.. p. 196.
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that analogy ie similar to experiencei it "is but a more
koindirect experience, founded on some remote similitude• "
We have certain knowledge about one phenomenon occurring in 
a certain situation, and by enumerating the ways in which 
another situation is similar to the first, we may conclude 
that the phenomenon also occurs in the second situation* 
Campbell says that this kind of moral evidence is perhaps 
better understood by example, and offers the following as 
explanations
The circulation of the blood in one human body is, 1 
shall suppose, experimentally discovered* Nobody will 
doubt of this being a sufficient proof from experience, 
that the blood circulates in every human body. Nay, 
further, when we consider the great similarity which 
other animal bodies bear to the human body, and that 
both in the structure and in the destination of the 
several organs and limbsi particularly when we consider 
the resemblance in the blood itself, and blood-vessels, 
and in the fabric and pulsation of the heart and arter­
ies, it will appear sufficient experimental evidence of 
the circulation of the blood in brutes, especially in 
quadrupeds*
Further, Campbell admonishes his reader that evidence from 
analogy "is at best but a feeble support, and is hardly ever 
honoured with the name of proof," but he adds that "• • • 
when the analogies are numerous, and the subject admits not
k/Levidence of another kind, it doth not want efficacy."
About the use of analogical reasoning in various situations,
Campbell addsi
It must be owned, however, that it is generally mora 
successful in silencing objections than in evincing 
truth, and on this account may more properly be styled
^Campbell, p. 53* ^ I b i d * ^ I b i d * , pp* 53-5^*
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the defensive arms of the orator than the offensive. 
Though it rarely refutes, it frequently, like those wea­
pons which, though they cannot kill the enemy, will ward 
off his blows• *
Though Reid does not take up analogy specifically as 
a kind of evidence, either probable or demonstrative, he 
does treat the topic in the preliminary part of his Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Here his remarks about 
analogy signify a strong similarity between his understand­
ing of the subject and Campbell's. While he uses examples 
to illuminate his meaning, Reid attempts a definition as 
well. He writes*
It is natural to men to judge of things less known, 
by some similitude they observe, or think they observe, 
between them and things more familiar or better known.
In many cases, we have no better way of judging. And, 
where the things compared have really a great similitude 
in their nature, when there is reason to think that they 
are subject to the same laws, there may be a consider­
able degree of probability in conclusions drawn from 
analogy.^6
As an example, Reid provides an argument from analogy stat­
ing that if other planets in the solar system are similar 
to the earth in numerous ways which he lists then it is 
probable that they too are inhabited by living beings. r
Reid also points out that argument from analogy is 
better in some situations than in others. He says*
Analogical reasoning, therefore, may be of excellent 
use in answering objections against truths which have 
other evidence. It may likewise give a greater or a 
less degree of probability in cases where we can find 
no other evidence. But all arguments, drawn from ana­
45Ibid., p. 5^.
^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 236. ^Ibid.
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logy, are still the weaker, the greater disparity there 
is between the things comparedj and, therefore must be 
weakest of all when we compare body with mind, (because 
there are no two things in nature more unlike.^8
Hence Reid auxd Campbell agree as to the nature and 
value of analogy, offering similar examples of its use and 
indicating their recognition of its worth in dealing with 
objections* Both men see a relation between the evidence 
of analogy and that of experience, Campbell points out 
that knowledge of things familiar, such as the circulation 
of the blood in the human body, is found first by experimen­
tal observation,"a sufficient proof from experience• " Reid 
on the other hand speaks of the manner in which man natur­
ally goes about judging "things less known, by some simili­
tude they observe, or think they observe, between them and 
things more familiar or better known," In describing the 
way judgments are made about unfamiliar things on the basis 
of their similitude with the familiar, Reid's language is 
quite similar to that of Campbell's description of the evi­
dence of experience as assisting man to decide "concerning 
things common from things familiar which resemble them,"
Both see the relation of the evidence of experience to that 
of analogy! they regard experience as making argument from 
analogy possible. Were it not for experience with the fami­
liar there could be no analogy drawn between it and the 
unfamiliar.
The third kind of moral evidence enumerated by Camp­
^Ibid.. p. 237. •
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bell is testimony, which, unlike the other types, is treated
by Reid in his chapter on probable reasoning in Essays on
the Intellectual Powers of Man. Campbell does not regard
moral evidence as deriving from experience but as having a
logical origin. He writesi
• , • the evidence of testimony is to be considered as 
strictly logical, no further than human veracity in 
general, or the veracity of witnesses of such a charac­
ter, and in such circumstances in particular, is sup­
ported, or perhaps more properly, hath not been refuted, 
by experience. But that testimony, antecedently to 
experience, hath a natural influence on belief, is 
undeniable. In this it resembles memoryi for though 
the defects and misrepresentations of memory are correc­
ted by experience, yet that this faculty hath an innate 
evidence of its own we know from this, that if we had 
not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we 
had never been able to acquire experience,^9
He defines the evidence from testimony in the following
fashions
Testimony is a serious intimation from another, of any 
fact or observation, as being what he remembers to have 
seen or heard or experienced. To this, when we have no 
positive reasons of mistrust or doubt, we are, by an 
original principle of our nature (analogous to that 
which compels our-faith in memory), led to give an 
unlimited assent.5
Reid, discussing the evidence of testimony in 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. concurs with 
Campbell entirely, agreeing that unless there is Borne exter­
nal reason to doubt the veracity of testimony, we are prone 
to believe it. In An Inquiry Into the Human Mind Reid 
treats evidence from testimony from a somewhat different 
direction, discussing the tendency in man to speak truth
^Campbell, p. 5^. 5°Ibid„ p. 55.
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by the nature of hie being. Reid confesses* "I find that 
truth is always at the door of my lips, and goes forth spon­
taneously, if not held back," and adds that "another origi­
nal principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a 
disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to 
believe what they tell us."-*1 This "principle of veracity" 
or "principle of credulity," as Reid calls it, is the 
"counterpart" to man's original inclination to speak the 
truth.^2 The principle of credulity and the subsequent 
tendency to speak the truth seem to be what Campbell refers 
to in the preceding excerpt where he asserts " . . .  that 
testimony, antecedently to experience, hath a natural 
influence on belief, is undeniable." Campbell, like Reid, 
believes that man's tendency to believe what he is told is 
quite strong, even to the point of being an innate princi­
ple of his constitution.
As a fourth category of moral reasoning, Campbell 
adds the calculations of chance almost as an afterthought. 
Campbell'8 understanding of chance as evidence is relative­
ly simple. His definition of chance is operational, as in 
the following excerpt from his work on rhetoric*
When a die is thrown out of the hand, we know that its 
gravity will make it fall* we know also that this, to­
gether with its cubical figure, will make it lie so, 
when intercepted by the table, as to have one side 
facing upwards. Thus far we proceed on the certain 
principles of a uniform experience* but there is no 
principle which can lead me to conclude that one side
^Reid, Inquiry, p. 196. ^2Ibid.
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rather than another will be turned up. I know that this 
circumstance is not without a causei but is, on the con­
trary, as really affected by the previous tossing which 
it receives in the hand or in the box, as its fall and 
the manner of its lying are by its gravity and figure. 
But the various turns and motions given it, in this 
manner, do inevitably escape my noticei and so are held 
for nothing. I say, therefore, that the chance is equal 
for every one of the six sides.33
The fact that the causes of the die's coming to lie on one 
side rather than another are unseen does not preclude the 
existence of a cause or causes for "the various turns and 
motions" of the die. Campbell observes that calculations 
can be done regarding the probability of various combina­
tions of sides turning up in a throw and that "examples of 
this we have in the computations that have been made of the 
value of annuities, insurances, and several other commer­
cial articles."^ He warns, however, that "in such cases 
a great number of instances is necessary, the greatest 
exactness in collecting them on each side, and due care 
that there be no discoverable peculiarity in any of them,
which would render them unfit for supporting a general con- 
ccelusion."-^
Unfortunately Campbell does not go beyond this 
point in explaining how calculations of chance might prove 
useful as evidence in oratory. He seems more concerned 
with the peculiar nature of chance as it is related to both 
demonstrative and moral evidence. He calls it "a mixture
^ C a m p b e l l ,  pp.  5 6 - 5? .  ^ I b i d . , p .  5 7 .
55I b i d . .  pp. 5 7 -5 8 .
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of the demonstrative and the moral» or rather a particular 
application of the former, for ascertaining the precise 
force of the latter*'0  Because one is able to do calcula­
tions about chance it appears to fall into the category of 
demonstrative evidence, but as calculations of chance can 
never go beyond the probable it appears to be moral in 
nature.
Reid does not seem to find this difficulty in cate­
gorizing the evidence of chance, but with reservation calls 
it probable evidence and credits mathematicians for explor­
ing the topic in detail.-^ Reid agrees with Campbell that 
we only attribute events to chance "because we know only 
the remote cause which must produce some one event of a 
numberi but know not the more immediate cause which deter­
mines a particular event of that number in preference to 
the others*"^
Thus Reid and Campbell concur in their understand­
ing of the nature of evidence drawn from calculations of 
chance, but a discussion of the influence of one man upon 
the other would be pointless here, for as Reid admits, math­
ematicians have explored the topic extensively.-*9 This 
seems more likely a case of both men drawing upon common 
knowledge of the day, probably dealing with a popular topic
56Ibid., p. 49.
-^Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 483, ^ Ibid.
59Ibid., pp. 483-84.
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in the intellectual milieu in which they lived and worked.
The Utility of Syllogistic Logic
In considering Campbell’s discussion of the utility 
of demonstrative evidence, the topic of the syllogism has 
already been treated, but because Campbell elaborates upon 
it in a section devoted to the syllogism, the topic deserves 
specific mention at this point. Campbell, of course, finds 
demonstrative evidence much less practical in rhetorical 
discourse than moral evidence,^0 but he has particular anti­
pathy for the syllogism as a means of discovering truth.
He writesi
It is long since I was first convinced, by what Mr. 
Locke had said on the subject, that the syllogistic arlv 
with its figures and moods, serves more to display the 
ingenuity of the inventor, and to exercise the address 
and fluency of the learner, than to assist the diligent 
inquirer in his researches after truth. The method of 
proving by syllogism, appears, even on a superficial 
review, both unnatural and prolix. The rules laid dov*n 
for distinguishing the conclusive from the inconclusive 
forms of argument, the true syllogism from the various 
kinds of sophism, are at once combersome to the memory 
and unnecessary in practice. No person, one may ven­
ture to pronounce, will ever be made a reasoner, who 
stands in need of them. In a word, the whole bears the 
manifest indications of an artificial and ostentatious 
parade of learning, calculated for giving the appear­
ance of great profundity to what in fact is very shal­
low. Such, I acknowledge, has been, for a long time, 
my sentiments on the subject.®*
Campbell's objections to the slavish adherence to syllogis­
tic reasoning centers around the fact that it is not appli­
cable to the manner in which men use reasoning in the prac-
6°Campbell, p. ^3,  61 Ibid., pp. 61 - 6 2 .
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tical affairs of life. Discourse relying heavily on syllo­
gistic reasoning unnecessarily flaunts the cleverness of 
the speaker and ignores the intelligence of most audiences. 
It does not make the discovery of truth any easier or more 
certain. Moral evidence is more easily accommodated by 
the listener, probably because it cam be less formal, 
among other reasons. Campbell strongly implies that the 
study of the syllogism can never make one adroit at reason­
ing.
With regard to the syllogism, Reid'B sentiments are 
almost exactly those of Campbell. It has already been 
noted in this chapter that Reid regards the philosopher’s 
devotion to the syllogism as directly responsible for the 
slow progress of knowledge in the ages when it held sway in 
the scholarly community, and that he believes man c,.m 
learn to reason quite well without ever considering a syl­
logism.*^ Though he does not think the syllogism impracti­
cal for rhetorical discourse, as Campbell does, Reid’s rid­
icule implies his opinion of syllogistic logic as an an­
tique to be kept in a museum. In A Brief Account of Aris­
totle’s Logic he writes 1
Although the art of categorical syllogism is better 
fitted for scholastic litigation than for real improve­
ment in knowledge, it is a venerable piece of antiquity, 
and a great effort of human genius. We admire the pyra­
mids of Egypt, and the wall of China, though useless 
burdens upon the earth 1 we can bear the most minute des­
Reid, Aristotle*b Logic, p. 701•
63Ibid., p. 710.
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cription of them, and travel hundreds of leagues to see 
them* if any person should, with sacrilegious hands, 
destroy or deface them, his memory would be had in ab­
horrence, The predicaments and predicables, the rules 
of syllogism, and the topics, have like title to our 
veneration as antiquitiesi they are uncommon efforts, 
not of human power, but of human genius; and they make 
a remarkable period in the progress of human reason.6**
Reid implies that if man has not evolved in his reasoning
beyond the point of the syllogism, he should have done so.
In this piece of sarcasm Reid makes his disdain for the
syllogism quite apparent, and affirms Campbell's regard for
it as an impractical tool in rhetorical discourse. While
Campbell believes the syllogism to be "cumbersome" for both
speaker and listener, Reid holds it to be another of the
"burdens upon the earth,"
Both men have little use for the syllogism, but Reid 
cannot take credit for influencing Campbell on this topic, 
Campbell cites Locke for his opinion of the uselessness of 
the syllogism and indicates that Locke's influence on his 
concept of the syllogism took place long prior to his wri­
ting on rhetoric.^ Here again it is difficult to see cau­
sal relationships between the two men, since the concept of 
the antique and useless nature of the syllogism is acquired 
from an outside source, Reid also cites Locke in his dis­
cussion of the syllogism, and confesses his agreement with 
that philosopher that the study of mathematical sciences 
can strengthen the student's ability to reason,^ but he
6i*Ibi<j., p. 711, ^Campbell, pp. 6 1*6 2 .
^^Reid, A r i s t o t l e ' s  L o g i c , p ,  7 0 8 ,
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does not specifically attribute his notions about the uti­
lity of the syllogism to Locke*
The Source of Laws Governing the Use of Language
Reid and Campbell agree in their understanding of 
the source of the rules cf language usage* Neither suppos­
es a set of transcendent and immutable laws governing lang­
uage usagei both believe that the use to which men put 
language dictates appropriateness*
Campbell explains his concept of language usage in 
the following mannert
Language is purely a species of fashion (for this 
holds true of every tongue) in which by the general but 
tacit consent of the people of a particular state or 
country, certain sounds come to be appropriate to cer­
tain things, as their signs, and certain ways of 
inflecting and combining those sounds come to be estab­
lished, as denoting the relations which subsist among 
the things signified*
It is not the business of grammar, as some critics 
seem preposterously to imagine, to give law to the 
fashions which regulate our speech* On the contrary, 
from its conformity to these, and from that alone, it 
derives all the authority and value* For, what is the 
grammar of any language i It is no other than a collec­
tion of general observations methodically digested, and 
comprising all the modes previously and independently 
established, by which the significations, derivations, 
and combinations of words in that language are ascer­
tained *°7
Amplifying this notion, Campbell asserts further that there 
is no "universal archetype by which the particular grammars 
of all different tongues ought to be regulated," and he 
reasons that "where there is no law there is no transgres-
^ C a r a p b e l l ,  pp. 139-40*
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68sion," and hence no "correctness#"
Campbell is forced to acknowledge, however, that we 
do indeed make judgments about correctness and to admit that 
there is that usage which he calls "not reputable#" This 
kind of usage is common among the vulgar and is quite unde­
sirable. Campbell says that , what children are to
men, that precisely the ignorant are to the k n o w i n g , a n d  
the knowing would not employ the language of the ingorant 
any more than a man would speak as a child# When Campbell 
insists that rules governing language are derived from the 
manner in which language is used, he apparently does not 
think it necessary to consider the use of language by the 
unlearned. He means only to defend the usage of the 
learned#
In scattered references Reid expresses similar ideas
about the origin of laws governing language usage# In one
place he states briefly that "language is made to serve the
purposes of ordinary conversationi and we have no reason to
expect that it should make distinctions not of common 
70use."' In a letter to James Gregory he compares language 
to a machine which is progressively improved by "the inven­
tions of thousands of ingenious men, in a succession of 
ages," and to a tree "which, from a small seed, grows 
imperceptibly, till the fowls of the air lodge in its
68Ibid., pp. 140-41. 69Ibid., p. 143#
^°Reid, Intellectual Powers, p. 310.
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branches, and the beasts of the earth rest under its
shadow."^1 Alluding to the tree of language, Reid adds that
M* • . its growth is the effect of the united energy of all
72who do or ever did use it. In these passages the evi­
dence is strong that Reid, like Campbell, does not perceive 
any "universal archetype" which prescribes the manner in 
which language is to be used. Language is the result of 
all the improvements of men who use it, and Reid does not 
impugn the authority of the common man in his use of lang­
uage nor in any other matter. Indeed, the use of language 
by the common man is possibly the most frequently used 
measuring device for evaluating the truth of a common sense 
propositioni for example, the fact that all men believe in 
the existence of matter and use language in a manner indi­
cating that belief affirms the validity of such a belief. ^  
The use to which the common man puts language does not cor­
rupt it» on the contrary, language is improved by man's 
use, like the machine mentioned above.
Like Campbell, Reid finds it difficult to ignore 
the efforts of grammarians, but Reid is somewhat prone to 
give them credit for making improvements in language. He 
writes that "grammarians have, without doubt, contributed
^Thomas Reid, Letter XI, August 26, 1787* to Dr. 
James Gregory, in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir 
William Hamilton (Edinburgh» Maclachlan and Stewart,
1863), I, 70-71.
7 2 I b i d . ,  p .  7 1 .
"^Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 230-3^.
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much to its [language's] regularity and beautyi and philo­
sophers, by increasing our knowledge, have added many a 
fair branch to it| but it would have been a tree without the
7 kaid of either. Reid again uses the analogy of the tree 
in speaking of the "branches" added by philosophers and 
grammarians, but he also recognizes the authority of the 
masses in regulating the use of language. He says, "So 
fond are ingenious men to invent such improvements in lang­
uage, and so prone the multitude to adopt them, when they 
please the public taste, that all languages are perpetually
7<changing. • • • Thus, although the grammarian may advo­
cate changes in language, and although the masses are prone 
to incorporate frequent changes into the language, both do 
so only when the suggested changes "please the public 
taste."
While Campbell recognizes that there is a reputable 
use of language as well as a disreputable usage, Reid does 
not seem to notice this. He tends to credit all men, both 
learned and vulgar* for their combined contributions to the 
improvement of language. At this point Campbell is more 
realistic than Reid in observing that although they may 
not be justified in doing so, men do make judgments about 
the usage to which language is put. Because of his philo­
sophical reliance upon the manner in which common men use
7 II
' Reid, Letter XI to Gregory, p. 71.
75Ibid.
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language, Reid is somewhat obligated to condone all usage 
as reputable.
Aesthetics
Their understanding of the effects of aesthetics 
upon the listener is yet another point in which Campbell 
and Reid seem to concur. Campbell advocates the recogni­
tion of certain of man's faculties, other than reasoning, 
which are capable of promoting belief. He points out that 
gratification of the fancy helps the speaker maintain atten­
tion without which all his speaking would be in vain. 
Further, Campbell explains that "those qualities in ideas
which principally gratify the fancy, are vivacity, beauty,
76sublimity, novelty."
Campbell agrees with Hume in his understanding of
vivacity as a liveliness of ideas which induces belief.
Of course the fact that lively ideas promote belief makes
them of great interest to the rhetorician. Campbell is
concerned not only with the fact that lively ideas engage
the imagination and maintain the attention of auditors, but
with the fact that they assist persuasion. He states that
". . . lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint
77ideas to induce belief."
Considering the second quality which appeals to the 
fancy, Campbell expresses his notion that beauty is an
76Campbell,  p. 7 3 .  7 7 I b i d .
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"excellence,M presumably abiding in an object, but he is
less than lucid on this point.78 He saysi "That there is a
beauty in the perceived fitness of means to their end, and
79instruments to their use, is incontrovertible,"'7 and adds 
that "• • .as music is to the ear what beauty is to the 
eye, I shall, for want of a more proper term, denominate
gothis excellence in style, its music. . . . "  Campbell's 
reader must wish that he had found "a more proper term," or 
at least that he had devoted more attention to a definition 
of beauty as excellence.
Campbell's definition of sublimity is somewhat 
clearer, but it too lacks precision. He associates the 
sublime with "those great and noble images, which, when in 
suitable colouring presented to the mind, do, as it were, 
distend the imagination with some vast conception, and
8lquite ravish the soul." He further defines the purpose 
of the sublime, saying that "the sublime, it may be urged,
as it raiseth admiration, should be considered as one spe-
82cies of address to the passions."
The only remark which Campbell makes about novelty, 
in addition to the one cited above, has to do with his 
warning of the impropriety of using novelty merely for the 
sake of avoiding the "beaten track."83 Of course Reid too
78Ibid., p. 215. 79Ibid. 80Ibid., pp. 215-16.
8lIbid.. p. 3. 82lbid. 83Ibld.. p. 200.
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finds nothing admirable in novelty for its own sake and in 
fact regards it as easily overused.
Surprisingly, Campbell's treatment of these elements 
of style is a great deal more truncated and scattered than 
Reid's, perhaps because he wishes to discuss them only as 
they are applicable as appeals to the fancy and not as they 
are related to a system of aesthetics in general. Neverthe­
less, a similarity appears between Campbell and Reid on 
these points. Where Campbell remarks on the effects of 
vivacity, beauty, sublimity, and novelty on the fancy, Reid 
enumerates novelty, grandeur, and beauty as the objects of
8 IItaste in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.
Novelty, which Reid discusses first, provides man 
with pleasure. "The pleasure we receive from novelty has 
so great influence in human life,H Reid says, "that it well 
deserves the attention of philosophers. • • He would
perhaps suggest that Campbell treat the topic in somewhat 
more detail also, but he agrees with Campbell that novelty 
affects man and also in his observation that it is at times 
overused to the detriment of a work. Reid declares that 
M. . . things that have nothing to recommend them but novel­
ty, are fit only to entertain children, or those who are
86distressed from a vacuity of thought." Obviously both 
men concur in their high regard for the power of novelty
8Steid, Intellectual Powers, p. ^93t ®^Ibid.
86Ibid.. p. 494.
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in appealing to the minds of auditors, though Reid does not 
specifically discuss novelty as it addresses the fancy. 
Equally important is the fact that they both have the great­
est disdain for the use of novelty for its own sake,
Reid does not use the term sublimity, but in discus­
sing grandeur he expresses some of the same sentiments that 
Campbell does in treating sublimity. While Campbell sees 
the sublime as dealing with "noble images" which address 
the passions and inspire man to admiration, Reid, in writing 
of grandeur, treats those "objects which may be called 
grand." The emotion evoked by these objects "disposes to 
seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state, to a 
kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnamity, and a contempt 
of what is mean."87 Clearly Reid's category of grandeur 
could as accurately be called sublimity, and Campbell's 
definition of the sublime is quite similar to Reid's of 
grandeuri the terms appear interchangeable.
The last object of taste which Reid treats is 
beauty, which appears in a great deal more detail than 
Campbell's analysis of the subject, Reid agrees with Camp­
bell in his belief that beauty produces a sensation of 
pleasure. He writesi
The emotion produced by beautiful objects is gay 
and pleasant. It sweetens and humanises the temper, is 
friendly to every benevolent affection, and tends to 
allay sullen and angry passions. It enlivens the mind, 
and disposes it to other agreeable emotions, such as
87Ibid.
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those of love, hope, and joy. It gigfis value to the 
object, abstracted from its utility.
In addition to this sensation of pleasure attached to the 
perception of a beautiful object, or to beauty in written 
or oral discourse, is its value, which is also perceived by 
the observer. Reid explains that ”this agreeable emotion is 
accompanied with an opinion of belief of their [the beauti­
ful objects'] having some perfection or excellence belong- 
8 9ing to them.” 7 In defining beauty further, Reid proclaims
that "it is an agreeable feeling or emotion, which is fitted
90by Nature to produce that feeling.”7 Thus it is Reid who 
defines not only beauty but the concept of excellence men­
tioned by Campbell.
Though Reid does not treat vivacity as a quality of 
discourse appealing to the fancy, he deals with the concept 
of the lively idea, which is what Campbell has in mind when 
he uses the term vivacity. The strength of Hume's influ­
ence on Reid hardly allows him to ignore this doctrine in 
his works. Concerning the manner in which lively ideas 
affect communication Reid writes that ”Those who have live­
ly conceptions, commonly express them in a lively manner—
that is, in such a manner as to raise lively conceptions
91and emotions in others.”7 Though Reid neglects to mention 
the ability of lively ideas to effect belief when he speaks
88I b i d . , p. 4 9 8 .  8 9 I b i d . 90I b i d . , p .  4 9 9 .
91 I b i d . ,  p .  365 .
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of the manner in which they "raise lively conceptions and 
emotions in o t h e r s h e  implies an agreement with Campbell's 
assertion that lively ideas have an ability to bring about 
belief in others. On this point also there appears to be 
accord between Campbell and Reid.
Summary
Obviously several similarities exist between Camp­
bell and Reid as they write on topics relevant to communi­
cation. One of the most obvious ways in which Campbell's 
work on rhetoric is like the writing of Reid lies in his 
approach to many of the topics he investigates. His dis­
cussions of evidence and of language usage are remarkably 
lacking in rules of thumb for the practicing orator. His 
viewpoint, like Reid's, is stringently descriptive and 
lends credence to the term philosophy in the title of his 
work on communication. In this respect Campbell and Reid 
share an interest in the dispassionate and persistent exam­
ination of phenomena. In their discussions of evidence, 
logic, and language usage neither Campbell nor Reid de­
clines to apply the empiricist's cold eye to the matter at 
hand. It is as though Campbell carefully and methodically 
lays what he believes to be the foundation of rhetorical 
communication when he takes up the philosophical principles 
of the use of evidence to address the faculties of man, and 
in this way he reaffirms the relationship between philoso­
phy and rhetoric, a relationship which Reid would hardly
338
deny.
Attempting to identify some causal relation between 
Reid and Campbell on the concepts of novelty, sublimity, and 
beauty is of course an obvious error in the light of Addi­
son's treatment of the subjects prior to the writing of both 
Reid and Campbell.^ By the time Reid and Campbell treated 
these subjects they had quite possibly become widely accept­
ed by writers on criticism and aesthetics. At any rate, 
few find it necessary to cite any source for these ideas.
Except on the matter of their understanding of com­
mon sense as a kind of intuitive evidence, finding a causal 
relation between Campbell and Reid is a futile exercise, 
Campbell cites Reid's responsibility in articulating a the­
ory of common sense as evidence, and we might as well take 
Campbell's word as sufficient testimony to his indebtedness 
to Reid. Further comparisons for the sake of demonstrating 
a causal relation between the work of these two is a pre­
tense to knowledge. For example, an influence of Reid's 
discussion of evidence in Essays on the Intellectual Powers 
of Man, 1?85, upon Campbell's in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 
1 7 7 6, is impossible. Of course Reid treats various ele­
ments of evidence in works which appeared earlier than 
Campbell's rhetoric, but his clearest account of the topic 
is in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Notably,
•^Joseph Addison, The Spectator. Monday, June 23,
1712 and Tuesday, June 24, 1712, numbers 412-13 in The 
Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford 1 Oxford University 
Press, 1965), III, 5^0-4?.
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A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic (17^3) and An Inquiry 
Into the Human Mind (177*0 appear before The Philosophy of 
Rhetorici further, Reid was an influential founder of the 
Aberdeen Philosophical Society, along with Campbell, prior 
to Campbell's writing. If causal influence does exist be­
tween Campbell and Reid on any point except the theory of 
common sense, then Campbell may have as logically influenced 
Reid as vice versa.
Perhaps the most judicious appraisal that can be 
made of this analysis of the common points of interest in 
the rhetorical thought of Campbell and Reid is that there 
are striking similarities in the works of these two men. 
Whether Reid influenced Campbell more than Campbell influ­
enced Reid is difficult to say with certainty. We might as 
accurately take these similarities as an incident of the 
occurrence of contemporaries taking their inspiration from 
a common milieu and deriving similar notions about the 
nature of man's mind and his motivation.
III. Reid and Blair
Hugh Blair (1718-1800) is another eighteenth-century 
rhetorician who must be mentioned when considering Reid's 
relation to his contemporaries. Conclusive evidence of a 
transfer of intellectual stimulation between these two, 
however, may be as difficult to show as in the case of 
Campbell and Reid. There exists the possibility of some 
exchange of ideas between Blair and Reid. Blair delivered
3^0
his popular lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres from 
1759 to 1783, first to the townspeople of Edinburgh and then 
from his position as Regius Professor of Rhetoric and Belles
O-aLettres at the University.Reid and Blair were friends 
during most of this time, while Reid was professor of King's 
College at the University of Aberdeen (1763-1787)* Both men 
corresponded with David Hume, and in one of Reid's letters 
to Hume he refers to his friendship with Blair. A portion 
of the letter follows*
King's College, [Aberdeen]
18th March 17&3
Sir,— On Monday last, Mr. John Farquhar brought me 
your letter of February 2 5th, enclosed in one from Dr. 
Blair. I thought myself very happy in having the means 
of obtaining at second hand, through the friendship of 
Dr. Blair, your opinion of my performance* and you 
have been pleased to communicate it directly in so 
polite and friendly a manner as merits great acknow­
ledgements on my part.“
This friendship between Blair and Reid suggests that Blair
had probably more than a mild interest in Reid's thought
and that he was quite possibly swayed in his thinking about
communication by his relationship with Reid.
The Origin and Use of Language
One prominent area of similarity between Reid and 
Blair is in their ideas on the origin and use of language.
^Harold F. Harding, "Editor's Introduction," in 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres by Hugh Blair (fac­
simile edition* Carbondale*Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1965). I, ix-x.
q Il
7 Reid, Letter to David Hume, p. 91*
3*U
Blair devotes several lectures to the evolution of language, 
in which he puts forth a theory of the "History of the Rise
and Progress of Language in several particulars, from its
ocearly to its more advanced periods."7"̂
Blair begins with a definition of language, saying*
Language, in general, signifies the expression of 
our ideas by certain articulate sounds, which are used 
as the signs of those ideas. By articulate sounds, are 
meant those modulations of simple voice, or of sound 
emitted from the thorax, which are formed by means of 
the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue,
the lips, and the palate.^
Pursuing the notion that language is related to ideas in
some way, he addsi
How far there is any natural connexion between the ideas 
of the mind and the sounds emitted, will appear from 
what I am afterwards to offer. But as the natural con­
nexion can, upon any system, affect only a small part 
of the fabric of Languagej the connexion between words 
and ideas may, in general, be considered as arbitrary
and conventional, owing to the agreement of men among
themselves} the clear proof of which is, that different 
nations have different Languages, or a different set of 
articulate sounds* which they have chosen for communi­
cating their ideas
In one place Blair calls this system of sounds which com­
municate thought an "artificial method," and later, an 
"invention. " 98
Asserting that language is an invention of man, 
Blair then turns his interest to the earliest history of 
man to discover the origin of language. He considers and
9-*Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Let­
tres . ed. Harold F. Harding (facsimile editioni Carbondales 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1965). I. 97•
96Ibid.. pp. 98-99. 97Ibid. 98Ibid.
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puts aside the notion that language was given by God to the 
first couple. In the following excerpt he imagines the 
conditions under which the rudiments of language first 
appeared*
If we should suppose a period before any words were 
invented or known, it is clear, that men could have no 
other method of communicating to others what they felt, 
than by the cries of passion, accompanied with such mo­
tions and gestures as were farther expressive of pas­
sion. For these are the only signs which nature teaches 
all men, and which are understood by all. One who saw 
another going into some place where he himself had been 
frightened, or exposed to danger, and who fought to warn 
his neighbour of the danger, could contrive no other way 
of doing so, than by uttering those cries, and making 
those gestures, which are the signs of fear* just as 
two men, at this day, would endeavour to make themselves 
understood by each other, who should be thrown together 
on a desolate island, ignorant of one another's Lang­
uage. Those exclamations, therefore, which by Grammar­
ians are called Interjections, uttered in a strong and 
passionate manner, were beyond doubt, the first elements 
or beginnings of S p e e c h .99
Supposedly by their original constitution all men are out­
fitted to understand certain,"cries of passion," and before 
the invention of words such passionate interjections and 
gesticulations must have been the only means of communica­
tions among men.
Words did develop, however, and Blair speculates 
about how their developement came about. He writes*
Wherever objects were to be named, in which sound, 
noise, or motion were concerned, the imitation by words 
was abundantly obvious. Nothing was more natural, than 
to imitate, by the sound of the voice, the quality of 
the sound or noise which any external object madej and 
to form its name accordingly. Thus, in all Languages, 
we find a multitude of words that are evidently con-
"ibid., pp. 101-102.
3^3
Btructed upon this principle. A certain bird is called 
the Cuckoo, from the sound which it emits. When one 
sort of wind is said to whistle. and another to roari 
when a serpent is said to hissi a fly to buzz, and fal­
ling timber to crash? when a stream is said to flow, 
and hail to rattle ? the analogy between the word and 
the thing signified is plainly discernible.100
Blair admits that such an onomatopoeic explanation for the
origin of names for objects which make no sound appears
weak, but he suggests that some names for objects perceived
only by sight or touch had some relation at one time to the
objects themselves. He writes*
Stability, for instance, fluidity, hollowness, smooth­
ness, gentleness, violence, &c,, they imagine to be 
painted by the sound of certain letters or syllables, 
which have some relation to those different states of 
visible objects, on account of an obscure resemblance 
which the organs of the voice are capable of assuming 
to such external qualities. By this natural mechanism, 
they imagine all Language to have been at first con­
structed, and the roots of their capital words 
formed.101
Hence there exists a natural relation between words
and the thoughts which they are intended to convey, but
Blair explains that the principle of this natural relation
"can only be applied to Language in its most simple and
102primitive state. He adds further that "words, as we
now employ them, taken in the general, may be considered
as symbols, not as imitations? as arbitrary, or instituted,
103not natural signs of ideas." J Apparently it avails the 
language scholar little to attempt to find the influence of
100Ibid.. pp. 102-103. 101Ibid.. pp. 103-104.
102Ibid., p. 1 0 5 . 103Ibid., p. 1 0 6 .
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imtation in modern language; it is more profitable to assume 
that words are merely arbitrary assignations of sounds to 
stand for meanings# Nevertheless, Blair speculates that 
primitive artificial language was derived from man's attempt 
to imitate the sounds he heard from things around him and 
from an original tendency in man to associate certain mean­
ings with particular sound clusters#
Blair's account of the origin and nature of language
is actually quite similar to Reid's. Reid, like Blair,
comprehends language to be more than words; he reasons that
the primitive must have had some method by which he arrived
at artificial signs, or words, to stand for ideas and
things in the external world. These natural signs consist
of vocal modulations and various movements and positions
1 Okof the body and the facial features.
Blair's definition of language as that which "sig­
nifies the expression of our ideas by certain articulate 
sounds"1^  in no way indicates that he believes language to 
consist of words alone. On the contrary, like Reid, Blair 
comprehends that words are the invention of man, an artifi­
cial way of communicating. Though Blair does not indicate 
how man arrives at a common understanding of these artifi­
cial creations called words, he nevertheless declares them 
to be man-made. He implies, where Reid asserts, that 
"cries of passion, accompanied with such motions and ges-
10^Reid, Inquiry, pp. 117-18. 10^Blair, p. 98.
3^5
tures, as were farther expressive of passion”10** are innate­
ly and immediately understood by all men.
Reid's account of the origin and nature of language 
is scattered through sundry of his writings, and nowhere 
does it receive so extensive a treatment as Blair gives it 
in his lectures. Blair finds space to discuss the onomato­
poeic nature of language and shows great interest in the 
subject. Whereas Blair speculates that men commonly came 
about the words they use by imitating the sounds of things 
around them and by their innate awareness that sounds some­
how convey certain meanings, Reid sees the invention of
words as arbitrary agreements among men to have certain
107sounds stand for meanings. r Considering these differences 
the critical reader of Blair and Reid must confess that a 
remarkable concord exists between these two on the matter 
of the origin and nature of language.
Aesthetics
Perhaps less remarkable is the agreement between
Blair and Reid with regard to their aesthetic theories. As
might be expected of a rhetorician, Blair gives considerably
more attention to topics related to aesthetics than does
Reid. He devotes an entire lecture to the subject of taste,
which he defines as Hthe power of receiving pleasure from
1 oftthe beauties of nature and of art,” and in the three sub­
10**Ibid.. p. 101. 10?Reid, Inquiry, p. 117*
10®Blair, p. 16.
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sequent lectures he treats other topics related to taste,
109such as sublimity, beauty, and novelty,
Blair distinguishes between sublimity in objects and
the description of such objects in writing, and declares his
intent to discuss the two matters separately for the sake of
precision in his own writing, Blair describes the effect of
the sublime object on its viewer as follows*
It is not eaBy to describe, in words, the precise 
impression which great and sublime objects make upon us, 
when we behold themi but every one has a conception of 
it. It consists in a kind of admiration and expansion 
of the mindi it raises the mind much above its ordinary 
statei and fills it with a degree of wonder and aston­
ishment, which it cannot well express. The emotion is 
certainly delightfuli but it is altogether of the seri- . 
ous kind* a degree of awfulness and solemnity, even 
approaching to severity, commonly attends it when at 
its height* very distinguishable from the mpre gay and 
brisk emotion raised by beautiful objects.11
Blair defines sublimity in writing as follows* "The true
sense of Sublime Writing, undoubtedly, is such a description 
of objects, or exhibition of sentiments, which are in them­
selves of a Sublime nature, as shall give us strong impres­
sions of them,"111
Sublime writing, in order to be called sublime, 
must be descriptive of something sublime in the external 
world, and the writing it3elf must be done well enough to 
embue the reader with a vivid notion of the object des­
cribed. If the writing does not deal with a sublime object^ 
no matter how elegant the style nor how vivid the impression
109Ibid., pp. 36-96, U 0 Ibid., p. 46
lllIbid., p. 58*
3^7
conveyed by it, the writing is not sublime according to 
Blair.
Blair devotes considerably less attention to the 
subject of beauty than to sublimity. He declaresi
Beauty, next to Sublimity, affords, beyond a doubt, 
the highest pleasure to the imagination. The emotion 
which it raises, is very distinguishable from that of 
Sublimity. It is of a calmer kindi more gentle and 
soothingj does not elevate the mind so much, but produ­
ces an agreeable serenity. Sublimity raises a feeling, 
too violent, as I showed, to be lasting! the pleasure 
arising from Beauty admits of longer continuance. It 
extends also to a much greater variety of objects than 
sublimity! to a variety indeed so great, that the feel­
ings which Beautiful objects produce, differ consider­
ably, not in degree only, but also in kind, from one 
another. Hence, no word in the language is used in a 
more vague signification than Beauty. It is applied to 
almost every external object that pleases the eye, or 
the ear I to a great number of the graces of writing! to 
many dispositions of the mindj nay, to several objects 
of mere abstract science. We talk currently of a beau­
tiful tree or flower! a beautiful poem? a beautiful 
character! and a beautiful theorem in mathematics.112
Attempting to define that quality which all beautiful things
have in common, Blair decides that "the agreeable emotion
which they all raise, is somewhat of the same nature; and,
therefore has the common name of Beauty given to iti but it
113is raised by different causes." J Thus that which is beau­
tiful appeals to the imagination and raises an emotion not 
so violent but more enduring than that raised by the sub­
lime .
Novelty is another principle which delights the 
imagination. Blair says that novelty "has no merit to 
recommend it, except its being uncommon or new," and "by
112Ibid.. pp. 80-81. ll3Ibid.. p. 81.
means of this quality alone, [novelty] produces in the mind
11 ifa vivid and agreeable emotion." He adds that "new and 
strange objects rouse the mind from its dormant state, by 
giving it a quick: and pleasing impulse," and further, that 
"the emotion raised by Novelty is of a more lively and pun­
gent nature, than that produced by Beauty; but much shorter 
in its continuance. For if the object have in itself no 
charms to hold our attention, the shining gloss thrown upon
lieit by novelty soon wears off." J Novelty alone, unenhanced 
by more enduring qualities, is not appealing for very long, 
and Blair implies that it is not to be employed for its own 
sake •
Blair gives only brief attention to the other
pleasures of taste. He declares that imitation serves in
"recalling the original ideas of Beauty or Grandeur wh.'.ch
16such objects themselves exhibited." Melody and harmony 
heighten "by the power of musical sound" the pleasure 
received from the beautiful and the sublime, and "Wit, 
Humour, and Ridicule likewise open a variety of pleasures 
to Taste, quite distinct from any that we have yet consi­
dered."11*̂
Throughout his discussion of the objects of taste, 
Blair regocnizes the lack of originality in his own theory 
of aesthetics. He cites Longinus in treating sublimity,11®
1 1^Ibid.. p. 9 1. ll5Ibid., pp. 9 1-9 2 .
ll6Ibid.. p. 92. 117Ibid.
11®Ibid., pp. 58, 62, passim.
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119and Addison on beauty, grandeur, and novelty, 7 He does 
not mention Reid or Campbell, however, whose similarities 
have already been discussed. The lack of originality in his 
treatment of taste does not hamper Blair, who rather vigor­
ously pursues the subjects of beauty, grandeur, and novelty 
as though he thinks they require a concise summary and dis­
cussion in his lectures.
Obviously, by including the categories of beauty, 
grandeur or sublimity, and novelty, Blair's theory of aes­
thetics becomes much like those of both Campbell and Reid, 
though the indication is clear that he received his guidance 
in selecting these three from sources other than Campbell or 
Reid. As mentioned earlier Reid undertakes a discussion of 
the three elements of taste, beauty, sublimity or grandeur,
and novelty, and expresses sentiments regarding each which
120are in accord with those of Blair# Reid, however, does 
not include categories of wit, humor, or ridicule as objects 
of taste, and on this point he differs with Blair. Judging 
from the brevity of his remarks about wit, humor, and ridi­
cule, however, Blair considers them either relatively less 
important than the other objects of taste or so well-treated 
in other places outside his lectures that he devotes only a 
few paragraphs to them, Blair's treatment of aesthetic 
matters is quite similar to Reid's though certainly no 
causal relation is perceptible between the two men.
ll9Ibid.. p. 44.
120Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 493-508,
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Summary
Though Blair does not acknowledge any indebtedness 
to Reid for his notion of the origin and nature of language, 
there is some possibility of a causal influence between the 
two, however uncertain, Reid's theory of natural language 
was quite well developed by the time he published his first 
important long work. An Inquiry Into the Human Mind (1763),121 
Blair's lectures began in 1759, three years earlier than the 
publication of Reid's work, but there remains the possibi­
lity of a personal influence because of the evident friend­
ship between the two. Because neither Blair nor Reid cites 
the other as his mentor in this matter, however, the possi­
bility that Blair influenced Reid must be admitted as well 
as the possibility that both came to their conclusions sim­
ultaneously and independently. Certainly it seems most 
probable that each was aware of the theory of natural lang­
uage expounded by the other, judging from the remarkable 
concord between the two on the details of the theory and 
from their friendship. Indeed possibly because of their 
friendship and the customary disregard for the necessity of 
citing sources, the exchange of ideas between Reid and 
Blair, as well as between Reid and other colleagues, was 
more casual. Such a practice, though perhaps promoting an 
admirable synthesis of ideas in the century of enlighten­
ment, makes for great difficulty in investigating the
121Reid, Inquiry, pp. 117-18.
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influences between the thinkers of the era and requires the 
critic to be satisfied with as assertion of a close correla­
tion in lieu of direct influence.
On the matter of aesthetic theory Blair simplifies 
matters to a great extent by declaring his indebtedness to 
Longinus and Addison for his notion of taste. Apparently 
Reid and Blair drew on similar sources for the development 
of their respective theories of taste, and in this case the 
correlation is obviously due to a mutual affinity for an 
aesthetic theory already well established and in the main­
stream of thought in the eighteenth century.
IV. Reid and Whately
Richard Whately (1787-1 8 6 3) anther rhetorician 
who must be considered in this analysis of Reid's influence. 
Whately's work on communication, Elements of Rhetoric, did 
not appear in the eighteenth century, but the mind of its 
author, born in 1787. is a product of the dominant influ­
ences, philosophical and rhetorical, of the eighteenth cen­
tury. Elements of Rhetoric was first published as a sepa­
rate work in 1828, but its preparation and revision
122stretched over as much as three decades. Whately's edu­
cation at Oxford undoubtedly acquainted him with the ideas 
of his contemporaries, and in Elements he reveals a know-
‘'Douglas Ehninger, "Editor's Introduction," in 
Elements of Rhetoric by Richard Whately (facsimile editionj 
Carbondalei Southern Illinois University Press, 1963)* PP* 
xvi-xvii.
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ledge of and interest in Reid's work. Writing of the pur­
poses of argument he uses the following examplei
Again, Berkeley and Reid seem to have alike admitted 
that the non-existence of matter was a necessary con­
sequence of Locke's Theory of Ideasi hut the former was 
hence led, bona fide. to admit and advocate that non­
existence i while the latter was led by the very same 
Argument to reject the Ideal Theory, Thus, we see it is 
possible for the very same Argument to be Direct to one 
person, and Indirect to another, leading them to differ­
ent results, according as they judge the original con­
clusion, or the contradictory of a premiss, to be the 
more probable.
Here Whately appears acquainted with Reid's rejection of 
skeptical epistemology which denied the knowability of the 
existence of the external world. How extensive his know­
ledge of or interest in Reid's philosophy was is impossible 
to say from this excerpt, but at least Whately confesses an 
acquaintance with Reid's thought. His knowledge of Reid 
and the entirety of eighteenth-century thought was doubtless 
extensive, but this excerpt mentioning Reid provides an 
additional justification for seeking some similarity be­
tween the work of Reid and that of Whately.
It is perhaps best to state at the outset, however, 
that the relation of Whately's rhetorical thought to Reid's 
is tenuous compared to Reid's relation to the ideas of 
Campbell and Blair. This meager relation is due in part at 
least to the practical and prescriptive approach of Whate-
•^Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. 
Douglas Ehninger (facsimile editioni Carbondale* Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1 9 6 3), P» ^3*
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ly*s Elements in comparison with Campbell's more analytical 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, for example. Whately is more in­
clined to make recommendations to the practicing speaker and 
writer than are either Campbell or Blair. Whately's rheto­
ric might be compared to Berkeley's epistemology in one 
respect, since Berkeley and Blair were burdened with the 
motive of buttressing the church against the onslaughts of 
its detractors both internal and external, Berkeley solved 
his problem by refuting the atheists and making denial of 
the existence of God an absurdity under his system. Whately 
on the other hand accomplished his goal by arming the clergy 
with the weapons of argumentation. Whately's motives for 
writing served to create a highly prescriptive rhetoric in 
contrast to the more normative and speculative approach of 
Campbell and Blair.
Common Sense
Where Whately mentions common sense, he does so
with tacit acknowledgment of Reid's philosophy. For the
most part, his brief remarks regarding common sense imply
that Whately finds this subject well-absorbed into the
scholarly mainstream of the era, so well-absorbed perhaps
that most readers either knew at once the source of the
idea or were little concerned with its source since it was
so generally known. In one reference Whately writes*
Again, in arguing for the existence and moral attri­
butes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, 
great use may be made of a like progressive course of 
Argument, though it has been often overlooked. Some
35^
have argued for the being of a God from the universal» or 
at least, general, consent of mankind; and some have 
appealed to the opinions of the wisest and most cultiva­
ted portion, respecting both the existence and the moral 
excellence of the Deity. It cannot be denied that there 
is a presumptive force in each of these Arguments; but 
it may be answered, that it is conceivable, an opinion 
common to almost all the species, may possibly be an 
error resulting from ajCpnstitutional infirmity of the 
human intellect. . . .
Revealing his overwhelming interest in ecclesiastical matters 
Whately offers an argument to which Reid would not be averse. 
Reid, too, often argues for the truth of a proposition on 
the basis of its universal acceptance among men. Here, how­
ever, Whately warns of the difficulty with such an argument. 
He concedes that the presumption lies in favor of an argu­
ment based on the popularity of its conclusion, but he 
admonishes his reader that all men holding such a proposi­
tion might be misguided, insane, prejudiced, or otherwise 
afflicted with a "constitutional infirmity of the human 
intellect."
Reid too is often wont to warn of those infirmities 
which cloud the judgment of entire nations. He writes con­
cerning taste that "whole nations by the force of prejudice
12are brought to believe the grossest absurdities. . . . "  J 
However, this problem with an appeal to popularity such as 
the one Whately offers as an example does not deter Reid 
from making this appeal on many occasions, nor from declar-
1 ?4Ibid. , p. 83.
12 SR eid ,  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Powers, p .  4 9 2 .
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ing its value in determining the truth of first principles. 
Reid declares, " . . .  I conceive that the consent of ages 
and nations, of the learned and unlearned, ought to have 
great authority with regard to first principles, where every 
man is a competent judge." Seemingly Reid here recog­
nizes what Whately would call the presumption in favor of 
the proposition held to be true by the "consent of ages and 
nations*" but he does not at this juncture warn of any inher­
ent pitfalls in judging such propositions true on the basis 
of their long-term popularity among men.
Whately's idea of common sense is an adaptation of 
Reid's, though he fails to acknowledge Reid. As would be 
expected, he interprets the notion of popularity in terms 
of the presumption in its favor, but the idea remains 
intact as Reid's.
Common Usage
Reid and Whately also seem to agree upon the diffi­
culties created by the use of technical language. In his 
brief discussion Whately warns against the "unnecessary 
Introduction of Technical language of any kind" into ordi­
nary discourse, but he makes an exception in the "Theologi­
cal Style" which is justifiably prone to a "peculiar phrase­
ology. He rejects technical language "when the meaning
can be adequately, or even tolerably, expressed in common,
126I b i d . , p .  4 3 9 .  127Whately, pp. 29^-295.
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i.e. unscientific words." He adds that "the terms and 
phrases of art have an air of pedantic affectation, for 
which they do not compensate, by even the smallest appear-
1 0Q
ance of increased Energy." He warns further that even 
with regard to the peculiar language of the cleric, such 
language may only "serve as a veil for poverty of thought. 2 9  
In general it is best in all cases to use terms common to 
all men.
Reid also indicates an affinity for language used as 
it is used by the common man. In discussing language*s 
limitations, Reid writes that "language must have many im­
perfections when applied to philosophy, because it was not
130made for that use." J Elsewhere too he declares that 
"language is made to serve the purposes of ordinary conver­
sation j and we have no reason to expect that it should make
131distinctions that are not in common use." J Clearly it is 
Reid's sentiment as well as Whately's that "ordinary" lang­
uage is much to be preferred over specialized terminology. 
Indeed Reid determines that language is ill-equipped to 
meet the demands of specialized fields such as philosophy 
because it is created by and for the common man.
Argumentation
Whately's treatment of argumentation bears some
1 2 8Ibid. 1 2 9 Ibid. p. 2 9 6.
13° R e id ,  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Powers, p.
131 I b i d . , p .  310.
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resemblance to that of Reid# Whately affords the subject 
lavish attention. Much of his discussion of argument is of 
a summary nature, and there is an indication that he know­
ingly draws on the work of others on the subject, as well 
as his own Elements of Logic. At one point he cites Camp­
bell^ distinction between the plausible and the probable
argument, and, though he disagrees with Campbell to some
132degree, acknowledges his reliance on Campbell's work. J
Kinds of argument.— Using Campbell's terminology, 
Whately, like both Campbell and Reid, distinguishes between 
demonstrative and probable argument. He discusses this 
issue in the following fashion*
Arguments may then be divided.
First, into Irregular, and Regular, i.e. Syllogisms* 
these last into Categorical and Hypothetical* and the 
Categorical, into Syllogisms in the first Figure, and in 
the other Figures, Ac. Ac.
Secondly, they are frequently divided into "Proba­
ble," for "Moral,"] and "Demonstrative," [or "Neces­
sary."]
Thirdly, into the "Direct," and the "Indirecti"
[or reductio ad absurdum.1— the Deictic, and the Elenc- 
tic, of Aristotle.
Fourthly, into Arguments from "Example," from "Tes- 
timpi^," from "Cause to Effect," from "Analogy," &c»
In this excerpt Whately reveals not only his reliance upon 
Aristotelean logic, but by his use of "Ac." indicates his 
intent to summarize what he believes to be well known. 
Nevertheless the point is clear that he accepts the desig­
nation of arguments into demonstrative and probable types.
1-^Whately, p. ^7.
^ I b i d . , p. M .  Brackets are Whately's.
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Parenthetically he provides the name "moral” which Campbell 
applies to probable arguments,
Whately's main concern, however, is a clarification 
of terms and classification of the elements of argumenta­
tion. He notes that " . . .  several of the different species 
just mentioned will occasionally contain each other. • •
He further asserts that the second designation of kinds of 
arguments into demonstrative and probable "is plainly a divi­
sion of Arguments according to their subject-matter, whether 
Necessary or Probable [certain or uncertain],"*35 jn an 
attempt to clarify this assertion, Whately adds*
In Mathematics, e.g. every proposition that can be 
stated is either an immutable truth, or an absurdity 
and self-contradictioni while in human affairs the pro­
positions which we assume are only true for the most 
part, and as general rules; and in Physics, though 
they must be true as long as the laws of nature remain 
undisturbed, the contradiction of them does not imply 
an absurdity* and the conclusions, of course, in each 
case have the same degree and kind of certainty with the 
premises. This therefore is properly a division, not of 
Argument? as such, but of the Propositions of which they 
cons ist.1™
The subject matter with which we deal in arguments about 
"human affairs" is necessarily of a probable nature; it does 
not deal with the certain truth or falseness of a proposi­
tion as in mathematics, but more often with the probable 
best course of action in the future or the probability or 
improbability of guilt in a law suit. Rhetorical discourse
•̂̂ I b i d . 1 ^ ^ I b i d . , p .  ^2 .  B rackets  are W h a te ly 's .
136I b id .
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must be more interested in probable reasoning because of 
the subject matter with which probable arguments deal.
Hence according to Whately the terms demonstrative and pro­
bable or necessary and moral do not designate kinds of argu­
ments but rather kinds of subject matter with which various 
kinds of arguments deal.
In his essay on reasoning, Reid discusses the char­
acteristics of and differences between demonstrative and
137probable arguments, but of course he does not anticipate 
Whately's relegation of the terms probable and demonstra­
tive to describe kinds of subject matter instead of kinds 
of arguments. This type of designation is implied in Reid, 
however.
Whately, in fact, admits to no effectual division 
of arguments into kinds except the fourth category above, 
the division into "Arguments from 'Example,' from 'Testi­
mony,' from 'Cause to Effect,' from 'Analogy,' &c„ &c,M 
Here again Whately's use of the inclusive notation "&c." 
indicates that there is something of which the reader should 
be aware but that Whately does not feel obligated to state. 
Regardless of what he intends by "&c.," Whately finds that 
the fourth category "is a division according to the rela-
tio of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the
138 *conclusion." J Further explaining his meaning Whately




• • • the logical connexion between the premises and 
conclusion is independent of the meaning of the terms 
employed, and may be exhibited with letters of the 
alphabet substituted for the termer but the relation 
1 am now speaking of between the premises and conclu­
sion. (and the varieties of which form the several 
species of Arguments,) is in respect of their subject- 
matters in reference to the relation existing between 
the premiss, which is the Cause, and the conclusion, 
which is the Effecti and an "Argument from Example," 
in like manner, from the relation between the known 
and the unknown instance, both belonging to the same 
class. And it is plain that the present division, 
though it has reference to the subject-matter of the 
premises, is yet not a division of propositions con­
sidered by themselves, (as in the case with the divi­
sion into "probable and demonstrative,") but of Argu­
ments considered as sucht for when we say, e.g. that 
the premiss is a Cause, and the conclusion is the 
Effect, these expressions are evidently relative, and 
have no meaning, except in reference to each otheri 
and so also when we say that the premiss and the con­
clusion are two parallel cases, that Yftty expression 
denotes their relation to each other.1-'9
Reiterating his dislike for the division of arguments into
probable and demonstrative kinds, Whately, points to the
necessity for an appropriate innovation in defining the
kinds of arguments.
He solves this problem by dividing arguments into 
two oategories. The first category he calls a priori.
1/LQwhich "is manifestly Argument from Cause to Effect."
The second category "comprehends all other Arguments,"1*1’1 
and under this heading fall the several kinds of arguments 
from sign and all from induction or example.
It is only at this point, after he has restructured 
the subject of argumentation, that Whately's analysis of it
139Ibld.. pp. 43-44. l4°Ibid., P* 46. 141Ibid
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again begins to resemble that of other writers* Under the
second and more inclusive category* for instance* he treats
the use of testimony at some length* and of chance* example*
the principle of induction* the uBe of argument from exper-
ikoience* analogy* and related topics.
In discussing these matters Whately's analysis often 
is prescriptive in nature* making his advice easily applied 
to the actual circumstances of the speaker in the courtroom 
or the legislative hall. Referring to the use of the testi­
mony of witnesses, for example* he admonishes his readers
• • • when the question relates to what is strictly a 
matter of fact,— the intellectual character of the wit­
ness is not to be wholly left out of the account. A 
man strongly influenced by prejudice, to which the weakest men are ever the most liable, may even fancy 
he sees what he does not. And some degree of suspicion 
may thence attach to the testimony of prejudiced, though 
honest men* when their prejudices sure on the same side 
with their testimonyi for.otherwise their testimony 
may even be the stronger.
Generally, however* Whately adds little that is novel to 
the definition of various kinds of arguments. His custom­
ary attitude is summarized well in his introductory para­
graph dealing with argument from example, in which he 
declares that in his definition he is "taking that term in 
its widest acceptation."1^  Though Whately's organization 
of the subject is perhaps new* he does not profess any 
innovations in his understanding of the individual topics 
he takes up. His reorganization* however* must be acknow-
1^2Ibid. * pp. 58-108. lZf3Ibid.* pp. 61-62.
l44Ibid., p. 85.
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lodged as a beneficial contribution to the study of argu­
ment and its use*
Compared to Whately's minute analysis of argumen­
tation* Reid's concept of it seems clumsy indeed* Reid* 
in his rather scanty treatment of sense* memory* conscious-
i Ilcness, testimony, axioms* reasoning* J and the probability
ihAof chance does not undertake the miniscule demarcations 
peculiar to Whately, and he designates these as kinds of 
evidence and not of argument per se* Because of Reid's 
inclination toward the philosophical analysis rather than 
prescriptive rules of discourse, he is wont to include such 
epistemological considerations as memory* sense* and con­
sciousness in his discussion, whereas Whately might be 
expected to disregard these* While the two men concur in 
their understanding of the various categories which, they 
undertake in common, their approaches to the subject of 
argument and their organisations are dedicedly different*
The utility of the syllogism.— The issue of the use 
of syllogistic logic arises in Whately's thought and is 
expressed concisely in his Elements of Logic. In relating 
this issue* Whately reveals his awareness of the controversy 
over "whether it is by a process of Reasoning that New 
Truths are brought to light, • • • a controversy
1^^Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 3 2 6-3 0 .
1^6Ibld.. pp. 1*83-8**.
1**7'Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (London1 
Longman, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1 8 7 0), p. 1 5 6.
363
in which Reid participated. He does not mention Reid how­
ever. At the outset Whately declares that the dispute
• . • is, perhaps, in great measure, a dispute concern­
ing the use of wordsi but it is not, for that reason, 
either uninteresting or unimportant* since an inaccurate 
use of language may often, in matters of Science, lead.^ 
to confusion of thought, and to erroneous conclusions*
While he does not cite Reid's objection to the use of the
syllogism, Whately does mention Campbell "and many others"
who
. . • have objected to the Syllogism altogether, as 
necessarily involving a petitio principii [or begging of 
the question, as Whately calls itJi an objection which, 
of course, he would not have been disposed to bring 
forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill- 
founded, it lies against all arguments whatever.1**9
In Whately's contention against summary dismissal of the
syllogism as a useful tool in the discovery of new truth,
he arguesi
Had he [Campbell] been aware that a Syllogism is no 
distinct kind of argument otherwise than in form, but 
is, in fact, any argument whatever, stated regularly 
and at full length, he would have obtained a more 
correct view of the object of all Reasoning* which is 
merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as 
it were, and implied in those with which we set out, 
and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the 
full force of that which he has admitted*— to contem­
plate it in various points of view* to admit in one 
shape what he has already admitted in another,— and to 
give up and disallow whatever is inconsistent with it.150
In other words, Whately maintains that any argument might 
be cast into a syllogism for any of various reasons and 
that a syllogism is not a particular kind of argument to 
be avoided simply for being of that kind. In a reductio
146I b i d . l 4 9 I b i d . t p .  157 .  15° I b i d .
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ad absurdum argument against Campbell, and implicitly Reid, 
Whately asserts that to throw out the syllogism is, in 
essence, to throw out all argument as a means of discovering 
truth* In saying this Whately extends Campbell’s contention 
beyond its intenti this is the only way Whately can argue as 
he does*
In answering what he identifies as Campbell's objec­
tion against the syllogism, Whately might as well be answer­
ing Reid’s. Reid, of course, points to the "slow progress 
of useful knowledge, during the many ages in which the 
syllogistic art was most highly cultivated as the only 
guide to science" as one principal reason for his discon­
tent with this particular kind of argument,*Reid adds 
that his conviction of the uselessness of the syllogism "is 
strengthened by the puerility of the examples which have 
always been brought to illustrate its rules."*-*2 Reid finds 
reason to admire the inductive method far more than the 
deductive syllogism as a tool of the philosopher and the 
scientist.
On the matter of the examples used to illustrate
the rules of syllogistic art, Whately saysi
• • . one cause which has led the above-mentioned 
writers into their error, is, their selecting examples 
(such as, it muBt be owned, are abundant in Logical 
treatises) in which the Conclusion is merely a portion 
of what one of the Premises by itself has already im­
plied in the very signification of the term that is 
taken for its Subject. • . .
*-**Reid, Aristotle's Logic, p. 701. *^2Ibid.
*^Whately, Elements of Logic, p. 158.
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Whately accuses those detractors of the syllogism of pre­
judicing the case against it by using only examples which 
demonstrate its triteness and its tendency to beg the ques­
tion. He contends, however, that the syllogism is not 
inherently trite and that it is quite useful when proper 
application is made of it.
Briefly, Whately does not agree in the least with 
the opinions of Reid and Campbell as he interprets them, 
when they maintain that the syllogism is of no use. Accord­
ing to Whately such a rejection of the syllogism is a rejec­
tion of all argument as a means of discovering truth, since 
any argument may be cast in the form of a syllogism. The 
subject of the syllogism is mentioned here, not because of 
any similarity between Whately's notion and Reid's, but on 
the contrary because Whately's endorsement of the syllogism 
as a means of discovering truth reveals what is perhaps a 
direct negative influence from Reid, Campbell, and others 
who are averse to reliance on syllogistic reasoning.
Summary
Undoubtedly Whately was knowledgeable about and 
interested in the work of Thomas Reid, particularly in 
Reid's notion of common sense. In the two references to 
common sense in Whately's rhetoric he demonstrates this 
knowledge and interest. Although he discusses universal 
common sense as it relates to arguments from authority, 
there is little indication that Reid's notion significantly 
altered Whately's view from what it might have been had he
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not known Reid. Whately does not, for instance, discuss
other methods of determining the truth of a common sense
first principle. He mentions only Reid's appeal to the
consent "of ages and nations, of the learned and un- 
1 *>4learned, in order to test the truth of common sense 
notions.
In the matter of their mutual dislike of specialized 
language, Reid and Whately display definite accord. The 
extent to which Whately's agreement with Reid on this issue 
can be attributed to causal influence, however, is doubtful. 
The concidence of such a caveat in Reid and Whately seems 
entirely possible on the basis of its apparent reasonable­
ness alone.
Further, supposing a causal relation to exist 
between Reid and Whately on the subject of argumentation 
is probably a mistake. Far more likely than any causal 
influence is the possibility that Whately was influenced by 
many sources, some much older than the work of Reid. Of 
subjects such as the evidence of consciousness and memory, 
on which Whately might more likely have been influenced by 
Reid's philosophy, there is no mention at all. Indeed 
Whately drew on sources from Aristotle to Campbell in 
treating argumentation, but not specifically from Reid.
While he evidently knew of Reid's work and was perhaps 
swayed by it, attempting to determine the extent oft that 
influence is futile. The greater part of the material used
154Ibid., p. *09.
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in Whately's analysis of argument was, judging from his 
writing itself, in the domain of all scholars, and at the 
time of his writing no one could possibly have claimed it 
as a personal possession. As to the organization of his 
discussion, that is perhaps solely his innovation.
Surprisingly, Whately reveals more of Reid's influ­
ence in his disagreement over the utility of the syllogism 
than in some places where he and Reid concur in their judg­
ment. Here some causal influence between Reid and Whately 
might be supposed, because Whately acknowledges his aware­
ness that Campbell and others hold the syllogism as an impo­
tent tool for philosophy and science. His argument in 
behalf of the syllogism's usefulness is a direct refutation 
of Reid and Campbell.
Therefore, except for Reid's admitted influence on 
the subject of common sense and his implied influence on 
the matter of the syllogism, very little else can be said 
about the relationship between Reid's thought and the rhe­
torical work of Richard Whately. Though the fact of Reid's 
contribution of his notion of common sense to Whately's 
rhetoric cannot be questioned, the importance of the con­
tribution in molding Whately's thought is doubtful. On the 
matter of language usage and argumentation the significance 
of the possible Reidean contribution to Whately is not only 
doubtful, but the possibility itself is tenuous at best.
Reid and Campbell's objection to the use of the syllogism 
quite possibly gave more direction to Whately'a thought on
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argument and logic, negatively, than on any one of the other 
items in which their judgments concur.
V. Reid and Priestley
In this examination of Reid's relation to his con­
temporaries Joseph Priestley (1733-180*0 merits considera­
tion because of his demonstrated interest in rhetoric and 
communication and because of his well-publicized disdain
1 KCfor Reid's notion of common sense. Though Priestley 
first delivered A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criti­
cism in 1762,1^  it was 1776 before they were put into writ-
1 *57ten form and presented for publication in entirety. By 
this time he had published his Examination of Dr. Reid's 
Inquiry, leaving the possibility open for some influence 
between the men, either positive or negative.
Because of the celebrated differences between Reid 
and Priestley on epistemology we might expect to find a 
considerable divergence in their concepts of rhetoric and 
communication as well, but this is not the case.
155Joseph Priestley, An_Examination of Dr. Reid's 
Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common 
Sensei Dr. Beattie's Essav on the Nature and Immutability 
of Truthi and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf 
of Religion, in The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of 
Joseph Priestley, ed. John T. Rutt (Londoni George Small- 
field, printer, 1817), III, 25-6l, passim. Priestley's 
Examination was first published in 177^*
* ̂ Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy, "Edi­
tors' Introduction," in A Course of Lectures on Oratory and 
Critic ism by Joseph Priestley (facsimile editionj Carbon- 
dalei Southern Illinois University Press, 1965). P» xv.
1 ̂ Ibid. . pp. xvi-xvii.
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Aesthetics
Reid and Priestley concur to some extent in their
theories of aesthetics. The concept of taste as composed of
beauty, novelty, and sublimity, which appears time and again
in eighteenth-century criticism, appears in Priestley's
writing. About novelty he saysi
For the first perception of an object makes a much 
stronger impression than any subsequent perception of 
it. This must necessarily be the case if perception 
depend upon any mechanical laws affecting the brain.
Upon whatever principle we account for it, the oftener 
any sensations are repeated, the less we are affected 
by them. But the chief source of the charms of novelty 
is the exercise of our active powers. Both previous to 
the perception of any new object, whether it be a new 
scene in nature, a new train of adventures, or a new 
system of principles, the mind is full of expectation, 
and is eagerly employed in surveying itj which keeps 
the attention strongly awake, and gives the object an 
opportunity of making a deep impression. Whereas when 
this first curiosity is gratified, and the object is 
become familiar, we view it in a more cursory and super­
ficial mannerj there being then no reason for so close 
an attention.to it, as we expect no new knowledge or 
informat ion•
Priestley's examination is of an expository nature and not 
directed at proferring the public speaker useful suggestions 
. about the use of novelty.. Perhaps because of this adherence 
to a descriptive approach, he does not specifically admon­
ish against the use of novelty for its own sake or against 
its over-use, though he describes the tendency of the mind 
to lose interest in what it once found novel. He is more 
concerned with the nature of novelty and the intellectual
1 c Q
D Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Ora­
tory and Criticism, eds. Vincent M. Sevilacqua and Richard 
Murphy (facsimile editionj Carbondalei Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1 9 6 5). pp. 1^6-147.
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processes governing its ability to give pleasure.
Writing of sublimity in a similar fashion, Priestley
adds i
Great objects please us for the same reason that new 
objects do, viz. by the exercise they give to our facul­
ties. The mind, as was observed before, conforming and 
adapting itself to the objects to which its attention is 
engaged, must, as it were, enlarge itself, to conceive 
a great object. This requires a considerable effort of 
the imagination, which is also attended with a pleasing, 
though perhaps not a distinct and explicit consciousness 
of the strength and extent of our own powers,*59
The sublime exercises the mind by expanding it and thereby 
gives pleasure, but specifically what sublimity is, Priest­
ley declines to say precisely. To get a more definite idea 
of how he views the sublime we muBt consider one of his 
specific examples regarding science and its relation to 
sublimityi he writesi
The sublime of science consists in general and com­
prehensive theorems, which, by means of very great and 
extensive consequences, present the idea of vastness to 
the mind. A person of true taste may perceive many 
instances of genuine sublime in geometry, and even in 
algebrai and the sciences of natural philosophy and 
astronomy, exhibit the noblest fields of the sublime 
that the mind of man was ever introduced to. Theorems 
may also be sublime by their relating to great ob­
jects. I®0
Seemingly then that which is sublime is related to the 
noble, the grand, the vast, the general, the comprehensive, 
and other such things, and by giving attention to such sub­
jects the mind is enlarged and receives pleasure.
Speaking of the various pleasures of taste, Priest­
ley mentions briefly the pleasure taken in beauty, novelty,
159Ibid., p. 151. l6°Ibid.. p. 157.
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and grandeur, but he does not give any explanation of his
concept of beauty except to declare it a source of plea-
sure. 1^ 1 He seems only to be paying respect to the
accepted divisions of taste. He provides a somewhat more
definitive account of beauty in writing when he sayst
All beauties, and admired strokes in composition, 
derive their excellence and fine effect, either from 
drawing out and exercising our faculties, by the views 
the present to our minds» or else transferring from 
foreign objects, by the principle of association, ideas 
which tend to improve the sense of a passage. *■62
Priestley's treatment of the subjects of novelty,
sublimity, and beauty coincides with Reid's,*^ as well as
1 64with other writers of the century such as Addison. His 
scattered discussion of these three aesthetic factors in 
discourse implies, in fact, that he regarded them as being 
well assimilated by the minds of the day and certainly not 
his own contribution. They are mentioned here, not because 
of any indication that Priestley is influenced by Reid to 
include them, but because they are a point on which the 
thought of the two men corresponds.
Argumentation
Another point of similarity between Reid and Priest­
ley appears in their treatment of argumentation, but here 
again little can be asserted regarding any causal influence. 
Priestley, like Reid, designates two kinds of argument,
l6 lIbid.. p. 1 3 1. l6 2 Ibid.. p. 1 3 6.
*^Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp. 493-508.
1^^Addison, pp. 540-47,
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which he describes as followst
Logicians speak of two kinds of method in argumen­
tative discourses, the analytic and the synthetici and 
the distribution is complete and accurate. For, in all 
science, we either proceed from particular observations 
to more general conclusions, which is analysis* or, be­
ginning with more general and comprehensive propositions^ 
we descend to the particular propositions which are con­
tained in them, which is synthesis.1®5
Noticeably, Priestley does not pretend to differ from the 
received division of argument into the two types which 
correspond to Reid's categories of demonstrative and proba­
ble reasoning.Apparently Priestley understood these 
divisions to be the work of other men, but he affirms his 
agreement with them in their classifications.
As a rhetorician, Priestley demonstrates a somewhat 
greater interest in the practical application of the kinds 
of argument than Reid. In the following excerpt he reveals
i •
this interest!
In the former method [analytic or probable argu­
ment] we are obliged in our investigation of truth* 
for it is only by comparing a number of particular 
observations which are self-evident, that we perceive 
any analogy in effects, which leads us to comprehend 
an uniformity in their cause, in the knowledge of which 
all science consists. In the latter method it is gener­
ally more convenient to explain a system of science to 
others. For, in general, those truths which were the 
result of our own inquiry, may be made as intelligible 
to others by which we arrive at the knowledge of them* 
and it is easier to show how one general principle 
comprehends the particulars comprized under it, than to 
trace all those particulars to one that comprehends 
them all.1 •
^Priestley, p. 42.
1^^Reid, Intellectual. Powers, pp. 475-84. 
^^Priestley, pp. 42-43.
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Here Priestley proceeds as if he is offering advice to his 
auditors on the best use of the two methods of argument, and 
in this overt concern for the application of such argument, 
he differs somewhat from Reid's more analytical approach*
This difference, however, is explicable in the intentions 
of the respective authors*
Summary
The points on which Reid and Priestley share common 
ground, their concurrence on aesthetics and argumentation, 
do not point to the possibility of causal influence, but 
rather to the likelihood that both men were influenced from 
other sources*
Though the editors of Priestley's lectures, Bevi-
lacqua and Murphy, indicate that Priestley was indirectly
168influenced by common-sense philosophy, the influence 
does not manifest itself in any tangible manner as rhetori­
cal theory* Perhaps the most remarkable features of Reid's 
rhetorical theory are the concepts of common sense and 
natural language, neither of which receives attention in 
Priestley's work. For this reason Priestley is treated 
most tersely in this chapter*
VI. Reid and Kames
There is a probability that Henry Home, Lord Kames 
(1696-1782), was influenced in his rhetorical and critical
1 68Bevilacqua and Murphy, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
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thought by Reid's work. Karnes' Elements of Criticism first 
appeared in 1 7 6 1 predating Reid's earliest important 
work, An Inquiry Into the Human Mind (1 7 6 3)# toy two years. 
The two men corresponded as early as 1772, and in one case 
there is an indication that Kames and Reid knew each other 
personally and not only through their writings. Reid writes 
to Kames1
My Lord,— I was very glad to understand, toy the 
letter you honoured me with of November 9» that you 
got safe home, after a long journey, in such dreadful
rainy weather. I got to Mr. C 's on horseback
soon afternvou left me, where 1 was in good warm 
quarters.*
Reid and Kames corresponded about many subjects related to 
philosophy and science, and after Kames' death his widow 
sent her husband's gold snuff box to Reid, apparently as a 
token of the friendship. Part of Reid's reply to her 
follows 1
I accept, dear madam, the present you sent to me, 
as a testimony of your regard, and as a precious relic 
of a man whose talents 1 admired and whose virtues I 
honoured 1 a man who honoured me with a share of his 
conversation, and of his correspondence, which is my 
pride, and which gave me the best opportunity of know­
ing his real worth.
1 have lost in him one of the greatest comforts of 
my life 1 but his remembrance will always be dear to me, 
and demand my best wishes and prayers for those whom 
he has left behind him.
When time has abated your just grief for the loss 
of such a husband, the recollection of his eminent 
talents, and of his public and domestic virtues, will 
pour balm into the wound. Friends are not lost who
James R. Boyd (ed.), Elements of Criticism by 
Henry Home, Lord Kames (New Yorki A.S. Barnes Co., 1 8 7 7), 
P. 3. 170' Thomas Reid, Letter I, December 3, 1772, to Lord 
Kames, in The Wbrks of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William 
Hamilton (fidinburgh1 Maciachian and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), I, 50.
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leave such a character behind them, and such an example 
of those who come after them,1?*
The high esteem Reid expresses in this letter indicates a 
very warm friendship, which would facilitate the free and 
continuous exchange of ideas. As in previous sections of 
this chapter, however, the discussion of the relation be­
tween these two men will not attempt to show any causal link 
between their ideas where none is specifically admitted. It 
will, however, present the areas in which Reid and Kames 
concur in their understanding of rhetorical matters, and 
will point up the possibility of causal influence.
Natural Language
Karnes' ideas correspond perhaps more closely with
Reid's than do those of other eighteenth-century thinkers
on the subject of natural language, Kames writes about
natural language in the following excerpt*
So intimately connected are the soul and body, that 
every agitation in the former produceth a visible effect 
upon the latter. There is, at the same time, a wonder­
ful uniformity in that operationi each class of emotions 
and passions being invariably attended with an external 
appearance peculiar to itself. These external appear­
ances or signs may not improperly be considered as a 
natural language, expressing to all beholders emotions 
and passions as they arise in the heart, Hope, fear, 
joy, grief, are displayed externallyi the character of 
a man can be read in his face* and beauty, which makes 
so deep an impression, is known to result, not so much 
from regular features, or a fine complexion, as from
^Thomas Reid, Letter to Mrs, Drummond, in The 
Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edin­
burgh* Maclachian and Stewart, 1 8 6 3), I, 6 1 .
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good-nature* good sense* sprightliness,, sweetness* or 
other mental quality* expressed upon the countenance*172
Like Reid* Kames perceives the outward bodily appearances
and expressions to be signs of the inward emotions which
they supposedly represent* In An Inquiry Into the Human
Mind Reid defines natural language as Nthe signs that are
naturally expressive of our t h o u g h t s A v o i d i n g  Blair's
17khistorical approach ' Kames finds the speculative attitude 
which Reid uses more adaptable to his purposes*
Kames continues his examination of natural language 
by considering man's ability to understand these signs* He 
writesi
But by what means we come to understand the language* is 
a point of some intricacy1 it cannot be by sight mere­
ly! for upon the most attentive inspection of the human 
face* all that can be discerned* are figure* color* and 
motion* which, singly or combined, never can represent a 
passion, nor a sentiment 1 the external sign is indeed 
visiblei but to understand its meaning we must be able 
to connect it with the passion that causes it* an opera­
tion far beyond the reach of eyesight* Where, then* is 
the instructor to be found that can unveil this secret 
connection? If we apply to experience, it is yielded, 
that from long and diligent observation, we may in some 
measure* learn in some measure* in what manner those we 
are acquainted with express their passions externally1 
but with respect to strangers* we are left in the dark! 
and yet we are not puzzled about the meaning of these 
external expressions in a stranger, more than in a bo- 
som-companion* Further* had we no other means but ex­
perience for understanding* the external expressions of 
passions form a language understood by all, by the young 
as well as the old* by the ignorant as well as the 
learned1 I talk of the plain and legible characters of
172Henry Home, Lord Kames* Elements of Criticism 
(revised with additions), ed* James R. Boyd (New York* A.S. 
Barnes Co., 1877), p* 229*
1^Reid, Inquiry* p* 118. ^ B l a i r ,  pp. 97-116*
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that languagej for undoubtedly we are much indebted to 
experience in-deciphering the dark and more delicate 
expressions.1'3
Here Kames asserts his belief that man learns to understand 
many of these natural external signs of inward emotions by 
experience. He differs in this matter from Reid, who main­
tains that natural signs are possessed by man "previous to 
all compact or agreement [about the meanings of words]"i 
these natural signs "have a meaning which every man under­
stands by the principles of his nature," and prior to any 
experience with them.1^
Regardless of this apparent disagreement on how man 
comes to understand natural signs, Kames and Reid concur on 
the division of all language into two varieties. Kames 
calls these voluntary and involuntary, while Reid's divi­
sions are called natural and artificial. According to Kames
"words are obviously voluntary signsi and they are arbi- 
177trary. • • ,MAff Amplifying this concept further, he writes
of voluntary signs other than words, sayingi
The other kind of voluntary signs comprehends cer­
tain attitudes or gestures that naturally accompany 
certain emotions with surprising uniformityi excessive 
joy is expressed by leaping, dancing, or some elevation 
of the bodyi excessive grief, by sinking or depressing 
iti and prostration and kneeling have been employed by 
all nations, and in all ages, to signify profound vener­
ation. Another circumstance, still more than uniformity, 
demonstrates these gestures to be natural, viz. their 
remarkable conformity or resemblance to the passions 
that produce them. . . .  Joy, which is a cheerful eleva­
tion of the mind, is expressed by an elevation of bodyt 
pride, magnanimity, courage, and the whole tribe of
17^Kames, pp. 229-30. 176Reid, Inquiry, p. 117*. 
177''Kames, p. 230.
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elevating passions,are expressed by external gestures 
that are the Bame as to the circumstances of elevation, 
however distinguishable in other respectsi and hence an 
erect posture is a sign or expression of dignity, , , , 
Grief, on the other hand, as well as respect, which 
depress the mind, cannot, for that reason, be expressed 
more significantly than by similar depression of the 
bodyi and hence, to be cast down, is a common phrase, 
signifying to be grieved or dispirited,17o
Kames develops a ramification of the theory of natural lang­
uage which Reid does not treat, speculating that in some way 
the body is related to and affected by the emotions it feels, 
and has what appears to be an innate tendency to imitate the 
emotion. Hence, for example, an elevating emotion such as 
joy literally elevates the body.
Though Reid does not recognize the possibilities of 
Karnes' theory of voluntary signs, he does concur in Kames* 
analysis of involuntary, or artificial signs. . Kames writes»
The involuntary signs, which are all of them natur­
al, are either peculiar to one passion, or common to 
many. Every vivid passion hath an external expression 
peculiar to itself, not excepting pleasant passionsj 
witness admiration and mirth. The pleasant emotions 
that are less vivid have one common expressioni from 
which we may gather the strength of the emotion, but 
scarce the kind* we perceive a cheerful or contented 
looki and we can make no more of it. Painful passions, 
being all of them violent, are distinguishable from 
each other by their external expressions! thus fear, 
shame, anger, anxiety, dejection, despair, have each 
of them peculiar expressions, which are apprehended 
without the least confusioni some painful passions 
produce violent effects upon the body, trembling, for 
example, startling, and swooning* but these effects, 
depending in a good measure upon singularity of consti­
tution, are not uniform in all men.*79
Kames does not adequately distinguish between voluntary
signs which are "attitudes or gestures that naturally
l78lbid., pp. 230-31. 179lbid. . p. 232
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accompnay certain emotions with surprising uniformity" and 
the involuntary signs which "are either peculiar to one 
passion, or common to many aM Seemingly, voluntary signs 
which are not words hut which, because of the regularity 
with which they accompany certain emotions, are disting- „ 
uished as voluntary may upon occasion appear to be involun­
tary, or natural signs as Reid calls them, Reid seems to 
have worked out this problem far more clearly than Kames.
He declares those signs natural whose meaning is not predi­
cated upon a previously compacted meaning! artificial signs, 
conversely, are those whose meanings are agreed upon in 
advance.1®0
Generally, Karnes' notion of voluntary and involun­
tary signs corresponds quite closely with Reid's. The two 
men agree so closely, in fact, that the possibility of in­
fluence of one upon the other or of their mutual influence 
is virtually inescapable.
Agltketlca
It is not difficult to determine the source of 
Karnes' theory of aesthetics, which includes novelty, gran­
deur, and beauty as the three objects of taste. He gives a
large amount of space to these ideas, devoting a separate
l8lchapter to each of the three. Reid treats the subjects
1®°Reid, Inquiry, p. 117-
1®1Kames, pp. 102-28, 129-37. 152-57.
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1in considerably less space, but essentially little differ­
ence exists between the ideas of Reid and Kames on these 
matters•
The subject may be treated briefly because of the 
discussion of it earlier in this chapter, and because the 
many authors who treated the subjects of novelty, grandeur, 
and beauty as a trinity apparently gathered their inspira­
tion either directly or indirectly from Joseph Addison*
The matter is mentioned here, however, because it is yet 
another point on which Reid and Kames concur, possibly 
indicating a common interest in Addison.
Summary
Though little of interest can be said about the 
fact that Reid and Kames concur regarding the objects of 
taste, the degree of their agreement on the nature of lang­
uage is more remarkable* Seemingly Kames and Reid were 
developing their thoughts on communication at about the 
same time, and there appears every possibility that an 
exchange of ideas took place, either in the form of manu­
scripts or conversations and letters* Whether the relation­
ship between Kames and Reid was close enough to warrant an 
assertion that one influenced the other on the theory of 
language remains uncertain, however*
1®2Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp* 490-508*
VII. Reid and Adam Smith
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Adam Smith (1723-1790) is another eighteenth-cen­
tury figure who gave some attention to communication. Be­
cause Smith's lectures on rhetoric at the University of 
Glasgow are a significant contribution to communication the­
ory* and because of the possibility of some influence be­
tween Smith and Reid, Smith may appropriately be considered 
in this chapter* Smith lectured on rhetoric and belles let- 
tres at the University of Glasgow from November 17&2 to Feb­
ruary 1763*1®^ Reid became Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
Glasgow in 1 7 6 3 , succeeding Smith in that post* Before this 
appointment Reid had served as Professor of Philosophy at
1 gitKing's College at the University of Aberdeen* There is 
no indication that Reid heard Smith's lectures, but he was 
aware of them and apparently admired them* In his inaugural 
lecture at the University of Glasgow Reid requested help in 
finding any of Smith's lecture notes, including those on 
rhetoric*1®-*
Whether Reid actually acquired Smith's notes remains 
uncertain, but his interest in Smith's work is clearly indi­
cated and the probability of his knowledge of Smith is
1®-^Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Let- 
tres, ed* John M* Lothian (fedinburgh 1 Thomas Nelson and 
Sons, Ltd., 1963), pp. 1-193*
181*Dugald Stewart, "Account of the Life and Writings 
of Thomas Reid, D.D.," in The Works of Thomas Reid. P.P.. 
ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh! Maclachian and Stew- 
art, I8 6 3 ), I, 6, 10*
^ ‘’Alexander Campbell Praser, Thomas Reid ■ (London 1 
Oliphant, Anderson, and Perrier, 1 8 9 8), p* 76.
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great. Reid's first important work, An Inquiry Into the 
Human Mind, of course, appeared in print only slightly prior 
to his arrival at Glasgow, lessening the probability of 
Smith's being directly influenced by that work. The possi­
bility remains, however, that each was influenced by the 
other in some other way. The evidence shows only that Reid 
was interested in Smith after he succeeded him at Glasgow.
No certainty exists about the relationship between the two 
men prior to this time, but there are some similarities in 
their works dealing with rhetoric.
The Origin and Nature of Language
Both Reid and Smith deal with the origin and nature 
of language, and both take a rather speculative approach to
the subject. In one lecture, Smith attempts to focus atten­
tion upon man's beginnings to discover the origin of lang­
uage in the pristine ages of civilization. He describes 
the situation in which language developed in the following 
passagei
Two savages who met together and took up their dwelling 
in the same place would very soon endeavour to get signs 
to denote those objects which roost frequently occurred 
and with which they were most concerned. The cave they 
lodged in, the tree from whence they got their food, 
or the fountain from whence they drank, would all soon 
be distinguished by particular names, as they would have 
frequent occasion to make their thoughts about them
known to one another, and would by mutual consent agree
on certain signs whereby this might be accomplished. 
Afterwards when they met with other trees, caves, and 
fountains, concerning which they would have occasion to
1®^Stewart, pp. 9-10.
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converse, they would naturally give the same name to 
them as they„had before given to other objects of the 
same kind. 1 '
Seemingly Smith imagines that language originated by the 
arbitrary assignation of words to stand for things. He sees 
no natural connection between the sounds of words and the 
meanings they denote. Nor does he concern himself with why 
these savages would "endeavour to get signs to denote those 
objects which most frequently occurred and with which they 
were most concerned," nor with whether any natural language 
existed before the use of words.
In this respect at least Smith differs from Reid, 
who, of course, postulates the existence of a natural lang­
uage prior to the use of the artificial language of words. 
Like Reid, however, Smith understands words as purely arbi­
trary signs which stand for things. Similarly, Reid and 
Smith concur in their postulation that meanings are assigned
to words by the "mutual consent" of those who use the
188words. In brief, Reid and Smith concur to some degree 
in their understanding of the origin of language but the 
extent of the agreement is not great enough to assert any 
influence between them. There is a possibility that both 
men came upon their ideas about the origin of language from 
a common source, but no mention appears in their writings 
of this possibility.
1®^Smith, p. 7* 1®®Reid, Inquiry, pp. 117-19,
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Aesthetics
Smith and Reid seem to agree in their notions of 
the objects of taste, but as stated before regarding Kames, 
this is a topic on which many eighteenth-century rhetori­
cians and critics concur# For that reason it is treated 
briefly here.
Smith discusses novelty, grandeur, and beauty, but
only in scattered and rather succinct remarks# Defining
grandeur, he says that "whatever we see that is great or
noble excites our admiration and amazement) and whatever is
little or mean on the other hand excites our contempt," and
adds that "a great object never excites our laughter,
neither does a mean one, simply as being such# It is the
blending and joining of those two ideas which alone gives
18Qthat emotion." 7 In another lecture, he talks of grandeur 
and beauty together*
As there are two sorts of objects that excite our 
admiration, viz. when an object is grand, or when it 
is beautiful) and two that excite our contempt, viz# 
those that are little or mean, or such as are deformed 
or disagreeable in themselves) so there must be two 
sorts of ridicule proceeding from the combinations of 
these different objects* firstly, when mean objects 
are exposed by considering them as grand) or secondly, 
when grand ones, or such as pretend or are expected to 
be so, are ridiculed by exposing the0raeanness and 
littleness which is found in them#1^
Here, however, Smith is as concerned with producing the
effect of ridicule as he is with producing grandeur and
beauty# He mentions grandeur and beauty only as they re-
l89Smith, p. 39. 190Ibid.. p. 44.
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late to the real subject of his concern, the use of ridicule. 
The subject of novelty arises in another of Smith's 
lectures. He decries the poor estate of the newel as a 
literary form, saying* HAs newness is the onlJy merit in a 
novel and curiosity the only motive which indices us to read 
them, the writers are necessitated to make use of this meth-
191od to keep it up. 7 Even in this brief comment, however, 
Smith reveals a striking similarity to Reid, who warns that 
", , , things that have nothing to recommend them but novel­
ty, are fit only to entertain children, or those who are 
distressed from a vacuity of thought. " 192 Though Reid is 
somewhat more explicit in his disapproval of novelty for 
the sake of novelty, both men agree in this matter.
Of course Smith's remarks about the objects of taste 
are quite brief, perhaps because he recognized that the sub­
ject had been thoroughly treated by othersv but they provide 
evidence enough to confirm the fact that, like Reid,19-̂ he 
acknowledged the validity of the triad* novelty, grandeur, 
and beauty.
Summary
Upon textual analysis of the rhetorical writing of 
Smith and Reid, little can be stated with certainty about 
the nature or cause of the agreement. The fact that they
191Ibid,. p, 91.
192Reid, Intellectual Powers, p, **9**,
193Ibld., pp. **90-508.
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agree, however, ia interesting in itself and probably points 
up a common source of influence, as in the case of the ob­
jects of taste, or possibly the fact that they developed 
their ideas simultaneously without external influences*
VIII. Reid and Thomas Sheridan
Thomas Sheridan (1719-1788), another contemporary of 
Reid'8 , deserves mention here as showing some agreement with 
Reid's theory of communication in A Course of Lectures on 
Elocution, which he delivered at Oxford in 1759*1^  Though 
Sheridan does not confirm the fact that he drew directly 
from Reid's thought on language, and though Reid does not 
acknowledge an acquaintance with Sheridan# Reid's theory 
of the nature and use of language is quite similar to 
Sheridan's.
Like Reid, Sheridan divides language into two kinds, 
declaring*
* ... we have in use two different kinds of language, 
which have no sort of affinity between them, but custom 
has establishedt and which are communicated thro* differ* 
ent organsi one, thro* the eye, by means of written 
charactersi the other, thro' the ear, by means of arti- 
aulate sounds and tones* But these two kinds of lang­
uage are so early in life associated, that it is diffi­
cult ever to separate themj or not to suppose that 
there is some kind of natural connection between them* 
And it is a matter of importance to us, always to bear 
in mind, that there is no sort of affinity between them, 
but what arises from an habitual association of ideas* 
Tho' we come to consider them in relation to others, we 
see clearly enough their utter independence of each
194-7 Frederick W. Haberman, "English Sources of Amer­
ican Elocution," History of Speech Education in America, ed* 
Karl R. Wallace (New Yorki Appleton-Century Crofts, 195*0» 
p. 115*
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otheri as is obvious in the case of men born blind, or 
deaf i the former of whom may be perfect masters of the 
language which is spoken, and the latter of that which 
is writteni tho* neither of them can form an idea of 
the other's language, or of the manner, by which a com­
munication of that sort, between the deaf and the blind, 
is possible.
Sheridan divides the kinds of language according to the 
manner in which they are perceived. One kind of language is 
received visually and the other aurally. He further 
explains that we have these two meanB of receiving coramuni- 
cation by the design of nature, which "did not trust an 
article, so essential to the well-being of man, to communi­
cation by one sense onlyi she has also made it visible to
196the eye, as well as audible to the ear, 7 As a kind of 
safeguard against the loss of all communication, nature has 
provided a back-up system to assure that man is always pro­
vided some means of communication,
Sheridan calls the former kind of language the 
"hand-writing of nature" and the latter the "speech" of 
nature, and further declares that each kind of language 
"carries evident marks with it, of its divine original* as 
it corresponds exactly to its archetype, and is therefore 
universally legible, without pains or studyi and as it contains
in itself a power, of exciting similar, or analogous emo- 
197tions." Man then has some original ability to know the
I O C77Thomas Sheridan, A Course of Lectures on Elocu­
tion. 2nd ed. (Dublim Samuel Whyte, 17^)» pp. 23-24,
196Ibid., p. 144. 197lbid.
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meaning of the written language without having encountered 
it before. He can perceive the meaning of natural language 
because of the affinity which the language has for the 
thing it signifies. For instance, the handwriting of nature 
might be a frown which conveys the meaning of its archetype, 
a sentiment of disapproval. Nowhere, however, is Sheridan 
explicit about the elements of this natural language of 
which he speaks.
Reid's articulation of the theory of natural lang­
uage is clearer than Sheridan's though they hold similar 
views of it. Sheridan's designation of the kinds of lang­
uage according to the manner in which they are perceived by 
men is only slightly different from Reid's. Reid differen­
tiates the artificial from the natural language according 
to the manner in which their signs acquire meaning. The 
signs of artificial language "have no meaning but what is 
affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use 
them," and the signs of natural language "have a meaning
which every man understands by the principles of his
198nature." 7 The two men agree, however, that natural lang­
uage, or the "handwriting" of nature, is universally under­
stood without previous agreement upon its meaning. Gener­
ally, their concepts of the nature of language are similar 
enough to justify speculation about the reasons for this 
likeness.
1^®Reid, Inquiry, p. 117»
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Because Sheridan delivered his lectures at about 
the same time that Reid was formulating his Inquiry Into 
the Human Mind Sheridan could not have been influenced dir­
ectly by that work* Further, there is no evidence that 
Sheridan was aware of Reid's thought at all, whether from 
Reid's lectures at the University of Aberdeen or in the 
Aberdeen Philosophical Society* Sheridan's theory of lang­
uage, like Reid's and other writers' mentioned in this 
chapter, appeared at about the same time, giving credence 
to the speculation that this particular theory was widely 
known and accepted during the eighteenth century. No owner­
ship can be rightfully credited to Reid, although his was 
one of the early discussions of it. The similarity between 
Sheridan and Reid on this point, however, requires its 
brief mention here.
IX. Reid and Edward T. Channing
Edward T. Channing (1790-1856), an American who 
made an appreciable contribution to rhetorical theory, 
might also be considered in this examination of Reid's re­
lation to his contemporaries even though Channing lived 
most of his life in the nineteenth century. An analysis 
of the relation between Reid and Channing has been done by 
Dorothy I. Anderson and Waldo W. Braden in the introduction 
to their edition of Channing*s Lectures Read to Seniors in
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199Harvard College * Anderson and Braden point out the cor­
relation between Channing's and Reid's approaches to the 
subject of rhetoric and the similarities in their views on 
the nature and use of language* They do not speculate about 
any causal influence of Reid upon Channing* They do assert, 
however, that Channing was influenced by several eighteenth- 
century thinkers, and add that
Specifically Channing reflects the philosophy of 
Thomas Reid, the Scottish common sense philosopher 
(1 7 1 0-1 7 9 6), whose methods and conclusions are reflected 
in the rhetorics of Blair, Campbell, and Whately, and 
whose ideas and those of his follower, Dugald Stewart, 
permeate the thinking of American academic communities, 
especially Harvard, during the late eighteenth century 
and well into the nineteenth century. 2 &0
Anderson and Braden thus note the possibility of influence
upon Channing by others besides Reid* They summarize this
relationship to other eighteenth-century minds in the
following manner1
In rhetorical theory, Channing is clearly in the 
same stream with Kames, Blair, and Campbell* He was 
the typical nineteenth-century rhetorician and teacher 
attempting to ground his discipline firmly in the Scot­
tish philosophy, seeing rhetoric as the root of all the 
verbal communicative processes, attempting to streng­
then all the faculties involved in verbal communication, 
and recognizing the interaction of society and the 
individual communicator*201
19977Dorothy I Anderson and Waldo W* Braden (eds.), 
"Introduction," in Lectures Read to Seniors in Harvard Col­
lege by Edward T. Charming (facsimile editionj Carbondalei 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1 9 6 8), pp. xx-xxx.
200Ibid.. p. xxi. 201Ibid.. p. lii.
391
Anderson and Braden seem to recognize that to state with 
certainty a causal influence between Reid and Channing is 
to misconstrue the available facts. They justifiably resort 
to an assertion of the probability of such influence, statr- 
ing that the evidence reveals that "Channing is clearly in 
the same stream with Kames, Blair, and Campbell,"
X • Summary
Virtually all that can be stated with certainty 
about most of the men examined in this chapter is that they 
are "in the same stream" with Thomas Reid, and that they 
give tacit assent to his thought on some points. Asserting 
more than this, except in cases where Reid's influence is 
clearly acknowledged, places any student of eighteenth-cen­
tury communication in a most tenuous position. Campbell 
and Whately, for instance, cite Reid and reveal their know­
ledge of his thought on common sense. In doing so they 
warrant an assertion of the fact that Reid influenced their 
thought in this matter. Of the two men, however, only 
Campbell recognizes the rhetorical significance of the 
theory of common sense. Like Reid, Campbell discusses com­
mon sense as a source of evidence. Whately, on the other 
hand, mentions Reid's epistemology only briefly in one 
place and presents in another an argument from popularity 
very similar in form to those used by Reid to prove common 
sense first principles. In other words, only in the case 
of Campbell is there any evidence that Reid's notion of
392
common sense had any actual effect on rhetorical theory.
In this case, of course, Campbell acknowledges his indebted­
ness to Reid.
While the evidence of Reid's influence upon his 
contemporaries is circumstantial in most cases, it serves 
to underscore some possibility of a causal relationship 
between his ideas and those of the prominent rhetoricians 
of his time. The similarities between his thought on lang­
uage and that of the rhetoricians discussed in this chapter 
are obvious, and these clearly invite the statement that 
the rhetorical thought of Thomas Reid, in varying degrees, 
is in the tradition of that of Campbell, Blair, Whately, 
Priestley, Kames, Smith, Sheridan, and Channing.
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I. A Chronological List of Reid*s Major Works
Essay on Quantity (17**8), first published in the Trans- 
actions of the Royal Society of London*
An Inquiry Into the Human Mind (1763)*
A Brief Account of Aristotle*s Logic (177*0* first pub- 
lisKed in the appendix of Lord Karnes' Sketches of 
Man.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785)*
E8says on the Active Powers of Man (1788).
A Statistical Account of the University of Glasgow (1799)*
II. Other Sources for Reid's Works
Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry Into the Human Mind. 3rd. ed.
corrected"! Ed inburgh i Printed for A. Kincaid and 
J. Bell, 1769-
_. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. ed.
A. D. Woozley. London* Macmillan and Co., 19*H.
_. Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 3 vols.
Edinburgh1 Printed for Beil and Bradfute, 1803.
• The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D. 2 vols. ed.
Sir William Hamilt'Sru Eainourgm Maclachlan and 
Stewart, 1 8 6 3. This edition of Reid's Works is used 
in the dissertation because of its comprehensiveness 
and because it includes Reid's letters and copious 
notes by Hamilton.
III. Unpublished Materials
Those researching Reid's thought may wiBh to 
inspect the appendices to The Scottish Philosophy by
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James McCosh*, in which the author includes a list of the 
questions proposed for discussion in the Aberdeen Philo­
sophical Society and summarizes same of Reid's unpublished 
manuscripts lent to McCosh by Francis Edmund of Aberdeen*
IV. Orations
Four orations, delivered in Latin by Reid at 
graduation ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, from 
1753-1762, are collected and edited by Walter Robinson 
Humphries**, They do not provide additional insignt into 
Reid's communication theory, however, and are not cited in 
the text of this study for that reason*
*James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (New York* 
Robert Carter and Brothers, 1 8 8 0), pp. ^6 7-7 0 ,
**Thomas Reid, Philosophical Orations, ed, Walter 
Robinson Humphries (Aberdeen! The University Press, 1937)t
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